City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency

Issues

Does the Clean Water Act allow the Environmental Protection Agency to discipline permit-holders for violations of water quality standards without enumerating specific limits to which permit holders’ water discharges must conform?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine if the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) must impose specific limits in the permits it distributes under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). The CWA empowers the EPA to issue National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permits to cities and businesses that discharge waste. The City of San Francisco contends that the EPA can only establish limitations on effluent discharges under the permit, and that it lacks the authority to establish other generic requirements. The EPA counters that its authority reaches beyond effluent limitations and that it is permitted to enforce limitations on water receiving standards. The outcome of this case has profound implications on businesses’ ability to avoid legal liability, as well as the interests of local communities.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Clean Water Act allows EPA (or an authorized state) to impose generic prohibitions in NPDES permits that subject permitholders to enforcement for exceedances of water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their discharges must conform.

Like most cities in the United States, San Francisco operates a combined sewer system that collects both sewage and stormwater runoff. City of San Francisco v. U.S. EPA (“Ninth Circuit”) at 7. During extreme weather, the system occasionally exceeds capacity causing a combined sewer overflow (“CSO”) that discharges pollutants into surrounding waterways.

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Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn

Issues

Do economic harms, such as losing employment, qualify as injury to “business or property” under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, if those harms stem from personal injuries, such as ingesting an unwanted drug?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property” for the purposes of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Commercial truck driver Horn ingested Dixie X to alleviate his back pain, after learning from the sellers that it contained no THC, even though it did. After testing positive for THC in a random drug test from his employer, Horn was fired. He then sued the sellers for injury to his business under RICO. Medical Marijuana, Inc. argues that ingestion of an unwanted substance like THC is a personal injury, and that economic damages from such an injury do not turn it into an injury to “business or property.” Horn claims that losing his job because of Medical Marijuana’s alleged fraud is an injury to “business or property.” This case has significant implications for the rights of human trafficking victims, the cost of doing business in consumer products, and the vitality of the hemp industry.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant’s acts for purposes of a civil treble-damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

Respondent, Douglas Horn, was a commercial truck driver for fourteen years before the event leading to this case occurred. Brief for Respondent, Horn at 3–4. In February 2012, he was involved in a trucking accident in which he sustained injuries to his shoulder and back.

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Bufkin v. McDonough

Issues

Must the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule was properly applied during the claims process when reviewing veterans’ benefits claims? 

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the standard of review that the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) should apply to claims on appeal. Bufkin argues that the Veterans Court must review the Secretary of Veterans Affairs’ and the Board of Veteran Appeals’ application of “the benefit of the doubt” where any evidence material to the veteran’s disability-benefits claim is in approximate balance. Further, Bufkin contends that in conducting this separate review, the Veterans Court is reviewing a matter of law, which requires a more demanding standard of review than clear error. McDonough counters that the Veterans Court is instead engaging in a factual review, arguing it should not reassess the facts to determine whether the benefit-of-the-doubt rule applies unless clearly erroneous. McDonough asserts that the Veterans Court need only consider whether the Department of Veterans Affairs properly applied the rule when raised. The outcome of this case has future implications for veterans’ disability benefits claims and the scope of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ powers.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims must ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule in 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) was properly applied during the claims process to satisfy 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1), which directs the court to “take due account” of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ application of that rule.

In 1988, Congress enacted the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act (“VJRA”) creating the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”), a specialized Article I tribunal meant to review

Additional Resources

●  Jimmy Hoover, Justices Will Decide If Vets Are Getting the 'Benefit of the Doubt', The National Law Journal (Apr. 30, 2024).

●  Sarah Barker, Supreme Court to Rule on Benefit of the Doubt Rule in Veterans’ Benefits Cases, Mason Veterans and Servicemembers Legal Clinic (May 13, 2024).

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Bouarfa v. Mayorkas

Issues

Can a visa petitioner challenge an immigration visa revocation decision in court if the revocation is based on the incorrect application of non-discretionary criteria?

The questions for the Supreme Court to consider are: first, whether USCIS can revoke a visa petition on discretionary grounds based on non-discretionary reasoning; second, whether courts can examine this decision to revoke a visa petition; and third, whether an applicant can order a review of a court’s petition denial. Petitioner Amina Bouarfa argues that courts should be able to review discretionary USCIS decisions where the premise for the decision is non-discretionary, and that an applicant is entitled to a court review these decisions. Respondents Alejandro Mayorkas and the Department of Homeland Security counter that the plain statutory language of immigration law prohibits Article III court review of these discretionary decisions; and, instead, USCIS has control over reviewing and reversing immigration decisions. The outcome of this case will influence the balance of power between the executive and judicial branches.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a visa petitioner may obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of non-discretionary criteria.

In 2014, Petitioner Amina Bouarfa, a U.S. citizen, filed an I-130 immediate relative visa petition with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), a division of the Department of Homeland Security (“the agency”), on behalf of her husband, Ala’a Hamayel, a noncitizen from Palestine. Bouarfa v. Mayorkas at 2–3. Upon approval from USCIS, an I-130 petition allows a U.S.

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Williams v. Washington

Issues

Must claimants exhaust required state administrative remedies to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether it is necessary for claimants to exhaust state remedies before bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court. Williams, et al. argue that the language of § 1983 and the Supremacy Clause compel states to hear § 1983 claims. Washington counters that state sovereignty allows states to create laws about their own courts’ jurisdiction regardless of whether this denies certain federal claims. This case has serious implications for plaintiffs’ choice of forum when bringing a § 1983 claim and on the allocation of power between state and federal governments.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court.

In 1871, Congress enacted § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to create a right of action for individuals to sue state officials for violations of their civil rights and safeguard citizens from discrimination caused by state law. U.S.C. § 1983. Federal courts maintain original jurisdiction over civil rights brought under § 1983. 28 U.S.C.

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Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger

Issues

Does amending a complaint to omit a federal question after removal to federal court defeat federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331? Does a post-removal amendment restrict a federal district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the post-removal amendment of a complaint can defeat federal-question subject matter jurisdiction and preclude a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. On one hand, Royal Canin and Purina argue both that federal-question jurisdiction cannot be extinguished by amending a complaint and also that a district court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction even after the resolution of all federal claims. On the other hand, Anna Wullschleger and Gerald Brewer contend that the amended complaint determines federal-question jurisdiction, and a federal district court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction when no federal claim remains in the lawsuit. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for forum manipulation and federalism.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether a post-removal amendment of a complaint to omit federal questions defeats federal-question subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and (2) whether such a post-removal amendment of a complaint precludes a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Anastasia Wullschleger and Geraldine Brewer purchased prescription pet food from Royal Canin and Purina under the impression that the companies formulated the food to treat their pets’ health and disease problems. Brief for Respondents in Opposition, Anastasia Wullschleger at 4.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Maggie Gardner for her guidance and insights into this case.

Additional Resources

  • Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Dog Food Suit Location Dispute to Get US Supreme Court Review, Bloomberg (April 29, 2024).
  • Richard S. Davis, Master of Its Choice of Forum?: Supreme Court to Decide if a Plaintiff May Compel Remand of a Removed Case by Voluntarily Dismissing Its Federal Claims, Foley & Lardner, LLP (May 22, 2024).

 

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Lackey v. Stinnie

Issues

Must a party win a case to get attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, or is it enough to win a preliminary injunction that solves the underlying controversy of the case?

This case asks the Supreme Court if a party must win a case to get attorney’s fees or if it is enough to win a preliminary injunction that solves the underlying controversy of the case. Lackey argues that the Supreme Court should reject the Circuit consensus and decide that a preliminary injunction winner is not a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S. Code § 1988 to be consistent with the Supreme Court’s previous cases. Additionally, Lackey maintains that when the case has been resolved due to a voluntary change in the law rather than a judicial order, there is no “prevailing party” as defined by § 1988. Stinnie counters that the winner of a preliminary injunction does indeed “win” a case in the way Congress intended when it used the term “prevailing party.” Further, Stinnie contends that the voluntary change in the law was not necessary for them to achieve meaningful relief, so they have already “prevailed” over the other party. The Supreme Court’s decision, in this case, will impact federal, state, local, and municipal governments’ ability to protect the public interest, private attorneys’ ability to vindicate civil rights, and the workload facing lower courts. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether a party must obtain a ruling that conclusively decides the merits in its favor, as opposed to merely predicting a likelihood of later success, to prevail on the merits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and (2) whether a party must obtain an enduring change in the parties’ legal relationship from a judicial act, as opposed to a non-judicial event that moots the case, to prevail under Section 1988.

Under the now-repealed Virginia law § 46.2-395, a Virginia resident faced automatic suspension of their driver’s license if they failed to pay specific court fines or fees. See Stinnie v. Holcomb at 3 (2018). In March of 2019, the Governor of Virginia proposed an amendment, suspending the enforcement of the law.

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Glossip v. Oklahoma

Issues

Does due process require the reversal of a conviction where the state suppressed evidence that a key witness was under psychiatric care and failed to correct false testimony about that care?

Court below
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine when a prosecutor’s nondisclosure of information requires retrial of a death row case. Richard Eugene Glossip, a death row inmate, asserts that the state hid information that a key witness in the case was under psychiatric care and failed to correct that witness’s lies about his psychiatric care. He argues that these actions, along with other failures to turn over information, violate his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois. Christopher G. Michel, the court-appointed amicus curiae arguing in support of the judgment in the lower court, argues that the undisclosed information was too unclear to vindicate Petitioner or affect the jury. He also argues that the court cannot hear this case, as held by the lower court on an adequate and independent state ground. The outcome of this case has significant implications for public confidence in the criminal justice system and the role of prosecutors.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the state’s suppression of the key prosecution witness’ admission that he was under the care of a psychiatrist and failure to correct that witness’ false testimony about that care and related diagnosis violate the due process of law under Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois; (2) whether the entirety of the suppressed evidence must be considered when assessing the materiality of Brady and Napue claims; (3) whether due process of law requires reversal where a capital conviction is so infected with errors that the state no longer seeks to defend it; and (4) whether the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding that the Oklahoma Post-Conviction Procedure Act precluded post-conviction relief is an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment.

On January 14, 1997, Justin Sneed bludgeoned Barry Van Treese to death. Glossip v. State at 223. Sneed pled guilty to this murder, for which he received a sentence of life without parole, and agreed to testify regarding the involvement of Richard Glossip in the crime.

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Garland v. VanDerStok

Issues

Are weapons parts kits or incomplete frames or receivers regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968?

This case asks the Court to determine whether the Gun Control Act of 1968’s definition of “firearm” permits the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) to regulate weapons parts kits and incomplete frames and receivers. Merrick Garland, Attorney General, et al., argues that a natural reading of the word “firearm” includes weapon parts kits, incomplete frames, and receivers; and, that failing to regulate these items would create a loophole in the nation’s gun laws. Jennifer VanDerStok et al., counters that the rule is outside the scope of the ATF’s authority. This case touches on important questions regarding the Gun Control Act of 1968, and its ability to regulate ghost guns.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether “a weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive” under 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 is a “firearm” regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968; and (2) whether “a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver” that is “designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver” under 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c) is a “frame or receiver” regulated by the act.

The definition of “firearm” in the Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”) includes “any weapon… which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive,” as well as “the frame or receiver of any such weapon.” VanDerStok v.

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Trump v. United States

Issues

Is a former president protected from being criminally charged for actions while in office, especially if the actions involved official duties?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a former president can be protected from criminal prosecution by presidential immunity for conduct while in office. Former President Trump, the Petitioner, argues that the Constitution’s Executive Vesting Clause, the Separation of Powers principle, and the Impeachment Judgment Clause grant former presidents absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for their official acts, while historical precedents and common-law immunity doctrines provide foundational support. Trump also contends that the clear-statement rule requires criminal laws to apply to the President only if explicitly stated by Congress. Trump further urges the Court to grant absolute criminal immunity for presidential official duties to maintain executive independence or, if considering qualified immunity, to require a clear legal violation. The United States counters that granting former presidents absolute criminal immunity conflicts with the Separation of Powers principles and the Impeachment Judgment Clause and lacks the support of historical precedent or common-law immunity principles. The United States argues that federal criminal statutes universally apply to the President, and the clear-statement principle does not justify a broad exemption since criminal statutes generally do not seriously threaten presidential powers. The United States also contends that any grant of immunity to a former president should not bar prosecution for charges related to alleged misuse of official powers undermining democratic processes. The decision will influence the application of presidential immunity, election processes, and the presidential right to make political speech.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether and if so to what extent does a former president enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office

Former President Donald Trump was indicted by a federal grand jury in Washington, D.C., on four criminal charges in relation to his alleged efforts to overturn the 2020 presidential election results. United States v. Trump at 4.

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