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Republic of Hungary v. Simon

Issues

Does expropriated property have a commercial nexus with the United States when the property is liquidated, the proceeds from liquidating that property are commingled with a foreign nation’s general assets, and those general assets are then later used commercially in the United States?

This case asks the Court to determine whether the expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is satisfied when a claimant’s assets were seized and liquidated into funds that were “commingled” with the nation’s general assets, and the nation’s general assets were then used for commercial purposes within the United States. Hungary argues that commingled assets do not satisfy the expropriation exception because there is insufficient evidence to establish that the funds from the liquidated assets were directly used in a commercial capacity in the present day. The Simon survivors counter that commingled assets do satisfy the expropriation exception and that there is sufficient evidence that the funds from their seized property were later used for commercial purposes within the United States. This case touches on important questions regarding the role of American courts in international disputes, the Holocaust’s legacy, and human rights violations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether historical commingling of assets suffices to establish that proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act; (2) whether a plaintiff must make out a valid claim that an exception to the FSIA applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference; and (3) whether a sovereign defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the FSIA.

Foreign sovereigns generally enjoy sovereign immunity in the United States, which prevents American courts from asserting jurisdiction over them. Simon v.

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United States v. Miller

Issues

Does 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) allow a trustee to avoid a transfer to the government, even when the government could not have been directly sued under nonbankruptcy law?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether § 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee to avoid a transfer to the government when the government could not have been directly sued under nonbankruptcy law. Section 106 abrogates sovereign immunity in certain bankruptcy claims, including § 544(b). Section 544 states that a trustee “may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor… that is voidable under applicable law,” which typically invokes state laws that fall outside of the purview of bankruptcy law. The Government argues that § 106 should be read narrowly, and that sovereign immunity is not waived when the actual creditor could not pursue an avoidance claim under the applicable state law due to sovereign immunity. Miller counters that the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 106 extends to the applicable law referenced in § 544. The outcome of this case has serious implications for the powers of trustees in bankruptcy cases and the power of the United States to waive sovereign immunity.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a bankruptcy trustee may avoid a debtor’s tax payment to the United States under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy.

Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings allow for the liquidation of assets to pay off a debtor’s creditors. 11 U.S.C.

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Food and Drug Administration v. Wages and White Lion Investments, L.L.C.

Issues

Was the Food and Drug Administration’s denial of White Lion’s application to market flavored e-cigarette products arbitrary and capricious?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) denial of Wages and White Lion Investments, L.L.C.’s (“White Lion”) application to market flavored e-cigarette products was arbitrary and capricious. White Lion submitted an application to the FDA to sell their flavored nicotine liquid, used in e-cigarettes, on the market. The FDA denied their application, claiming that White Lion did not include sufficient scientific study support in their application for the FDA to conclude that the benefits of the flavored nicotine liquid outweighed the risk of use by youth. White Lion claims that the FDA erroneously rejected their application for approval of their flavored nicotine liquid because they lacked a longitudinal comparative study, a requirement that White Lion claims was not communicated to the public. The FDA counters by claiming that longitudinal studies are not required and that White Lion’s application was rejected because they could not show that e-cigarette use reduced smoking. The outcome of this case has significant implications for youth e-cigarette use, public health, state budget stability, and product investment and innovation in the e-cigarette industry.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the court of appeals erred in setting aside the Food and Drug Administration’s orders denying respondents’ applications for authorization to market new e-cigarette products as arbitrary and capricious.

In 2009, the federal government passed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“Tobacco Control Act”) which required manufacturers of tobacco products, including nicotine liquid for e-cigarettes, to receive Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) authorization before selling such products.  Food and Drug Administration v.

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Velázquez v. Garland

Issues

Does the 60-day voluntary-departure period provided for in 8 U.S.C. 1229c extend to the next business day when the last day of the period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a holiday?

This case asks the Court to determine when a noncitizen has failed to voluntarily depart in a timely manner or move to reopen or reconsider an adverse decision under the 60-day voluntary departure period provided for in 8 U.S.C. 1229c. Petitioners argue that the common law has established a rule that extends deadlines when the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, and that this rule is presumptively incorporated into the voluntary-departure statute because it was not expressly negated by Congress. Respondent counters that the common law rule only applies to judicial actions not private actions, only extends to judicial deadlines not statutory deadlines, and is not incorporated into the statute. This case raises significant questions of precisely when a noncitizen subject to removal must voluntarily depart the country in order to satisfy the statute, as well as broader consistency within the legal system.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, when a noncitizen’s voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, a motion to reopen filed the next business day is sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1).

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (codified in 8 U.S.C. 1101) a noncitizen who is found removable from the United States in proceedings before an immigration judge, may be granted authorization to leave the country voluntarily rather than be removed from the country. Velazquez v.

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NVIDIA Corp. v. E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB

Issues

Does the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act require plaintiffs alleging scienter (knowledge of fraud by defendants) based on allegations about internal company documents to plead with particularity the contents of those documents? And, does the Act permit expert opinion rather than particularized allegations of fact to satisfy the Act’s falsity requirement?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide how plaintiffs can demonstrate intent (also called “scienter”) under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) for the purpose of alleging securities fraud. More specifically, this case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether plaintiffs can allege intent based on allegations about internal company documents without referring to specific content in those documents. It also asks the Supreme Court to determine if plaintiffs can satisfy the Act's falsity requirement by relying on an expert opinion in lieu of particularized allegations of fact. NVIDIA argues that Öhman’s failure to allege with particularity the contents of the internal documents to show that NVIDIA misrepresented its finances to investors does not show a strong inference of scienter that the PSLRA requires in order to reduce frivolous lawsuits, and that Öhman’s reliance on expert testimony to satisfy the PSLRA’s rigorous particularity standard would allow plaintiffs to circumvent it. Öhman counters that the PSLRA evinces a holistic approach in meeting the burden of showing a strong inference of scienter rather than requiring one specific allegation. Öhman also claims that an expert’s conclusion is an allegation of fact since the experts’ assertion is backed by embedded statements of fact to arrive at such a conclusion. The outcome of this case has strong implications for the national economy and access to justice.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether plaintiffs seeking to allege scienter under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act based on allegations about internal company documents must plead with particularity the contents of those documents; and (2) whether plaintiffs can satisfy the Act's falsity requirement by relying on an expert opinion to substitute for particularized allegations of fact.

In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) to rein in frivolous suits in securities fraud class actions. Choi, Stephen, and Pritchard, A.C., Securities Regulation: Cases and Analysis. 6th ed., Foundation Press, 2024.

Additional Resources

  • Choi, Stephen, and Pritchard, A.C., Securities Regulation: Cases and Analysis. 6th ed., Foundation Press, 2024.
  • Lipton, Ann, NVIDIA, Business Law Prof Blog (16 August, 2024).
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Delligatti v. United States

Issues

Is attempted murder a crime of violence under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether one can commit attempted murder without using, attempting to use, or threatening to use physical force against another person or their property. If no, attempted murder is a “crime of violence” and can serve as the basis for sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); if yes, it cannot—regardless of whether an individual defendant actually used physical force against another person. Salvatore Delligatti, who was convicted of attempted murder and seeks to challenge the enhancement of his sentence for that offense, argues that attempted murder does not inherently involve the action of using physical force because even completed murder can be committed through inaction. The United States counters that intentionally causing the death of another person, even through inaction, inherently involves the use of whatever physical force causes that other person’s death. The outcome of this case will determine the continued viability of Congress’s four-decade-old mechanism to crack down on gun violence, the Armed Career Criminal Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

The federal criminal code provides for heightened minimum sentences when someone uses or possesses a firearm “in relation to any crime of violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). That same section defines a “crime of violence” as a felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C.

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Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Todd Heath

Issues

Does the False Claims Act cover reimbursement requests made to a program regulated by the Federal Communications Commission but largely funded by private service providers?

This case asks the Court to determine whether reimbursement requests made by schools and public libraries to the Federal Communications Commission’s E-Rate program can constitute false “claims” under the False Claims Act (FCA). Wisconsin Bell contends that the FCA does not cover reimbursement requests to the E-Rate program because the money for the E-Rate program’s funds comes solely from private companies, and the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC) is not an agent of the federal government. The federal government argues that the FCA does cover reimbursement requests to the E-Rate program because the funds are made available by the federal government, and the federal government can control the USAC. This case touches on important questions regarding the FCA’s scope and the FCA’s impact on businesses working with the federal government.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether reimbursement requests submitted to the Federal Communications Commission's E-rate program are “claims” under the False Claims Act.

A company violates the False Claims Act (FCA) if it “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” that is material to the government’s decision to use federal funds. 31 U.S.C.

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Facebook, Inc. v. Amalgamated Bank

Issues

Does a company mislead investors when it discloses a future risk without mentioning that the potential bad event has happened before?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a company’s risk disclosure to investors is false or misleading when the company does not disclose a risk that has materialized in the past, even when that past event poses no risk of ongoing or future harm to the company. In this case, Facebook failed to disclose a past data breach, the Cambridge Analytica Scandal, in its 2016 10-K disclosures. Shareholders sued the company and its executives, arguing that the failure to disclose this information was false or misleading. On one hand, Facebook argues that it does not have to disclose such past events in the form at issue because risk disclosures are forward-looking and investors understand that. On the other hand, Amalgamated Bank contends that companies must disclose information about past bad events because stating a risk as a hypothetical event could mislead investors into believing there have been no past bad events. The outcome of this case will affect the requirements of risk disclosures, which could impact the quantity and quality of disclosure information, how much companies must disclose, and whether investors’ demands are met.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether risk disclosures are false or misleading when they do not disclose that a risk has materialized in the past, even if that past event presents no known risk of ongoing or future business harm

In 2014, Professor Aleksandr Kogan created an app that paid users for taking a psychological test. Amalgamated Bank v. Facebook, Inc. at 11–12. The app also collected data on the quiz takers and their Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) friends resulting in data collection from over 30 million Facebook profiles. Id.

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E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera

Issues

Are employers seeking to invoke an FLSA exemption required to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard or a clear and convincing evidence standard?

This case asks for the Supreme Court to decide which standard of proof applies when an employer asserts an FLSA exemption as an affirmative defense from liability: preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence. Petitioners, E.M.D. Sales, Inc., et al. (“E.M.D.”), argue that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies only in limited circumstances, not to mere monetary disputes between private parties. Further, E.M.D. asserts that the risk of erroneous decision is equal between the parties. Respondents Faustino Sanchez Carrera et al. (“Carrera”), argue that a clear and convincing evidence standard applies because the FLSA protects important interests. Further, Carrera argues the clear and convincing evidence standard is necessary to allocate the unequal risks among employers and employees. The outcome of this case has serious implications for labor law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of a Fair Labor Standards Act exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence.

Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) in 1938 to protect employees from unfair labor practices. Brief for Petitioners, E.M.D. Sales, Inc. et al. at 4–5.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Stewart Schwab for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Becerra

Issues

Are patients “entitled to” SSI benefits when they are eligible for SSI benefits or when they are receiving cash SSI benefits?

The Disproportionate Share Hospital adjustment (“DSH”) is a statutory provision administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) within the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) that increases payments to hospitals serving high percentages of low-income patients to account for their increased treatment costs. At issue here is how eligibility for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) affects these DSH payments. Advocate Christ Medical Center argues that the phrase “entitled to [SSI] benefits” in the DSH provision should include all patients enrolled in the SSI program, even if they do not receive monthly cash payments. HHS counters that only patients receiving cash benefits during hospitalization should count. This case has important ramifications on agency interpretation, administrative workability, and hospitals’ ability to accept low-income patients.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the phrase “entitled ... to benefits,” used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, means the same thing for Medicare part A and Supplemental Social Security benefits, such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.

Administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) within the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), the Medicare program aims to provide health insurance to elderly or disabled individuals. Advocate Christ Med. Ctr. v. Becerra at 349, 351. Hospitals receive a fixed payment for treating a Medicare patient. Id. At 349.

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