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Daniel Schmidt, a former Wachovia customer, sued the bank in state court after the IRS determined that the investment strategy Wachovia had recommended was illegal. Wachovia, which is headquartered in Charlotte, NC, successfully sought to remove the case to federal court because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties. After an adverse decision on the merits, Wachovia appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Rather than address the decision on the merits, however, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the case altogether. It determined that the federal system never had jurisdiction to hear the case because Wachovia had branches in South Carolina, and therefore there was no diversity of citizenship between the parties. Wachovia appealed to the Supreme Court because it hopes to keep the case from being retried in state court.

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In 1995, Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. and Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. entered into a five-year franchise agreement authorizing Reeder as an official Volvo heavy truck dealer. Volvo manufacturers its heavy trucks only after a retail customer solicits bids from several Volvo dealers and accepts a bid. This sort of "competitive bidding" process is an industry-wide practice, and Volvo offers price concessions throughout the process. Reeder claims that Volvo discriminated against the dealership by offering it smaller price concessions. Reeder claims this not only resulted in a loss of business for Reeder, but also violated the Robinson Patman Act. A jury trial resulted in a victory for Reeder, and a divided Eigth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Reeder's claims. Volvo appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. In its decision, the Supreme Court will help define who receives protection under the Robinson-Patman Act, as well as the amount and kind of evidence a plaintiff will need to produce for this type of claim.

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Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (“section 922”), to prohibit domestic abusers from obtaining firearms. Section 922 covers individuals convicted for a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” which includes state misdemeanors that constitute “the use of physical force.” The Supreme Court will consider whether convictions under Maine’s domestic assault law satisfy this predicate offense requirement. Stephen Voisine was convicted under Maine’s domestic assault statute, which criminalizes “the intentional, knowing, or reckless causation of bodily injury or offensive physical contract to another person.” Voisine was then convicted under section 922. But Voisine asserts that common law battery requires a mens rea greater than recklessness and that the “use of physical force” implies intentional conduct. The United States argues that recklessness meets the standard for common law battery, and contends that section 922 would be pointless if it did not cover misdemeanors like Maine’s domestic assault statute. The Court’s decision will affect the ability of misdemeanants to possess firearms and the health and safety of domestic violence victims.

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In 2003, Virginia police stopped David Moore for driving on a suspended license. The officers then violated Virginia law by arresting Moore instead of issuing a summons. A follow-up search revealed cash and cocaine in Moore's pockets. Moore moved to suppress this evidence on grounds that the illegal arrest made the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Virginia responded that while Moore's arrest violated state law, the search was reasonable under the U.S. Constitution because it was incident to an arrest based on probable cause that he committed a crime. The trial court found the search constitutional and convicted Moore on drug charges. The Virginia Court of Appeals initially reversed but reinstated the conviction after hearing the case en banc. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the conviction, and Virginia appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. This case could affect many state laws concerning civil liberties and the way in which police think about illegal arrests.

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This case asks whether the definition of burglary under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) of 1984 includes nonpermanent or mobile structures used for overnight lodging. The ACCA’s definition of burglary was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, which defined burglary as any crime involving unlawful entry or unlawfully remaining in a structure or building with the intent to commit a crime. Respondents Victor Stitt and Jason Sims were previously convicted of burglary under their respective state statutes, which both defined burglary to include acts against mobile homes, trailers, tents, and other nonpermanent structures used for overnight accommodations. Now, the State contends Congress intended nonpermanent and mobile structures to be included within the ACCA’s definition of burglary, despite not being explicitly included in Taylor. On the other hand, Stitt and Sims contend that the Supreme Court in Taylor had the option of including language referencing nonpermanent and mobile structures and, by excluding it, established a line of case precedent that understands burglary to exclude such structures. The Court's decision in this case has implications on the rights of criminal defendants, as well as on existing protections for homeowners.

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The Supreme Court will determine whether a conviction under the Florida robbery statute, which contains as an element “overcoming victim resistance,” constitutes a “violent felony” under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), thereby triggering enhanced sentencing under the ACCA. Petitioner Denard Stokeling (“Stokeling”) argues that under the ACCA, a “violent felony” involves the use of “violent force.” Stokeling maintains that Florida robbery is not a “violent felony” because only a slight amount of force suffices to meet its “overcoming victim resistance” element, which does not constitute “violent force.” Respondent United States (“Government”) contends that a “violent felony” under the ACCA is a felony “capable of causing pain or physical injury.” The Government asserts that Florida robbery is a “violent felony” because any act that violates the Florida robbery statute is by definition “capable of causing pain or physical injury.” From a policy perspective, this case is important because it will determine which criminals will be subjected to enhanced sentencing under the ACCA.

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The Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy ("VOPA"), an independent state agency, advocates for individuals with mental illnesses and developmental disabilities. In accordance with federal funding requirements, Virginia law authorizes VOPA to access an individual's records if VOPA believes an individual was abused. During an investigation, a state facility denied VOPA access to the records of three individuals, and VOPA sued three state officials alleging that they violated federal law. The Eleventh Amendment provides that states cannot be sued in federal court by residents of one of the United States or of a foreign state. However, the Supreme Court, in Ex parte Young, recognized an exception to the Eleventh Amendment allowing a party to sue state officials for injunctive or declaratory relief to correct an ongoing violation of federal law. The Fourth Circuit held that, because the plaintiff in this suit was a state-created agency rather than a private individual, the suit could not proceed under the Ex parte Young exception and that allowing it to proceed in federal court would be a violation of Virginia’s sovereign immunity. This decision may affect the ability of independent agencies to protect vulnerable individuals from neglect and has the potential to increase legal conflict between state agencies.

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The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides defendants with the right to a speedy trial. In July of 2001, Michael Brillon was charged with aggravated domestic violence, and was ultimately sentenced to twelve-to-twenty years confinement. However, due to excessive delays before his trial caused solely by his public defenders, the Supreme Court of Vermont vacated his conviction and dismissed the charges with prejudice. The questions the United States Supreme Court will have to decide is whether delays caused by an indigent's public defenders' lack of preparedness can be the basis for a sixth amendment right to a speedy trial violation, on the theory that the state is responsible for providing adequate public defenders to indigents; and if so, does this give greater rights to indigent defendants than defendants with private attorneys?

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The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois convicted Alexander Vasquez of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. However, the district court had erroneously admitted statements made during recorded telephone conversations by Marina Perez into evidence for their truth. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the lower court’s error was harmless because the jury would have come to the same conclusion had there been no error. Vasquez now appeals, arguing that the Seventh Circuit misapplied the harmless-error analysis by ignoring the impact the error had on the jury. The Supreme Court will decide how courts should properly carry out harmless-error tests, as well as examine the possible constitutional questions such an error would create.

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Petitioner Panagis Vartelas, a Greek citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to counterfeiting and was convicted in 1994. In 2003, following a brief trip to Greece, Vartelas received notice to appear for removal proceedings. The immigration judge ordered Vartelas’s deportation, after deeming Vartelas inadmissible under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Vartelas argues that application of this 1996 Act to his 1994 crime violates the presumption against retroactivity and the reasonable expectations he had when entering his guilty plea. Respondent Attorney General Eric Holder argues that Vartelas’s case does not have a retroactive effect because it penalizes acts conducted after the statute’s enactment: Vartelas’s decision to leave and re-enter the United States. This case affects lawful permanent residents who were convicted of crimes prior to the Act’s enactment. The Supreme Court’s decision could restrict their ability to travel internationally, which in turn could damage their ability to maintain family ties or fulfill religious obligations.

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