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Schriro v. Landrigan

Issues

Whether a state appellate court's interpretation of trial court proceedings is a finding of fact that is entitled to deference under the AEDPA.

Whether the Supreme Court's ruling in Strickland v. Washington allows a state court to deny an ineffective assistance of counsel claim when the defendant originally waives the presentation of assumedly mitigating evidence, but later claims that the evidence was erroneously excluded, especially when the state court determines that the exclusion of mitigation did not prejudice the sentence.

 

What must a defense attorney do when faced with a client who, after being found guilty of murder, refuses to allow family members to testify prior to his sentencing, even though those family members would introduce evidence that might result in the reduction of his sentence? In this case, the Supreme Court will address the extent to which a criminal defendant may claim that his defense attorney acted incompetently by not introducing mitigating evidence during his trial, even when the defense attorney directly follows his orders not to do so. Furthermore, the Court will determine the extent to which a federal court may review and overturn a defendant's state court sentence if he claims his attorney acted incompetently.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. In light of the highly deferential standard of review required in this case pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), did the

Ninth Circuit err by holding that the Arizona state court unreasonably determined the facts when it found that Landrigan “instructed his attorney not to present any mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing”?

2. Did the Ninth Circuit err by finding that the Arizona state court's analysis of Landrigan's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was objectively unreasonable under

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), notwithstanding the absence of any contrary authority from this Court in cases in which (a) the defendant waives presentation of mitigation and impedes counsel's attempts to do so, or (b) the evidence the defendant subsequently claims should have been presented is not mitigating?

An Arizona state court convicted Respondent Jeffrey Landrigan of first-degree murder in 1990. See Petition for Certiorari at 1,2. After Landrigan's conviction, the trial court considered evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See id at 2.

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Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States, ex rel. Daniel Kirk

Issues

Under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4), do FOIA responses produced by a federal agency qualify as publicly disclosed reports, which are barred from use in claims of fraud against the government under the False Claims Act?

 

Daniel Kirk, a Vietnam War veteran, filed a qui tam suit against Schindler Elevator Corporation ("Schindler"), alleging that Schindler violated the False Claims Act ("FCA") through its failure to comply with The Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustments Assistance Act ("VEVRAA"). Section 3730(e)(4) of the FCA expressly states that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over claims based upon “public disclosure of . . . administrative . . . report[s] . . . or investigation[s].” Kirk's FCA claim utilized information requested from the Department of Labor under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the case, holding that information obtained through a FOIA request constitutes a “report” or “investigation” under the FCA, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. In doing so, the Second Circuit rejected the Third Circuit’s method of focusing upon the dictionary definitions of “report” and “investigation” and instead adopted the Ninth Circuit’s method of considering the “nature of the [FOIA] document itself.” Schindler appealed, claiming that FOIA responses, by virtue of being produced by federal agencies, are "reports” or “investigations" and therefore fit the FCA public disclosure bar. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on whether a federal agency's FOIA disclosure is a "report" or "investigation" under Section 3730(e)(4).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a federal agency's response to a Freedom of Information Act request is a "report ... or investigation" within the meaning of the False Claims Act public disclosure bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4).

In 2004, Respondent Daniel Kirk filed a complaint with the Department of Labor ("DOL") against his former employer, Petitioner Schindler Elevator Corporation (“Schindler”), alleging that Schindler had violated the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act ("VEVRAA”). 

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New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira

Issues

Is arbitrability of a dispute over the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act’s Section 1 exemption subject to determination by the courts or by an arbitrator pursuant to a valid delegation clause, and does the Section 1 exemption for contracts of employment apply to independent contractor agreements?

This case gives the Supreme Court an opportunity to determine whether a dispute over the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act’s (“FAA”) Section 1 exemption is an arbitrable issue pursuant to a valid delegation clause. Additionally, the Court has the opportunity to decide whether the Section 1 exemption for contracts of employment includes, as a matter of law, independent contractor agreements. Section 1 of the FAA carves out an exception from the Act’s applicability for contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, and other classes of workers engaged in interstate commerce. New Prime argues that the delegation clause covers threshold disputes such as the applicability of the FAA and that the phrase “contract of employment” does not include independent contractor agreements. Oliveira counters that courts must first determine the applicability of the FAA before requiring arbitration and also that the ordinary meaning of “contracts of employment” at the time the FAA was enacted included independent contractor agreements. The Supreme Court’s decision has implications for the trucking industry and will likely influence whether this industry will continue to resort to arbitration to resolve disputes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether a dispute over applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act's Section 1 exemption is an arbitrability issue that must be resolved in arbitration pursuant to a valid delegation clause.
  2. Whether the FAA's Section 1 exemption, which applies on its face only to “contracts of employment,” is inapplicable to independent contractor agreements.

Petitioner New Prime, Inc. (“New Prime”) is a national trucking company that recruits and trains new drivers through an apprenticeship program. Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc. at 3–4. Student apprentices participating in this program are unpaid, except during one phase of the program when they are paid fourteen cents per mile driven. Id.

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Schaffer v. Weast

Issues

Whether, in an administrative hearing contesting the sufficiency of an Individualized Education Program (IEP) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the burden of proof is on the parent of the special education student to whom the IEP applies or whether the burden instead rests on the school district that is required under the IDEA to develop the IEP.

 

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., parents and schools work together to come up with an appropriate Individualized Education Program ("IEP") for children with special educational needs. When the two parties cannot come to an agreement on the appropriateness or the sufficiency of an IEP the IDEA provides for an “impartial due process hearing,” which either party can initiate, to challenge the IEP at hand. The IDEA is silent as to who has the burden of proof at these hearings. The Court granted certiorari in order to determine to which party the burden should be allocated—the parents or the school. In this case, as in many IEP challenges, the question of burden is outcome determinative. Petitioner argues that principles of due process as well as policy and fairness compel allocation of the burden to the school in all IEP challenges. Respondents argue that Congress intended the burden to be allocated to the party initiating the hearing and seeking relief, as is the customary rule when legislation fails to specifically allocate the burden. The decision in this case will have far reaching implications for children with special educational needs and their families, educational funding, taxpayers, and the IDEA program as a whole.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, when parents of a disabled child and a local school district reach an impasse over the child's individualized education program, either side has a right to bring the dispute to an administrative hearing officer for resolution. At the hearing, which side has the burden of proof—the parents or the school district?

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San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco


In 1981 the City of San Francisco enacted the Hotel Conversion Ordinance ("the HCO") in order to stem the depletion of housing for the poor, elderly, and disabled by controlling the conversion of hotel units from residential to tourist use. The HCO, as revised in 1990, places harsh requirements on the owners of hotels who want to convert their property from residential to tourist use. These requirements include the construction of a new residential unit for each unit that is converted, or a payment to the city of 80 percent of the cost of constructing such a replacement. The owners of the San Remo Hotel sought to convert their hotel from residential to tourist use, and challenged the legality of the HCO under the takings clause of the California constitution. The California Supreme Court upheld the HCO, and the owners of the hotel then challenged it in federal court under the takings clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, ruled that they were precluded from raising this issue by virtue of the state court's prior ruling.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Is a Fifth Amendment Takings claim barred by issue preclusion based on a judgment denying compensation solely under state law, which was rendered in a state court proceeding that was required to ripen the federal Takings claim?

In 1981 the City of San Francisco ("the City") enacted its first Hotel Conversion Ordinance ("HCO"). The San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir.1998) ("San Remo I"). The HCO was designed to stop the depletion of housing for the poor, elderly, and disabled by controlling the conversion of hotel units from residential to tourist use. Id. at 1098.

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Samson v. California

Issues

Whether a parolee’s Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy is so diminished by his/her societal status that a parolee can be searched at any time and without reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing?

 

In 1996 the California Legislature adopted Penal Code section 3067, mandating that every prisoner eligible for release on state parole “shall agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause.” Petitioner Samson is a parolee who was arrested for drug possession after a search that was instigated solely because of his parolee status. Samson argues that under the Fourth Amendment he enjoys a diminished yet reasonable expectation to privacy that is eliminated by California’s 1996 parole search condition, which Samson claims “confers unfettered discretion on law enforcement officers to conduct searches of parolees.” The Supreme Court will have to decide whether a parolee's diminished expectation of privacy makes parolees subject to searches where there is no suspicion at all of any wrongdoing.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit police from conducting a warrantless search of a person who is subject to a parole search condition, where there is no suspicion of criminal wrongdoing and the sole reason for the search is that the person is on parole?

In 1996, the California Legislature enacted Penal Code section 3067, mandating that every prisoner eligible for release on state parole “shall agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause.” Brief for Respondent at 2.

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Samantar v. Yousuf

Issues

Whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies to government officials acting in their official capacities, and if so, whether the individual retains that immunity after he or she is no longer an official of a foreign state.

 

Numerous plaintiffs filed claims against Mohamed Ali Samantar, the former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Somalia, alleging that he was personally liable for a systematic use of torture and killing of civilians by Somali intelligence agencies during the 1980s. The district court found that Samantar was immune to these charges under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) and dismissed the case. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statutory language of FSIA does not cover either current or former government officials. In determining the scope of the FSIA as it relates to individuals, the Supreme Court will have an opportunity to clarify the language of the statute and resolve ambiguities between the FSIA and other immunity statutes. The decision could have a major impact on United States international relations by altering the immunity enjoyed by U.S. officials abroad and influencing the number of international claims in U.S. courts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether a foreign state's immunity from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1604, extends to an individual acting in his official capacity on behalf of a foreign state. ??

2. Whether an individual who is no longer an official of a foreign state at the time suit is filed retains immunity for acts taken in the individual's former capacity as an official acting on behalf of a foreign state. ?

Somali government agents, including the National Security Service (“NSS”) and the military police, allegedly subjected disfavored Somali clans and government opponents to widespread, systematic use of torture, arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial killing. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 373–74 (4th Cir.

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Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Professor Jens Ohlin for his time and helpful insight on this case.

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Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter

Issues

Is the government liable for all contract-related payments to a tribal organization under a statute requiring the government to pay funds “subject to the availability of appropriations” when Congress appropriated enough funds to cover any individual government contract, but not every assigned contract?

 

The Indian Self–Determination and Education Assistance Act (“ISDA”) allows Indian tribes to implement programs previously administered by the federal government. The government must reimburse tribes using Congressional appropriations for any reasonable implementation costs, known as contract support costs (“CSCs”). However, Congress appropriated insufficient funds to cover all of the tribes’ CSCs and the government failed to fully reimburse respondents, including the Ramah Navajo Chapter (“Ramah”). The district court determined that the government was not required to pay Ramah’s CSCs due to exhausted appropriations, but the Tenth Circuit held that a tribe can fully recover if Congress appropriated sufficient funds to cover their individual contracts. The government now appeals, arguing thatthe total sum of recoverable CSCs is limited to the appropriation. The Supreme Court’s decision may impact Congress’s ability to limit spending and the government’s perceived reliability as a contract partner.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the government is required to pay all of the CSCs incurred by a tribal contractor under the ISDA, where Congress has imposed an express statutory cap on the appropriations available to pay such costs and the Secretary of the Interior cannot pay all such costs for all tribal contractors without exceeding the statutory cap.

Under the ISDA, the United States can enter into self-determination contracts with Indian tribes and tribal organizations that allow those groups to implement various services previously administered by the government. 25 U.S.C.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

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Salazar v. Buono

Issues

Whether Buono has standing and, if he does, whether the sale of land in question from the Department of the Interior to the Veterans of Foreign Wars overcomes the Establishment Clause violation?

 

Salazar v. Buono concerns the Establishment Clause and a Latin cross on federal land. In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars(“VFW”) erected a large Latin cross on Sunrise Rock in San Bernardino, California, commemorating veterans of World War I. In 2004, ten years after Sunrise Rock became federal parkland, Frank Buono sued the Secretary of the Interior. Buono argued that the cross’ presence on federal land violated the Establishment Clause. Buono won. While the case was on appeal, Congress attempted to transfer the land to the VFW. After the Court of Appeals affirmed Buono’s victory, Buono moved to enforce the judgment. The District Court then blocked the land transfer and ordered the removal of the cross. The Court of Appeals affirmed that enforcement action. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether Buono had standing to challenge the cross’ presence in the first place, and if he did, whether transfer to a private party corrects the Establishment Clause violation. This case may have implications for standing doctrine in religious injury cases. Furthermore, this case may provide guidance on the use of land transfer as a means to resolve Establishment Clause violations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

More than 70 years ago, the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) erected a cross as a memorial to fallen service members in a remote area within what is now a federal preserve. After the district court held that the presence of the cross on federal land violated the Establishment Clause and the court permanently enjoined the government from permitting the display of the cross, Congress enacted legislation directing the Department of the Interior to transfer an acre of land including the cross to the VFW in exchange for a parcel of equal value. The district court then permanently enjoined the government from implementing that Act of Congress, and the court of appeals affirmed. The questions presented are:

  1. Whether respondent has standing to maintain this action where he has no objection to the public display of a cross, but instead is offended that the public land on which the cross is located is not also an open forum on which other persons might display other symbols.
  2. Whether, even assuming respondent has standing, the court of appeals erred in refusing to give effect to the Act of Congress providing for the transfer of the land to private hands.

The Mojave National Preserve and the Cross

In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars (“VFW”) erected a Latin cross atop Sunrise Rock on the north side of Cima Road in southeastern California. See Buono v. Norton212 F.Supp.2d 1202, 1205 (C.D. Cal.

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Additional Resources

·      Annotated U.S. Constitution: First Amendment (Religion and Expression)

·      Wex: Law about First Amendment (Establishment Clause)

·      PrawfsBlawg: Salazar v. Buono (Feb. 24, 2009)

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Safford Unified School District # 1 v. Redding

Issues

Whether the Fourth Amendment requires a stricter standard than reasonableness for student strip-searches, and if so, whether school officials conducting a strip-search have qualified immunity from suit for violation of Fourth Amendment rights.

Safford middle school officials strip-searched thirteen-year-old Savana Redding, seeking prescription-strength ibuprofen pills based on uncorroborated information from another student that Savana possessed ibuprofen in an unspecified time and location. This case concerns whether the school violated Redding's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and, if so, whether qualified immunity shields the school officials from liability. After a District Court and a Ninth Circuit panel found the search to be lawful, the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc; it reversed and held that qualified immunity did not protect the school official who ordered the search. Petitioners Safford Unified School District #1, et al. argue that the search was reasonable given the fellow student's tip and the threat of prescription drug abuse, but that even if it was not, school officials must have qualified immunity so they are free to exercise their judgment regarding drug abuse in schools. They argue that a decision in Respondent's favor would hamper school officials' ability to respond in the face of threats to student safety in school. Respondent April Redding argues that a strip search was unreasonable because the school lacked any indication that Savana had pills hidden in her undergarments, and that the school officials should be held responsible. She argues that a decision for Petitioner would enable school officials to conduct highly invasive searches based on only minimal, vague suspicion. This case promises guidance both to school officials seeking to carry out their duties effectively without violating students' rights and to lower courts responsible for assessing school officials' conduct.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits public school officials from conducting a search of a student suspected of possessing and distributing a prescription drug on campus in violation of school policy.

(2) Whether the Ninth Circuit departed from established principles of qualified immunity in holding that a public school administrator may be liable in a damages lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conducting a search of a student suspected of possessing and distributing a prescription drug on campus.

In the fall of 2003, Safford Middle School officials were concerned about the distribution of prescription and over-the-counter-drugs among students. See Redding v. Safford Unified School District 531 F.3d 1071, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2008). Bringing medicine on campus without permission violated school rules, and a student had recently become ill after ingesting a pill he allegedly received from a classmate.

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