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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether claims under Section 1981 can survive absent a showing that race was the but-for cause of the plaintiff’s harm. Here, NAAAOM sued Comcast for racially discriminating against ESN’s network by refusing to enter into a contract with them. Comcast argues that a plaintiff cannot successfully plead race discrimination if race was not the but-for cause—or the actual cause—of the refusal to contract. NAAAOM counters that the correct causation standard is a “motivating factor” or “mixed-motives” approach in which racial discrimination need only be one factor in establishing a claim under Section 1981. This case’s outcome could affect how Section 1981 and Title VII claims are brought by marginalized communities and how employers will allocate resources to handle litigation.

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This case consolidates three lawsuits, together claiming that the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) decision to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) policy is unlawful. Before the Supreme Court, DHS argues that the DACA rescission is unreviewable agency action, that it complied with the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”) requirements, and that DACA is unlawful. In response, various states, individual DACA recipients, and organizations argue that DHS did not consider all data, failed to offer a sufficient justification for its decision, and improperly relied on the conclusion that DACA was unlawful. The case’s outcome will have important implications for the hundreds of thousands of current DACA recipients and their communities, immigration enforcement policies, and the economy.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether damages claims filed by private individuals against federal officers merit a judicial tort remedy, absent any other legal remedies. The parents of Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca—who was fatally shot on Mexican soil by a U.S. officer on U.S. soil—sued the U.S. officer, other unknown federal employees, and the United States. They argue that under Bivens, their damages claims should proceed despite the lack of statutory provisions because the essence of their claims is the same as Bivens and because no other legal remedy is available. Jesus Mesa, Jr., the Border Patrol agent who shot and killed Sergio, contends that the parents’ claims should be dismissed because the claims fall outside of Bivens given the “new context” they present and the “special factors” that warrant the Court’s caution in recognizing a Bivens action in this case. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for national security, separation of powers, and accountability of agents employing deadly force in foreign territories.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), an order denying a motion for relief from an automatic stay in a bankruptcy proceeding is a final order. Petitioner Ritzen Group, Inc. argues that an order denying stay relief is an interlocutory order—and thus not immediately appealable—because it merely affects the bankruptcy claims-adjudication process by determining where the parties can resolve underlying claims. Respondent Jackson Masonry, LLC argues that an order denying stay relief is final and subject to immediate appeal because proceedings deciding motions for stay relief are distinct from the overall bankruptcy proceeding and involve discrete claims, procedural standards, and legal standards. The outcome of this case will have implications on the judicial efficiency of bankruptcy litigation.

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This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split regarding the interpretation of the stop-time rule in the context of removal proceedings and to determine what it means to be considered “inadmissible” under the rule. The stop-time rule is a limitation on the Attorney General’s power to cancel the removal of an alien and applies, in part, when the alien commits an offense listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) that renders the alien “inadmissible.” Andre Martello Barton (“Barton”) argues that he cannot be deemed “inadmissible” under the stop-time rule because he was not seeking admission into the United States and, as a result, was never adjudicated as inadmissible. Alternatively, Barton asserts that it is a legal impossibility for him to be rendered “inadmissible” because he is an already-admitted lawful permanent resident of the United States. U.S. Attorney General William Barr counters that, for stop-time purposes, an alien is “inadmissible” if the alien is convicted of or admits to committing an offense listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), regardless of whether the alien is seeking admission or already admitted. The outcome of this case has important implications for the removability of lawful permanent residents who have prior criminal convictions.

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This case arises out of an incident in 2004 when the Athos I, a ship that CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. (“CARCO”) had chartered, collided with an abandoned anchor near CARCO’s designated port. This case asks the Supreme Court to decide how to interpret the charter agreement’s “safe berth” clause, under which CARCO was obligated to designate a safe destination port for the Athos I. CARCO argues that, under the safe berth clause, it was obligated only to exercise due diligence in selecting a safe port. Frescati Shipping Co. (“Frescati”), the Athos I’s owner, counters that the clause is better interpreted as a warranty of safety that gives rise to strict liability. The outcome of this case will determine the contours of a charterer’s obligations under safe berth clauses and the degree to which industry actors can efficiently bargain to allocate risks before accidents occur.

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This case asks whether a police officer has reasonable suspicion to pull over a vehicle if the officer knows only that the vehicle’s registered owner has a suspended driver’s license, but the officer is unsure whether the registered owner is driving the vehicle. Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, police officers may initiate brief stops of drivers who they reasonably suspect are committing a crime. In the present case, police deputy Mark Mehrer observed a moving vehicle and determined that the vehicle belonged to Charles Glover, who had a suspended license. Mehrer pulled over Glover’s vehicle after assuming that Glover was driving and thus violating the law. The State of Kansas argues that Mehrer had reasonable suspicion to stop Glover, because the Fourth Amendment allowed him to make the commonsense assumption that the driver of a vehicle owns that vehicle. Glover counters that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment right against illegal searches and seizures, because without that assumption, Mehrer had no reason to stop his vehicle. The outcome of this case has implications for drivers’ privacy, public safety, and the amount of discretion police officers possess in deciding when to stop a vehicle.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether Congress has the power to revoke States’ sovereign immunity from federal copyright infringement under the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (“CRCA”). Frederick Allen, a videographer, and his video production company argue that the CRCA is a valid exercise of Congress’s enforcement power under the Intellectual Property Clause (“Clause”) of the Constitution. Allen and his company also argue that the CRCA is valid because it enforces his due process rights under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Roy Cooper, the governor of North Carolina, argues that the CRCA is unconstitutional and that Congress’s Section 5 power to abrogate state sovereign immunity does not apply in this case. The outcome of this case has important implications for copyright holders and copyright enforcement, as well as for determining the extent of Congress’ power to abrogate state sovereign immunity.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether pollution added to navigable waters through a nonpoint source is regulated by the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). A point source is a discernable, confined, and discrete conveyance that includes pipes, ditches, and other clearly discernable means from which pollutants are or can be discharged into navigable waters. County of Maui (“Maui”) contends that pollutants that enter navigable waters through nonpoint sources, like groundwater, are too attenuated to attach liability under the CWA. Maui argues that pollutants that enter navigable waters through nonpoint sources are not added “directly to” navigable water and thus fall outside the scope of 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A), the statute that codifies which pollutant discharges are subject to the CWA’s permit requirements. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund (“HWF”) counters that Maui’s reading is underinclusive and that the CWA’s intended purpose is to regulate pollutants not just added directly to navigable waters, but also those that were simply added to navigable waters. HWF argues that discharges of pollutants to nonpoint sources which then enter navigable waters fall within the meaning of “discharge of a pollutant” under the CWA. The outcome of this case has important implications for the continued viability of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System’s permit program, the divide between federal and state control of groundwater regulations, and the fiscal impact that the CWA has on individual landowners.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether general allegations that disclosure of fraud is always inevitable and that disclosure sooner rather than later is always more prudent satisfy the “more harm than good” pleading standard of Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer. The Retirement Plans Committee of IBM argues that a rule that disclosure sooner rather than later is always prudent is too broad and will result in liability in cases in which fiduciaries did not disclose information as soon as possible, but nonetheless acted prudently. In contrast, Jander asserts that Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) fiduciaries should not be held to a different standard of prudence than all other ERISA fiduciaries, and that raising the pleading standard would make the standard impossible to meet. The outcome of this case will affect companies’ ability to provide ESOPs to their employees and employees’ access to ESOPs. This case will also have important implications for the stability and protection of employees’ retirement benefits.

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