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In 1999, the city of Valdez imposed a tax on vessels using its harbors. This case concerns the constitutionality of that tax and the apportionment methodology used to assess the tax. Petitioner Polar Tankers claims that the tax is a tonnage duty prohibited by the Constitution's Tonnage Clause. Polar Tankers argues that the apportionment methodology utilized by Respondent Valdez distorts a vessel's value, and that the effect of the distortion is to allow Valdez to make revenue that is grossly disproportionate to the amount of time a vessel actually spends using Valdez' ports. Furthermore, Polar Tankers argues that Valdez' apportionment scheme creates a risk of double taxation for vessels. Valdez, however, claims that the tax is nothing more than an ad valorem property tax. Valdez argues that the Tonnage Clause does not apply to ad valoremtaxes, and that its apportionment scheme is based on a vessel's productive activity in Valdez. Lastly, in response to the charge of creating a risk of double taxation for vessels, Valdez states that domicile states do not have exclusive authority to tax vessels for time spent on the high seas. Thus, the outcome of this case will affect taxation as it relates to interstate commerce.

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Two defendants were charged in Puerto Rico court and federal court on the same set of facts and for largely the same crimes. See Luis M. Sanchez Valle v. The People of Puerto Rico, 2015 WL 1317010 (P.R. 2015), at 2a, 4a (pincited to linked document). Each defendant was convicted and sentenced in federal court first, and then moved to dismiss the pending state charges. The defendants argued that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibited Puerto Rico from prosecuting them for the same crimes they were convicted of in federal court. See id. at 2a–5a. The trial courts granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, but the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals reversed. Relying on the dual sovereignty doctrine, the court held that Puerto Rico, an independent sovereign, could charge the defendants for crimes under the Puerto Rico Constitution. See id. However, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court reversed, deciding that Puerto Rico had no sovereign status, derived its power to prosecute from the U.S. Constitution, and thereby could not charge the defendants for the same crime. The Supreme Court will decide whether the Puerto Rico Supreme Court was right. See Brief for Petitioner, The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico at i. Puerto Rico argues that the island is a sovereign state, and that under the dual sovereignty doctrine, there are no double jeopardy concerns. See id. at 19, 22. However, Valle contends that the Puerto Rico has no sovereign status. See Brief of Respondents, Luis M. Sánchez Valle and Jaime Gómez Vásquez at 3. The Court’s decision will affect the balance of the federal system and the dignity of the people of Puerto Rico. See id. at 61.

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Many of Puerto Rico’s municipalities are in financial crisis, and public utility companies are facing insolvency. In this consolidated case, the Supreme Court will determine whether Chapter 9 of the federal Bankruptcy Code preempts Puerto Rican laws permitting distressed municipalities to restructure their debt. Puerto Rico and its Government Development Bank assert that Puerto Rico is not prevented from passing local bankruptcy laws because Congress has not directly addressed territorial law in this area. But public utility creditors Franklin California Tax-Free Trust and BlueMountain Capital Management, LLC, argue that Congress preempted any state or territorial municipal bankruptcy legislation in an effort to ensure a uniform federal bankruptcy standard. The Court’s ruling will impact Puerto Rican municipalities’ ability to provide essential services to their residents, and the rights of creditors to collect on their debt. 

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James Puckett was charged in Federal District Court with armed bank robbery and use of a firearm during the commission of the crime. Puckett agreed to plead guilty to both charges partially in exchange for the prosecutor’s promise to recommend a sentencing reduction to the judge based on Puckett’s acceptance of responsibility for his crimes. After the plea agreement but before the sentencing, Puckett engaged in acts to defraud the United States Postal Service, and the prosecutor refused to recommend the sentencing reduction. Puckett’s counsel did not formally object to the prosecutor’s refusal to file the recommendation, thus creating a “forfeited” error. Consequently, when the court sentenced Puckett, he received no reduction in his sentence. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Puckett requested that the case be remanded and that he be allowed to revoke his guilty plea. The Fifth Circuit denied Puckett’s request and upheld the sentence, finding that Puckett had not met his burden under Rule 52(b). Under Rule 52(b), the party challenging the error must prove that the error was significant enough to warrant reversal even though the party forfeited his right to have the court consider the error by not objecting when it occurred. Puckett sought review by the Supreme Court and his writ of certiorari was granted on October 1, 2008.​

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In 2002, Arnold Preston, a lawyer, and Judge Alex Ferrer entered into a contract where Preston agreed to act as Ferrer's personal manager in exchange for a portion of the earnings from a potential television deal. The contract contained a clause which required that any disputes over the validity of the contract be arbitrated. Several years later, Preston filed an action with the American Arbitration Association against Ferrer, seeking earnings which he claims are owed under that contract. Ferrer claims that the entire contract is invalid under the California Talent Agencies Act, and also contends that under that act, the parties must exhaust their administrative remedies by submitting the dispute to the California Labor Commissionerbefore an arbitrator or court can hear the case. The California Court of Appeals agreed with Ferrer. Preston challenges this holding, claiming that that the Federal Arbitration Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), which held that when there is an arbitration agreement disputes over the validity of a contract must first be submitted to an arbitrator, require this dispute to be first submitted to arbitration. Arbitration agreements are found in many contracts, and this decision could have a significant impact on the enforceability of such clauses and on the States' ability to regulate certain industries and agreements.

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The police brought in Respondent Randy Moore for questioning in connection with the kidnapping and murder of Kenneth Rogers. Moore requested legal counsel and was told that he was not entitled to counsel unless he could afford it. Moore ultimately confessed to accidentally killing Rogers and was then appointed legal counsel. On counsel’s advice, Moore pled no contest to felony-murder and was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. After Oregon state courts denied Moore’s petition for post-conviction relief, Moore petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief, asserting that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney had failed to move to suppress his confession. The federal district court denied his petition, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the failure of Moore’s counsel to seek suppression of Moore’s confession was unreasonable and highly prejudicial. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Oregon argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to apply the correct standard in granting habeas relief and that Moore did not show that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to seek suppression of his confession. This decision will ultimately impact when and how often defendants and states pursue plea agreements, the finality of those agreements once made, as well as the deference federal courts accord to decisions of state criminal courts.

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After a lawsuit against hydroelectric company PPL Montana was dismissed in federal court, PPL Montana sought a declaratory judgment in state court to determine the ownership of riverbeds along three Montana rivers. The State of Montana asserted that it owned the riverbeds under the equal footing doctrine, and sought compensation for PPL Montana’s use of the land. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to Montana, holding that the State of Montana owned the riverbeds and that PPL Montana owed the State of Montana $40,956,180. The issue of title largely turns upon whether the river is “navigable.” PPL Montana argues that navigability for title purposes should be determined by looking at individual segments of rivers and the actual commercial use of rivers at the time statehood was obtained. Montana contends that the proper navigability test is the susceptibility of travel through longer river stretches, which can be informed by current uses. The Supreme Court’s decision may affect rivers’ public benefits and the reliance interests of riverbed owners.

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Summum, a religious organization, seeks to place a monument containing the Seven Aphorisms of Summum among other historical and cultural artifacts and monuments displayed in Pioneer Park. It brought a civil suit in the Federal District Court of Utah, alleging that the city of Pleasant Grove had abridged its First Amendment freedom of speech rights in denying the request to display the Seven Aphorisms monument, while approving other similar expressive monuments. The District Court denied Summum’s preliminary injunction motion, but the Tenth Circuit reversed the ruling and granted the injunction, finding that any privately-donated monument retained its character as private speech. The court held that since a park is a traditional public forum, the city cannot engage in content-based restrictions of private speech without a compelling state interest and a narrowly-tailored policy to that end. The city contends that there is no First Amendment violation because the display constitutes government speech—the city owns, controls, and ultimately decides to display the monument. It fears that the Tenth Circuit ruling would chill free speech for both private parties and the government, for the ruling would require the city to display any monument at the request of a private party or, alternatively, ban all displays in public parks. But Summum argues that categorizing such displays as government speech, where the decision to display a monument is subject to the city’s selection process, would allow the city to engage in viewpoint discrimination.

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) requires a federal court to dismiss a civil action if an unavailable party is indispensable, that is, if the court could not in good conscience proceed without that party. Foreign sovereigns can make themselves unavailable by asserting their sovereign immunity from suit. The Supreme Court will consider the interaction between these two doctrines in this interpleader action to resolve the ownership of property claimed by the Republic of the Philippines ("Philippines") and by Mariano Pimentel ("Pimentel"). The Philippines successfully asserted its sovereign immunity, and now argues that the action cannot proceed in its absence. Pimentel responds that foreign sovereigns cannot stop an interpleader action merely by claiming an interest in the property at issue and then asserting sovereign immunity. The Court's decision in this case will impact courts' ability to adjudicate title to assets claimed by foreign sovereigns. This issue is likely to become increasingly important as sovereigns make ever-greater investments in private sector assets.

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Mayola Williams brought suit against Philip Morris U.S.A. alleging that Philip Morris fraudulently and negligently caused the death of her husband, who smoked Philip Morris cigarettes for over forty years. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed a trial jury’s punitive damages award of $79.5 million. Philip Morris contends that the punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive because it was not reasonably related to Mr. Williams’ injuries. Williams argues that the Oregon Supreme Court was within its discretion to affirm the trial jury’s punitive damages award because the award conformed with many of the guidelines for determining reasonable damages, and those guidelines are the most important factor. This decision will impact punitive damages calculation in product liability and other tort cases.

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