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Walter Himmelreich brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) suit against the United States during his federal prison sentence in 2010. The suit was subsequently dismissed under the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception. The exception states that courts do not have jurisdiction over claims “based upon the exercise or performance . . . [of] a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or [a government] employee.” Himmelreich later brought suit against prison officials, alleging various constitutional violations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned the district court’s decision to dismiss that complaint on the basis of the FTCA's judgment bar, which the district court determined barred plaintiffs from bringing claims against government employees that had previously received judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether a dismissal under the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception in Section 2680 is a “judgment” that would bar future claims under the FTCA’s judgment bar. Simmons argues that a dismissal on the grounds of the discretionary-function exception constitutes a judgment, and that the judgment bar should apply. Himmelreich argues that a dismissal on the grounds of the discretionary-function exception has no claim-preclusive effect and thus fails to trigger the judgment bar. The decision in this case will clarify the proper scope of the FTCA's judgment bar and may impact government employees’ exposure to liability.

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The Supreme Court will consider whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) applies to lawyers, known as “special counsel,” appointed by a state Attorney General to collect debts owed to the state, during the performance of their duties. Various lawyers and their firms, appointed as special counsel by the Ohio Attorney General, argue that special counsel are properly defined as state “officers,” making special counsel exempt from the FDCPA. Pamela Gillie and Hazel Meadows, Ohio debtors, counter that special counsel are not “officers” but independent contractors subject to the FDCPA’s requirements. Gillie and Meadows also argue that use of Attorney General letterhead by special counsel to collect a debt is a “false, deceptive, or misleading representation” in violation of Section 1692e of the FDCPA. The Court’s decision could alter state sovereignty to collect debts and the power of state attorneys general.

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The Supreme Court will decide the scope of authority given to a single judge in cases that are otherwise referable to a three-judge panel. See Brief for Petitioners, Stephen M. Shapiro et al. at 1. Shapiro argues that the Three-Judge Court Act prohibits a single-judge district court from dismissing non-frivolous reapportionment complaints for failure to state a cause of action because the statute limits federal court review to subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. at 17. McManus argues that the Act creates a procedural framework wherein single-judge district courts may dismiss claims for failure to state a cause of action without convening a three-judge court for every reapportionment complaint. See Brief for Respondents, David J. McManus, Jr., et al. at 15–17. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case could affect the ability of Americans to challenge the constitutionality of state election laws. See Brief for Petitioners at 9.

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Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates filed a class action lawsuit in federal court, arguing that Allstate Insurance Companyviolated New York law in failing to pay interest to policyholders. The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that New York law prevented a class action lawsuit in this context, and the Second Circuit affirmed. This case concerns the application of state law in federal court under the Erie Doctrine, particularly whether New York class action law applies in federal court and whether it conflicts with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Shady Grove argues that Rule 23 is the comprehensive class action rule for federal courts, and that New York law cannot undermine federal court procedure. Allstate claims that state law applies because plaintiffs would have different rights in state and federal court. The case will address Rule 23 and the ability of states to restrict class action lawsuits.

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Petitioner Monroe Setser’s arrest in Lubbock, Texas for drug- and firearms-related crimes resulted in both state and federal criminal charges as well as the revocation of his probation for an unrelated state offense. Setser pleaded guilty in federal court and received a 151-month prison sentence that would run concurrently to the state sentence to be imposed for the same incident but consecutively to the sentence imposed pursuant to his probation revocation. The Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal. Setser now argues that federal district courts lack the authority to impose federal sentences that run consecutively to anticipated state sentences. He notes that Congress has not demonstrated any intention to the contrary. By invitation of the Supreme Court, attorney Evan Young responds that district courts have broad discretion in determining how federal sentences will be served. Young argues that this determination must remain an exclusively judicial function.

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With the passage of the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Congress sought to regulate employee benefit plans, including employer-provided health care benefits. However, the particular scheme of remedies Congress created for both plan participants and plan providers has been a source of mischief for courts hearing claims of ERISA violations. Traditionally, the Supreme Court has held Congress to their particular word choice as to the remedies available to aggrieved parties, sometimes creating results that do not seem particularly fair to the lay observer. In Sereboff, the Court will again take up the issue of what remedies Congress contemplated when it envisioned “appropriate equitable relief” under ERISA.

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In 2001, police witnessed Victor Harris driving 73 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour zone. When they tried to pull him over, Harris sped away. Officer Timothy Scott joined the chase and after approximately six minutes of pursuit at average speeds between 80 and 90 miles per hour and an unsuccessful attempt at stopping Harris, Scott received authorization from his supervisor to stop Harris by force. Using his push bumper, Scott made direct contact with Harris’s car, causing him to lose control and roll down an embankment. Harris suffered serious injuries. Harris argues that under Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), which set forth circumstances in which deadly force is reasonable to prevent escape, Scott’s use of force was unreasonable and unconstitutional. Scott argues, however, that the force used should not be characterized as “deadly force” and that a simple reasonableness, and not the more specific test of Garner, should apply. Nevertheless, Scott argues that he should be entitled to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court, reviewing the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in favor of Harris, will determine the standard to be applied to uses of force in vehicular pursuits which will in turn affect police officers’ discretion in such situations. The Court will also further define the reasonableness requirement inherent in the Fourth Amendment, contributing to an already expansive and complex body of law.

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Plata v. Schwarzenegger and Coleman v. Schwarzenegger were separate class actions concerning healthcare conditions in California state prisons. Although the cases were decided separately, they resulted in similar outcomes: the district court in each case determined that the lack of adequate physical or mental care violated the prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights, leading to years of court orders designed to remedy the violations. After California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger declared a state of emergency due to prison overcrowding in 2006, the Plata and Coleman plaintiffs argued that the only means of remedying the continued constitutional violations was the release of significant numbers of inmates from state prisons. Subsequently, a three-judge district court convened under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) issued a prisoner release order. Governor Schwarzenegger and other state officials (“Schwarzenegger”) appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. They contend that the three-judge district court improperly applied the PLRA because California had not had sufficient time to implement the latest court order. Schwarzenegger also contends that the district court failed to determine that overcrowding was the primary cause of the violations. In response, the Plata and Coleman plaintiffs, along with the California Correctional Police Officers’ Association, argue that the PLRA was properly applied because the state was given a reasonable amount of time to comply with previous court orders and the prisoner release order remedied the primary cause of the violations. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine when courts may remedy constitutional violations through a prisoner release order under the PLRA, and could dramatically alter the number of prisoners and the services provided in California prisons.

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California enacted California Civil Code §§ 1746–1746.5, which imposed restrictions on the sale of violent video games to minors. The Entertainment Merchants Association and the Entertainment Software Association sought declaratory relief in federal court, alleging that the law was an impermissible restriction of speech in violation of the First Amendment. The district court and the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of Entertainment Merchants. California appealed, asserting that the First Amendment does not protect the sale of violent video games to minors and that California need not show a direct causal link between violent video games and physical or psychological harm in minors before restricting such sales. The Supreme Court's decision will affect minors' constitutional rights, the power of states to control which materials children are exposed to, and the expression in media with violent content.

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In 2005, Nadejda Reilly filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. On the petition she listed her business property as an exemption, demonstrating her intent to retain the entire property by declaring the property’s exemption amount to be equal to her estimation of the asset’s value. The bankruptcy trustee assigned to the case, William Schwab, did not object to Reilly’s exemption but later determined the business property had a higher value than Reilly’s estimation and sought to sell the property to recoup the difference. Reilly argued that Schwab’s failure to object within the thirty-day statutory period rendered the property exempt. Schwab countered that Reilly’s exemption was limited to the specific amount claimed and did not serve to fully exempt the property from distribution. Schwab also argued that the objection deadline applied only to the type of property claimed as exempt, not to the value. The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit disagreed, holding that Schwab was on notice that Reilly intended to fully exempt the property and failure to object in time rendered the property exempt. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision will determine whether a debtor in a Chapter 7 proceeding successfully claimed a full exemption in an asset by declaring that the exemption value equals the asset’s value, and whether the thirty-day objection period applies.

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