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The Supreme Court will consider whether a state offense that is “described in” a federal criminal statute must meet all elements of the statute, including jurisdictional requirements, to constitute an aggravated felony. See Brief for Petitioner, Jorge Luna Torres at 2. Petitioner Jorge Luna Torres argues that under the plain meaning of the aggravated felony definition, the New York offense of arson is not described in the federal arson offense because it does not satisfy the federal statute’s interstate commerce requirement. See id. But U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch contends that it is reasonable to interpret that a state offense may constitute an aggravated felony under the relevant federal offense, even if the conduct does not meet a jurisdictional element. See Brief for Respondent, Loretta E. Lynch at 17. The Court’s ruling will clarify the definition of “aggravated felony,” and impact the relationship between immigration law and criminal law, particularly with respect to immigrants facing deportation. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. (“NACDL”), in Support of the Petitioner at 1.

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Following an automobile stop in Manhattan, New York police officers ran Petitioner Jose Tolentino’s driver’s license through a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) database, discovering that his driver’s license had been suspended and that he had at least ten suspensions for failure to answer a summons or to pay a fine. Tolentino was indicted by a grand jury for aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. On appeal, Tolentino argues his DMV records must be suppressed because they were the fruit of an unlawful stop. Respondent State of New York argues that, even if the stop was unlawful, the exclusionary rule should not be extended to apply to information the government already possessed, since such an application would be unreasonable. The Supreme Court will have to balance the cost of suppressing highly probative evidence against the potential benefit of discouraging police from conducting random automobile stops without probable cause.

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Sean Carter was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and rape, and was sentenced to death in Ohio. His counsel filed a federal habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and requested a pre-petition competency hearing to determine whether Carter was competent to participate in the federal habeas proceeding. The district court granted both the petition and the request. Two years later, the district court determined that Carter was incompetent and dismissed his petition while also stopping the one-year statute of limitations. When the warden at the facility where Carter is imprisoned challenged the district court's decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that even though the district court was justified in finding Carter incompetent, the proper course of action was to stay, rather than dismiss, the habeas proceedings until Carter was competent. Another warden now argues that a district court does not have the authority to stay federal habeas proceedings, nor does Carter have a right to competence in his own habeas proceedings. How the Supreme Court decides this case will determine the balance between recognizing the finality of state-court criminal judgments and allowing federal courts to use their discretion to implement stays in federal habeas proceedings where a capital prisoner’s competence to assist counsel is questionable.

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Petitioner Eric L. Thompson, a metallurgical engineer formerly employed by Respondent North American Stainless (“Stainless”), sued Stainless under Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that Stainless fired him in retaliation for a gender discrimination complaint his then-fiancée (and now wife) Miriam Regalado filed against Stainless with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The Sixth Circuit found that Thompson did not have standing to sue Stainless and dismissed his complaint. Thompson argues that Title VII not only prohibits third-party retaliation but also gives third-party victims standing to sue, primarily because this furthers Title VII’s goal of eliminating discrimination and is consistent with the EEOC’s longstanding interpretation of Title VII. In opposition, Stainless argues that Section 704(a) does not give those third parties standing to sue the allegedly retaliating employer because permitting such an action would contradict congressional intent and unnecessarily curtail employers’ ability to manage their workforces.

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During the Cold War, two Communist bloc diplomats agreed to conduct espionage for the Central Intelligence Agency in exchange for aid in defecting to the United States and the CIA's promise of lifetime financial assistance. The couple, suing under the names John and Jane Doe, complied with the CIA's requests and eventually the CIA settled them in the United States, provided them with falsified identities, and assisted John Doe in finding a job. In 1997, however, John Doe was laid off because of a corporate merger and was unable to find new work because of his falsified resume. The CIA refused to provide the Does with more financial assistance and denied their appeals within the agency. The Does sued the CIA in the District Court for the Western District of Washington. The CIA claimed that under Totten v. United States, a Civil-War-era Supreme Court case, the district court did not have jurisdiction over alleged secret contracts for espionage. The district court concluded that although it did not have jurisdiction over contract claims, it did have jurisdiction over constitutional and tort claims arising from the secret agreement between the Does and the CIA. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Now the Supreme Court must take another look at Totten and decide whether or not that case prevents the Does from suing the CIA for tort and constitutional claims relating to the CIA's alleged obligations to the Does.

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The Supreme Court will clarify the interaction between the Hobbs Act of 1948 (“the Hobbs Act”) and Congress’ commerce power over intra-state activity. The Hobbs Act prohibits obstruction or delay of “the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts . . . to do [so].” Petitioner David Anthony Taylor was convicted in federal court for affecting interstate commerce by attempting to rob a marijuana dealer of his “drugs and drug proceeds.” Taylor argues that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his activity had any effect on interstate commerce, and thus he was deprived of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment due process rights. However, the United States contends that the aggregation principle of the Commerce Clause grants federal jurisdiction over the activity as part of a “national market,” even if the stolen drugs remained entirely within one state. Consequently, the United States asserts that the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act is satisfied as a matter-of-law.

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Brent Taylor, executive director of the Antique Aircraft Association ("AAA") filed a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request with the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") to obtain plans and specifications for a vintage aircraft. After the FAA denied Taylor's request on trade-secret grounds, he sued to compel disclosure of the information. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Taylor's claim was barred because he had been "virtually represented" in a prior action by Greg Herrick, a fellow AAA member whose prior FOIA request for the same records the Tenth Circuit found to have been properly denied due to trade-secret protections. Taylor asserts that preclusion of his claim on the "virtual representation" theory violated his due process rights because he had no legal relationship with Herrick and received no notice of the prior suit. The FAA counters that preclusion was appropriate because Herrick had adequately represented Taylor's interests in the earlier action. The decision in this case will clarify the circumstances under which courts may bar claims under the "virtual representation" theory and may influence plaintiffs' litigation strategies, broaden defendants' exposure to duplicative suits, and limit the availability of FOIA requests of certain members of the public.

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Alejandra Tapia was convicted of smuggling illegal aliens and sentenced to fifty-one months in prison. At her sentencing, the district court factored in her history of substance abuse in its decision to give her a sentence beyond the minimum term so that she could enter and complete an in-custody drug rehabilitation program. Tapia appealed her sentence to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's decision. Citing a circuit split, Tapia appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to determine whether it was proper for the district court judge to cite Tapia's rehabilitative needs in ordering a longer prison sentence. Petitioner Tapia contends that the plain meaning of the Sentencing Reform Act and the legislative history behind this Act confirm that rehabilitation is an inappropriate consideration in prison sentencing. The United States agrees with Tapia and urges vacating the lower court decision. Writing as amicus curiae by invitation of the Supreme Court, Professor Stephanos Bibas asserts that under the Sentencing Reform Act, district courts may properly consider the rehabilitative potential of in-prison targeted treatment programs when determining a prison sentence. Ultimately, this decision will impact when a district court may use incarceration to punish defendants and may also affect particular groups of defendants sentenced to incarceration.

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After falling through a deck on property owned by Respondent Kan Pacific Saipan, LTD, Petitioner Kouichi Taniguchi filed suit against the company for negligence. The district court granted summary judgment in Kan Pacific’s favor, and also awarded the company costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6); the award included costs incurred in translating various documents from Japanese to English. The Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision, holding that the phrase “compensation of interpreters” in § 1920(6) applies to written translations, in addition to verbal interpretations. Taniguchi now appeals, arguing that the statute’s plain meaning, structure, and legislative history indicate that the term “interpreters” should be limited to oral translators of spoken language. The Supreme Court will decide whether litigants can recover for non-verbal translation costs; this decision has the potential to increase recoverable court costs, and to deter meritorious litigation.

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Faced with a prison sentence of more than fifteen years for committing three “violent felonies” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), Marcus Sykes is challenging the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling that his conviction under Indiana law for fleeing from law enforcement officers in a vehicle constitutes a “violent felony.” Sykes argues that classifying his offense as a “violent felony” presumes that there is violence associated with flight from police. According to Sykes, such speculation by the courts may undermine the Sixth Amendment rights of individuals faced with a mandatory sentence enhancement and is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling that other offenses with a similar propensity for violence are not “violent felonies.” However, the United States contends that fleeing from police in a vehicle is both violent in nature and in practice, as it poses a risk of serious harm to law enforcement officers and members of the public. In light of this danger of violence, the United States believes that the Seventh Circuit properly treated vehicular flight as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. The Supreme Court’s decision would help resolve the disagreement between the Seventh and the Eleventh Circuit over this issue.

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