Issues

This case will have important repercussions for two seemingly disconnected areas of the law: the methods available for defendants to challenge courtroom procedures and the delineation of the jurisdictional boundaries of courts of appeals. The issue in this case is whether the Ninth Circuit had constitutional and statutory authority to hear an interlocutory appeal challenging a policy that all defendants appearing in pretrial proceedings must wear physical restraints. On the one hand, the United States argues that the Ninth Circuit lacked statutory authority because the appeal fell into neither the collateral-order exception nor the ambit of the All Writs Act, and lacked constitutional authority because the claims were moot. On the other hand, Sanchez-Gomez et al. contend that the Ninth Circuit had statutory authority under either the collateral-order exception or the All Writs Act, and had constitutional authority because their claims fell into the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness. The case will either open or close a novel avenue for criminal litigants to challenge courtroom policies.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

In American Pipe, the Court held that the statute of limitations is tolled for an individual that files an action after a related class action fails. This case asks the Court to decide whether American Pipe tolling also applies to subsequent class actions. China Agritech, Inc. argues that American Pipe tolling should not apply to subsequent class actions, because such an extension would be inequitable and would conflict with the rationale surrounding current law on class action procedures. Michael Resh counters that American Pipe tolling should apply to subsequent class actions because such an extension would be both equitable and consistent with current law and precedent. The Supreme Court’s ruling could potentially relax the urgency and attentiveness required of class action members, or emphasize the importance of awareness and involvement individuals must display to share in the judgment won by the asserted members of their class. The decision could also implicate burdens on the courts, separation of powers issues, and practical considerations for class action plaintiffs and defendants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether Erik Hughes is eligible for a sentence reduction even though he pled guilty with a binding sentence agreement. Hughes pled guilty to drug and firearm charges and received a 180-month sentence, which, at the time, was just below the range recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines of between 188 and 235 months. Since his sentencing, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines, reducing the sentencing range for Hughes’s crime to between 151 and 188 months. Hughes sought to modify his sentence under 15 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which requires a sentence to be based on the Guidelines. The Eleventh Circuit denied modification based on Freeman v. United States, in which the Supreme Court held that sentences from plea deals are not based on the Guidelines, but Hughes contends that the circuit court incorrectly applied the 4-1-4 decision. Hughes also argues that he is eligible for a modification because his sentence is based on the Guidelines under a tort theory of proximate cause. The United States responds that the connection between the Guidelines, the plea agreement, and the sentencing is too tenuous. At stake are an important question of what portions of a plurality decision should bind lower courts, potential inequities regarding parties who may and may not have their sentences reduced, and a shift in power in plea negotiations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

Koons and his co-petitioners were convicted of federal drug charges but received sentences below the statutory minimum because they “substantially assist[ed]” the government. The United States Sentencing Commission subsequently retroactively reduced the sentencing guidelines ranges for the crimes for which they were sentenced. Koons sought a further sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which provides for a sentence reduction when the initial sentencing was based on a sentencing range that had been subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission. Koons argues he is eligible for the sentence reduction because the Sentencing Guidelines were initially consulted in determining his sentencing range. The United States counters that he is ineligible for the sentence reduction because his sentence was ultimately based on the statutorily prescribed minimum sentence. The decision in this case has implications for sentencing disparities, the influence of mandatory minimums, and the power of the Sentencing Commission.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

In 2012 the State of Maryland, under Democratic Governor Martin O’Malley, and with the help of NCEC Services, a company specializing in electoral analytics and political strategy, redrew its Sixth Congressional District to comply with one-person-one-vote rules. This resulted in the exclusion of approximately 66,000 registered Republicans and the inclusion of 24,000 Democrats in the District. O. John Benisek alleges that the new Sixth District was the result of backdoor meetings intended to consolidate Democratic control of the District. Linda Lamone, the State Administrator of Elections, on the other hand, contends that the current district lines more closely resemble the historic party composition of the voters. Benisek argues that this redistricting treats Republicans unfavorably in violation of the First Amendment. Lamone counters that this is not a valid claim in court because no rigorous judicial standard can be created to assess the impact of gerrymandering in redistricting efforts. Lamone contends that the Plaintiffs cannot put forth a clear, neutral, and judicially manageable standard for these cases, and thus the political process should resolve the issue. But Benisek responds that this is a First Amendment case where the correct inquiry is whether voters suffered retaliation for their political beliefs. The outcome of this case will have implications for the proper role of the legislature and the judiciary in the redistricting process and for levels of citizen civic engagement and political influence.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

The Supreme Court will decide whether the application of a revocation-upon-divorce statute—a state law that automatically revokes the beneficiary status of a policyholder’s former spouse after a divorce—to a contract signed prior to the enactment of the statute violates the Contracts Clause. The Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” Petitioners Ashley Sveen and Antone Sveen (“the Sveens”) argue that the application of Minnesota’s revocation-upon-divorce statute to a life insurance policy that the decedent, Mark Sveen, purchased before the enactment of the statute is a valid exercise of the State’s authority to regulate divorce. The Sveens claim that the Minnesota statute does not violate the Contracts Clause because it serves a legitimate public interest and does not substantially impair contractual obligations. Respondent Kaye Melin counters that the original purpose of the Contracts Clause was to prevent legislative interference with private contracts and that modern courts should interpret it as such. Melin argues that the retroactive application of the Minnesota statute would not survive under the original meaning of the Contracts Clause and that the application also violates the Contracts Clause as it is currently understood. This case will provide clarity regarding courts’ disagreement as to the appropriate interpretation of the Contracts Clause and will affect the way in which estates are settled.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case will determine how much a state can force a medical provider to say when that speech is antithetical to the provider’s religious beliefs. California’s Reproductive FACT Act (“the Act”) requires licensed pregnancy-service facilities to disseminate a notice stating that: “California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women” and providing a phone number that patients can call to seek more information. The Act also requires unlicensed clinics to distribute a notice disclosing that they are not licensed by the state. The National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (“NIFLA”) argues that the Act unconstitutionally compels speech and should be subjected to strict scrutiny, which it cannot survive. NIFLA further contends that the Act discriminates impermissibly against pro-life clinics based on their viewpoint. California responds that the Act is a permissible exercise of the government’s authority to regulate speech between professionals and their clients, which survives any level of scrutiny. California also claims that the Act addresses fraudulent practices affecting women’s understanding of their reproductive healthcare choices and does not suppress pro-life viewpoints. Will free speech prevail over regulation of doctors and will the result benefit pregnant women?

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether there will be an exception to the rule of tribal sovereign immunity when a tribe is sued in an in rem proceeding. Petitioner Upper Skagit Indian Tribe argues that there should not be an exception for in rem proceedings because actions against a tribe’s land challenge its sovereignty and cannot be distinguished from in personam actions in the way they affect a tribe’s personal interests. The Upper Skagit Indian Tribe asserts that because the Court has never recognized this exception it is up to Congress instead to weigh the policy considerations at issue and create new legislation if necessary. Respondents Sharline and Ray Lundgren argue that the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe does not have sovereignty over the land at issue because it lost title to the land in 1855 and cannot regain sovereignty through a commercial purchase, which is how it got the land back in 2013. Furthermore, the Lundgrens argue that there should be an exception to tribal sovereign immunity for cases of in rem jurisdiction because of the state interest in regulating the conditions of title to property within its territory. This case will determine whether there will be a new class of cases in which a private individual can subject an Indian tribe to a lawsuit.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

The Supreme Court will determine whether American Express can contractually prevent merchants from steering customers’ credit-card choice at point-of-sale. The Second Circuit reversed the lower court, deciding in favor of American Express because of insufficient proof of anticompetitive effects in light of benefits captured by assessing both the merchant and customer sides of the market. Several states, joined by the United States, argue that American Express’s anti-steering provisions burden consumers and merchants by increasing prices. American Express counters that price increases correspond to increases in product value. If the Court upholds the Second Circuit’s test that considers both sides of a two-sided market, this would significantly change the long-standing approach to assessing antitrust claims, and affect the way the credit card market operates.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case will decide whether public-sector workers represented by a union can be required to pay agency fees. Janus argues that requiring public-sector workers to pay agency fees constitutes compelled speech and association, imposing undue restrictions on workers’ First Amendment rights. The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (“AFSCME”) argues that imposing agency fees on all workers allows unions to appropriately and fairly represent all workers’ interests, which unions are legally required to do. This issue affects every dues-paying, public sector worker. Accordingly, this case will impact the way unions organize and represent public-sector workers.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources