Wood v. Allen

Issues

Whether the scope of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act requires a federal court to conduct its own fact-finding, and to what degree, when determining the reasonableness of state court decisions regarding habeas corpus petitions under the Act.

 

In 1994, Petitioner Holly Wood was convicted of capital murder for sneaking into his ex-girlfriend’s bedroom and shooting her in the head with a shotgun. The judge imposed the death penalty, as recommended by the jury. Wood claims that, during sentencing, he did not receive effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. He argues that defense counsel failed to further investigate or present evidence of his mental disabilities. According to Wood, the state court’s rejection of this argument was an unreasonable application of federal law. He also argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s standard of review in habeas corpus proceedings abdicates the court’s judicial review function under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The State of Alabama counters that the Eleventh Circuit properly deferred to the reasonable determinations of the state courts as required by the AEDPA. This decision will better define the appropriate level of deference due to state court factual determinations during federal habeas corpus proceedings.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether a state court’s decision on post-conviction review is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts when it concludes that, during the sentencing phase of a capital case, the failure of a novice attorney with no criminal law experience to pursue or present evidence of defendant’s severely impaired mental functioning was a strategic decision, while the court ignores evidence in the record before it that demonstrates otherwise?

2. Whether the rule followed by some circuits, including the majority in this case, abdicates the court’s judicial review function under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act by failing to determine whether a state court decision was unreasonable in light of the entire state court record and instead focusing solely on whether there is clear and convincing evidence in that record to rebut certain subsidiary factual findings?

In 1993, while on parole for shooting another former girlfriend, petitioner Holly Wood snuck into the bedroom of his ex-girlfriend while she slept and fatally shot her in the head with a shotgun. See Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1283–84 (11th Cir.

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·          Annotated U.S. Constitution: Sixth Amendment

·          Wex: Law about Criminal Procedure

·          Federation of American Scientists, Charles Doyle: Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty (Jun. 3, 1996)

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Wittman v. Personhuballah

Issues

  1. Did the Virginia Legislature impermissibly use race as a predominant factor in creating its Third Congressional District?
  2. And do Republican congressmen, alleging that the redistricting process hurt them politically, have standing to challenge the ruling that struck down the original redistricting plan? 

 

In 2012, Virginia’s congressional redistricting plan increased the Third Congressional District’s black voting-age population from 53.1 percent to 56.3 percent. The Supreme Court will consider whether the Virginia’s redistricting plan impermissibly relied on race in drawing congressional districts, and whether Republican congressmen have standing to appeal the lower court’s ruling, which struck down the original plan. The appellants in this case including Congressman Wittman contend that political considerations, not race, predominated the redistricting plan. They also argue that the Republican congressmen were injured because the redistricting plan affected their reelection chances. But several voters including Gloria Personhuballah argue that the Third District was drawn with race as the predominant factor. Personhuballah maintains that the Republican congressmen lack standing because they have not suffered any injury as a result of redistricting. This case could change who can challenge potentially discriminatory redistricting plans, and what constitutes racial gerrymandering. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Did the court below err in failing to make the required finding that race rather than politics predominated in District 3, where there is no dispute that politics explains the Enacted Plan?


2. Did the court below err in relieving Plaintiffs of their burden to show an alternative plan that achieves the Legislature’s political goals, is comparably consistent with traditional districting principles, and brings about greater racial balance than the Enacted Plan?

3. Regardless of any other error, was the court below’s finding of a Shaw violation based on clearly erroneous fact-finding?

4. Did the majority err in holding that the Enacted Plan fails strict scrutiny because it increased District 3’s black voting-age population percentage above the benchmark percentage, when the undisputed evidence establishes that the increase better complies with neutral principles than would reducing the percentage and no racial bloc voting analysis would support a reduction capable of realistically securing Section 5 preclearance?

5. Do Appellants have standing to appeal where it is undisputed that any judicial remedy will change at least one district represented by an Appellant and harm that Appellant’s re-election chances and interests as a Republican voter?

In 2012, the Virginia legislature approved a congressional districting plan (the “2012 plan”). See Page v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, Civil Action No. 3:13cv678, 2015 WL 3604029, at *3 (E.D. Va.

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Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission

Issues

Although McConnell v. FEC upheld the primary definition of electioneering communications, did it also preclude parties from challenging the application of that definition to prohibit certain forms of broadcast advertisements? 

 

Plaintiff Wisconsin Right to Life broadcasted three advertisements condemning the Senate for filibustering President Bush’s judicial nominees and urging viewers to contact Senator Feingold who was campaigning for reelection at the time. Wisconsin Right to Life believed that continued broadcasting of the ads would violate the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s prohibition on electioneering communications. Accordingly, Wisconsin Right to Life filed suit to request an injunction against the Federal Election Commission for possible enforcement of the restrictions on electioneering against Wisconsin Right to Life, and a judgment that the definition of electioneering, as applied to Wisconsin Right to Life’s ads, violated the Constitution. The court relied on a prior Supreme Court case, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, to dismiss Wisconsin Right to Life’s “as-applied” challenge. Wisconsin Right to Life now argues that McConnell did not, indeed could not, preclude as-applied challenges and that the ads were a permitted form of grassroots lobbying, not electioneering. The Federal Election Commission argues that McConnell squarely precluded as-applied challenges and that Wisconsin Right to Life’s distinction between grassroots lobbying and electioneering is a line drawn in the sand on a windy day.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether as-applied challenges are permitted to the prohibition on corporate disbursements for electioneering communications at 2 U.S.C. § 441b after McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)?

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Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Issues

Whether under NEPA the CEQ could make "alternative arrangements" that allowed the Navy to continue using MFA sonar in its training exercises off the coast of southern California without filing an EIS because the District Court’s conditional preliminary injunction constituted "emergency circumstances."

Whether the District Court abused its discretion by issuing a preliminary injunction on the "mere possibility of irreparable harm," and also by not deferring to the CEQ’s findings.

 

On March 22, 2007, the Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") sued the United States Navy in the District Court for the Central District of California to enjoin the Navy from conducting training exercises off the coast of southern California. Specifically, the NRDC sought to prevent the Navy from using mid-frequency active ("MFA") sonar during these exercises because such use harmed whales and other marine mammals, in violation of several environmental laws. The District Court concluded in January 2008 that NRDC had proven that allowing the exercises to continue would cause near certain harm to the environment and issued a preliminary injunction. In response to the injunction, both the President and the Council for Environmental Quality ("CEQ") exempted the Navy from two environmental statutes, finding that emergency circumstances existed which allowed the training to continue. The District Court, however, found the exemptions were improper and upheld its preliminary injunction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Navy challenges this decision by arguing that courts below used too lax of a standard when deciding that a preliminary injunction was justified and that the judiciary improperly interfered with the executive branch’s authority to control the military. How the Supreme Court decides this case will not only reflect its view on balancing environmental protection and national security, but also clarify the roles each Federal branch has in these matters.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether CEQ permissibly construed its own regulation in finding "emergency circumstances."

2. Whether, in any event, the preliminary injunction, based on a preliminary finding that the Navy had not satisfied NEPA’s procedural requirements, is inconsistent with established equitable principles limiting discretionary injunctive relief.

The United States Navy uses mid-frequency active ("MFA") sonar to detect submerged submarines. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 664 (9th Cir. 2008) (hereinafter NRDC).

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Winkelman v. Parma City School District

Issues

When are parents able to bring Individuals with Disabilities Education Act claims, for themselves or their children, without legal counsel?

 

Jeff and Sandee Winkelman contested the adequacy of their eight-year-old autistic son’s “Individual Education Plan,” designed by Parma City School District, under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). Both the administrative hearing board and the federal district court that heard the Winkelmans’ claim approved the plan. The Winkelmans appealed the decision without a lawyer. The court of appeals dismissed the Winkelmans’ claim, holding that parents are barred from litigating IDEA claims pro se on behalf of their children. The Winkelmans argue that IDEA permits pro se litigation, while Parma City claims educational policy and precedent suggest otherwise. Courts of appeals are split on whether parents can litigate pro se their own procedural IDEA claims, their children’s substantive IDEA claims, or neither. The case will settle the split and define the scope of parental rights under IDEA and pro se litigation under federal law in general.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, and if so, under what circumstances, non-lawyer parents of a disabled child may prosecute an Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, 20 U.S.C § 1400 et seq., case pro se in federal court?

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2003), states and local school boards receive federal grants for assistance in educating children with disabilities. Any state receiving federal funds must provide each enrolling disabled child with a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE), which includes special education and related services tailored to the child’s needs. 20 U.S.C.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors Michael Heise and Andrea Mooney for their insight into this case.

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Williams v. Pennsylvania

Issues

Do the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require an appellate judge’s recusal in a capital punishment appeal when the judge, previously a district attorney, oversaw the office that prosecuted the same case?

 

In 1984, Terrance Williams was sentenced to death for the murder of Amos Norwood. After successfully receiving post-conviction sentencing relief in 2012, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed and reinstated Williams’ sentence. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require the recusal of an appellate judge—here Pennsylvania Chief Justice Ronald Castille—from participation in a capital punishment appeal when the judge led the District Attorney’s Office that prosecuted the same case. Williams argues that due process compels recusal, given the risk of potential bias and partiality that may taint both the judge’s decision-making and the reviewing tribunal’s impartiality. However, Pennsylvania argues that Justice Castille’s recusal was not constitutionally required under the Court’s holding in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), nor was his presence on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. This case will impact an appellate judge’s ability to make discretionary determinations regarding his or her own recusal.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments violated where the presiding Chief Justice of a state supreme court declines to recuse himself in a capital case where he had personally approved the decision to pursue capital punishment against Petitioner in his prior capacity as elected District Attorney and continued to head the District Attorney’s office that defended the death verdict on appeal; where, in his state supreme court election campaign, the Chief Justice expressed strong support for capital punishment, with reference to the number of defendants he had “sent” to death row, including Petitioner; and where he then, as Chief Justice, reviewed a ruling by the state post-conviction court that his office committed prosecutorial misconduct under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), when it prosecuted and sought death against Petitioner?
  2. Whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments violated by the participation of a potentially biased jurist on a multimember tribunal deciding a capital case, regardless of whether his vote is ultimately decisive?

On June 11, 1984, Terrance Williams and Marc Draper robbed and murdered Amos Norwood.  See Brief for Petitioner at 4.  The Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, under the leadership of then-District Attorney Ronald Castille, prosecuted the defendants.  

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Williams v. Illinois

Issues

Does it violate the Confrontation Clause to allow an expert witness, who did not prepare the forensic DNA report, to give testimony concerning the report?

 

Petitioner, Sandy Williams, was charged with sexual assault on 22-year-old L.J in 2000. At trial, the prosecution called an expert witness to testify about DNA test results that identified Williams as the assailant. He moved to strike the evidence under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause because the testifying witness had not performed the DNA tests. The court denied his motion and convicted Williams of sexual assault, kidnapping, and robbery. He contends that allowing an expert witness to testify regarding forensic reports when the witness did not prepare the reports violates the Confrontation Clause. Williams insists that he must have the opportunity to cross-examine the analysts that prepared the reports, particularly because DNA test results are prone to error or manipulation. Respondent, the State of Illinois, argues that allowing the expert witness to testify does not violate the Confrontation Clause because the witness was applying her own independent analysis and opinions concerning the report.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a state rule of evidence allowing an expert witness to testify about the results of DNA testing performed by non-testifying analysts, where the defendant has no opportunity to confront the actual analysts, violates the Confrontation Clause.

On February 10, 2000, 22-year-old L.J. walked home after her shift as a clothing store cashier in Chicago. See People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 129 (Ill. 2010). L.J.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

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Will v. Hallock

Issues

(1) When an individual's suit against the government, brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, is dismissed due to an exception to the government waiver of sovereign immunity, may a second suit on the same grounds be brought against government employees?

(2) Was the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit the proper forum for an interlocutory appeal from the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss the second suit against the government employees?

 

Under the Federal Tort Claims ACT ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. ? 1346(b), the federal government must waive its sovereign immunity from suit to allow private parties to sue the United States for torts committed by federal employees during the scope of their employment. The FTCA also has a judgment bar provision, 28 U.S.C. ? 2676, which prevents a plaintiff from suing multiple times on the same FTCA claim. This case originated when Respondent Susan Hallock brought a claim under the FTCA against the United States after the federal government improperly seized and damaged her property. Her suit was subsequently dismissed because the claim fell within one of the exceptions to the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA. Petitioners Richard Will and his fellow Customs Services agents now argue that the dismissal of Susan Hallock's FTCA claim should bar Hallock from bringing the same claim under the FTCA against the federal employees involved in the seizure of her property. Ultimately, the Court must decide whether general res judicata principles should apply to bar Hallock's suit. The Court's decision may have large implications for The Court's decision may have large implications for judgment finality, and it may also have substantive implications for federal employees' amenability to suit under the FTCA.

As an initial matter, however, the Court must decide whether Will's interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit was premature because the district court litigation did not formally conclude. Consequently, the Court may not even address the issue of the judgment bar provision's applicability, and the significance of the Court's decision will rest solely on its analysis of the collateral order doctrine.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether a final judgment in an action brought under 28 U.S.C. ? 1346(b) of the Federal Tort Claims Act, dismissing the claim on the ground that relief is precluded by one of the FTCA's exceptions to liability, 28 U.S.C. ? 2680, bars a subsequent action by the claimant against the federal employees whose acts gave rise to the FTCA claim?

(2) Did the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal of the District Court's order denying a motion to dismiss under the FTCA's judgment bar, 28 U.S.C. ? 2676?

Plaintiff Susan Hallock and her husband Richard Hallock operated a computer software business out of their home in Mohawk, New York. See Hallock v. Bonner, 387 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 2004).

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Whorton v. Bockting

Issues

1. Does the new ruling in Crawford v. Washington, that a witness must have been cross–examined in order for their hearsay testimony to be admitted as evidence, “significantly improve the pre-existing fact-finding procedures” and “implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial,” allowing it to apply retroactively?

2. Does 28 U.S.C. § 2254 incorporate the analysis from Teague v. Lane to allow federal courts to review cases decided correctly under then-current law, but rendered incorrect by subsequent Supreme Court decisions?

 

Marvin Bockting, a criminal defendant, was convicted of rape and sentenced to life in prison by a Nevada Court. He challenges the constitutionality of the court’s admitting hearsay testimony of his victim without opportunity for cross-examination. While no such requirement was in place at the time of his conviction, the Supreme Court has since decided that such cross-examination is necessary for the admission of hearsay testimony. The Supreme Court is now asked to determine whether this new rule must be retroactively applied. This case will represent another data point in the set defining the scope of retroactivity of criminal procedure rules. Moreover, it will clarify federal courts’ powers to hear cases on writs of habeas corpus when the issue at hand is the retroactive application of a criminal procedure rule.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether, in direct conflict with the published opinions of the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth circuits, the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that this court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) regarding the admissibility of testimonial hearsay evidence under the Sixth Amendment, applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.

2. Whether the Ninth Circuit's ruling that Crawford applies retroactively to cases on collateral review violates this court's ruling in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).

3. Whether, in direct conflict with the published decisions of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (1) and (2) adopted the Teague exceptions for private conduct which is beyond criminal proscription and watershed rules.

Autumn, a six year old girl, lived with her mother, Laura, and step-father, Marvin Bockting, in a one room motel room in Las Vegas, Nevada. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1013 (2005). One evening Autumn awoke upset.

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Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt

Issues

Can a state enforce laws that significantly reduce the availability of abortion services while failing to advance any valid interest, including the state’s interest in promoting health?

 

In 2013, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 2 (“H.B. 2”), which imposed new requirements on abortion clinics. For example, H.B. 2 required a physician performing an abortion to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the abortion clinic. Whole Woman’s Health, a private abortion clinic, sued the state of Texas to lift the new restrictions. The Supreme Court will determine whether a state can enforce laws that significantly reduce the availability of abortion services while failing to advance any valid interest, including the state’s interest in promoting health. Whole Woman’s Health argues that H.B. 2 imposes an undue burden on women’s access to abortions. Hellerstedt contends that H.B. 2’s justification of improving patient health is supported by substantial evidence, and H.B. 2 will not impose a burden in the majority of cases. This case implicates H.B. 2’s effect on women’s health and H.B. 2’s imposed costs on women seeking abortions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1a. When applying the Due Process Clause standard associated with the Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey decision, does a court err by refusing to consider whether and to what extent laws that restrict abortion for the stated purpose of promoting health actually serve the government’s interest in promoting health?



1b. Did the Fifth Circuit err in concluding that this standard permits Texas to enforce, in nearly all circumstances, laws that would cause a significant reduction in the availability of abortion services while failing to advance the State’s interest in promoting health—or any other valid interest?

2. Did the Fifth Circuit err in holding that res judicata provides a basis for reversing the district court’s judgment in part?

In 2013, Texas passed House Bill Two (“H.B. 2”), which places specific requirements on abortion clinics. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) at 576. The Texas Legislature stated that it enacted H.B.

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