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This case gives the Supreme Court an opportunity to determine whether a dispute over the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act’s (“FAA”) Section 1 exemption is an arbitrable issue pursuant to a valid delegation clause. Additionally, the Court has the opportunity to decide whether the Section 1 exemption for contracts of employment includes, as a matter of law, independent contractor agreements. Section 1 of the FAA carves out an exception from the Act’s applicability for contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, and other classes of workers engaged in interstate commerce. New Prime argues that the delegation clause covers threshold disputes such as the applicability of the FAA and that the phrase “contract of employment” does not include independent contractor agreements. Oliveira counters that courts must first determine the applicability of the FAA before requiring arbitration and also that the ordinary meaning of “contracts of employment” at the time the FAA was enacted included independent contractor agreements. The Supreme Court’s decision has implications for the trucking industry and will likely influence whether this industry will continue to resort to arbitration to resolve disputes.

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Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., parents and schools work together to come up with an appropriate Individualized Education Program ("IEP") for children with special educational needs. When the two parties cannot come to an agreement on the appropriateness or the sufficiency of an IEP the IDEA provides for an “impartial due process hearing,” which either party can initiate, to challenge the IEP at hand. The IDEA is silent as to who has the burden of proof at these hearings. The Court granted certiorari in order to determine to which party the burden should be allocated—the parents or the school. In this case, as in many IEP challenges, the question of burden is outcome determinative. Petitioner argues that principles of due process as well as policy and fairness compel allocation of the burden to the school in all IEP challenges. Respondents argue that Congress intended the burden to be allocated to the party initiating the hearing and seeking relief, as is the customary rule when legislation fails to specifically allocate the burden. The decision in this case will have far reaching implications for children with special educational needs and their families, educational funding, taxpayers, and the IDEA program as a whole.

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In 1981 the City of San Francisco enacted the Hotel Conversion Ordinance ("the HCO") in order to stem the depletion of housing for the poor, elderly, and disabled by controlling the conversion of hotel units from residential to tourist use. The HCO, as revised in 1990, places harsh requirements on the owners of hotels who want to convert their property from residential to tourist use. These requirements include the construction of a new residential unit for each unit that is converted, or a payment to the city of 80 percent of the cost of constructing such a replacement. The owners of the San Remo Hotel sought to convert their hotel from residential to tourist use, and challenged the legality of the HCO under the takings clause of the California constitution. The California Supreme Court upheld the HCO, and the owners of the hotel then challenged it in federal court under the takings clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, ruled that they were precluded from raising this issue by virtue of the state court's prior ruling.

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In 1996 the California Legislature adopted Penal Code section 3067, mandating that every prisoner eligible for release on state parole “shall agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause.” Petitioner Samson is a parolee who was arrested for drug possession after a search that was instigated solely because of his parolee status. Samson argues that under the Fourth Amendment he enjoys a diminished yet reasonable expectation to privacy that is eliminated by California’s 1996 parole search condition, which Samson claims “confers unfettered discretion on law enforcement officers to conduct searches of parolees.” The Supreme Court will have to decide whether a parolee's diminished expectation of privacy makes parolees subject to searches where there is no suspicion at all of any wrongdoing.

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Numerous plaintiffs filed claims against Mohamed Ali Samantar, the former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Somalia, alleging that he was personally liable for a systematic use of torture and killing of civilians by Somali intelligence agencies during the 1980s. The district court found that Samantar was immune to these charges under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) and dismissed the case. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statutory language of FSIA does not cover either current or former government officials. In determining the scope of the FSIA as it relates to individuals, the Supreme Court will have an opportunity to clarify the language of the statute and resolve ambiguities between the FSIA and other immunity statutes. The decision could have a major impact on United States international relations by altering the immunity enjoyed by U.S. officials abroad and influencing the number of international claims in U.S. courts.

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The Indian Self–Determination and Education Assistance Act (“ISDA”) allows Indian tribes to implement programs previously administered by the federal government. The government must reimburse tribes using Congressional appropriations for any reasonable implementation costs, known as contract support costs (“CSCs”). However, Congress appropriated insufficient funds to cover all of the tribes’ CSCs and the government failed to fully reimburse respondents, including the Ramah Navajo Chapter (“Ramah”). The district court determined that the government was not required to pay Ramah’s CSCs due to exhausted appropriations, but the Tenth Circuit held that a tribe can fully recover if Congress appropriated sufficient funds to cover their individual contracts. The government now appeals, arguing thatthe total sum of recoverable CSCs is limited to the appropriation. The Supreme Court’s decision may impact Congress’s ability to limit spending and the government’s perceived reliability as a contract partner.

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Salazar v. Buono concerns the Establishment Clause and a Latin cross on federal land. In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars(“VFW”) erected a large Latin cross on Sunrise Rock in San Bernardino, California, commemorating veterans of World War I. In 2004, ten years after Sunrise Rock became federal parkland, Frank Buono sued the Secretary of the Interior. Buono argued that the cross’ presence on federal land violated the Establishment Clause. Buono won. While the case was on appeal, Congress attempted to transfer the land to the VFW. After the Court of Appeals affirmed Buono’s victory, Buono moved to enforce the judgment. The District Court then blocked the land transfer and ordered the removal of the cross. The Court of Appeals affirmed that enforcement action. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether Buono had standing to challenge the cross’ presence in the first place, and if he did, whether transfer to a private party corrects the Establishment Clause violation. This case may have implications for standing doctrine in religious injury cases. Furthermore, this case may provide guidance on the use of land transfer as a means to resolve Establishment Clause violations.

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Safford middle school officials strip-searched thirteen-year-old Savana Redding, seeking prescription-strength ibuprofen pills based on uncorroborated information from another student that Savana possessed ibuprofen in an unspecified time and location. This case concerns whether the school violated Redding's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and, if so, whether qualified immunity shields the school officials from liability. After a District Court and a Ninth Circuit panel found the search to be lawful, the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc; it reversed and held that qualified immunity did not protect the school official who ordered the search. Petitioners Safford Unified School District #1, et al. argue that the search was reasonable given the fellow student's tip and the threat of prescription drug abuse, but that even if it was not, school officials must have qualified immunity so they are free to exercise their judgment regarding drug abuse in schools. They argue that a decision in Respondent's favor would hamper school officials' ability to respond in the face of threats to student safety in school. Respondent April Redding argues that a strip search was unreasonable because the school lacked any indication that Savana had pills hidden in her undergarments, and that the school officials should be held responsible. She argues that a decision for Petitioner would enable school officials to conduct highly invasive searches based on only minimal, vague suspicion. This case promises guidance both to school officials seeking to carry out their duties effectively without violating students' rights and to lower courts responsible for assessing school officials' conduct.

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After Petitioners Chantell and Michael Sackett began construction on their land, they received a compliance order from Respondent, the Environmental Protection Agency, informing them that their construction project violated the Clean Water Act because it filled in protected wetlands. The Sacketts sought pre-enforcement judicial review of the compliance order under the Administrative Procedure Act, but were denied. The Sacketts assert that Congress intended to provide for pre-enforcement judicial review, and that without such review, the compliance order violates their due process rights. The Environmental Protection Agency maintains that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of compliance orders under the Administrative Procedure Act because compliance orders are not self-executing. The Environmental Protection Agency argues that sufficient procedural safeguards exist under the Clean Water Act to provide adequate review before any penalties are enforced. The Supreme Court's decision will impact the ability of regulated parties to seek review of compliance orders, and will determine what methods the Environmental Protection Agency can utilize to respond to environmental emergencies.

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Section 401 of the Clean Water Act requires that a facility requiring a federal license, such as a nuclear power plant, must receive state water quality certification when it engages in activities “which may result in any discharge” into lakes and rivers. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether water flowing through hydroelectric dams constitutes a “discharge.” Petitioner Warren argues that the mere flow of water through an existing dam does not constitute a discharge on the grounds that the Supreme Court had previously held in the Miccosukee case that the term “discharge” requires an addition of water to the existing flow from a distinct body of water, and thus does not refer to the removal and replacement of water from and to the same body of water. Florida Water Mgmt. Dis. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95 (2004). Respondent Maine Board of Environmental Protection and other respondents contend that state water quality certification is required for dams because the definition of discharge used in the Miccosukee case can be distinguished from this case via two main avenues. First, respondents argue that Miccosukee dealt with Section 402 of the Clean Water Act, and is not necessarily binding in this case. Congress’ intent in enacting Section 402, respondents argue, was to regulate pollutants added to the nation’s waters, while Section 401 was aimed at water regulation generally and as such the definition of discharge in Section 401 includes water flowing through dams. Respondents also attempt to distinguish the Miccosukeerequirement of an addition of water to the existing flow of water by interpreting “discharge” under the plain meaning of the term. The definition of “discharge,” respondents claim, includes the Miccosukee requirement, but is not limited by it; hydroelectric dams are thus subject to state regulation because the more expansive plain meaning of “discharge” includes the discharge of water from a dam even without an addition to the flow. The resolution of the conflicting definitions followed by Miccosukee and state environmental protection boards will have far-reaching effects on the profitability and efficiency of hydroelectric dams throughout the nation, energy production generally, and the environment.

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