FCC v. AT&T Inc.

Issues

Whether a corporation, like an individual, has “personal privacy” that could be violated by disclosure of facts obtained during a law enforcement investigation.

 

The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) generally allows access to, and disclosure of, federal information and records to those who requested them, subject to some exceptions, including one for a disclosure that would constitute an invasion of “personal privacy.” Following a recent investigation of Respondent AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”) by Petitioner the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), Respondent CompTel, a non-profit trade association, requested under FOIA all of the records and information pertaining to the FCC’s investigation. In allowing disclosure of some of the information, the FCC rejected AT&T’s argument that such disclosure would constitute an invasion of “personal privacy,” holding that this exception was strictly limited to individuals. AT&T appealed to the Third Circuit, which held that a corporation may have “personal privacy” interests and remanded to the FCC. AT&T argues that the term “personal privacy” applies to corporations as well as individuals, and the FCC argues that such a term is limited to individuals. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will determine the amount of protection given to corporations under FOIA and will likely affect the amount of access the public has to certain private corporate information.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Exemption 7(C) of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C), exempts from mandatory disclosure records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes when such disclosure could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of "personal privacy." The question presented is: Whether Exemption 7(C)'s protection for "personal privacy" protects the "privacy" of corporate entities.

Under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, federal agencies must disclose records to anyone who requests them, subject to certain exemptions. See AT&T v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 492 (3d Cir.

Written by

Edited by

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

Additional Resources

· Time, Adam Cohen: Why Companies Don’t Deserve Personal Privacy Rights (Dec. 15, 2010)

· Inside Counsel, Melissa Maleske: Supreme Court Will Decide if "Personal Privacy" under FOIA Applies to Corporations (Nov. 30, 2010)

· United States Department Of Justice: FOIA Request Handbook

Submit for publication
0

FAA v. Cooper

Issues

Whether a plaintiff suing under an invasion of privacy theory can recover for emotional and other nonpecuniary damages when the relevant statute’s language is ambiguous about the types of damages it covers.

 

A joint criminal investigation carried out by the Department of Transportation and the Social Security Administration revealed that Respondent Stanmore Cawthon Cooper failed to disclose that he had HIV to one agency, while simultaneously collecting medical benefits from the other. Upon being convicted for making these misrepresentations, Cooper brought suit against the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Transportation, and the Social Security Administration under the Privacy Act of 1974, arguing that the Government had unlawfully disclosed his HIV status. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that the Privacy Act’s language, which imposes liability on federal agencies only in cases where an individual suffered “actual damages,” does not cover Cooper’s allegations of emotional harm. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the term “actual damages” encompasses mental or emotional harm suffered. The FAA now appeals, arguing that the term “actual damages” is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the federal government to exclude noneconomic damages. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will address whether emotional and other noneconomic damages are “actual damages,” raising broad implications for future suits under the Privacy Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a plaintiff who alleges only mental and emotional injuries can establish "actual damages" within the meaning of the civil remedies provision of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a(g)(4)(A).

In 1985, Stanmore Cawthon Cooper, an airline pilot, was diagnosed with human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”). See Cooper v. FAA, 596 F.3d 538, 541 (9th Cir.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Shannon Nelson and Louis Alonzo Madden v. Colorado

Issues

Is Colorado’s requirement that defendants must prove their innocence by clear and convincing evidence after reversal of conviction of a crime, in order to have various monetary penalties returned to them, consistent with due process?

This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to decide the constitutionality of a statute requiring a defendant to initiate a civil case to obtain reimbursement of costs, fees, and restitution after the reversal of conviction of a crime. This case arises out of Shannon Nelson’s conviction for sexual assault, which was overturned after she served prison time and paid various fees. The Colorado Supreme Court found that due process did not require a refund because a defendant could receive compensation by filing a civil suit under the Exoneration Act. Nelson argues that Colorado’s requirement improperly places the burden of proof on the defendant to prove his or her innocence in order to recover fees paid for a conviction that was later overturned. Colorado asserts that Nelson did not necessarily have an automatic right to the refund of her criminal penalties and that, even if she did, Colorado’s requirement satisfies due process. This case poses questions about a state’s ability to affect the presumption of innocence through statutes that influence the scope of due process.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Colorado, like many states, imposes various monetary penalties when a person is convicted of a crime. But Colorado appears to be the only state that does not refund these penalties when a conviction is reversed. Rather, Colorado requires defendants to prove their innocence by clear and convincing evidence in a separate civil proceeding to get their money back. The Question Presented is whether this requirement is consistent with due process.

Petitioner Shannon Nelson was convicted in 2006 of sexual assault offenses against her children for which she began serving a prison term and incurred monetary charges, which the state of Colorado imposes on defendants who have been convicted. See Colorado v. Nelson, 2015 CO 68, No. 13SC495 (Colo. Dec. 21, 2015) at ¶2.

Written by

Edited by

Submit for publication
0

Lewis v. Clarke

Issues

Does a lawsuit against a tribal employee for an act he committed within the scope of his employment by the tribe violate tribal sovereign immunity?

With Lewis and Clarke, the Supreme Court will venture into the relatively unfamiliar legal territory of tribal sovereign immunity for individuals employed by Indian tribes. The case arises out of an automobile accident between Brian and Michelle Lewis and William Clarke, an employee of the Mohegan Sun Casino, which is owned by the Mohegan tribe. In a lawsuit brought by the Lewises, Clarke successfully convinced the Connecticut Supreme Court that he was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. The Lewises argue that sovereign immunity does not apply when a tribal employee is sued in his individual capacity because the finances of the tribe are not formally at risk. Clarke counters that the finances of the tribe are at risk in this suit, and thus, the sovereign immunity of the tribe should extend to him because he was acting within the scope of his tribal employment. To some, the voyage of Lewis and Clarke into the obscure realm of tribal sovereign immunity for individuals imperils tribal coffers; to others, the regulatory power of the states is at stake.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the sovereign immunity of an Indian tribe bars individual-capacity damages actions against tribal employees for torts committed within the scope of their employment.

Lewis and Clarke’s five-year voyage to the Supreme Court began on October 22, 2011 with the chance encounter of Brian and Michelle Lewis (“Lewis”) and William Clarke (“Clarke”) in Norwalk, Connecticut. See Lewis v. Clarke, 135 A.3d 677, 679 (Conn. 2016). At the time, Clarke was an employee of the Mohegan tribe and was responsible for transporting patrons of the Mohegan Sun Casino in a limousine to their homes.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker

Issues

Is a ship's owner subject to punitive damages for the acts of the ship's master if the court hasn't found that the owner directed, countenanced, or participated in those acts and the acts went against the owner's established policies?

If Congress has enacted a controlling statute that provides civil and criminal penalties for certain maritime conduct but does not provide for punitive damages, can a court impose punitive damages for the conduct under federal maritime common law?

Does federal maritime law allow punitive damages as high as those in this case?

 

In 1989 the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef, off the Alaska coast, spilling millions of gallons of oil into Prince William Sound. In the years following the spill, Exxon would pay millions of dollars in private claims and over a billion dollars to settle government suits under environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). An additional class action suit by private parties sought compensatory damages for economic harm, as well as punitive damages (a civil penalty for particularly egregious conduct). In the final suit, an Alaska district court awarded roughly $20 million in compensatory damages against Exxon-and $5 billion in punitive damages. The Ninth Circuit eventually reduced the punitive damages award to $2.5 billion but upheld the decision to award such damages. Exxon now asks the United States Supreme Court to strike down the award of punitive damages or reduce its amount. In addressing Exxon's petition, the Court must set maritime law standards for punitive damage awards against a ship's owner for acts of the ship's master. The Court will also consider whether Congress meant penalties under the CWA to be the full punishment for a spill, excluding punitive damages under maritime law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. May punitive damages be imposed under maritime law against a shipowner (as the Ninth Circuit held, contrary to decisions of the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits) for the conduct of a ship's master at sea, absent a finding that the owner directed, countenanced, or participated in that conduct, and even when the conduct was contrary to policies established and enforced by the owner?

2. When Congress has specified the criminal and civil penalties for maritime conduct in a controlling statute, here the Clean Water Act, but has not provided for punitive damages, may judge-made federal maritime law (as the Ninth Circuit held, contrary to decisions of the First, Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits) expand the penalties Congress provided by adding a punitive damages remedy?

3. Is this $2.5 billion punitive damages award, which is larger than the total of all punitive damages awards affirmed by all federal appellate courts in our history, within the limits allowed by federal maritime law?

The following facts are taken from Exxon v. Baker, 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007); Baker v. Exxon, 270 F.3d.1215 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F.Supp.2d 1043 (D.Alaska 2002); and the Encyclopedia of the Earth:

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors Trevor W. Morrison, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and W. Bradley Wendel for their insights into the Exxon v. Baker case.

Submit for publication
0

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger

Issues

Should there be a direct causal link between a litigant’s discovery misconduct and a compensatory sanction that a court imposes in response to such misconduct pursuant to the court’s inherent authority?

Respondents Leroy Haeger, et. al (“the Haegers”) were injured during a vehicle accident as a result of a failed tire, which was manufactured by Petitioner Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (“Goodyear”). After the case settled, the Haegers discovered that Goodyear did not disclose several tests that it performed on the tire; the Haegers then moved the court to sanction Goodyear for its discovery misconduct. The district court relied on its inherent powers to sanction Goodyear and its counsel. Goodyear argues that the Supreme Court should limit inherent authority sanctions to those fees and costs directly caused by the claimed misconduct. The Haegers argue that although compensatory damages must be causally linked to the sanctioned misconduct, when the sanctionable misconduct is not limited to a single, discrete instance, but instead is so pervasive as to undermine or affect the whole litigation, an award of the entire amount of attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the party who is victim to the misconduct may be appropriate to compensate that party. The outcome of this case could potentially affect the scope of district courts’ inherent power to impose sanctions for discovery misconduct, when the courts cannot rely on the Rules or other statutory authority. The case will show whether a more exacting causation standard or a more discretionary standard should be used by the district court to impose sanctions under its inherent powers. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Is a federal court required to tailor compensatory civil sanctions imposed under inherent powers to harm directly caused by sanctionable misconduct when the court does not afford sanctioned parties the protections of criminal due process?

BACKGROUND

In June 2003, Leroy Haeger, et al. (“the Haegers”) suffered serious injuries when, as they were driving on a highway, a Goodyear G159 tire on their vehicle failed, causing the vehicle to swerve off the road and overturn. Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 813 F.3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 2016). The Haegers sued Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (“Goodyear”) in Arizona state court, but Goodyear removed the case to federal court.

Written by

Edited by

Submit for publication
0

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.

 
In 1980, Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) and the Exxon (now Exxon Mobil Corp.) subsidiaries, Exxon Chemical Arabia, Inc (ECAI) and Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Company (Yanbu) created two joint venture entities: Yanpet and Kemya. SABIC entered into sublicensing agreements with the two entities under which both were to pay royalties for use of an exclusive gas-phase process to manufacture polyethylene. Nearly twenty years later, Exxon Mobil, Yanbu, and ECAI claimed that SABIC actually charged Yanpet and Kemya more than the amount of royalties actually agreed upon.
 
In 2000, SABIC sued Yanbu and ECAI in the Delaware Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the joint venture agreements had not been violated and that the royalty charges were correct. Exxon Mobil, Yanbu, and ECAI countersued in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking the converse declaratory judgment. In 2003, the Delaware Superior Court returned a verdict against SABIC. SABIC has appealed the verdict, which is currently pending. Prior to the state court trial, SABIC moved to dismiss Exxon Mobil's federal court action claiming foreign sovereign immunity. The motion was denied and SABIC then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The federal appeals court did not address the sovereign immunity issue but vacated the District Court's orders with instructions for dismissal, finding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred federal subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of Exxon and its subsidiaries because such was previously decided in the state court case. The Supreme Court faces the issue of whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars lower federal courts from conducting de facto appellate review of decisions by state courts, may be interpreted to incorporate preclusion principles and deny jurisdiction to federal courts because a pending state-court proceeding presents identical issues, notwithstanding the long-established system of dual federal and state jurisdiction.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars lower federal courts from conducting de facto appellate review of decisions by state courts, may be expansively interpreted to incorporate preclusion principles and divest federal courts of jurisdiction solely because a pending state-court proceeding presents identical issues, notwithstanding the long-established system of dual federal and state jurisdiction.
In 1980, Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) and the Exxon (now Exxon Mobil Corp.) subsidiaries, Exxon Chemical Arabia, Inc (ECAI) and Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Company (Yanbu) created two joint venture entities: Yanpet and Kemya. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 364 F.3d 102, 103 (3d. Cir. 2004). Yanpet was the joint venture between SABIC and Yanbu, and Kemya was the joint venture between SABIC and ECAI. Id. Both of these entities are limited liability partnerships engaged in the manufacturing of polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. v.
Submit for publication
0

Evenwel, et al. v. Abbott, et al.

Issues

Does the “one-person, one-vote” principle of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause permit states  to draw  their legislative districts on the basis of total population, or does it require States to use voter population?

 

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide the Fourteenth Amendment’s “one-person, one-vote” principle requires states to apportion eligible voters equally across districts. See Reply Brief for Appellants, Sue Evenwel et al. at 2. The Texas Constitution requires that the State legislature reapportion its legislative districts after each federal decennial census. See Evenwel et al. v. Perry et al., 14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, at 2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2014). In 2013, Texas adopted a new redistricting plan (“Plan S172”). See id. at 2. Texas drew its senatorial districts based only on total population. See id. at 2–3. Sue Evenwel is a registered Texas voter. See id. at 2. Evenwel argues that the one-person,  one-vote  principle requires states to divide their districts so that they each comprise a substantially equal number of eligible voters. See Brief for Appellants, Sue Evenwel et al. at 19. Texas Governor Greg Abbott contends that the Constitution does not require states to utilize any specific measure, and thus they are free to equalize districts on the basis of total population. See Brief for Appellees, Greg Abbott et al. at 43–44. The Court’s decision could affect the voting power of eligible voters, and the method and amount of data collection states must engage in to constitutionally apportion voting districts.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Did the three-judge district court correctly hold that the “one-person, one-vote” principle under the Equal Protection Clause allows States to use total population, and does not require States to use voter  population,  when apportioning state legislative districts?

After each federal decennial census, the Texas Constitution requires that the State legislature reapportion its legislative districts. See Evenwel et al. v. Perry et al., 14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, at 2 (W.D. Tex. Nov.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman

Issues

Does New York’s no-surcharge law (N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 518), which requires merchants to label price differences as a cash “discount” rather than a credit-card “surcharge,” unconstitutionally restrict speech?

The Court must consider whether New York’s surcharge ban that requires merchants to label price differences as a cash discount rather than a credit-card surcharge unconstitutionally restricts speech. Petitioners Expressions Hair Design et al. argue that criminalizing truthful speech about credit-card costs violates the First Amendment because it prevents the free flow of accurate ideas amongst the public. Eric T. Schneiderman, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of New York, on the other hand, asserts that the law regulates conduct and not speech; thus, the price controls fall outside of the ambit of the First Amendment entirely. The outcome of this case will impact how a state can restrict the actions and language of merchants with respect to different forms of payments by consumers. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether New York’s regulation of the conditions under which sellers differentiate prices charged to consumers paying by credit card and consumers paying by other means, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 518, is subject to scrutiny under, and consistent with, the First Amendment.

Whenever a consumer uses a credit card to make a purchase, the merchant is charged a swipe fee. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2015). Merchants typically pass on these charges to consumers through higher prices regardless of whether they pay by credit card or not.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Evans v. Chavis

Issues

Whether a federal court should presume that a prisoner's filing of a state petition for writ of habeas corpus was timely because the state court gave no indication that the filing was untimely, or whether the federal court should engage in an independent determination of whether the filing was timely under state law.

 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), state prisoners have one year to file their federal writ of habeas corpus petitions after their state conviction becomes final, but the one-year limitations period may be tolled for "properly filed" state habeas petitions that are "pending." In 1991, a jury convicted Reginald Chavis of attempted first degree murder. After unsuccessfully appealing his conviction, Chavis filed two rounds of state habeas petitions. The courts denied all of Chavis's state petitions, and Chavis filed a federal habeas petition on August 30, 2000. The state claims that the one-year limitations period applicable to Chavis's federal habeas corpus petition expired during the three years that passed between his first round of petitions to the California Court of Appeal and the filing of his first habeas petition with the California Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held that Chavis's petition was "pending" and thus entitled to tolling for the three-year interval. It based its decision of the fact that the California Supreme Court did not dismiss the petition as untimely but rather decided it on the merits.

The Supreme Court's ruling will turn on an interpretation of the term "pending."  If the Court agrees with Chavis that the federal court should presume from a state court's silence that the petitioner's filing was "pending," then the Court will affirm the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the three-year interval was tolled. But if the Supreme Court finds that a federal court must conduct an independent determination of timeliness under state law, then the Court must remand this case for further proceedings to determine whether Chavis's petition would be considered timely under California law. This case is significant because it will determine what a federal court must do when the state court is silent on the issue of whether the prisoner's filing was timely under state law. Thus, it may have an impact on federalism, comity, and finality, as well as the intended function of the writ of habeas corpus.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Did the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals err in holding that a prisoner is entitled to tolling for a three-year interval between his first round petitions for writ of habeas corpus to the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court-an interval during which AEDPA took effect-because the California Supreme Court did not dismiss the petition as untimely, but summarily denied the petition without comment or citation?

2. Did the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals contravene the Supreme Court's decision in Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225 (2002), which held that the California Supreme Court's denial of a habeas petition "on the merits" does not itself "indicate that the petition was timely"?

On July 29, 1991, a jury in Sacramento County Superior Court convicted Reginald Chavis of attempted murder and sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole. Chavis v. LeMarque, 382 F.3d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 2004).

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0
Subscribe to