Johnson v. Williams

Issues

Whether an issue not addressed in a state court opinion has been “adjudicated on the merits” for the purposes of federal habeas corpus review when the state court gave a detailed opinion mentioning other claims but apparently ignored the constitutional grounds for relief.

 

Tara Williams was on trial in California state court for special circumstances murder and firearm enhancement. During the trial, over Williams’s objections, the court dismissed a juror on the grounds that he was biased against the prosecution. After an alternate replaced the dismissed juror, the jury convicted Williams on both counts. Williams appealed, claiming that the juror’s dismissal had violated California state law as well as her Sixth Amendment rights. The California Court of Appeals affirmed Williams’ conviction, but only did so by addressing her state law claims, ultimately failing to explicitly discuss the Sixth Amendment issues raised. Williams then filed a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging a violation of her Sixth Amendment rights. Though the federal district court denied her petition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that Williams’ Sixth Amendment claim had not yet been “adjudicated on the merits” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Warden Deborah K. Johnson appealed, claiming that the California Court of Appeals’ prior ruling was an adjudication on the merits and therefore precluded the subsequent habeas petition.  How the Supreme Court decides the case will determine the degree of deference a federal court hearing a petition for habeas corpus will give a state court decision that does not explicitly address the federal grounds for relief.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a habeas petitioner's claim has been “adjudicated on the merits” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) where the state court denied relief in an explained decision but did not expressly acknowledge a federal-law basis for the claim.

In October 1993, Petitioner Tara Williams, drove two friends to various stores in preparation for a robbery that they had planned to commit that evening. See Williams v. Cavazos, 646 F.3d 626, 631 (9th Cir.

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Additional Resources

• Michael O'Hear, A Test for Richter’s Reach (Jan. 31, 2012)

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Judulang v. Holder

Issues

Whether a lawful permanent resident who pled guilty to deportable offenses, but did not leave the country and return before the government started deportation proceedings, is barred from applying for discretionary relief  where  similarly situated permanent residents in exclusion proceedings could seek such relief.

 

After Petitioner Joel Judulang, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of a deportable offense, the Board of Immigration Appeals determined that he was not eligible for a discretionary waiver of deportability under Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. On its face, Section 212(c) applies only to lawful permanent residents who are excludable when they attempt to enter the country, rather than to residents convicted of deportable offenses while already in the country. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals has previously allowed some permanent residents convicted of deportable offenses to apply for the Section 212(c) discretionary waiver. Petitioner Judulang asserts that he should be allowed to take advantage of the waiver, since his deportable offenses would render him excludable if he tried to re-enter the country. Judulang further argues that the Board of Immigration Appeals' change in Section 212(c) policy regarding deportable and excludable offenses is impermissibly retroactive and facially unconstitutional. The Department of Justice argues that the Board of Immigration Appeals has good reason to require a close textual similarity between a charged ground of deportability and a waivable ground of excludability, and that its policy is not impermissibly retroactive because it does not reflect a change in previous law. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will mean the difference between amnesty and deportation for many lawful permanent residents convicted of deportable offenses.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a lawful permanent resident who was convicted by guilty plea of an offense that renders him deportable and excludable under differently phrased statutory subsections, but who did not depart and reenter the United States between his conviction and the commencement of removal proceedings, is categorically foreclosed from seeking discretionary relief from removal under  form  Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Petitioner Joel Judulang, born in the Philippines in 1966, became a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) of the United States at eight years of age. See Judulang v. Chertoff, 535 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1130 (S.D. Cal.

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Jones v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections

Issues

Does the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which requires that prisoners first exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to filing a civil rights suit in federal court, mandates that a prisoner's entire civil suit be dismissed from federal court if the prisoner has failed to totally exhaust all available administrative remedies for each claim prior to filing suit? Additionally, does a prisoner, who proceeds to file suit in federal court but fails to attach to his complaint proof and documentation of how he exhausted all available administrative remedies, must have his entire case dismissed from  federal  court? Finally, does a prisoner's entire civil rights case must be dismissed from  federal  court if, during the process of exhausting available administrative remedies, he failed to specifically name the parties whom he later named as defendants in his federal court case?

 

Lorenzo Jones and Timothy Williams both filed suit against the Michigan Department of Corrections on the grounds that the treatment they received in jail violated their Constitutional civil rights. The Circuit Court held that neither plaintiff fulfilled their requirements to totally exhaust available administrative remedies under 42. U.S.C. § 1997e of the PLRA. The Circuit Court held that Jones failed the exhaustion requirement because he failed to either describe or attach proof of how he exhausted administrative remedies in his complaint. See Jones v. Bock, 135 Fed at 839. Although Williams did attach proof of exhaustion to his complaint, the Circuit Court held that he still failed the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement because he did not specifically name the defendant in his initial grievance filings with prison officials. See Williams v. Overton, 136 Fed at 862. In these consolidated cases, Petitioners argue that the Circuit Court's holdings amount to judicially-created pleading requirements that are inconsistent with the PLRA’s text, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and judicial norms. Respondents maintain that the PLRA instituted a “new regime” for inmate Civil Rights Act suits and that the text and structure of the PLRA require the Circuit Court’s heightened pleading requirements. See Brief for Respondents at 27-28. How the Supreme Court decides these condensed cases will reflect its view of the correct balance of burden between inmate plaintiffs and the judiciary. These cases will either require prisoners to be more vigilant in asserting their own civil rights or require the judiciary to be more active in defending prisoners’ rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Jones v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections:

1. Whether satisfaction of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is a prerequisite to a prisoner's federal civil rights suit such that the prisoner must allege in his complaint how he exhausted his administrative remedies (or attach proof of exhaustion to the complaint), or instead, whether non-exhaustion is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proven by the defense.

2. Whether the PLRA prescribes a “total exhaustion” rule that requires a federal district court to dismiss a prisoner's federal civil rights complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies whenever there is a single unexhausted claim, despite the presence of other exhausted claims.

Williams v. Overton:

1. Whether the PLRA requires a prisoner to name a particular defendant in his or her administrative grievance in order to exhaust his or her administrative remedies as to that defendant and to preserve his or her right to sue them.

2. Whether the PLRA prescribes a “total exhaustion” rule that requires a federal district court to dismiss a prisoner's federal civil rights complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies whenever there is a single unexhausted claim, despite the presence of other exhausted claims.

Purpose and Effect of the PLRA

If a prisoner feels that his civil rights have been violated during his incarceration, he has a right to file a civil rights claim in federal court. Each year, thousands of prisoners commence actions on these grounds. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), which was passed by Congress in 1996, was designed in response to an influx of prisoner civil rights litigation.

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Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P.

Issues

Can an investment adviser for a mutual fund violate its fiduciary duty with respect to compensation imposed by the Investment Company Act when the adviser accepts a fee that has been duly approved by the fund’s directors?

 

In 2004, Jerry Jones sued Harris Associates, L.P. under § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act for breach of its fiduciary duty with respect to the fees it receives for advising mutual funds of which Jones was a shareholder. Harris Associates created and advised the mutual funds in question. The board of trustees for the mutual funds approved the fees Harris Associates received. Jones’s case was dismissed on summary judgment in the Northern District of Illinois. The district court applied the Second Circuit’s Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc. standard to analyze the advising fees and found that the fees could have been the product of a normal, arms-length negotiation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but rejected the Gartenberg standard, and adopted a more lenient standard that allows court interference in fee arrangements only when there is evidence that the adviser failed to disclose relevant information or misled the board during fee negotiations. The Supreme Court’s decision will define the contours of a mutual fund adviser’s fiduciary duty with regard to compensation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Congress enacted the Investment Company Act of 1940 to mitigate the conflicts of interest inherent in the relationship between investment advisers and the mutual funds they create and manage. See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984). Section 36(b) of that Act imposes on investment advisers "a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services" and authorizes fund shareholders to bring a claim for "breach of [that] fiduciary duty." 15 U.S.C. § 80a- 35(b). The Act further provides that, in such an action, "approval by the board of directors" of the fund is not conclusive, but "shall be given such consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances." Id. § 80a-35(b)(2).

The question presented is:

Whether the court below erroneously held, in conflict with the decisions of three other circuits, that a shareholder's claim that the fund's investment adviser charged an excessive fee - more than twice the fee it charged to funds with which it was not affiliated - is not cognizable under §36(b), unless the shareholder can show that the adviser misled the fund's directors who approved the fee.

Petitioners Jerry and Mary Jones, and Arline Winerman (collectively, “Jones”) were owners of shares in three separate mutual funds in the Oakmark group of funds. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 1:04-cv-08305, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Feb.

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John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States

Issues

Whether the statute of limitations in the Tucker Act limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims?

 

John R. Sand & Gravel Co. (“JRS”) brought a takings claim against the United States government in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act. The United States filed a motion to dismiss the action, claiming that JRS filed the suit after the Tucker Act’s six-year statute of limitations expired. The United States Court of Federal Claims denied the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the decision of the lower court because it found that the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim, even though neither party raised the issue of jurisdiction; it was raised by a group of interested third parties in an amicus brief.  The Federal Circuit, agreeing with the amicus brief, dismissed the case, finding that the statute of limitations was a jurisdictional issue that the court could raise sua sponte, or on its own, and that JRS brought the claim too late. JRS argues that the plain language of the statute shows that the statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional issue and the court could not raise the issue sua sponte.  JRS relies on the legislative history of the Tucker Act to support its point. Conversely, the United States government argues that because the statute of limitations is part of Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity, it does limit the jurisdiction of the court. While the issue in this case is narrow, the Court’s decision may help in delineating where the Court draws the line between which issues are jurisdictional and which are not.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The statute of limitations in the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2501, provides: “Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.”  The question presented is:  Whether the statute of limitations in Tucker Act limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.

In 1969, John R. Sand & Gravel Co. (“JRS”) signed a 50 year lease for a 158-acre tract of land in Michigan. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 457 F.3d 1345, (Fed. Cir.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Kevin Clermont for his insights into this case.

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Jimenez v. Quarterman

Issues

When a court finds that a defendant lost his right of direct appeal because of a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, and accordingly reinstates his appeal, does the time to seek federal habeas review run from the conclusion of the reinstated proceedings?

 

Carlos Jimenez was convicted of burglary and, due to a prior felony, received an enhanced sentence of forty-three years in prison. Jimenez appealed to the Texas Third Court of Appeals, but through no fault of his own, was unaware that his appeal was denied until after the statute of limitations expired for him to appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. In order to remedy this, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted Jimenez a reinstated appeal, which essentially tolled the statute of limitations for purposes of direct review in state court. After exhausting all state remedies, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Jimenez’s federal petition for habeas corpus, stating that for purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A), “direct review” ended when he initially failed to timely appeal the decision of the Third Court of Appeals, not when his reinstated appeal was exhausted. The United States Supreme Court will decide whether the reinstated appeal tolled the statute of limitations until the completion of the reinstated direct review for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a Certificate of Appealability should have issued pursuant to Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 482, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000) on the question of whether pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(A) when through no fault of the petitioner, he was unable to obtain a direct review and the highest State Court granted relief to place him back to original position on direct review, should the 1-year limitation begin to run after he has completed that direct review resetting the 1- year limitations period?

Because the underlying cases are unpublished, the following facts are taken from the parties’ briefs.

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Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A.

Issues

Whether a mistake of law made by a debt collector allows it to avoid liability by asserting a bona fide error defense under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

 

In 2006, Respondents Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A. et al. (“Carlisle”) served Petitioner Karen Jerman with a notice of collection, which included a provision requiring the debtor to dispute the debt in writing.   Carlisle based  the provision on their understanding of current Sixth Circuit case law interpreting the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). The district court concluded that the FDCPA, which governs debt collection practices, does not require the plaintiff to dispute the debt in writing and  consequently  the notice violated the Act. However, the court granted Carlisle immunity under the FDCPA’s “bona fide error defense,” which protects debt collectors from penalties for unintentional violations of the FDCPA. Jerman contends that the defense does not include violations resulting from legal errors such as misinterpretations of the statute. Carlisle counters that the Sixth Circuit ruling should be upheld because the plain language of the statute includes legal errors under the defense. This decision will potentially resolve a circuit split on this issue.  It may also impact professional responsibility standards for attorneys involved in debt collecting and the incentives of individuals to bring suit against debt collectors where areas of the law are unsettled.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a debt collector's legal error qualifies for the bona fide error defense under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) governs debt-collection policies but also protects debt collectors who unintentionally violate the Act. A debt collector may avoid liability for an FDCPA violation by “show[ing] by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” 28 U.S.C. § 1692(k)(c).

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Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders

Issues

Whether, in a private right-of-action, primary liability applies to an investment adviser for alleged participation in the issue of material misstatements by the client funds that it advises despite the lack of aiding-and-abetting liability claims in private actions under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Security Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5.

 

A 2003 investigation by the New York State Attorney General revealed that Janus Capital Management, an investment adviser, had secretly allowed several hedge funds to engage in market-timing trades using the assets of the Janus Investment Fund, which were publicly marketed toward long-term investors. Subsequently, First Derivative Traders, a stockholder in Janus Capital Management’s parent company, brought a private securities fraud action against the Janus companies, alleging that Janus Capital Management was responsible for misleading statements in the Janus Funds’ prospectuses. Though Janus Capital Management argued that its status as a mere outside service provider precluded liability, the Fourth Circuit allowed First Derivative Traders to move forward with its claim. In a decision that will affect the scope of secondary liability in private securities-fraud actions, the Supreme Court is now asked to decide whether an investment adviser can be held responsible for misstatements that appear in its client’s offering documents.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

There is no aiding-and-abetting liability in private actions brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). Thus, a service provider who provides assistance to a company that makes a public misstatement cannot be held liable in a private securities-fraud action. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific- Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). In the decision below, however, the Fourth Circuit held that an investment adviser who allegedly "helped draft the misleading prospectuses" of a different company, ''by participating in the writing and dissemination of [those] prospectuses," can be held liable in a private action "even if the statement on its face is not directly attributed to the [adviser]." App., infra, 17a- 18a, 24a (emphases added). The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in concluding-in direct conflict with decisions of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits-that a service provider can be held primarily liable in a private securities fraud action for "help[ing]" or "participating in" another company's misstatements.

2. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in concluding-in direct conflict with decisions of the Second, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits-that a service provider can be held primarily liable in a private securities-fraud action for statements that were not directly and contemporaneously attributed to the service provider.

On September 3, 2003, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer filed a complaint against a hedge fund for making secret arrangements with Janus Capital Management (“JCM”) to benefit from market-timing. See First Derivative Traders v. Janus Capital Group, Inc., 566 F.3d 111, 128 (4th Cir.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Charles Whitehead for his insights into this case.

Additional Resources

· New York Times, Peter J. Henning: The Hurdles to Suing Outside Advisers for Fraud (Oct. 27, 2010).

· Wall Street Journal, Brent Kendall: High Court Requests White House Views on Janus Appeal (Jan. 11, 2010)

· American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, Eric Zitzewitz: How Widespread is Late Trading in Mutual Funds?

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James v. United States

Issues

Whether attempted burglary is a felony that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another person, and thus is subject to the 15-year mandatory minimum sentencing requirements for violent felonies under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

 

Alphonso James was convicted four times between 1997 and 2003: once for attempted burglary, twice for drug offenses, and the last time for illegal possession of a firearm. At the sentencing for his firearm offense the government argued that under the Armed Career Criminal Act a 15 year mandatory minimum sentence should be applied because James had three prior convictions for a violent felony and serious drug offenses. James is contesting the classification of attempted burglary as a violent felony, and the issue is now before the U.S. Supreme Court. The government argues that attempted burglary presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another person and thus fits one of the statutory definitions of a violent felony. James argues that determining whether his attempted burglary presented the specified risk would require the court to conduct impermissible fact-finding in opposition to the Court’s rulings in Taylor v. United States and Shepard v. United States. James also makes a statutory construction argument to support the exclusion of attempted burglary from the definition of a violent felony. Both the District Court for the Middle District of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit ruled that attempted burglary was a violent felony. If the Supreme Court upholds those rulings, more felons will be subject to this federal modified “three strikes” rule, thus adding fuel to the national debate about mandatory minimums and increasing prison populations.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the Eleventh Circuit erred  by  holding that all convictions in Florida for attempted burglary qualify as a violent felony under 18  U.S.C. ?  924(e), creating a circuit conflict on the issue.

    In June of 1997, Alphonso James, Jr.

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