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Agron Kucana, an Albanian immigrant, missed his immigration hearing and, in absentia, was ordered to be removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”) denied Kucana's motion to reopen his case. Kucana appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that the Board’s decision was not subject to judicial review. In relevant part, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) specifies that certain matters subject to the Attorney General’s discretion are not subject to judicial review. The dispute in this case centers on the scope and proper interpretation of the statute — in particular, on whether it allows judicial review of decisions not to reopen cases, or whether these decisions are outside the realm of judicial review, because they are the subject to the Attorney General’s discretion. The outcome of this case will determine the ability of immigrants to challenge denials of their motions to reopen through the regular judicial process.

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Teleflex, Inc. sued KSR International Co. in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for allegedly infringing upon KSR’s adjustable automotive pedal assembly patent. KSR argued that Teleflex’s patent was invalid for being obvious because it combined preexisting pedal technology and preexisting electronic control technology. The District Court agreed with KSR that Teleflex’s patent was invalid for being obvious and granted KSR’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the patent was not obvious because KSR failed to establish that some “‘suggestion, teaching, or motivation’ would have led a person of ordinary skill” in the field of automotive pedal technology “to combine the relevant prior art teachings” to create Teleflex’s device. The Supreme Court will either uphold or change the definition of non-obviousness used in the United States for the last twenty years. Broadening the definition of non-obviousness could invalidate patents for any number of devices that combine pre-existing elements and open everything from the pharmaceutical industry to the computer software industry to greater competition.

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Wanda Krupski (“Krupski”) suffered an injury as a passenger on a cruise ship owned and operated by Costa Crociere S.p.A. (“Costa Crociere”). In the United States District Court of the Southern District of Florida, her lawyer filed suit against Costa Cruise, N.V., LLC, Costa Crociere’s booking agent. The parties dismissed that suit by stipulation, because the owner and operator of a cruise ship is subject to liability, not the booking agent. Krupski filed an amended complaint against Costa Crociere—the correct party. Costa Crociere filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion, finding that Krupski had not made a “mistake” within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) (“Rule 15(c)”) that would allow the amendment to relate back to the original filing of the complaint. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify what constitutes a “mistake” within the meaning of Rule 15(c).

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KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impressions, Inc., MCN International, Inc. tests whether a showing of the absence of a likelihood of confusion is necessary before a defendant may invoke the classic fair use defense in a trademark infringement suit. By statute, incorporating cases at common law, there appears to be no such requirement. In this case, the Court will determine whether the Ninth Circuit erred in applying such a rule.

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John Tesmer was convicted of a home invasion charge after pleading guilty in Michigan state court. A Michigan statute prohibited the appointment of appellate counsel for defendants who pleaded guilty. Citing that particular statute, the trial judge John F. Kowalski denied Tesmer's request for an appointed appellate counsel. Tesmer, along with two other indigent criminal defendants and two attorneys who routinely represented indigent criminal defendants, filed a complaint stating that the Michigan statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court had previously recognized a litigant's standing to sue when the litigant suffered an actual injury, bears a close relation to the third party, and the third party in question has limited ability to protect his or her own interests. In this case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine two issues: (1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee an automatic right to appointed appellate counsel for indigent criminal defendants convicted by a guilty plea? (2) Do attorneys who derive part of their income from representing indigent criminal defendants convicted by a guilty plea have third-party standing to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute which purportedly violates the due process rights of such defendants?

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California nonunion state employees sued their collective bargaining agent, alleging that the imposition of an additional agency fee assessment used to fund political actions without notice or an opportunity to object violated their First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the nonunion employees. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. The nonunion employees now appeal. The Supreme Court will determine what disclosures unions must provide when imposing additional agency fees on nonmembers, and the extent to which unions can use nonmembers’ wages to fund expenditures without first obtaining consent.

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During his trial for first-degree murder, Alexandre Mirzayance's attorney advised him to withdraw his insanity plea on the morning the insanity phase of the trial was to begin. After he was sentenced to twenty-nine years to life, Mirzayance initiated a habeas petition, claiming that his attorney's advice to withdraw his insanity plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The California Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court both summarily dismissed the petition without explanation. Mirzayance appealed to the federal court system. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), a federal court is barred from granting habeas relief unless the prior state proceeding "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." After a remand from the Ninth Circuit to conduct a factual hearing, the district court granted the petition, apparently misapprehending the test the Ninth Circuit dictated. The Ninth Circuit applied the facts surrounding the withdrawal of the defense and found ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland test. Knowles argues that the Ninth circuit failed to adhere to AEDPA's rule requiring deference to state courts. He argues that it should have reviewed the state-court decision based on whether there was any way that the state court could have ruled the way it did. Mirzayance argues that when a state court has no published reasoning for its decision, a federal court is entitled to conduct its own fact-finding on review.

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Michael Knight, trustee of the Rudkin Testamentary Trust, petitioned the United States Tax Court to dispute the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") assessment that the Trust owed taxes for investment-advisory expenses Knight had deducted in full. The Internal Revenue Code contains a 2% floor on all itemized deductions. The IRS assessed that Knight failed to recognize this floor, significantly lowering the deduction amount. Knight argued these expenses should be exempt because they were necessary for Knight to fulfill his fiduciary duties as a trustee. The Tax Court stated that, to be exempt, Knight needed to show these expenses would not have been incurred if the assets were not held in trust. The Tax Court found Knight failed to satisfy his burden of showing that the expenses were unique to trusts and decided in favor of the IRS. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between a holding by the Sixth Circuit and those of the Second, Fourth, and Federal Circuits. As trustees spend billions of dollars yearly on management advice, this case will have wide-reaching consequences. A decision for the IRS will result in the same level of taxation on investment-management expenses for individuals and trusts and more taxes to the IRS tempered by decreased use of management services by trustees. A decision for Knight would lower the taxes of trustees and encourage trustees to use investment-management services.

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In 2005, Carolyn M. Kloeckner (“Kloeckner”) left her job as a Senior Investigator for the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Employee Benefits Security Administration in the St. Louis office. Soon after, she filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging sex and age discrimination and a hostile work environment. The DOL charged her with being “absent without leave” and fired her a year later. The dismissal, coupled with the discrimination complaint, result in what is known as a "mixed"  case,  and  is therefore  subject to certain forum restrictions.  After an unsuccessful outcome with her EEO complaint, Kloeckner appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which dismissed her claims as untimely. Kloeckner tried to challenge this MSPB decision in federal district court, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, holding that only federal circuit courts had jurisdiction over mixed cases that were dismissed on a procedural ground. The federal circuit courts disagree on this issue, and so the Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will determine whether a federal district court or a federal appellate-level court can hear an appeal of an MSPB decision to dismiss a mixed claim for being untimely.

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Klein & Co. Futures, Inc. was a futures commission merchant ("FCM"), serving as a middleman in futures trading. Norman Eisler, the Chairman of the New York Futures Exchange, a subsidiary of the Board of Trade of the City of New York, allegedly engaged in a price fixing scheme that caused Klein & Co. to go out of business. Klein & Co. argues that it should have standing to sue the Board of Trade under 7 U.S.C §​25(b)(1) for damages resulting from the Board's initial failure to take action against Eisler. The Board of Trade successfully argued in the District Court for the Southern District of New York and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that Klein & Co. should not have standing because Congress intended standing under the statute to be limited to buyers and sellers of commodities. This case will have an important impact on the $1.1 billion futures industry because FCMs provide the financial backing for all investors in the commodities market. If FCMs are denied the right to sue, the risk of lending will increase and board members will remain insulated from civil law suits.

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