Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals

Issues

Does the FMLA’s self-care provision abrogate states’ sovereign immunity from suits for damages?

 

After respondent Maryland Court of Appeals denied petitioner Daniel Coleman’s request for medical leave and terminated his employment, Coleman filed this suit against the State of Maryland under the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), which provides that “an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period . . . [b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position,” 29 U. S. C. §2612(a)(1) (D). Coleman argues that the Act’s medical leave provisions should be considered as a unified effort against gender discrimination that permits state employees to sue state employers under the self-care provision, and that the purpose of preventing gender discrimination abrogates state immunity. The state responds that the FMLA’s provisions address discrete forms of discrimination that should be examined individually and that the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity bars lawsuits against a state employer under the self-care provision. By deciding whether a state employee has legal recourse for a violation of the self-care provision, this case will clarify the scope of state exposure to employment lawsuits seeking money damages under the FMLA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In passing the FMLA, as the Court recognized in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 701, Congress intended to eliminate gender discrimination in the granting of sick leave. The legislative record supports its purpose and findings. The question presented for review is:

Whether Congress constitutionally abrogated states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it passed the FMLA’s self-care leave provision.

From March 2001 through August 2007, Coleman worked at the Maryland Court of Appeals. See Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

Additional Resources

Constitutional Law Prof Blog, Ruthann Robson: On Floors, Ceilings, Federalism and Constitutional Law Exams: West Virginia Weekend (Apr. 9, 2011)

National Organization for Women: The Provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act (Feb. 5, 2007)

Stanford Law Review, Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, (Apr. 2006)

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Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council; Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council

Issues

Whether the discharge from Coeur Alaska's Kensington Gold Mine constitutes "fill material," and thus is regulated by § 404 permits issued by the Army Corps of Engineers, or whether the discharge is subject to the Environmental Protection Agency's effluent limitations and is governed under the § 402 permit program.

 

In 2005, the Army Corps of Engineers issued a permit under the federal Clean Water Act ("CWA"), authorizing Coeur Alaska, Inc. to discharge wastewater from the Kensington Gold Mine in navigable waters in Alaska. Environmental groups claimed that this permit violated the CWA because the discharge from the mine did not comply with the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") pollution standards under the CWA. Coeur Alaska, however, argued that the Army Corps of Engineers governed the discharge under a different section of the  CWA,  and that the issuance of the  permit therefore  did not violate the CWA. In this case, the Supreme Court's decision will determine whether the permit issued for the Kensington Mine is valid, and potentially resolve the conflicting authority of the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers under the CWA. In addition, the outcome of this case will impact environmentalists and industry representatives in determining the extent to which certain pollutants can be discharged into U.S. waters.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council (07-984)

The Clean Water Act provides two separate programs for the permitting of discharges into navigable waters of the United States. Under Section 404 of the Act, the Army Corps of Engineers may issue permits for discharges of "fill material," subject to the water-quality restrictions imposed by Section 404(b)(1). Under Section 402 of the Act, the Environmental Protection Agency may issue permits for the discharge of all other pollutants, subject to the effluent limitations prescribed under Sections 301 and 306 of the Act. In 2002, after notice and comment, the EPA and the Corps jointly promulgated a regulation defining the statutory term "discharge of fill material" to include "tailings or similar mining-related materials." Pursuant to its authority under Section 404 to grant permits for the discharge of "fill material," the Corps granted petitioner a permit to deposit certain mine tailings in a lake.

In the decision below, the Ninth Circuit invalidated that permit even though it acknowledged that the proposed discharge "facially meets the current regulatory definition of ‘fill material.'" Upsetting 35 years of established agency practice, the court of appeals held that the Corps may not issue a Section 404 permit for the discharge of fill material if the fill material in question otherwise would be subject to a Section 301 or 306 effluent limitation.

The question presented is whether the Ninth Circuit erred in reallocating the Corps' and EPA's permitting authority under the Act.

Alaska v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council (07-990)

Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in invalidating the longstanding regulatory interpretation of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the "Corps") and the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") that discharges of dredged or fill material are subject to the exclusive permitting authority of the Corps under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, rather than effluent limitations and standards of performance promulgated under Sections 301 and 306 and applied by EPA pursuant to its separate permitting authority under Section 402.

In 2004, Coeur Alaska sought a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers ("Army Corps") to open the Kensington Gold Mine in southeast Alaska. See Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. Army Corps of Engineers, 486 F. 3d 638, 641 (9th Cir.

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Clark v. Arizona

Issues

Whether Arizona's insanity law, as set forth in A.R.S. § 13-502 (1996) and applied in this case, violated Petitioner's right to due process under the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment?

Whether Arizona's blanket exclusion of evidence and refusal to consider mental disease or defect to rebut the state's evidence on the element of mens rea violated Petitioner's right to due process under the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment?

 

 

On June 21, 2000, 17-year-old Eric Clark shot and killed Flagstaff, Arizona Police Officer Jeffrey Moritz. Brief for Petitioner at 2. At the time, Clark had been suffering from delusions and hallucinations and had been diagnosed as suffering schizophrenia and psychosis. Id. At trial, he attempted to present evidence of his mental illness in order to negate the mens rea knowledge and intent elements of first degree murder. The government, however, argued successfully that under Arizona's definition of insanity (A.R.S. § 13-502(A)) and State v. Mott, evidence of Clark's mental illness was impermissible to negate the mens rea of the crime. Clark was subsequently convicted of first degree murder. He appeals the conviction, arguing that preventing him from using evidence of his mental disease to negate the mens rea of the crime violates his Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Arizona's insanity law, as set forth in A.R.S. § 13-502 (1996) and applied in this case, violated Petitioner's right to due process under the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment?

Whether Arizona's blanket exclusion of evidence and refusal to consider mental disease or defect to rebut the state's evidence on the element of mens rea violated Petitioner's right to due process under the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment?

 

In the early morning on June 21, 2000, in Flagstaff, Arizona, 17-year-old Eric Clark borrowed the keys to his brother's truck while his brother was sleeping.

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Clapper v. Amnesty International USA

Issues

Does a group of international organizations, lawyers, and media personnel have standing to sue for prospective relief based on their allegation that the United States would imminently acquire their international communications using surveillance authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978?

 

In 2008, Congress passed the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), which revised the procedures for authorizing certain foreign intelligence collection, including expanded authority to collect information on persons outside of the United States using electronic surveillance.  Additionally, the new procedures allow the government to disclose less information before targeting people reasonably believed to be abroad. Shortly after Congress passed the FAA, several organizations, including Amnesty International and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the act’s constitutionality.  The district court dismissed the lawsuit because it found the organizations lacked standing.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and now the Supreme Court must decide if Amnesty International and other organizations have a sufficient stake to allow them to move forward with their constitutional challenges to the FAA. Amnesty International and other organizations argue that they have standing based on a reasonable fear that the government will monitor some of their communications and based on the costly methods used to prevent that monitoring. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper argues that the groups do not have standing because their injuries are not imminent, they do not have ongoing or present injuries, and self-inflicted harms are not recognizable injuries. The decision in this case will likely result in a rebalancing of the competing interest in government transparency and safeguarding national security. Further, the decision will likely cause one side to incur greater costs either in litigating more cases based on alleged, unproven surveillance or in protecting confidential communications against unknowable surveillance.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. 1881a (Supp. II 2008)- referred to here as Section 1881a- allows the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence to authorize jointly the "targeting of [non-United States] persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States" to acquire "foreign intelligence information," normally with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's prior approval of targeting and other procedures. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(a), (b), (g)(2) and (i)(3); cf. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(c)(2). Respondents are United States persons who may not be targeted for surveillance under Section 1881a. Respondents filed this action on the day that Section 1881a was enacted, seeking both a declaration that Section 1881a is unconstitutional and an injunction permanently enjoining any foreign-intelligence surveillance from being conducted under Section 1881a. The question presented is:

Whether respondents lack Article III standing to seek prospective relief because they proffered no evidence that the United States would imminently acquire their international communications using Section 1881a-authorized surveillance and did not show that an injunction prohibiting Section 1881a-authorized surveillance would likely redress their purported injuries.

Amnesty International USA, along with attorneys, human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations, filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA). See Brief for the Respondents, American Civil Liberties Union at 15-16. The FAA amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), which established procedures for gathering foreign intelligence including by el

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City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation

Issues

Basic Governing Principles as Noted by the Second Circuit

The Second Circuit cited three basic principles that govern the issues at hand. The first is the Oneida's right of occupancy on Indian country, which "may extend from generation to generation, and will cease only by dissolution of the tribe, or their consent to sell to the party possessed of the right of pre-emption." Oneida Indian Nation, 337 F.3d. at 152 (citing In re New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761, 771 (1866)). The second, codified in the Non-Intercourse Act, represents federal preeminence over the disposition of land in Indian country, since "Congress alone has the right to say when the [United States'] guardianship over the Indians may cease." Id. (citing United States v. Boylan, 265 F. 165, 171 (2d. Cir. 1920)).  The sale or conveyance of reservation land can only be made with congressional sanction, that is, "by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution." Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000)). The third principle is federal preemption, which prohibits states from imposing property taxes upon Indian reservation land without congressional approval. Id. (citing In re New York Indians, 72 U.S. at 771).

 

In 1997 and 1998, the Oneidas re-purchased title to parcels of aboriginal land within Sherrill, New York, in open market transactions. Sherrill subsequently assessed property taxes, which the Oneidas ignored, asserting that the properties are contained within the Oneida Indian Reservation and therefore are considered to be "Indian Country", which is nontaxable by state municipalities. Sherrill sent the Oneidas notices of tax delinquency, held a tax sale where Sherrill repurchased the parcels, then initiated eviction proceedings. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York found in favor of the Oneidas. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court and also found that the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek, 7 Stat. 550, did not require the Oneidas to abandon their lands in the state of New York in exchange for land in Kansas, and further, that a reservation continues to exist even if a tribe ceases to exist and is protected under the Non-Intercourse Act. The Supreme Court must now assess the Second Circuit Court's interpretations.

This case consists of four separate questions, which ultimately address whether properties reacquired by the Oneida Indian Nation of New York are subject to taxation by the City of Sherrill, New York and Madison County, New York.

1. Whether alleged reservation land is Indian Country pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and this Court's decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) where the land was neither set aside by the federal government nor superintended by the federal government?

2. Whether alleged reservation land was set aside by the federal government for purposes of Indian Country analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't where the alleged reservation was established by the State of New York in the 1788 Treaty of Fort Schuyler, and not by any federal treaty, action or enactment?

3. Whether the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek, which required the New York Oneidas to permanently abandon their lands in New York, resulted in the disestablishment of the Oneida's alleged New York reservation?

4. Whether alleged reservation land may (i) remain Indian Country or (ii) be subject to the protections of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, or Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, if the tribe claiming reservation status and Non-Intercourse Act protection ceases to exist?

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether alleged reservation land is Indian Country pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and this Court's decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) where the land was neither set aside by the federal government nor superintended by the federal government?

2. Whether alleged reservation land was set aside by the federal government for purposes of Indian Country analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't where the alleged reservation was established by the State of New York in the 1788 Treaty of Fort Schuyler, and not by any federal treaty, action or enactment?

3. Whether the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek, which required the New York Oneidas to permanently abandon their lands in New York, resulted in the disestablishment of the Oneida's alleged New York reservation?

4. Whether alleged reservation land may (i) remain Indian Country or (ii) be subject to the protections of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, or Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, if the tribe claiming reservation status and Non-Intercourse Act protection ceases to exist?

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City of Ontario v. Quon (08-1332)

Issues

Did the City of Ontario, California violate the Fourth Amendment by conducting a search of their employees’ text messages sent and received on a pager supplied by the City, where there was in informal policy allowing some personal use of the pagers?

 

Officer Jeff Quon, a City of Ontario, California SWAT team member, was given a pager by his Department for communication. Although Quon was told that the pager communications were not private, a supervisor allowed Quon to use the pager for personal use so long as Quon reimbursed the department for overage charges, which Quon did. After determining the current payment system was not efficient, the Department ordered a review of the content of the text messages, ostensibly for the purpose of determining how many of the text messages were for business purposes. The search revealed Quon had sent personal messages to friends, as well as sexually explicit texts to both his wife and mistress. Quon sued the City of Ontario for violating his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Ontario, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted summary judgment in favor of Quon. The Ninth Circuit found the search to be unreasonable in light of Quon’s legitimate expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court will address a government worker’s Fourth Amendment rights, while also potentially addressing the Constitutional protection afforded to newer forms of communication, such as text messages.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether a SWAT team member has a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages transmitted on his SWAT pager, where the police department has an official no-privacy policy but a non-policymaking lieutenant announced an informal policy of allowing some personal use of the pagers.

2. Whether the Ninth Circuit contravened this Court's Fourth Amendment precedents and created a circuit conflict by analyzing whether the police department could have used "less intrusive methods" of reviewing text messages transmitted by a SWAT team member on his SWAT pager.

3. Whether individuals who send text messages to a SWAT team member's SWAT pager have a reasonable expectation that their messages will be free from review by the recipient's government employer.

The City of Ontario contracted with Arch Wireless to provide the City with alphanumeric two-way pagers and text messaging services. See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir.

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City of Arlington, Texas, et al. v. Federal Communications Commission, et al. and City of Arlington, Texas, et al. v. Federal Communications Commission, et al.

Issues

Should a court defer to the decision of an administrative agency when determining the limits of the agency’s power? Additionally, did the Federal Communications Commission exceed its power by setting timeframes on local governments for processing requests to build wireless service facilities?

 

A boom in wireless communications has prompted the building of more facilities for wireless services. While necessary to manage the growing demand for wireless services, these facilities can be unpopular neighbors in a community. Although the Communications Act requires a local government to respond within a reasonable time period to requests for building these facilities, the law does not specify what exactly is a reasonable time period. In 2008, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") set timeframes on zoning authorities for processing requests to build wireless facilities. The Petitioner Cities of Arlington, Texas, and New Orleans, Louisiana, challenged the FCC’s timeframes by arguing that the FCC overstepped its power under the Communications Act. When the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the FCC acted within its power, Arlington and New Orleans challenged that the Fifth Circuit improperly submitted its own judgment to that of the FCC on the question of the FCC’s scope of authority. Arguing to uphold the decision of the Fifth Circuit, Respondent FCC contends that Congress intended to empower the FCC to interpret the Communications Act in all its provisions. Differing from the FCC, Respondent Cellco (a partnership of four corporations) argues that although Congress did not empower the FCC to determine the limits of its own authority, the Fifth Circuit was right to defer to the FCC on these timeframes in particular. If the U.S. Supreme Court holds for Arlington and New Orleans, the uniformity in timely construction of wireless facilities may suffer. However, a holding for the FCC may allow the FCC and other agencies to expand their own powers at the expense of local governments. Further, if the U.S. Supreme Court holds for Cellco and the FCC, local governments may lose the flexibility and power to respond to local concerns. 

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

This case involves a challenge to the FCC's jurisdiction to implement §332(c)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934, titled "Preservation of Local Zoning Authority." Section 332(c)(7) imposes certain limitations on State and local zoning authority over the placement of wireless service facilities, but authorizes the FCC to address only one of these limitations; it states that no other provision "in this Act" may ''limit'' or "affect" State and local authority over wireless facilities placement. The FCC concluded that other provisions "in this Act" authorize it to adopt national zoning standards to implement §332(c)(7). The Fifth Circuit deferred to the FCC's jurisdictional determination applying Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), but acknowledged that "[t]he Supreme Court has not yet conclusively resolved the question of whether Chevron applies in the context of an agency's determination of its own statutory jurisdiction, and the circuit courts of appeals have adopted different approaches to this issue."

City of Arlington, Texas, et al., v. Federal Communications Commission, et al.

1. Whether, contrary to the decisions of at least two other circuits, and in light of this Court's guidance, a court should apply Chevron to review an agency's determination of its own jurisdiction; and

2. Whether the FCC may use its general authority under the Communications Act to limit or affect State and local zoning authority over the placement of personal wireless service facilities.

Cable, Telecommunications, and Technology Committee of the New Orleans City Council v. Federal Communications Commission

1. Should Chevron deference be afforded to an administrative agency's interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction?

2. If it is determined that an agency's interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction should be evaluated under Chevron, did the Fifth Circuit improperly apply Chevron?

3. Did the FCC usurp the jurisdiction and authority reserved for State and local governments by Congress in its interpretation of 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(C)(7) by creating additional limitations on state and local governments beyond those provided for in the statute?

According to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the Communications Act of 1996, Congress balanced the power of local governments to regulate their local land with the goal of allowing telecommunications technologies to develop. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 638 F.3d 229, 234 (5th Cir.

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Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

Issues

Whether (1) Citizens United may challenge BCRA's disclosure requirements imposed on "electioneering communications"  as-applied  to Hillary: The Movie; (2) whether the disclosure requirements are overly burdensome  as-applied  to Hillary: The Movie; (3) whether Hillary: The Movie should be construed as  advocating to  the viewers how to vote, subjecting it to the "electioneering communications" corporate prohibition; and (4) whether Hillary: The Movie should be considered an "advertisement," making it subject to the BCRA's disclosure and disclaimer regulations.

Prior to the 2008 primary elections, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation dedicated to educating the American public about their rights and the government, produced a politically conservative ninety-minute documentary entitled Hillary: The Movie ("The Movie"). This documentary covers Hillary Clinton's record while in the Senate, the White House as First Lady, and during her bid for the presidential  Democratic nominee, and contains express opinions about whether she would be a good choice for President. However, The Movie falls within the definition of "electioneering communications" under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA")-a federal enactment designed to prevent "big money" from unfairly influencing federal  elections-which , among other things, prohibits corporate financing of "electioneering communications" and imposes mandatory disclosure and disclaimer requirements on such communications. The District Court for the District of Columbia denied Citizens United's motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") from enforcing these provisions of the BCRA against Citizens United. The questions the Supreme Court will have to decide are (1) whether BCRA's disclosure requirements imposed on "electioneering communications" are to be upheld against all as-applied challenges' (2) whether BCRA's disclosure requirements are overly burdensome and fail a strict scrutiny test  as-applied  to The Movie; (3) whether The Movie is a "clear plea for action to vote," subjecting it to the "electioneering communications" corporate prohibition; and (4) whether The Movie constitutes an advertisement, making it subject to the BCRA's disclosure and disclaimer regulations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether all as-applied challenges to the disclosure requirements (reporting and disclaimers) imposed on "electioneering communications" by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA") were resolved by McConnell's statement that it was upholding the disclosure requirements against facial challenge "for the entire range of electioneering communications' set forth in the statute." Mem. Op. I, App. 15a (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (200)).

2. Whether BCRA's disclosure requirements impose an unconstitutional burden when applied to electioneering communications protected from prohibition by the appeal-to-vote test, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2007) ("WRTL II"), because such communications are protected "political speech," not regulable "campaign speech," id. at 2659, in that they are not "unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candidate," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976), or because the disclosure requirements fail strict scrutiny when so applied.

3. Whether WRTL II's appeal-to-vote test requires a clear plea for action to vote for or against a candidate, so that a communication lacking such a clear plea for action is not subject to the electioneering communication prohibition. 2 U.S.C. § 441b.

4. Whether a broadcast feature-length documentary movie that is sold on DVD, shown in theaters, and accompanied by a compendium book is to be treated as the broadcast "ads" at issue in McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126, or whether the movie is not subject to regulation as an electioneering communication.

Citizens United ("Citizens") is a non-profit corporation with the stated purpose of being "dedicated to restoring our government to citizens' control [t]hrough the combination of education, advocacy, and grass roots organization." See Citizens United. Prior to the 2008 primary elections, Citizens produced a documentary titled 

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CIGNA Corp. v. Amara

Issues

When a corporation’s summary plan description and actual retirement benefit plan are inconsistent, is the proper standard for measuring harm a standard of “likely harm” rebuttable by the defendant after a showing of “harmless error,” or must a plaintiff show “detrimental reliance” on the inconsistency?

 

CIGNA Corporation changed its employee retirement plan from a traditional defined benefits plan to a cash balance plan. Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), companies that change their retirement plan must release a summary plan description (“SPD”) that outlines the changes for employees in a manner that the average employee can understand. CIGNA released an SPD that described the change but did not mention a “wear-away” period during which the enrolled employees would continue earning credits under the plan while their minimum benefit would remain the same for a period of time. The Respondents, current and former CIGNA employees, sued in federal court, alleging that the inconsistency between the SPD and the actual benefit plan violated ERISA. The district court found for the plaintiffs, using a standard of “likely harm” to determine whether the employees were harmed by the inconsistency between the SPD and the original plan, and the Second Circuit affirmed. CIGNA appealed, arguing that a showing of “detrimental reliance” on the part of the employees is required before they can receive a remedy. The Court’s decision will likely affect the contents of SPDs and the availability of pension benefit plan class actions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a showing of "likely harm" is sufficient to entitle participants in or beneficiaries of an ERISA plan to recover benefits based on an alleged inconsistency between the explanation of benefits in the Summary Plan Description or similar disclosure and the terms of the plan itself.

Respondents, Janice C. Amara and others (collectively “Amara”), are current and former employees of CIGNA Corporation. See Amara v. CIGNA Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d 288, 295 (D. Conn.

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Additional Resources

· United States Department of Labor: Employee Retirement Income Security Act

· Society for Human Resource Management, Allen Smith: Supreme Court Will Review ERISA Plaintiffs' Showing in Summary Plan Description Case (July 7, 2010)

· Richard Glass: Is It Time to Re-Examine What it Means to Fulfill Your 401(K) Fiduciary Responsibilities? (Mar. 10, 2008)

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