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Soon after Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, it sought and received authorization from the Bankruptcy Court to sell its assets under Section 363(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Piccadilly also sought and received an exemption, pursuant to Section 1146(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, from Florida state tax on this sale. The Florida Department of Revenue objected to this exemption because the sale took place before the bankruptcy plan was confirmed. On appeal, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the decision of the Bankruptcy Court to exempt asset sales prior to confirmation of a bankruptcy plan. The Florida Department of Revenue argues that the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the statute is not justified by the rules of statutory interpretation and claims that the lower court's decision will create much unnecessary litigation and ambiguity in the law. Piccadilly Cafeterias argues, however, that the text is ambiguous and therefore can be read to support both points of view. For this reason, Piccadilly suggests looking beyond the text to congressional intent and policy concerns. Whichever way the Court interprets this statute, this case will have a profound impact on state and local revenue collection.

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After his conviction for importing marijuana in 1997, Ruben Flores-Villar was deported to Mexico. Flores-Villar subsequently reentered the United States on several occasions, leading to his conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1325 for being a deported alien found in the United States. Flores-Villar was born in Mexico, out of wedlock, to a United States citizen father and foreign mother. Under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401 and 1409, United States citizen fathers of non-marital children born abroad may only transmit United States citizenship if the father had resided in the United States continuously for at least five years after age fourteen. On the other hand, United States citizen mothers with foreign-born non-marital children are only required to have one year residence in the United States to transmit citizenship. Flores-Villar challenged his Section 1325 conviction on the grounds that the differential residency requirements of 1401 and 1409 make an impermissible classification based on gender that resulted in his alien status. The appeals court affirmed Flores-Villar's conviction and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the gender-based differentiation in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401 and 1409 is constitutionally permissible.

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Ignacio Flores-Figueroa, a Mexican immigrant used a false name, social security number, and resident alien card to obtain employment. Unbeknownst to him, these documents belonged to another person. When the government discovered this, it charged him with aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(1)(a), and he was found guilty. Flores-Figueroa contends that under the statute, he committed mere identity fraud rather than aggravated identity theft because he did not know that the identity information in fact belonged to a real person. The government argues that the statute should apply to all defendants who use another's identity information, regardless of their mens rea, or intent. The outcome of this case will impact how identity theft cases are prosecuted as well as the rights of immigrants who have used falsified identity documents.

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Petitioner Albert Florence was arrested on an outdated bench warrant for a non-indictable offense and was subjected to “strip searches” in two separate prison facilities. Florence sued both facilities, alleging that their blanket policies of strip searching all detainees, regardless of their offense, violates the Fourth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed a District Court opinion, holding that the policies in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Florence argues that the Fourth Amendment protects detainees from suspicionless strip searches when less intrusive alternatives better serve penological interests. The Respondents contend that the prison context diminishes the Fourth Amendment’s privacy expectation, and that the privacy expectation is outweighed by the security interest promoted by blanket strip searches. The decision in this case could affect prison security, the psychological wellbeing of detainees, and the future volume of prison litigation.

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Lisa and Robert Fitzgerald brought suit against the Barnstable School Committee (“Barnstable”) under both § 1983 and Title IX, claiming the district was deliberately indifferent to their daughter’s claims of sexual harassment by an older student on her school bus. Neither the police nor the school’s own investigation found enough evidence to charge or punish the alleged perpetrator. The federal district court dismissed the Fitzgeralds’ Title IX sexual discrimination claim on summary judgment. The court indicated that because Title IX prescribed the remedy for allegations of sexual discrimination in federally funded educational institutions, it foreclosed a separate § 1983 claim alleging a violation of a constitutional right to Equal Protection. The Fitzgeralds claim there are fundamental differences between the rights of action in § 1983 and Title IX, and that a statute intended to expand rights would never limit a constitutional right of action. Barnstable, however, maintains that Congress’s efforts to pass Title IX represented an entirely separate standard to govern sex discrimination in schools. Women’s rights groups claim that a decision to foreclose liability under § 1983 will make it more difficult to bring claims of sexual discrimination in educational institutions, while Barnstable claims that maintaining both causes of action would overexpose educational institutions to suits for violations committed by individuals, rather than just the institution itself.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will consider whether the University of Texas at Austin (“UT”)’s admissions policy, which considers race, is constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Abigail Fisher applied to UT for admission to its 2008 freshman class. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, et al., 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014). As part of its admission process, UT  computes  and considers Personal Achievement Index (“PAI”) Scores, which include various personal characteristics of applicants, including their race. UT does not assign a numerical score or value to the elements of an applicant’s PAI. See id. at 638. Ultimately, UT denied Fisher admission based on her PAI scores, and Fisher would not have received a seat in the 2008 class, even with a perfect PAI score, regardless of race. See id. at 639. In Fisher I, Fisher alleged that UT’s admission policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court ultimately remanded that case to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, so the appeals court could consider whether UT’s admission policy survives strict scrutiny under Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). The Fifth Circuit held that the policy did survive strict scrutiny. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Fisher argues that UT’s pursuit of intra-racial diversity is not a clearly articulated compelling government interest, and its admissions scheme is not narrowly tailored to achieving that interest. See Brief for Petitioner, Abigail Noel Fisher at 25, 30, 38. UT argues that the Court has already held that a university’s interest in diversity is  compelling,  and that UT’s admissions policy is narrowly  tailored,  because race-neutral approaches are insufficient to achieve its interest. See Brief for Respondents, University of Texas at Austin, et al. at 25, 40, 42. The outcome of this case will affect the admissions schemes and racial demographics of universities. 

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Petitioner Abigail Fisher, a white Texan, was denied admission to the University of Texas at Austin for the Fall 2008 entering class. Fisher sued the university, arguing that the denial violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection because she was denied admission to the public university in favor of minority applicants with lesser credentials. Fisher contends that the university’s admission policy cannot survive strict scrutiny as required by Grutter v. Bollinger. The university argues that its admissions policy is essentially identical to the policy upheld in Grutter. It asserts that its use of a holistic admissions process, considering race as one factor for admission, creates a diverse student body that benefits the entire university. This case allows the Supreme Court to reexamine Grutter, and it will have far-reaching implications for university admissions policies and racial demographics in schools throughout the United States.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a plaintiff has Article III standing to sue under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) when the plaintiff alleges no injury-in-fact. Respondent Denise Edwards contends that she has standing because, through RESPA, Congress identified a specific harm resulting from a conflict of interest between title insurance service firms and title agents who enter exclusive agreements to exchange referrals for kickbacks. Edwards argues that Congress tethered that harm to a certain class of plaintiffs, which includes Edwards. Respondent First American Financial Corporation rejoins that a plaintiff must allege a personal and concrete harm to gain Constitutional standing. Under this standard, First American asserts that Edwards alleged no such harm and thus lacks standing to sue. The Court’s decision here has the potential to greatly enhance plaintiffs’ ability to organize class actions and obtain relief for statutory violations in various industries and differing legal frameworks.

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After petitioner Steve Filarsky, a private attorney retained by the City of Rialto to conduct an internal affairs investigation, prompted City officials to order respondent Nicholas Delia, a local firefighter, to consent to a warrantless search of his home, Delia brought a civil rights claim against both Filarsky and the City, alleging, among other things, a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The district court granted a motion by Filarsky and the officials to dismiss the case on qualified immunity grounds, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, ruling that Filarsky, as a private attorney, could not enjoy immunity. Other circuit courts, however, have granted qualified immunity to private lawyers retained by the government. The Supreme Court must resolve the circuit split.

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