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Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), when a party, without the authority to do so, ships from the United States either “all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention” or “any component . . . that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention” in a way that would induce another party abroad to combine the component(s) to form the patented invention, that party commits patent infringement. Section 271(f)(1) prevents parties from evading domestic patent law when engaging in international transactions. The parties differ on how broad § 271(f)(1) should be construed. Life Technologies Corporation argues that courts should construe § 271(f)(1) narrowly to refer to the percentage of components for the invention that a party ships abroad. Promega Corporation, on the other hand, argues that the statute takes into account a combination of quantity and relative importance of the component(s) shipped abroad. The outcome of this case will determine the limits of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) and, consequently, the limits of private action in shipping materials abroad. 

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Respondents Jevic Holding Corporation et al. (“Jevic”) fired Petitioners Casimir Czyzewski et al., members of a certified class of truck drivers (“the drivers”), when the company filed for bankruptcy in 2008. The drivers were entitled to receive payment on their wage claims before other unsecured creditors received any distribution from Jevic’s bankruptcy estate, but they were skipped over when Jevic’s two largest creditors reached a settlement with Jevic. The drivers argue that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize a bankruptcy court to approve settlement that differs from the Code’s priority scheme. Jevic counters that the drivers have not presented a case or controversy because the drivers cannot show that a decision in their favor is likely to redress their injury. Further, Jevic argues that the Code does not make the absolute priority rule applicable to Chapter 11 settlements. The outcome of this case could affect the scope of the Bankruptcy Code priority scheme and could disadvantage employees who hold priority wage claims against their bankrupt employer. 

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This case gives the Supreme Court the opportunity to determine whether a state’s use of a black voting age population (“BVAP”) floor in crafting new legislative districts is permissible if the state also considers other race-neutral criteria. Appellants, Bethune-Hill et al. (“Bethune-Hill”), argue that the Virginia State Board of Elections’ (“BOE”) use of a 55% BVAP floor violated the Equal Protection Clause because the BOE acknowledged that complying with the racial target was the most important factor in the redistricting process. Bethune-Hill argues that racial targets demean minorities, regardless of whether the state also considers race-neutral factors. Appellees, the BOE, contend that their use of the BVAP floor was a lawful way of complying with the demands of the Voting Rights Act. The BOE claims that the fact that the challenged districts conform to traditional race-neutral redistricting standards illustrates that minority voters were not harmed in the way the Equal Protection Clause contemplates because the state grouped them according to communities of interest, not solely according to their skin color. This case will impact what measures states can take in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act.

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The Supreme Court will decide whether section 1915(b)(2) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires prisoners who file multiple actions in forma pauperis to pay a monthly installment on a “per-prisoner” basis, where prisoners owe no more than 20% of their preceding month’s income regardless of the number of cases for which they owe filing fee; or on a “ per-case ” basis, where a prisoner must pay 20% of her preceding month’s income for each case for which she owes a filing fee. See Brief for Petitioner, Antoine Bruce at 1–2. Federal prisoner Antoine Bruce argues that the monthly payments should be calculated on a per-prisoner basis, while Federal Bureau of Prisons Director Charles E. Samuels, Jr. argues that the payments should be calculated on a per-case basis. See id. at 16; Brief for Respondents, Charles E. Samuels, Jr., et al. at 13. The parties diverge sharply in their interpretations of the text of the statute, congressional intent, the statute’s purposes, and the constitutional-avoidance canon. See Brief for Petitioner at 16, 22, 32, 42, 49; Brief for Respondents at 13, 42, 46. The Court’s ruling will resolve a circuit split between the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits, which apply a per-prisoner cap, and the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, which apply a per-case cap. Additionally, the case will impact prisoners’ access to the courts and administrative costs associated with prisoner cases. See Brief for Petitioner at 11.

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Ronald Lee Sanders was found guilty of murder and other charges related to a 1981 attack in Bakersfield, California. At the sentencing phase of his trial, the jury found that there were four “special circumstances” related to his crimes, and accordingly sentenced him to death. On appeal, the California Supreme Court invalidated two of the special circumstances, but upheld the death sentence without reweighing whether it was warranted by the remaining special circumstances. The California Supreme Court also failed to specifically find that the presence of the invalid circumstances was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After a series of unsuccessful appeals and petitions for habeas corpus, the Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief, holding that it was unconstitutional for the California Supreme Court to uphold the death sentence without reweighing the special circumstances or finding the error to be harmless. Petitioner, the state of California, argues that the state's sentencing code is not the type of “weighing” statute that would render a death sentence invalid simply because certain special circumstances were found to be invalid. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will significantly impact the prospects for successful appeals or writs for habeas corpus by defendants similarly situated to Sanders.

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A California jury convicted William Payton of murder, rape, and two counts of attempted murder. During sentencing, the court failed to correctly explain the application of California's Penal Code, section 190.3(k) following the prosecutor's misstatement of the law to the members of the jury instructing them not to consider defendant's  post-crime  mitigating evidence. The court did instruct the jury that the prosecutor's statements should not be regarded as evidence in the case and that the jury should consider "any other circumstance" as dictated by the California statute. The jury sentenced the defendant to death and the California Supreme Court affirmed. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied Federal law. The Supreme Court will decide whether the Ninth Circuit had the authority to reverse the California Supreme Court.

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This case involves how a state can comply with the Confrontation Clause when presenting certificates of forensic analysis into evidence, rather than having the forensic analyst testify to the results of the evidence testing. In June 2009, the Supreme Court held in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts that certificates of analysis must be accompanied by an opportunity to cross-examine the forensic analyst who prepared the report. However, Virginia Code Sections 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1 allow for a defendant to question a forensic analyst at trial by calling him as a defense witness. Petitioners Mark Briscoe and Sheldon Cypress argue that this violates Melendez-Diaz and the Confrontation Clause by shifting the burden to the defendant and creating a waiver of a constitutional right through inaction. Virginia claims that the scheme is constitutional because the defendants are on notice of the charges against them and may still call the forensic analyst as a witness themselves. This case could affect trial strategy and the cost of presenting forensic evidence, as well as provide an opportunity for the Court to examine the recent 5-4 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts decision, where recently retired Justice David Souter cast a deciding vote.

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The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable government intrusion by prohibiting unlawful searches and seizures without a warrant. Two related exceptions to this rule are relevant in this case: the emergency aid exception and the exigent circumstance exception. This case will help define the type of conduct that must occur in order for an officer to validly invoke either the exigent circumstance or the emergency aid exception. The Court’s decision will help sharpen the line between permissible and impermissible police involvement and define the level of protection individuals continue to have under the Fourth Amendment.

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This case concerns a civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). Cook County, Illinois auctions tax liens to the public. The winning bidder pays the back taxes and can then recover the amount of the delinquent taxes from the property owner, along with a penalty. If the taxpayer doesn't pay, the winning bidder gains ownership of the property on which the lien was placed. Multiple bidders often tie in the auction, so bidders must submit affidavits that they are not using agents to gain an unfair advantage through relation with other bidders. Phoenix Bond and Indemnity Company ("Phoenix") brought a RICO suit against John Bridge for mail fraud, alleging that he submitted false affidavits which stated that it was unrelated to other bidders. The District Court dismissed the suit, stating that Phoenix was not the party that relied on the fraudulent mailings and therefore lacked standing to sue Bridge. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will determine whether only those parties who were the target of a fraudulent communication can bring a civil suit seeking damages under RICO.

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Bruce Brendlin was a passenger in a car driven by Karen Simeroth when she was the subject of a traffic stop by a County Deputy Sherriff. During the stop, the Deputy discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia in the car and on Brendlin. Brendlin was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine and moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the original traffic stop was unreasonable, and therefore in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied his motion, and the California Supreme Court upheld the denial on the basis that Brendlin had not been “seized” under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and thus could not challenge the stop. Brendlin appeals to the Supreme Court, arguing that he was effectively seized by the initial stop, and therefore should be able to challenge it. California argues that Brendlin was not seized, because he should have felt free to leave the scene of the traffic stop, and did not actually submit to the application of force or to a show of police authority.

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