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Humberto Fernandez-Vargas is a Mexican citizen who has been deported from and illegally reentered the United States numerous times. In January of 1982, Fernandez-Vargas illegally reentered the United States, where he remained, living and working in Utah, until his most recent deportation in 2004. During those twenty years, Fernandez-Vargas began a relationship and had a child with an American woman whom he married in 2001. After marrying, Mr. and Mrs. Fernandez-Vargas applied to adjust his immigrant status so Fernandez-Vargas could legally remain in the United States. However, in 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which revised an earlier provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act and, consequently, might have eliminated Fernandez-Vargas’ ability to adjust his status. The Supreme Court must decide whether the revised law should apply to and eliminate relief for Fernandez-Vargas, who illegally reentered the country prior to the legislation’s enactment.

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The Federal Power Act (“FPA”) empowers the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to regulate the transmission and sale of electric power in interstate commerce. See Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 219 (D.C. Cir. 2014). FERC issued Order 745 to incentivize retail customers to reduce electricity consumption when economically efficient. See Electric Power Supply, 753 F.3d at 219. Under the new order, the cost of incentive payments to retail customers to encourage reduced energy consumption is subsidized by entities participating in the wholesale electricity market. See id. The Electric Power Supply Association (“EPSA”), along with four energy industry associations, brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act alleging that the FERC’s Order 745 violates the  FPA,  because it invades the states’ exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the retail market. See id. at 218. The Supreme Court will consider whether (1) the FPA extends authority to the FERC to create a methodology that  wholesale-market  operators must use to calculate the compensation payments in the demand response scheme, and (2) whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Order 745 is arbitrary and capricious. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n et al. at 35–36. The Court’s resolution of this case will impact the regulatory balance in the energy sector between federal and state governments. See Brief of Amici Curiae CES and Dr. Silkman, in Support of Respondent at 4.

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In 2001, Patricia Kennedy filed an “intake questionnaire” with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging age discrimination by her employer, Federal Express Corporation (“FedEx”), against her and other couriers. Because she did not file a formal “charge” document, the EEOC did not notify FedEx, investigate the claims, or begin conciliation efforts. Five months later, Kennedy, along with thirteen other past and present FedEx couriers over the age of forty, filed suit over this issue in federal court. The trial court granted FedEx’s motion to dismiss, ruling (among other things) that Kennedy could not sue because she never filed a timely charge with the EEOC as required by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that Kennedy’s intake questionnaire is a “charge” for the ADEA’s purpose because it manifests her intent to activate the EEOC’s investigation and conciliation process.

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In July 2004, Wisconsin Right to Life aired a series of advertisements encouraging Wisconsin voters to urge their U.S. Senators, Russell Feingold and Herb Kohl, to oppose efforts to filibuster President Bush’s federal judicial nominees. The ads came into conflict with the limitations of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act because they coincided with Senator Feingold’s November 2004 re-election bid. The provision at issue prohibits corporations and unions from running ads targeted at a specific candidate within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election. WRTL argues that the Act should not be applied to its ads because they were grassroots “issue ads,” and not “electioneering ads” covered by this Act. The Federal Election Commission contends that the WRTL ads were intended to sway voters in the federal election, and thus the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act should be applied. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will have an important effect on the delicate balance between the free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment and the interests of campaign finance reformers seeking to limit the electoral involvement of special interests, such as corporations and unions, which may improperly influence the electoral process.

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The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) generally allows access to, and disclosure of, federal information and records to those who requested them, subject to some exceptions, including one for a disclosure that would constitute an invasion of “personal privacy.” Following a recent investigation of Respondent AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”) by Petitioner the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), Respondent CompTel, a non-profit trade association, requested under FOIA all of the records and information pertaining to the FCC’s investigation. In allowing disclosure of some of the information, the FCC rejected AT&T’s argument that such disclosure would constitute an invasion of “personal privacy,” holding that this exception was strictly limited to individuals. AT&T appealed to the Third Circuit, which held that a corporation may have “personal privacy” interests and remanded to the FCC. AT&T argues that the term “personal privacy” applies to corporations as well as individuals, and the FCC argues that such a term is limited to individuals. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will determine the amount of protection given to corporations under FOIA and will likely affect the amount of access the public has to certain private corporate information.

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A joint criminal investigation carried out by the Department of Transportation and the Social Security Administration revealed that Respondent Stanmore Cawthon Cooper failed to disclose that he had HIV to one agency, while simultaneously collecting medical benefits from the other. Upon being convicted for making these misrepresentations, Cooper brought suit against the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Transportation, and the Social Security Administration under the Privacy Act of 1974, arguing that the Government had unlawfully disclosed his HIV status. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that the Privacy Act’s language, which imposes liability on federal agencies only in cases where an individual suffered “actual damages,” does not cover Cooper’s allegations of emotional harm. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the term “actual damages” encompasses mental or emotional harm suffered. The FAA now appeals, arguing that the term “actual damages” is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the federal government to exclude noneconomic damages. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will address whether emotional and other noneconomic damages are “actual damages,” raising broad implications for future suits under the Privacy Act.

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This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to decide the constitutionality of a statute requiring a defendant to initiate a civil case to obtain reimbursement of costs, fees, and restitution after the reversal of conviction of a crime. This case arises out of Shannon Nelson’s conviction for sexual assault, which was overturned after she served prison time and paid various fees. The Colorado Supreme Court found that due process did not require a refund because a defendant could receive compensation by filing a civil suit under the Exoneration Act. Nelson argues that Colorado’s requirement improperly places the burden of proof on the defendant to prove his or her innocence in order to recover fees paid for a conviction that was later overturned. Colorado asserts that Nelson did not necessarily have an automatic right to the refund of her criminal penalties and that, even if she did, Colorado’s requirement satisfies due process. This case poses questions about a state’s ability to affect the presumption of innocence through statutes that influence the scope of due process.

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With Lewis and Clarke, the Supreme Court will venture into the relatively unfamiliar legal territory of tribal sovereign immunity for individuals employed by Indian tribes. The case arises out of an automobile accident between Brian and Michelle Lewis and William Clarke, an employee of the Mohegan Sun Casino, which is owned by the Mohegan tribe. In a lawsuit brought by the Lewises, Clarke successfully convinced the Connecticut Supreme Court that he was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. The Lewises argue that sovereign immunity does not apply when a tribal employee is sued in his individual capacity because the finances of the tribe are not formally at risk. Clarke counters that the finances of the tribe are at risk in this suit, and thus, the sovereign immunity of the tribe should extend to him because he was acting within the scope of his tribal employment. To some, the voyage of Lewis and Clarke into the obscure realm of tribal sovereign immunity for individuals imperils tribal coffers; to others, the regulatory power of the states is at stake.

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In 1989 the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef, off the Alaska coast, spilling millions of gallons of oil into Prince William Sound. In the years following the spill, Exxon would pay millions of dollars in private claims and over a billion dollars to settle government suits under environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). An additional class action suit by private parties sought compensatory damages for economic harm, as well as punitive damages (a civil penalty for particularly egregious conduct). In the final suit, an Alaska district court awarded roughly $20 million in compensatory damages against Exxon-and $5 billion in punitive damages. The Ninth Circuit eventually reduced the punitive damages award to $2.5 billion but upheld the decision to award such damages. Exxon now asks the United States Supreme Court to strike down the award of punitive damages or reduce its amount. In addressing Exxon's petition, the Court must set maritime law standards for punitive damage awards against a ship's owner for acts of the ship's master. The Court will also consider whether Congress meant penalties under the CWA to be the full punishment for a spill, excluding punitive damages under maritime law.

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Respondents Leroy Haeger, et. al (“the Haegers”) were injured during a vehicle accident as a result of a failed tire, which was manufactured by Petitioner Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (“Goodyear”). After the case settled, the Haegers discovered that Goodyear did not disclose several tests that it performed on the tire; the Haegers then moved the court to sanction Goodyear for its discovery misconduct. The district court relied on its inherent powers to sanction Goodyear and its counsel. Goodyear argues that the Supreme Court should limit inherent authority sanctions to those fees and costs directly caused by the claimed misconduct. The Haegers argue that although compensatory damages must be causally linked to the sanctioned misconduct, when the sanctionable misconduct is not limited to a single, discrete instance, but instead is so pervasive as to undermine or affect the whole litigation, an award of the entire amount of attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the party who is victim to the misconduct may be appropriate to compensate that party. The outcome of this case could potentially affect the scope of district courts’ inherent power to impose sanctions for discovery misconduct, when the courts cannot rely on the Rules or other statutory authority. The case will show whether a more exacting causation standard or a more discretionary standard should be used by the district court to impose sanctions under its inherent powers. 

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