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In 2000, Brian Michael Gall was involved in a drug ring for approximately 8 months. Five years later, he pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. The judge sentencing Gall chose to impose a sentence far below the sentence range recommended by the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) because of Gall’s exemplary and law-abiding behavior after he left the conspiracy. On appeal, this sentence was held unreasonable because of its great deviation from the sentence range recommended by the Guidelines. In two recent cases, the Supreme Court held that requiring a judge to impose a sentence within the Guidelines sentence range violates the Sixth Amendment, but that a sentence within the Guidelines range can be presumed reasonable. Consequently, though courts are not required to sentence within the Guidelines range, they are expected to consider the range in their sentencing decisions, and it is uncertain how much discretion they have to depart from the range. Gall v. United States will clarify the role of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in sentencing decisions and what justification is needed for a departure from the Guidelines sentencing range.

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Under California law, a union may become the exclusive bargaining representative for all public school employees in a particular school district if it can show that a majority of the employees agree to be represented by that union. See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. SACV 13–676–JLS, 2013 WL 9825479, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013). Such a union may establish an “agency shop” arrangement with the school district, under which employees, not members of the union, are required to pay an agency fee, and may only opt out from funding union activities not related to collective bargaining. See Friedrichs, 2013 WL 9825479, at *1. Friedrichs asserts that because of the political nature of collective bargaining, compelled agency fees are a violation of the First Amendment, and the opt-out system takes advantage of dissenters unaware of the affirmative objection requirement. See Brief for Petitioner, Rebecca Friedrichs, et al. 22, 30, 55–56, 61. In opposition, the Union argues that there is no justifiable reason to modify the opt-out arrangements, and that “agency shop” arrangements do not infringe employees’ First Amendment rights but are necessary to prevent a free riding problem. See Brief for Respondent, California Teachers Association, et al. at 15–17, 32, 55. The Court’s  decision in this case  will impact unions’ abilities to raise funds and the First Amendment rights of non-members of the union. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States, in Support of Respondents at 19–20, 26–29.

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Quicken Loans charged three couples with mortgage discount fees that were allegedly unearned. One couple, the Freemans, initiated a civil action under Section 2607(b) of the Real Estate Procedures Act of 1974 (“RESPA”), claiming that RESPA prohibits a settlement services provider from charging any unearned fees. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that Section 2607(b) only applies to fees split with another culpable party. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Now, after consolidating their case with the other couples’ claims, the Freemans argue that the Fifth Circuit’s decision should be overturned because the intent of RESPA was to proscribe all unearned fees, including fees charged by settlement service providers acting unilaterally. Quicken Loans counters that Congress intended to restrict only split fees, protecting consumers such as the Freemans through extensive disclosure requirements. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify the judicial interpretation of Section 2607(b) and determine which fees RESPA forbids.

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In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in reaction to the perceived failures of the self-regulatory system for accounting procedures that led to the infamous Enron and WorldCom scandals. The Act established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to supervise the audit of public companies. Although the Board is under the authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission, its members are not subject to direct removal or appointment by the President and it retains the power to set and raise its own budget. In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether the Act’s establishment of the Board is an unconstitutional violation of separation of power principles and whether the Board’s structure violates the Appointments Clause. Petitioners argue that the Act violates  separation  of powers by diminishing the President’s ability to control or supervise Board members. Respondents argue that the Act does not violate  separation  of powers because Congress can grant exclusive appointment and removal authority to the Heads of Departments. Petitioners additionally argue that the Board’s structure violates the Appointment Clause because Board members are Principal Officers and, even if they were to be construed as Inferior Officers, their appointment is still unconstitutional, because the SEC is not a “Department” and its Commissioners are not the SEC’s “Head,” as required by the Clause. In response, Respondents argue that Board members are inferior officers because they are controlled directly by the  SEC,  and that the SEC  is in fact  a “Department” over which the President can exercise broad control and the Commission is its “Head” because it exercises the SEC’s collective powers. The case will ultimately determine the permissibility of the scheme currently in place that regulates US financial markets.

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The Supreme Court must determine the boundaries of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and comity as applied to a state that has been unwillingly brought into another state’s courts. See Brief for Petitioner, Franchise Tax Board of the State of California at 1. The Franchise Tax Board of the State of California (“FTB”) looks to reverse Nevada v. Hall by expanding sovereign immunity to suits brought by private citizens in other states or, alternatively, to find that Nevada violated principles of full faith and credit, comity, and equality, by treating the FTB differently than it would a similar Nevada agency. See id. at 25. Conversely, Hyatt argues that Nevada v. Hall must be upheld as a matter of stare decisis and that the privilege of comity does not require the forum state, in all circumstances, to treat another state’s agency the same as the forum state’s equivalent agency. See Brief for Respondent, Gilbert P. Hyatt at 17. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine where states may be haled into court by a private citizen and to what degree states can be civilly liable for violating the law. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Multistate Tax Commission in Support of Petitioner at 4, 6.

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In 2005, Petitioner Ricky D. Fox ran for Police Chief of Respondent Vinton, Louisiana ("the Town"). During the campaign, Respondent Billy Ray Vice, the incumbent Police Chief, attempted to blackmail Fox and damage his public image. Fox won the  election,  but sued Vice and the Town for attempting to derail his campaign. Among Fox’s claims was a civil rights allegation under a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Following discovery in Fox’s civil case, Vice and the Town moved for summary judgment on the federal claim. Fox withdrew the claim, conceding that he failed to assert the required elements, but continued to pursue his state-based tort claims. The defendants then moved for attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, arguing that Fox’s federal claim was frivolous. The district court granted the defendants’ motion, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal. Fox argues that in a case with factually intertwined claims, a defendant must prevail over an entire lawsuit in order to receive attorneys’ fees. Vice and the Town, however, claim that nothing in Section 1988 prevents defendants from receiving attorneys’ fees for individual frivolous claims. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will address Section 1988’s purpose of encouraging meritorious civil rights  claims,  while discouraging groundless claims.

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Petitioner Charles Fowler murdered a local police officer after the officer approached him and his associates, who were preparing to rob a bank. Fowler was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), which makes it a federal crime to murder a witness to a federal crime with the intent of preventing that witness from communicating with federal law enforcement officials. Fowler challenged his conviction, arguing that the government did not show with sufficient certainty that the officer he murdered was reasonably likely to communicate with federal authorities, had he not been killed. Fowler asserts that failing to require the government to show at least a reasonable likelihood of such communication is inconsistent with the statutory language, and would disrupt the balance between state and federal criminal jurisdiction. The United States responds that requiring such a standard would undermine the statute’s purpose of maintaining the integrity of the federal justice system, and that allowing a lower standard will not disrupt the state-federal balance. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify the standard the government must meet in prosecuting Section 1512(a)(1)(C) violations, and resolve uncertainty among the circuit courts on this point.

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This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to determine whether the Georgia courts erred in determining that the prosecution’s peremptory challenges were not based on race discrimination. See Brief for Petitioner, Timothy Tyrone Foster at 2–4; Brief for Respondent, Bruce Chatman, Warden, at 1–2. Petitioner Timothy Tyrone Foster contends that he was denied due process and the right to an impartial  jury,  because the prosecution used peremptory challenges to strike black jurors on the basis of race. See Brief for Petitioner at 2–3. Foster argues that the prosecution’s jury selection notes demonstrate intent to exclude black jurors from the jury and that the prosecution’s purported reasons for striking the black prospective jurors are insufficient in light of the corresponding notes. See id. at 27–28. Respondent Bruce Chatman counters that the prosecution established sufficient justification for striking each prospective black juror and that the notes were prepared in anticipation of a Batson challenge. See Brief for Respondent at 1–2. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will provide greater clarity as to what constitutes a violation  under  Batson v. Kentucky.

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In 2000, T.A.'s parents realized that their son was a troubled teenager, and though it was suspected that he might have a learning disability, his school district determined that he was not disabled and therefore not entitled to special education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. T.A.'s problems continued and in 2003 his parents placed him in a private school. In 2004, a hearing officer determined that T.A. was disabled, and that because Forest Grove School District had failed to offer him free appropriate public education, the district had to reimburse T.A.'s parents for the cost of the private school. The school district appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that damages were not required because T.A.'s parents removed him unilaterally, without his ever having received special education services from a public agency. In this case, the Court will determine whether parents can unilaterally make this decision and then expect the school district to reimburse them, or if they must wait for action by the school district.

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