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The Supreme Court will decide whether the damages awarded in the case of design patent infringement should be calculated as the entire profits of the whole product or be limited to the profits attributable to the patent-protected component. The parties’ arguments center on divergent purposes of the controlling statute, 35 U.S.C. § 289, as well as the meaning of “article of manufacture” as it is used within § 289. Apple, pointing to the plain language, congressional intent, and policy implications, argues that the purpose of § 289 was to overturn judicial precedent and allow a design patent owner to recover damages when only a component of a device infringes the design patent. Samsung, however, argues that Apple’s reading is too broad and cuts against congressional intent because it will result in illogical outcomes and remove centuries-old judicial precedent. Depending on how the Supreme Court rules, this case will impact research and development funding and potentially create a new avenue of patent trolling. 

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This case will address a circuit split between the Seventh Circuit and nine other circuits concerning a individual’s ability to file a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged infringement on that individual’s Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures or an infringement of an individual’s due process rights. On April 10, 2013, Elijah Manuel sued the city of Joliet, Illinois for injuries suffered as a result of a forty-seven day detention following his unlawful arrest on March 18, 2011. Manuel emphasizes that the Seventh Circuit is alone in explicitly barring malicious prosecution claims under the Fourth Amendment and therefore its lower court holding should be overturned. The City of Joliet advocates for continued adherence to the Seventh Circuit’s precedent, which rejects the contention that legal process extends to claims of malicious prosecution, and also contends that Manuel’s claims are time barred by state tort law, which provides adequate remedy for alleged due process violations. Manuel argues that his malicious prosecution claim is a Fourth Amendment claim and falls within the purview of federal and not state law. The case will impact the availability of recovery for post-process detentions as well as the applicability of state restrictions on §1983 claims.

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This case addresses the correct standard to be applied in granting a Certificate of Appealability
(“COA”) on a motion to reopen a judgment. As per the standard, Petitioner Duane Buck argues that he deserved a COA, as a reasonable juror could consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be valid, as well as debate the validity of the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. In opposition, Respondent Lorie Davis, Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, contends that Buck’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was meritless and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. This case will settle the correct standard for granting a COA, while also addressing issues of implicit racial biases against African American defendants. 

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The Supreme Court will determine whether a close family relationship between the insider and tippee shows “personal benefit” necessary to establish insider trading. Petitioner Bassam Salman argues that a casual or social friendship does not prove personal benefit but, rather, proof of personal benefit requires a showing of monetary gain by the tipper. The United States contends that a tipper personally benefits by giving a gift of information to a family member or friend, rendering proof of monetary gain by the tipper unnecessary. The United States maintains that a tipper breaches his fiduciary duty to shareholders whenever he discloses non-public corporate information for non-corporate purposes. The Court’s decision in this case may have a substantial impact on the scope of SEC’s authority to enforce securities-fraud laws in case of tipping and consequently influence investors’ interests and their confidence in securities markets. 

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This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to decide whether the plain language of the federal bank fraud statute requires proof of, in addition to intent to deceive a financial institution, a specific intent to target the financial institution’s property. See Brief for Petitioner, Lawrence Eugene Shaw at 15. The case arises out of Lawrence Eugene Shaw’s conviction of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1), after Shaw withdrew funds from a Taiwanese businessman’s Bank of America account, albeit without any harm to Bank of America. See United States v. Shaw, 781 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2015). Shaw argues the plain language of § 1344(1) requires proof of intent to deprive that institution of its own property. See Brief for Petitioner at 15. The government responds that because the Congressional intent behind the statute was to target all forms of bank fraud, the statute must be interpreted broadly: without concern for schemers’ mental states as to whose property they sought to defraud. See Brief for Respondent, United States at 44–45. Potentially at stake is the balance between federal and state police power, with federal police power increasing the broader the Supreme Court interprets a statute. See Brief for Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL"), in Support of Petitioner at 5.

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Juan Bravo-Fernandez and Hector Martínez-Maldonado were involved in a federal program bribery scheme in which Bravo allegedly paid for Martinez’s trip to Las Vegas to attend a boxing match in exchange for Martínez pushing through beneficial legislation for Bravo’s private security company. A jury convicted both defendants of committing federal bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 but acquitted them of other bribery-related charges.  The convictions were later vacated due to a jury instruction error, and Bravo and Martínez were acquitted on remand.  Bravo and Martínez argue that the jury acquittals retain preclusive effect under the Double Jeopardy Clause despite the fact that jury had originally returned inconsistent verdicts. The government counters that because the jury’s inconsistent verdicts do not allow Bravo and Martínez to show that the jury had decided in their favor, collateral estoppel does not apply. The outcome of this case could potentially affect prosecutorial theories and could disadvantage criminal defendants who face various predicate and conspiracy charges. 

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And then the executive summary goes here...

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In 1992, ConAgra Foods, Inc. (“ConAgra”) sued Americold Logistics, LLC and its parent company, Americold Realty Trust (collectively, “Americold”), in Kansas state court to recover damages for goods destroyed by fire in an Americold storage facility. See ConAgra Foods, Inc. v. Americold Logistics, LLC, No. 13-2064-JWL, 2013 WL 5530274, *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 4, 2013). Americold removed the action to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, and received summary judgment. ConAgra appealed. Although the parties did not raise the question, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined Americold Realty Trust—a real estate investment trust (“REIT”) with potential beneficiaries in many states—had not shown it was completely diverse from ConAgra. Accordingly, the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. See ConAgra Foods, Inc. v. Americold Logistics, LLC, 776 F. 3d 1175, 1175–80 (10th Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court will decide how to determine the citizenship of a trust for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Americold maintains that the citizenship of a trust should be based on the citizenship of its trustees, not its beneficiaries. See Brief for Petitioners, Americold Logistics, LLC, et al. at 12. ConAgra contends that a court should consider a trust to be a citizen of every state in which any of the trust’s members, shareholders, or beneficiaries is a citizen. See Brief for Respondents at 18. The Court’s resolution of this case will impact the jurisdictional status of REITs and how courts determine the citizenship of trusts. See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (“NAREIT”), in Support of Reversal at 5; Brief of Amicus Curiae Winston Wen-Young Wong, in Support of Petitioner at 34

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In order to be granted relief under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 52(b) (“Rule 52(b)”), plain-error review requires that a defendant establish prejudice by proving that the error affected a substantial right. See Brief for Petitioner, Saul Molina-Martinez at 17–19. In this case, the Supreme Court has an opportunity to determine whether an appellate court, applying plain-error review, should presume a rebuttable presumption of prejudice if there is a miscalculation of a defendant’s sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Sentencing Guidelines”). See id. at i. Molina-Martinez, the petitioner, argues that an erroneous sentencing calculation under the Sentencing Guidelines should result in a rebuttable presumption that the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights. See id. at 15. The United States, the respondent, counters that because the misapplication of the Sentencing Guidelines is a non-structural error, Molina-Martinez retains the burden of showing prejudice. See Brief for Respondent, United States at 15, 24–28. The Court’s decision will potentially impact appellate courts’ application of plain-error review under Rule 52(b) and affect the procedural strategy and substantive rights of criminal trial litigants. See Brief for Petitioner at 45, 48; Brief for Respondent at 45–50.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will consider whether the United States must prove elements of a crime not contained in the relevant criminal statute but included in an erroneous jury instruction if the government failed to object to that instruction at trial.  The Court will also consider whether an appellate court may review a statute-of-limitations defense not raised at trial. See Brief for Petitioner, Michael Musacchio at i; Brief for Respondent, United States at i. Michael Musacchio was convicted of conspiracy to access a computer system without authorization. According to the relevant statute, the United States had to demonstrate “Mussachio had agreed to make unauthorized access or exceed authorized access” of a computer system. See United States v. Musacchio, 590 Fed. Appx. 360, 362 (5th Cir. 2014). However, the trial court’s jury instructions stated that the jury must find that Musacchio “intentionally access[ed] a protected computer without authorization and exceed[ed] authorized access.” (emphasis added) See id. at 361. Neither Musacchio nor the United States objected to the instruction. On appeal, Musacchio challenged the sufficiency of the government’s evidence. Musacchio contends that the law-of-the-case doctrine requires the United States to prove the elements of the crime as described in the jury instructions, even when the jury instructions were erroneous and imposed a heightened burden on the government. See Brief for Petitioner, Michael Musacchio, at 19–22. Musacchio also argues that a statue-of-limitations defense not raised at trial is reviewable on appeal. See id. at 37–39; 53. The United States contends that the law-of-the-case doctrine is inapplicable, because the jury instructions were patently erroneous, and the proper statutory elements were stated in the indictment. See Brief for Respondent, United States at 13. The United States further argues that Musacchio waived his statute-of-limitations defense by failing to raise it at trial. See id. at 40–41. The Court’s decision in this case may affect the government’s prosecutorial power, the fairness of trials, and the availability of statute of limitations defenses. See Brief for Petitioner at 19-20; Brief for Respondent at 13, 48-51.

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