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Jesse Busk and Laurie Castro, employees of Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. (“Integrity”), sued Integrity alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Specifically, the employees alleged that Integrity required post-shift security screenings lasting up to 25 minutes, yet failed to compensate their employees for the time spent undergoing the screenings. Integrity claims that it is immune from liability under the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, which provides that employers are not required to compensate for activities that are postliminary to an employee’s primary work activities. The Supreme Court will address whether under the FLSA, as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act, employers must compensate employees for post-shift security screenings.  The Supreme Court’s decision in the case will reflect its view on the correct balance between the interest of employers in preventing employee theft, and the interest of employees in obtaining compensation for time spent undergoing screenings related to theft prevention or similar activities. This decision will affect the range of activities that employers can require employees to perform with and without compensation. 

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On April 29, 2009, Sergeant Matt Darisse arrested Nicholas Heien in North Carolina after a traffic stop that Darisse initiated based on his misinterpretation of relevant state statutes. When Heien tried to exclude evidence that resulted from the traffic stop during his subsequent trial, the trial court denied his request. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that an officer cannot justify a traffic stop when a mistake of law serves as the primary justification for the stop. In December 2012, the North Carolina Supreme Court overturned the appellate court’s ruling. The Supreme Court of the United States will now consider whether a police officer’s mistake of law can serve as the requisite reasonable suspicion needed for a constitutional traffic stop. Heien argues that allowing police officers to base traffic stops on misinterpretations of the law would violate the Fourth Amendment rights of those stopped. North Carolina, however asserts that just as police officers can execute constitutional traffic stops by relying on reasonable mistakes of fact, a police officer can justify a stop if it is based on a reasonable but mistaken interpretation of a statute. The Court’s ruling implicates the Fourth Amendment practices of law enforcement, the right to privacy of individuals, and the right of individuals to be free from restraint. 

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The Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) requires companies issuing a security to create offering documents that adequately outline the security’s risks to potential investors. Section 13 of the Securities Act requires a plaintiff to file a Securities Act claim within three years to allege the existence of material misstatements or omissions in these offering documents. In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, however, the Supreme Court held that many statutory time limits could be “tolled” or stopped when plaintiffs are potential members of an existing class action dealing with the same legal claim. This case should decide whether or not the time limitation in § 13 is the sort of limit subject to this “American Pipe rule.” The decision has implications for the efficiency of courts and stock issuers alike.

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Upon the return of an unanimous verdict in favor of the defendant in a vehicular accident resulting in personal injury, the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, alleging juror misconduct as a basis for a new trial. That motion relied on a juror’s testimony about statements made during the jury’s deliberation by the foreperson that suggested she had withheld information during the jury selection process. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) (“FRE  606(b)”) allows the introduction of juror testimony only in very limited circumstances, and this case should determine whether the testimony offered here does or does not fall within one of those exceptions.  This case has greater implications for the sanctity of jury deliberations, as well as the balance between the right of civil litigants to a fair trial and the importance of finality in verdicts.  This decision should also clarify for lower federal courts the application of FRE 606(b). 

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In 2012, Brandon W. Owens filed a class action petition in Kansas state court, alleging that Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company and Cherokee Basin Pipeline owed royalty payments derived from certain gas wells. Dart and Cherokee sought to remove the case to federal court, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), commonly known as the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). In their notice of removal, Dart and Cherokee did not include supporting evidence of its allegation that the jurisdictional amount was met. Dart and Cherokee contend that mere allegations of the amount in controversy is sufficient to establish jurisdiction if there is no dispute over that amount. In opposition, Owens argues that the notice of removal has to contain factual evidence supporting federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court will decide how much evidence of the jurisdictional requirements—if any—a CAFA defendant seeking removal is required to include in his or her notice of removal. The resolution of this case will have a significant impact on a defendant’s burden in seeking removal and, in turn, large effects on the availability of a federal forum for many state court defendants.

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In 2000, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) with the intent to provide protection for the free exercise of religion in various contexts, including prisons and jails. In this case, the Supreme Court will consider whether a prison grooming policy prohibiting a half-inch beard grown in accordance with a prisoner’s religious beliefs, violates RLUIPA. Additionally, the Court will have the opportunity to determine the level of deference courts should give prison officials when considering whether a prison policy that substantially burdens inmates’ exercise of religion furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means available. The resolution of this case may impact the balance between the rights of prisoners to practice their religion freely while incarcerated and the government’s interest in prison safety. 

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