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Buckeye Check Cashing, a service provider in the payday loan industry, agreed to loan money to John Cardegna. The loan agreement contained an arbitration clause that compelled the parties to use arbitration, and not the courts, in case of dispute. Cardegna brought a class action lawsuit against Buckeye for allegedly charging interest rates higher than Florida usury law allows. Buckeye responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause. Cardegna resisted arbitration, maintaining that the arbitration clause was part of an illegal contract and therefore void ab initio—the clause had never come into existence as a matter of law. The issue before the Court is thus whether a court or an arbitrator should determine whether the underlying contract is void for illegality before enforcing the arbitration clause. The outcome will depend on whether the Supreme Court believes the separability doctrine applies to such contracts. If the Court affirms and holds that Cardegna's claims should be decided by the courts, the payday industry and its consumers, businesses that use arbitration clauses, and the policies behind the Federal Arbitration Act may suffer. If the Court instead decides that the claims should be sent to arbitration, low-income consumers, consumer protection regulation, and the integrity of the judicial system as a whole may be negatively affected.

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After their daughter suffered severe health problems following a routine vaccination for diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (“DTP”), Russell and Robalee Bruesewitz sued Wyeth, Inc., the manufacturer of the vaccine, alleging that Wyeth’s DTP vaccine was outmoded and inadequately designed. In response, Wyeth argued that Section 22(b)(1) of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (“NCVIA”) exempted vaccine manufacturers from all design-defect claims, including the one asserted by the Bruesewitz family. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Wyeth and dismissed the claim. The Supreme Court must now determine whether to sustain the categorical preclusion of all design-defect claims advanced against vaccine manufacturers, or whether to expose vaccine manufacturers to potential design-based litigation. This decision will affect the right of vaccine victims to seek compensation for their injuries and the ability of vaccine manufacturers to avoid costly litigation that may drive them out of the vaccine market.

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The Court must consider whether the proposed redistricting plans to North Carolina’s Congressional District 1 and Congressional District 12 constitute unconstitutional gerrymandering. Appellants Patrick McCrory, Governor of North Carolina, and A. Grant Whitney, Jr., Chairman of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, contend that the redistricting plans were not drawn based on race but rather were politically motivated. Appellees David Harris and Christine Bowser claim that direct and circumstantial evidence demonstrates that race was the predominant factor in the redrawing of district lines. The case is significant because it will address whether complying with the Voting Rights Act satisfies a compelling government interest and whether gerrymandering challengers must provide an alternative map when they present direct and circumstantial evidence of race-based redistricting. 

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Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), when a party, without the authority to do so, ships from the United States either “all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention” or “any component . . . that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention” in a way that would induce another party abroad to combine the component(s) to form the patented invention, that party commits patent infringement. Section 271(f)(1) prevents parties from evading domestic patent law when engaging in international transactions. The parties differ on how broad § 271(f)(1) should be construed. Life Technologies Corporation argues that courts should construe § 271(f)(1) narrowly to refer to the percentage of components for the invention that a party ships abroad. Promega Corporation, on the other hand, argues that the statute takes into account a combination of quantity and relative importance of the component(s) shipped abroad. The outcome of this case will determine the limits of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) and, consequently, the limits of private action in shipping materials abroad. 

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Respondents Jevic Holding Corporation et al. (“Jevic”) fired Petitioners Casimir Czyzewski et al., members of a certified class of truck drivers (“the drivers”), when the company filed for bankruptcy in 2008. The drivers were entitled to receive payment on their wage claims before other unsecured creditors received any distribution from Jevic’s bankruptcy estate, but they were skipped over when Jevic’s two largest creditors reached a settlement with Jevic. The drivers argue that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize a bankruptcy court to approve settlement that differs from the Code’s priority scheme. Jevic counters that the drivers have not presented a case or controversy because the drivers cannot show that a decision in their favor is likely to redress their injury. Further, Jevic argues that the Code does not make the absolute priority rule applicable to Chapter 11 settlements. The outcome of this case could affect the scope of the Bankruptcy Code priority scheme and could disadvantage employees who hold priority wage claims against their bankrupt employer. 

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This case gives the Supreme Court the opportunity to determine whether a state’s use of a black voting age population (“BVAP”) floor in crafting new legislative districts is permissible if the state also considers other race-neutral criteria. Appellants, Bethune-Hill et al. (“Bethune-Hill”), argue that the Virginia State Board of Elections’ (“BOE”) use of a 55% BVAP floor violated the Equal Protection Clause because the BOE acknowledged that complying with the racial target was the most important factor in the redistricting process. Bethune-Hill argues that racial targets demean minorities, regardless of whether the state also considers race-neutral factors. Appellees, the BOE, contend that their use of the BVAP floor was a lawful way of complying with the demands of the Voting Rights Act. The BOE claims that the fact that the challenged districts conform to traditional race-neutral redistricting standards illustrates that minority voters were not harmed in the way the Equal Protection Clause contemplates because the state grouped them according to communities of interest, not solely according to their skin color. This case will impact what measures states can take in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act.

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The Supreme Court will decide whether section 1915(b)(2) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires prisoners who file multiple actions in forma pauperis to pay a monthly installment on a “per-prisoner” basis, where prisoners owe no more than 20% of their preceding month’s income regardless of the number of cases for which they owe filing fee; or on a “ per-case ” basis, where a prisoner must pay 20% of her preceding month’s income for each case for which she owes a filing fee. See Brief for Petitioner, Antoine Bruce at 1–2. Federal prisoner Antoine Bruce argues that the monthly payments should be calculated on a per-prisoner basis, while Federal Bureau of Prisons Director Charles E. Samuels, Jr. argues that the payments should be calculated on a per-case basis. See id. at 16; Brief for Respondents, Charles E. Samuels, Jr., et al. at 13. The parties diverge sharply in their interpretations of the text of the statute, congressional intent, the statute’s purposes, and the constitutional-avoidance canon. See Brief for Petitioner at 16, 22, 32, 42, 49; Brief for Respondents at 13, 42, 46. The Court’s ruling will resolve a circuit split between the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits, which apply a per-prisoner cap, and the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, which apply a per-case cap. Additionally, the case will impact prisoners’ access to the courts and administrative costs associated with prisoner cases. See Brief for Petitioner at 11.

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Ronald Lee Sanders was found guilty of murder and other charges related to a 1981 attack in Bakersfield, California. At the sentencing phase of his trial, the jury found that there were four “special circumstances” related to his crimes, and accordingly sentenced him to death. On appeal, the California Supreme Court invalidated two of the special circumstances, but upheld the death sentence without reweighing whether it was warranted by the remaining special circumstances. The California Supreme Court also failed to specifically find that the presence of the invalid circumstances was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After a series of unsuccessful appeals and petitions for habeas corpus, the Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief, holding that it was unconstitutional for the California Supreme Court to uphold the death sentence without reweighing the special circumstances or finding the error to be harmless. Petitioner, the state of California, argues that the state's sentencing code is not the type of “weighing” statute that would render a death sentence invalid simply because certain special circumstances were found to be invalid. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will significantly impact the prospects for successful appeals or writs for habeas corpus by defendants similarly situated to Sanders.

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A California jury convicted William Payton of murder, rape, and two counts of attempted murder. During sentencing, the court failed to correctly explain the application of California's Penal Code, section 190.3(k) following the prosecutor's misstatement of the law to the members of the jury instructing them not to consider defendant's  post-crime  mitigating evidence. The court did instruct the jury that the prosecutor's statements should not be regarded as evidence in the case and that the jury should consider "any other circumstance" as dictated by the California statute. The jury sentenced the defendant to death and the California Supreme Court affirmed. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied Federal law. The Supreme Court will decide whether the Ninth Circuit had the authority to reverse the California Supreme Court.

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This case involves how a state can comply with the Confrontation Clause when presenting certificates of forensic analysis into evidence, rather than having the forensic analyst testify to the results of the evidence testing. In June 2009, the Supreme Court held in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts that certificates of analysis must be accompanied by an opportunity to cross-examine the forensic analyst who prepared the report. However, Virginia Code Sections 19.2-187 and 19.2-187.1 allow for a defendant to question a forensic analyst at trial by calling him as a defense witness. Petitioners Mark Briscoe and Sheldon Cypress argue that this violates Melendez-Diaz and the Confrontation Clause by shifting the burden to the defendant and creating a waiver of a constitutional right through inaction. Virginia claims that the scheme is constitutional because the defendants are on notice of the charges against them and may still call the forensic analyst as a witness themselves. This case could affect trial strategy and the cost of presenting forensic evidence, as well as provide an opportunity for the Court to examine the recent 5-4 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts decision, where recently retired Justice David Souter cast a deciding vote.

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