J.D.B. v. North Carolina

Issues

Does the age of an individual questioned by police affect whether that individual is in custody and must receive Miranda warnings?

 

Petitioner J.D.B. was a thirteen-year-old boy suspected of being involved in two break-ins. The police questioned him while he was at school without giving him a Miranda warning, and J.D.B. made incriminating statements. At his trial, J.D.B. moved to suppress those statements, arguing that he had been subjected to custodial interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona. Specifically, J.D.B. argued that a court should take account of his age when determining whether he was in custody. The North Carolina trial court and appellate courts all held that J.D.B. was not in custody for purposes of Miranda and allowed the statements into evidence. J.D.B. was convicted, placed on 12 months’ probation, and ordered to pay restitution. J.D.B. appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that age should be a factor in determining whether he was in custody for Miranda purposes. North Carolina contends that age is a subjective factor and should not be part of the objective custody inquiry. This case will determine what personal characteristics should be considered when determining whether a subject is in custody, and, therefore, whether a Miranda warning is necessary prior to questioning.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a court may consider a juvenile's age in a Miranda custody analysis in evaluating the totality of the circumstances and determining whether a reasonable person in the juvenile's position would have felt he or she was not free to terminate police questioning and leave?

On September 24, 2005, police spotted and interviewed Petitioner J.D.B. in the vicinity of two break-ins in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. See In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 136 (N.C.

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Additional Resources

· Education Week, Mark Walsh: High Court to Weigh Miranda Rights of Juveniles at School (Nov. 1, 2010)

· All Business, Kimberly Atkins: U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Miranda Age Factor (Nov. 1, 2010)

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J. McIntyre Machinery, LTD v. Nicastro

Issues

Where a foreign manufacturer has an exclusive distribution agreement with an independent company in the United States, does national distribution provide sufficient contacts to subject that manufacturer to personal jurisdiction in a products liability suit in a state the defendant does not explicitly target as a market for its products?

Robert Nicastro injured his hand in a shearing machine manufactured by J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. (“McIntyre”), a British company with no physical American presence. See Nicastro v. McIntyre Machinery America, 399 N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 539, 545. McIntyre Machinery America (“MMA”), McIntyre’s exclusive U.S.

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Additional Resources

· Forbes.com, James Beck: On the Docket—Inside the Courtroom (Oct. 22, 2010)

· Industry Week, Keith Wilson: “Equalizing” the Playing Field with Foreign Manufacturers (Feb. 10, 2010)

· Robb & Robb: Suing Foreign Product Manufacturers

·The Supreme Court will hear this case in tandem with Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, which concerns state general personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer whose products occasionally enter the state through its global parent company.

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Irizarry v. United States

Issues

Is a district court required to provide a defendant with notice of its intent to depart from the sentence range established by the United States Sentencing Guidelines, if the grounds for departure are not identified in either the presentence investigation report or the Government's presentencing hearing submissions?

 

In 2001 Leah Smith obtained a divorce from and restraining against her former husband, Richard Irizarry, for spousal abuse. Between the divorce in 2001 and 2003, Irizarry sent Ms. Smith 255 e-mails, several threatening to kill Ms. Smith and her family. In 2003, Irizarry was arrested. Irizarry pleaded guilty to making threatening interstate communications to his ex-wife. As a result, he was sentenced to sixty months imprisonment, a sentence nine months longer than the maximum sentence recommended by Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The district court sentenced Irizarry to the maximum amount of time allow under the statute, because of the likelihood Irizarry would continue threatening his ex-wife. Irizarry objected to the sentence because the court failed to give advance notice of its intent to depart upward from the sentencing guidelines as required by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32(h) ("Rule 32(h)"). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the sentence, determining that Rule 32(h) does not apply to such sentence variances. In the Supreme Court, Irizarry argues that his sentence should be overturned because Rule 32(h) requires a district court to give the parties notice any time it intends to depart from the sentencing range recommended by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, on a ground not previously identified in the presentence report or a government submission.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h), and the holding in Burns v.United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991) requiring a court to provide reasonable notice to the parties that it is contemplating a departure from the applicable sentencing guideline range on a ground not identified for departure either in the presentence report or in a party's prehearing submission, has any continuing application in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Richard Irizarry married Leah Smith in 1995. Irizarry was physically and mentally abusive to Smith and their son. In 2000, Smith left Irizarry and moved across the country and, in 2001, divorced Irizarry and obtained a restraining order against him. See United States v. Irizarry, 458 F.3d 1208, 1210 (11th Cir. 2006). That year, Irizarry was arrested and sent to jail for violating the restraining order after he arrived at Smith's new apartment. See Brief of United States in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 3.
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Iraq v. Beaty (07-1090); Iraq v. Simon

Issues

Whether U.S. courts have jurisdiction over the Republic of Iraq in cases involving the alleged misdeeds, including torture and hostage taking, by Saddam Hussein's regime, or whether Iraq is immune from prosecution.

 

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") prevents foreign governments from being sued in courts of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) creates an exception that allows US courts to hear cases involving foreign governments that sponsor terrorism. Alleged victims of Saddam Hussein's regime sued the current Iraqi government in federal court under this exception. However, due to the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003 ("EWSAA"), and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ("NDAA"), the issue of whether U.S. courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims has come into question. Iraq argues that both the EWSAA and the NDAA make § 1605(a)(7)'s exception to sovereign immunity inapplicable to them. In both cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that in spite of the EWSAA and the NDAA, U.S. courts maintain subject-matter jurisdiction to hear claims brought against Saddam Hussein's regime. Iraq appealed both decisions, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court's decision will determine whether victims of Saddam Hussein's government may sue the current Iraqi government in U.S. courts. The outcome of this case will impact U.S.-Iraqi relations, U.S. efforts to rebuild and support the current Iraqi government, and the ability of victims of Saddam Hussein's regime to sue the current Iraqi government.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Iraq v. Beaty (07-1090)

Whether the Republic of Iraq possesses sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in cases involving alleged misdeeds of the Saddam Hussein regime and predicated on the exception to immunity in former 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).

Iraq v. Simon (08-539)

Whether the Republic of Iraq possesses sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in cases involving alleged misdeeds of the Saddam Hussein regime predicated on the now repealed state sponsor of terrorism subject matter exception to immunity of former 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).

Republic of Iraq, et al., v. Robert Simon, et al.

Robert Simon ("Simon"), a news reporter for CBS News, was one of several American citizens in Kuwait and Iraq immediately following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. See Vine v. Republic of Iraq, 459 F. Supp. 2d 10, 14 (D.D.C.

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Indiana v. Edwards

Issues

If a state trial court finds a defendant competent to stand trial, is it entitled to find the defendant not competent to represent himself at trial?

Court below

 

In 1999, Ahmad Edwards stole a pair of shoes from an Indiana department store and then shot at the store security guard who chased after him, wounding the guard and a passer-by. The State of Indiana charged Edwards with theft, criminal recklessness, battery, and attempted murder. In 2004, an Indiana trial court declared Edwards competent to stand trial but later denied Edwards' request to serve as his own lawyer. The judge said that Edwards, a diagnosed schizophrenic, was not competent to represent himself. Edwards then went to trial with counsel, a jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to thirty years in prison. Edwards appealed, arguing that the court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself at trial. The Indiana Court of Appeals agreed with Edwards and called for a new trial. The appeals court held that once the trial court had found Edwards competent to stand trial, under United States Supreme Court precedent, the court could not impose a higher competency standard to determine whether he could act as his own lawyer. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court's decision. The Supreme Court will consider whether states may impose greater competency standards on defendants who wish to represent themselves than on ordinary defendants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May states adopt a higher standard for measuring competency to represent oneself at trial than for measuring competency to stand trial?

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Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.

Issues

If an antitrust plaintiff alleges that a competitor unlawfully tied a patented product to an unpatented product, must she also prove that the defendant had sufficient power to control the price or quantity of products in the patented good's market?

 

The Sherman Antitrust Act forbids product-tying arrangements by companies that possess substantial market power in the tying-product's market. While the party alleging the violation must generally prove such market power exists, market power is assumed when a company holds a valid patent on the tying product. Illinois Tool Works ("Illinois") makes the availability of licensing agreements for its patented products contingent on the exclusive use of other, unpatented products. It urges the Court to overturn the patent-based market-power presumption. Independent Ink, an Illinois licensee, claims that the tying arrangement improperly forces it to buy Illinois' ink, despite the availability of cheaper, effective substitutes, thereby stifling beneficial competition. The direct impact of the Court's decision, whether it preserves the status quo or changes its rule, making antitrust violations harder to prove, will be felt by sellers who tie patented products to unpatented ones, firms who buy products from such companies, and the consumers who ultimately purchase products from either company. Indirectly, the case may mark the Roberts Court's first foray into the doctrine of stare decisis, which provides insight into the current Court's view on when and how to defer to its past decisions. As a result, the effects of the decision may be felt in many areas of the Court's jurisprudence which don't deal with the antitrust law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, in an action under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. ? 1, alleging that the defendant engaged in unlawful tying by conditioning a patent license on the licensee's purchase of a non-patented good, the plaintiff must prove as part of its affirmative case that the defendant possessed market power in the relevant market for the tying product, or market power instead is presumed based solely on the existence of the patent of the tying product?

Trident is a wholly owned subsidiary of Illinois Tool Works, Inc. ("Illinois"). Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.

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IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez; Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc.

Issues

Should Employees' walking to and waiting at distribution stations where required safety equipment is distributed to the employees be included as part of either the principal activities for which an employer is employed or integral and indispensable to such principal activities, and therefore compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act?

 

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. ("FLSA"), as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 ("Portal Act"), an employee must be compensated for the time their employer requires them to spend donning and doffing protective gear. In the combined oral argument for Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc. and IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, the Supreme Court will consider an important related question—whether an employee is also entitled to compensation for time spent waiting at stations where required safety and health equipment is distributed, donned, and doffed, and traveling to and from these stations to work sites at the beginning and end of each workday.

Under the FLSA, employers must compensate employees for activities performed during the workday. However, the Portal Act, which amended the FLSA, removed employers' obligation to compensate employees for two categories of activities performed outside the workday. These activities include: "(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity, and (2) activities which are preliminary or postliminary to said principal activity or activities." Tum and Alvarez ("Employees") contend that walking and waiting at safety stations are inextricably linked to the donning and doffing process, and are principal activities that demark the beginning and end of the workday. The Employees also argue that these activities occur within the workday, and thus, the above Portal Act exceptions are inapplicable. Public policy considerations, such as employee safety, financial welfare, and corporate profitability will figure prominently in the Supreme Court's resolution of these conflicting appellate court rulings. The outcome will also profoundly impact workers' salaries, manufacturing costs, and corporate outsourcing policy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez :
Whether walking that occurs between compensable clothes-changing time and the time employees arrive at or depart from their actual work stations constitutes non-compensable "walking . . . to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity" within the meaning of Section 4(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act.

Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc. :
1. Is the time employees must spend walking to and from stations where required safety equipment is distributed compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), 254(a).
2. Do employees have a right to compensation for time they must spend waiting at required safety equipment distribution stations?

Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc. , 360 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2004)

Tum, representing current and former employees at Barber Foods' poultry processing plant in Portland, Maine, sued to recover unpaid wages for time spent waiting at and walking to stations where required safety equipment is distributed.

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