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Alphonso James was convicted four times between 1997 and 2003: once for attempted burglary, twice for drug offenses, and the last time for illegal possession of a firearm. At the sentencing for his firearm offense the government argued that under the Armed Career Criminal Act a 15 year mandatory minimum sentence should be applied because James had three prior convictions for a violent felony and serious drug offenses. James is contesting the classification of attempted burglary as a violent felony, and the issue is now before the U.S. Supreme Court. The government argues that attempted burglary presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another person and thus fits one of the statutory definitions of a violent felony. James argues that determining whether his attempted burglary presented the specified risk would require the court to conduct impermissible fact-finding in opposition to the Court’s rulings in Taylor v. United States and Shepard v. United States. James also makes a statutory construction argument to support the exclusion of attempted burglary from the definition of a violent felony. Both the District Court for the Middle District of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit ruled that attempted burglary was a violent felony. If the Supreme Court upholds those rulings, more felons will be subject to this federal modified “three strikes” rule, thus adding fuel to the national debate about mandatory minimums and increasing prison populations.

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Petitioner J.D.B. was a thirteen-year-old boy suspected of being involved in two break-ins. The police questioned him while he was at school without giving him a Miranda warning, and J.D.B. made incriminating statements. At his trial, J.D.B. moved to suppress those statements, arguing that he had been subjected to custodial interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona. Specifically, J.D.B. argued that a court should take account of his age when determining whether he was in custody. The North Carolina trial court and appellate courts all held that J.D.B. was not in custody for purposes of Miranda and allowed the statements into evidence. J.D.B. was convicted, placed on 12 months’ probation, and ordered to pay restitution. J.D.B. appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that age should be a factor in determining whether he was in custody for Miranda purposes. North Carolina contends that age is a subjective factor and should not be part of the objective custody inquiry. This case will determine what personal characteristics should be considered when determining whether a subject is in custody, and, therefore, whether a Miranda warning is necessary prior to questioning.

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In 2001 Leah Smith obtained a divorce from and restraining against her former husband, Richard Irizarry, for spousal abuse. Between the divorce in 2001 and 2003, Irizarry sent Ms. Smith 255 e-mails, several threatening to kill Ms. Smith and her family. In 2003, Irizarry was arrested. Irizarry pleaded guilty to making threatening interstate communications to his ex-wife. As a result, he was sentenced to sixty months imprisonment, a sentence nine months longer than the maximum sentence recommended by Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The district court sentenced Irizarry to the maximum amount of time allow under the statute, because of the likelihood Irizarry would continue threatening his ex-wife. Irizarry objected to the sentence because the court failed to give advance notice of its intent to depart upward from the sentencing guidelines as required by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32(h) ("Rule 32(h)"). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the sentence, determining that Rule 32(h) does not apply to such sentence variances. In the Supreme Court, Irizarry argues that his sentence should be overturned because Rule 32(h) requires a district court to give the parties notice any time it intends to depart from the sentencing range recommended by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, on a ground not previously identified in the presentence report or a government submission.

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The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") prevents foreign governments from being sued in courts of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) creates an exception that allows US courts to hear cases involving foreign governments that sponsor terrorism. Alleged victims of Saddam Hussein's regime sued the current Iraqi government in federal court under this exception. However, due to the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003 ("EWSAA"), and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ("NDAA"), the issue of whether U.S. courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims has come into question. Iraq argues that both the EWSAA and the NDAA make § 1605(a)(7)'s exception to sovereign immunity inapplicable to them. In both cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that in spite of the EWSAA and the NDAA, U.S. courts maintain subject-matter jurisdiction to hear claims brought against Saddam Hussein's regime. Iraq appealed both decisions, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court's decision will determine whether victims of Saddam Hussein's government may sue the current Iraqi government in U.S. courts. The outcome of this case will impact U.S.-Iraqi relations, U.S. efforts to rebuild and support the current Iraqi government, and the ability of victims of Saddam Hussein's regime to sue the current Iraqi government.

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