Corley v. United States

Issues

Whether federal law requires that a confession  taken  more than six hours after a defendant's arrest, and before the defendant appears before the magistrate judge, must be suppressed if there was unreasonable delay in bringing the defendant before the judge.

 

When Johnnie Corley was arrested for assaulting an officer and interrogated about the robbery of a credit union, he did not confess to a role in the robbery until more than six hours after his arrest. Moreover, Corley did not appear before a magistrate judge until the next day. After the District Court found Corley guilty, the Third Circuit affirmed. Corley is now appealing to the Supreme Court of the United States. His case will determine whether, if there was unreasonable delay in bringing a suspect before a magistrate judge, the suspect's confession is still valid. The Supreme Court's decision will affect suspects' rights and the procedure that police must follow during a confession.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3501 - read together with Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 5(a), McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) - requires that a confession taken more than six hours after arrest and before presentment be suppressed if there was unreasonable or unnecessary delay in bringing the defendant before the magistrate judge.

    Federal law enforcement officials identified Johnnie Corley as one of three men who robbed the Norsco Federal Credit Union in Norristown, Pennsylvania, on June 16, 2003. See U.S. v. Corley, 500 F.3d 210, 212 (3d Cir.

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    Connick v. Thompson

    Issues

    Is a single failure by prosecutors to provide exculpatory evidence to a defendant sufficient to establish failure-to-train liability against a District Attorney’s office?

     

    John Thompson was wrongfully imprisoned for 18 years following a trial during which the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence, in violation of Brady v. Maryland. Thompson brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the district attorney's office is liable for failing to properly train its employees on the requirements of Brady. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found in favor of assigning liability to the district attorney's office. Petitioners, including District Attorney Harry Connick, appealed to the Supreme Court. Connick claims that there was no obvious need to train prosecutors regarding Brady standards and that liability should not attach to the office when there was no notice that the training program needed reform. Respondent Thompson contends that the prosecutors’ lack of training amounted to a deliberate indifference to preserving constitutional rights and that liability may properly attach to the district attorney's office without a past history of violations. This decision will determine the extent to which a municipality may be liable for a single action by one of its employees.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Does imposing failure-to-train liability on a district attorney's office for a single Brady violation contravene the rigorous culpability and causation standards of Canton and Bryan County?

    In April 1985, shortly before his murder trial, a Louisiana state court convicted Respondent John Thompson of attempted armed robbery. See Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293, 296 (5th Cir. 2009). Several weeks later in May 1985, the same court convicted Thompson of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. See Thompson v. Connick, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29717 at *2 (E.D. La.

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    Additional Resources

    · Wex: Brady Rule

    · Law.com, Tony Mauro: Clement Lines Up Ex-Prosecutors, Seeks Argument Time in Misconduct Case (Aug. 25, 2010)

    · New Orleans Times-Picayune, Katy Reckdahl: Appeals Court Upholds $14 Million Judgment Against Orleans DA Office (Dec. 20, 2008)

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    Conkright v. Frommert

    Issues

    Whether a district court must defer to an ERISA plan administrator’s proposed remedy for an ERISA violation, where the violation resulted from a prior interpretation by the plan administrator.

     

    Courts generally give deference to discretionary decisions made by ERISA pension plan administrators. This case will test the limits of that deference and will decide if a court is obligated to defer to a plan administrator’s proposed remedy for an ERISA violation, when the cause of the violation itself was the administrator’s prior interpretation. Petitioners and their amici argue that allowing judges to involve themselves in ERISA pension plan determinations without deferring to decisions made by the plan administrator will increase the costs and uncertainty of maintaining pension plans. Respondents and their amici, on the other hand, argue that deferring repeatedly to a plan administrator will increase costs through more and prolonged litigation, and will be unfair to plan participants who justifiably rely on promised benefits to plan for retirement.

    ​

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    1. Whether the Second Circuit erred in holding, in conflict with decisions of thisCourt and other Circuits, that a district court has no obligation to defer to an ERISA plan administrator's reasonable interpretation of the terms of the plan if the planadministrator arrived at its interpretation outside the context of an administrativeclaim for benefits.

    2. Whether the Second Circuit erred in holding, in conflict with decisions of other Circuits, that a district court has "allowable discretion" to adopt any "reasonable"interpretation of the terms of an ERISA plan when the plan interpretation issue arises in the course of calculating additional benefits due under the plan as a result of an ERISA violation.

     

    The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C.

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    Additional Resources

    •       FindLaw: Pension Plans and ERISA

    •       United States Department of Labor: ERISA

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    Cone v. Bell

    Issues

    Whether the procedural bar prevents federal habeas courts from reviewing habeas petitions that state courts dismissed based on state procedural rules against re-litigating fully adjudicated claims, and whether federal courts can review state application of such rules.

     

    Gary Cone was convicted and sentenced to death in the Criminal Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, for the murder of two people. Subsequent to Cone’s direct appeal, the state made available documents that both supported Cone’s defense that he was a drug addict at the time of the killings and impeached the testimonies of several witnesses. Respondent Bell argues for the state that Cone is procedurally barred from raising his grounds for relief in a federal habeas corpus review, as state courts already rejected it and Cone failed to properly argue it in the state courts. Petitioner Cone, however, argues that there should not be a procedural bar in this case because he did not receive the new information until his second request for post-conviction review, so the courts erroneously found that his claim had been previously decided. He also argues that it is the federal court’s duty in federal habeas review to examine grounds for relief based on federal law.  The Supreme Court’s decision in this case could implicate the methods by which individuals convicted in state court can litigate their claims, both in state courts and upon federal habeas corpus review. Additionally, the Court’s decision could clarify the roles of state and federal courts in an area of law with implications for the federalist structure.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    The question presented is whether petitioner is entitled to federal habeas review of his claim that the State suppressed material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, which encompasses two sub-questions:
    1. Is a federal habeas claim “procedurally defaulted” because it has been presented twice to the state courts?
    2. Is a federal habeas court powerless to recognize that a state court erred in holding that state law precludes reviewing a claim?

    In 1982, Gary Bradford Cone, a Vietnam veteran, was found guilty and sentenced to death in a Tennessee criminal court for the murder of two elderly people during the commission of a robbery. See Cone v. Bell, 492 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir.

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    CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood

    Issues

    Does the plain language of the CROA create a non-waivable right to sue, thereby  voiding  a consumer contract’s binding arbitration agreement?

     

    Respondents Wanda Greenwood, Ladelle Hatfield, and Deborah McCleese each applied for an Aspire Visa credit card that petitioner CompuCredit Corporation marketed. Petitioner Synovus Bank issued the Aspire Visas after each respondent signed an agreement containing a binding arbitration provision. When respondents were charged card-related fees, they filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated alleging that petitioners engaged in deceitful marketing in violation of the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679 et seq. (“CROA”). CompuCredit moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the pre-dispute arbitration agreement. The district court acknowledged the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, but held that the CROA created a non-waivable right for consumers to sue in court. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the decision that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable under the CROA. Petitioners argue that the contract between the parties should be honored and the binding arbitration clause enforced. Respondents contend, however, that Congress intended to preserve the right to bring a claim in court when it enacted the CROA. The Supreme Court’s decision will consider the balance between consumers’ right to contract and providing adequate protections for vulnerable consumers. This decision will affect the enforceability of consumer contracts’ pre-dispute arbitration agreements and the extent to which arbitration may act as an acceptable substitute for an individual’s access to court.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether claims arising under the CROA are subject to arbitration pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement.

    CompuCredit Corporation considered a credit repair organization for purposes of this case, marketed a subprime credit card called Aspire Visa to consumers with impaired credit records. See Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010). As the card’s exclusive marketer and advertiser, CompuCredit Corp.

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    Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

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    Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals

    Issues

    Does the FMLA’s self-care provision abrogate states’ sovereign immunity from suits for damages?

     

    After respondent Maryland Court of Appeals denied petitioner Daniel Coleman’s request for medical leave and terminated his employment, Coleman filed this suit against the State of Maryland under the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), which provides that “an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period . . . [b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position,” 29 U. S. C. §2612(a)(1) (D). Coleman argues that the Act’s medical leave provisions should be considered as a unified effort against gender discrimination that permits state employees to sue state employers under the self-care provision, and that the purpose of preventing gender discrimination abrogates state immunity. The state responds that the FMLA’s provisions address discrete forms of discrimination that should be examined individually and that the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity bars lawsuits against a state employer under the self-care provision. By deciding whether a state employee has legal recourse for a violation of the self-care provision, this case will clarify the scope of state exposure to employment lawsuits seeking money damages under the FMLA.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    In passing the FMLA, as the Court recognized in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 701, Congress intended to eliminate gender discrimination in the granting of sick leave. The legislative record supports its purpose and findings. The question presented for review is:

    Whether Congress constitutionally abrogated states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it passed the FMLA’s self-care leave provision.

    From March 2001 through August 2007, Coleman worked at the Maryland Court of Appeals. See Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir.

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    Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

    Additional Resources

    Constitutional Law Prof Blog, Ruthann Robson: On Floors, Ceilings, Federalism and Constitutional Law Exams: West Virginia Weekend (Apr. 9, 2011)

    National Organization for Women: The Provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act (Feb. 5, 2007)

    Stanford Law Review, Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, (Apr. 2006)

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    Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council; Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council

    Issues

    Whether the discharge from Coeur Alaska's Kensington Gold Mine constitutes "fill material," and thus is regulated by § 404 permits issued by the Army Corps of Engineers, or whether the discharge is subject to the Environmental Protection Agency's effluent limitations and is governed under the § 402 permit program.

     

    In 2005, the Army Corps of Engineers issued a permit under the federal Clean Water Act ("CWA"), authorizing Coeur Alaska, Inc. to discharge wastewater from the Kensington Gold Mine in navigable waters in Alaska. Environmental groups claimed that this permit violated the CWA because the discharge from the mine did not comply with the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") pollution standards under the CWA. Coeur Alaska, however, argued that the Army Corps of Engineers governed the discharge under a different section of the  CWA,  and that the issuance of the  permit therefore  did not violate the CWA. In this case, the Supreme Court's decision will determine whether the permit issued for the Kensington Mine is valid, and potentially resolve the conflicting authority of the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers under the CWA. In addition, the outcome of this case will impact environmentalists and industry representatives in determining the extent to which certain pollutants can be discharged into U.S. waters.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council (07-984)

    The Clean Water Act provides two separate programs for the permitting of discharges into navigable waters of the United States. Under Section 404 of the Act, the Army Corps of Engineers may issue permits for discharges of "fill material," subject to the water-quality restrictions imposed by Section 404(b)(1). Under Section 402 of the Act, the Environmental Protection Agency may issue permits for the discharge of all other pollutants, subject to the effluent limitations prescribed under Sections 301 and 306 of the Act. In 2002, after notice and comment, the EPA and the Corps jointly promulgated a regulation defining the statutory term "discharge of fill material" to include "tailings or similar mining-related materials." Pursuant to its authority under Section 404 to grant permits for the discharge of "fill material," the Corps granted petitioner a permit to deposit certain mine tailings in a lake.

    In the decision below, the Ninth Circuit invalidated that permit even though it acknowledged that the proposed discharge "facially meets the current regulatory definition of ‘fill material.'" Upsetting 35 years of established agency practice, the court of appeals held that the Corps may not issue a Section 404 permit for the discharge of fill material if the fill material in question otherwise would be subject to a Section 301 or 306 effluent limitation.

    The question presented is whether the Ninth Circuit erred in reallocating the Corps' and EPA's permitting authority under the Act.

    Alaska v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council (07-990)

    Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in invalidating the longstanding regulatory interpretation of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the "Corps") and the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") that discharges of dredged or fill material are subject to the exclusive permitting authority of the Corps under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, rather than effluent limitations and standards of performance promulgated under Sections 301 and 306 and applied by EPA pursuant to its separate permitting authority under Section 402.

    In 2004, Coeur Alaska sought a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers ("Army Corps") to open the Kensington Gold Mine in southeast Alaska. See Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. Army Corps of Engineers, 486 F. 3d 638, 641 (9th Cir.

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    Clark v. Arizona

    Issues

    Whether Arizona's insanity law, as set forth in A.R.S. § 13-502 (1996) and applied in this case, violated Petitioner's right to due process under the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment?

    Whether Arizona's blanket exclusion of evidence and refusal to consider mental disease or defect to rebut the state's evidence on the element of mens rea violated Petitioner's right to due process under the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment?

     

     

    On June 21, 2000, 17-year-old Eric Clark shot and killed Flagstaff, Arizona Police Officer Jeffrey Moritz. Brief for Petitioner at 2. At the time, Clark had been suffering from delusions and hallucinations and had been diagnosed as suffering schizophrenia and psychosis. Id. At trial, he attempted to present evidence of his mental illness in order to negate the mens rea knowledge and intent elements of first degree murder. The government, however, argued successfully that under Arizona's definition of insanity (A.R.S. § 13-502(A)) and State v. Mott, evidence of Clark's mental illness was impermissible to negate the mens rea of the crime. Clark was subsequently convicted of first degree murder. He appeals the conviction, arguing that preventing him from using evidence of his mental disease to negate the mens rea of the crime violates his Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether Arizona's insanity law, as set forth in A.R.S. § 13-502 (1996) and applied in this case, violated Petitioner's right to due process under the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment?

    Whether Arizona's blanket exclusion of evidence and refusal to consider mental disease or defect to rebut the state's evidence on the element of mens rea violated Petitioner's right to due process under the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment?

     

    In the early morning on June 21, 2000, in Flagstaff, Arizona, 17-year-old Eric Clark borrowed the keys to his brother's truck while his brother was sleeping.

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    Clapper v. Amnesty International USA

    Issues

    Does a group of international organizations, lawyers, and media personnel have standing to sue for prospective relief based on their allegation that the United States would imminently acquire their international communications using surveillance authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978?

     

    In 2008, Congress passed the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), which revised the procedures for authorizing certain foreign intelligence collection, including expanded authority to collect information on persons outside of the United States using electronic surveillance.  Additionally, the new procedures allow the government to disclose less information before targeting people reasonably believed to be abroad. Shortly after Congress passed the FAA, several organizations, including Amnesty International and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the act’s constitutionality.  The district court dismissed the lawsuit because it found the organizations lacked standing.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and now the Supreme Court must decide if Amnesty International and other organizations have a sufficient stake to allow them to move forward with their constitutional challenges to the FAA. Amnesty International and other organizations argue that they have standing based on a reasonable fear that the government will monitor some of their communications and based on the costly methods used to prevent that monitoring. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper argues that the groups do not have standing because their injuries are not imminent, they do not have ongoing or present injuries, and self-inflicted harms are not recognizable injuries. The decision in this case will likely result in a rebalancing of the competing interest in government transparency and safeguarding national security. Further, the decision will likely cause one side to incur greater costs either in litigating more cases based on alleged, unproven surveillance or in protecting confidential communications against unknowable surveillance.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. 1881a (Supp. II 2008)- referred to here as Section 1881a- allows the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence to authorize jointly the "targeting of [non-United States] persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States" to acquire "foreign intelligence information," normally with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's prior approval of targeting and other procedures. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(a), (b), (g)(2) and (i)(3); cf. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(c)(2). Respondents are United States persons who may not be targeted for surveillance under Section 1881a. Respondents filed this action on the day that Section 1881a was enacted, seeking both a declaration that Section 1881a is unconstitutional and an injunction permanently enjoining any foreign-intelligence surveillance from being conducted under Section 1881a. The question presented is:

    Whether respondents lack Article III standing to seek prospective relief because they proffered no evidence that the United States would imminently acquire their international communications using Section 1881a-authorized surveillance and did not show that an injunction prohibiting Section 1881a-authorized surveillance would likely redress their purported injuries.

    Amnesty International USA, along with attorneys, human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations, filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA). See Brief for the Respondents, American Civil Liberties Union at 15-16. The FAA amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), which established procedures for gathering foreign intelligence including by el

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