Henderson v. United States

Issues

May a court order the government to transfer or sell firearms to a third party on behalf of a convicted felon, who may not possess firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 992(g)?

In this case, the Supreme Court of the United States will have the opportunity to resolve a circuit split and determine whether a convicted felon may request that the government transfer possession of a felon’s non-contraband firearms to a third party. Henderson, a convicted felon, requested that the FBI transfer possession of the firearms to a third party interested in purchasing the firearms. The FBI denied his request, asserting that convicted felons may not possess firearms and that a transfer to a third party would give Henderson constructive possession in violation of federal law. Henderson, however, argues that his inability to possess firearms under federal law does not terminate his entire ownership interest in non-contraband firearms. The Supreme Court’s ruling will implicate ownership rights of convicted felons’ non-contraband firearms.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

“The general rule is that seized property, other than contraband, should be returned to its rightful owner once * * * criminal proceedings have terminated.” Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302, 304 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Farrell, 606 F.2d 1341, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. La Fatch, 565 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1977))). 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), however, makes it “unlawful for any person * * * who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year * * * to * * * possess * * * any firearm.”

The question presented is whether such a conviction prevents a court under Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or under general equity principles from ordering that the government (1) transfer non-contraband firearms to an unrelated third party to whom the defendant has sold all his property interests or (2) sell the firearms for the benefit of the defendant. The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits and the Montana Supreme Court all allow lower courts to order such transfers or sales; the Third, Sixth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, by contrast, bar them.

Petitioner Tony Henderson is a former Border Patrol Agent who was charged with distributing marijuana, a felony under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See U.S. v. Henderson, 555 Fed. Appx. 851, 852 (11th Cir. 2014). He was arrested on June 7, 2006.

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Coleman v. Tollefson et al.

Issues

Under the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, does a dismissal of a frivolous or meritless suit at the district court level count as a third strike, precluding a subsequent suit, or must the appeals process be final for the strike to take effect?

The Supreme Court will decide whether, under the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“§ 1915”), a district court’s dismissal of a suit counts as a strike while it is still pending on appeal or before the time for seeking appellate review has passed. Andre Lee Coleman, a prisoner in Michigan, was barred under § 1915 from proceeding on a fourth action in forma pauperis while the decision from a previous action was on appeal in district court. Coleman argues that the district court improperly dismissed his action when it counted the pending appeal of his action as a third strike in accordance with § 1915(g). However, Tollefson counters that the strike should be in effect after the district court dismissal due to the PLRA’s text and Congress’s desire to ban meritless claims. This decision has the potential to affect how the statute is interpreted in the lower courts and the caseload volume of court dockets.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Under the "three strikes" provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), does a district court's dismissal of a lawsuit count as a "strike" while it is still pending on appeal or before the time for seeking appellate review has passed?

Andre Lee Coleman is a prisoner in the state of Michigan, and he has filed at least three actions or appeals of the type proscribed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Coleman v. Tollefson et al., 733 F.3d 175, 176 (6th Cir.

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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.

Issues

Does an employer violate Title VII by refusing to hire an applicant or by discharging an employee based on a religious observance when the applicant or employee failed to provide actual knowledge to the employer, through explicit notification, of the applicant’s or employee’s need for a religious accommodation?

The Supreme Court will determine whether an employer can be liable under Title VII for refusing to hire a candidate or dismissing an employee only if the employer had actual knowledge, gained by the candidate’s or employee’s explicit notification, that the candidate or employee required a religious accommodation. The EEOC argues that an employer violates Title VII when the employer refuses to hire an applicant or dismisses an employee based on “a religious observance and practice” that could be reasonably accommodated. Abercrombie & Fitch counters that its denial of an exception to a religion-neutral store policy—a look policy considered crucial to the vitality of its business—is not intentional discrimination under Title VII. The Supreme Court’s decision will implicate Title VII’s role in religion-neutral work policies as well as who bears the burden of raising the need for religious accommodations in the workplace.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's * * * religion." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(l). "Religion" includes "all aspects of religious observance and practice" unless "an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate" a religious observance or practice "without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j).

The question presented is whether an employer can be liable under Title VII for refusing to hire an applicant or discharging an employee based on a “religious observance and practice” only if the employer has actual knowledge that a religious accommodation was required and the employer’s actual knowledge resulted from direct, explicit notice from the applicant or employee. 

Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (“Abercrombie”) is an American clothing company with stores across the United States that operates under several names, including Abercrombie & Fitch, Abercrombie Kids, and Hollister Co. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.

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Tibble v. Edison International

Issues

Does ERISA time-bar claims brought against fiduciaries (for a breach of the duty of prudence) if the initial breach occurred more than six years before filing, but allegedly harmed the beneficiaries within the last six years?

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether the ERISA’s six-year filing window prohibits a claim that 401(k) plan fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence by offering higher-cost mutual funds to plan participants, despite identical lower-cost mutual funds being available, when fiduciaries initially chose the higher-cost mutual funds more than six years before the claim was filed. A group of employee-beneficiaries argue that plan fiduciaries have an “ongoing” duty of prudence under ERISA and the failure to remove an imprudent investment gives rise to a new six-year period. Edison International, the employer, counters that case should be dismissed because the record does not reflect the question that the Court granted certiorari for; or, in the alternative, that the judgment below should be affirmed because there is no reversible error. The resolution of this case could have implications concerning the future cost of ERISA-governed benefits plan, and the scope of fiduciary duties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a claim that ERISA plan fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence by offering higher-cost retail-class mutual funds to plan participants, even though identical lower-cost institution-class mutual funds were available, is barred by 29 U.S.C. § 1113(1) when fiduciaries initially chose the higher-cost mutual funds as plan investments more than six years before the claim was filed?

Respondent Edison International (“Edison”) is a holding company with interests in electrical utilities and other energy concerns, with a full-time workforce of over 14,000 employees. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F. 3d. 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013); Facts at a Glance, Edison International (last visited Feb.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Robert Hockett for his support with this preview.

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Kerry v. Din

Issues

Does the refusal of a U.S. citizen’s alien spouse’s visa application bestow upon the citizen an enforceable constitutionally protected interest?

The Supreme Court will decide whether refusing the visa application of a U.S. citizen’s alien-spouse triggers the citizen’s constitutionally protected interests, and whether the citizen may challenge this refusal. Secretary of State Kerry argues that a citizen’s liberty interests are not implicated because neither the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) nor the Due Process Clause confer upon the citizen a legally cognizable interest in the consular officer’s determination, and consular officers’ determinations should not be challenged in court because judicial review would conflict with the consular nonreviewability doctrine and congressional intent in establishing the INA. In opposition, Din, a U.S. citizen, argues that the consular officer’s determination conflicts with the Court’s jurisprudence, which establishes a fundamental right to marry and to benefit from the associational interests in marriage, and that the consular officer’s determination should be subjected to judicial review in order to protect citizens’ liberty interests from arbitrary restrictions. The Court’s ruling in this case implicates the ability of the government to prevent disclosure of confidential information related to national security concerns and the ability of citizens to live with their alien spouse in the United States.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether a consular officer’s refusal of a visa to a U.S. citizen’s alien spouse impinges upon a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen; and
  2. Whether respondent is entitled to challenge in court the refusal of a visa to her husband and to require the government, in order to sustain the refusal, to identify a specific statutory provision rendering him inadmissible and to allege what it believes he did that would render him ineligible for a visa.

Fauzia Din, a U.S. citizen, married Kanishka Berashk, an Afghani national, in September 2006. See Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2013). Din shortly thereafter filed a visa petition in order for Berashk to be admitted into the United States.

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Additional Resources

  • Lawrence Hurley: Supreme Court to Weigh Spouse Rights Over Denied Visa, Reuters (Oct. 2, 2014).
  • Ian R. Macdonald: SCOTUS Grants Certiorari to Two Immigration-Based Cases for 2015 Term: Will the Government Have to Explain its Exercise of “Discretion”?, The National Law Review (Oct. 15, 2014).
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Baker Botts v. ASARCO

Issues

Can bankruptcy lawyers recover compensation for fees incurred through defending a fee application against a bankruptcy client’s objections?

This case presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to decide whether courts have the authority to grant defense-fee awards when a law firm defends itself against its bankruptcy client’s objections to legal fees. Brief for Petitioner Baker Botts at (i). ASARCO argues that § 330 of the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”) does not permit awards for compensation to bankruptcy practitioners for successfully defending fee applications. Brief for Respondent at 16. In opposition, Baker Botts contends that § 330 gives courts broad discretion to award compensation for services that are necessary to the administration of bankruptcy cases, including successfully defending fee applications. Brief for Petitioners at 23. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact the compensation of bankruptcy lawyers and the rights of bankruptcy clients. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Committee On Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Business Law Section of the Florida Bar, et al. (“New York City and Florida Bar Associations”), in Support of Petitioners at 9; Brief of Amicus Curiae Bankruptcy Law Scholars, in Support of Petitioners at 25; Brief for Petitioners at 23 (quoting § 330(a)(C)).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code grants discretion to bankruptcy judges to award "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by" an attorney or other professional employed by the estate. 11 U.S.C. §330(a)(1). Before any compensation may be awarded, the Code requires professionals to complete a detailed fee application, to which any party in interest may object. It is undisputed that the preparation of such a fee application is compensable. But the circuits have now divided over whether defending it is likewise compensable. The Ninth Circuit, like the vast majority of lower courts, has held that bankruptcy judges may award compensation for the defense of a fee application, at least when the defense is meritorious and successful. It so held in part because categorically denying compensation would undermine the statutory requirement that bankruptcy professionals' compensation not be diluted compared to that of non-bankruptcy practitioners. But the Fifth Circuit, in the judgment below, held that such compensation is never authorized by §330(a). 

The question presented is whether Section 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code grants bankruptcy judges discretion to award compensation for the defense of a fee application.

In 2005, Respondent ASARCO, a copper mining company, filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) due to mounting cash-flow and litigation problems. In re ASARCO, 751 F.3d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 2014).

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Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar

Issues

Does a Florida rule of judicial conduct that bars judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds violate the candidates’ First Amendment right to freedom of speech?  

Court below

The Supreme Court will determine whether states may issue rules of judicial conduct that prohibit judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds. Williams-Yulee contends that Canon 7C(1), a Florida rule of judicial conduct prohibiting judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds, is unconstitutional because it restricts judicial candidates’ speech and fails strict scrutiny review since it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The Florida Bar counters that the rule is constitutional because it serves the Florida’s interest in ensuring judicial impartiality and is narrowly tailored because candidates can exercise free speech and may raise funds through alternative means. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case implicates the type of fundraising initiatives judicial candidates are permitted to take when running their campaigns. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does a rule of judicial conduct that prohibits candidates for judicial office from personally soliciting campaign funds violate the First Amendment?

Lanell Williams-Yulee became a candidate for a Florida County Court Judgeship in September 2009. See Fla. Bar v. Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d 379, 381 (Fla. 2014).

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Additional Resources

•    Current and Recent Cases of Interest, Fair Courts Litigation Task Force.

•    Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, Brennan Center for Justice (Oct. 23, 2014).

•    Adam Liptak: Judges on the Campaign Trail, The New York Times (Sept. 27, 2014). 

•    Greg Stohr: Judicial Campaign Solicitations Get Supreme Court Review, Bloomberg (Oct. 2, 2014).

•    Stephen Wermiel: SCOTUS for law students: Financing judicial elections, SCOTUS Blog (Dec. 23, 2014).

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Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project

Issues

Does the Fair Housing Act include a right of action for disparate-impact claims?

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”)’s interpretation of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) to include disparate-impact claims is subject to Chevron deference, which would result in disparate-impact liability under the FHA. The Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs argues that the Court should not defer to the HUD’s interpretation, which it claims is unreasonable because the language of the FHA differs from other statutes that explicitly allow disparate-impact liability. Inclusive Communities, on the other hand, argues that the HUD’s interpretation is entitled to deference because it is reasonable, and is in fact the most favorable interpretation, given that the FHA’s goal of “remedy[ing] existing effects of prior intentional segregation.” This case will ultimately determine the breadth of the rights of action under the FHA for discrimination in affordable housing. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1.    Are disparate-impact claims cognizable under the Fair Housing Act?

2.    If disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, what are the standards and burdens of proof that should apply?

NOTE: The Supreme Court has limited its inquiry to Question 1.

The Petitioner, Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs (“TDHCA”), is a state agency that allocates Low Income Housing Tax Credits (“LIHTCs”) to housing developers. See Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v.

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Additional Resources

•    Nicole Flatow: The Supreme Court is Poised to Cripple the Federal Ban On Housing Discrimination, Thinkprogress.org (Oct. 2, 2014).

•    Sam Hananel: Supreme Court to Hear Another Case On Housing Bias, Huffington Post (Oct. 2, 2014).

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Rodriguez v. United States

Issues

Does an officer’s continued detention of a driver, even after completion of the traffic stop, to conduct a canine sniff violate the Fourth Amendment when the officer lacks reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or some other legal justification to support the additional investigation?

The Supreme Court will determine whether an officer may extend a traffic stop, even after the stop has been completed, to conduct a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or some other legal justification. Dennys Rodriguez claims that any extension of a completed stop to conduct further investigation, no matter how brief, violates the Fourth Amendment unless the extension is independently justified by reasonable suspicion. The United States counters that officers may lawfully engage in further investigations during a traffic stop so long as the officer does not unreasonably prolong the stop. The Supreme Court’s decision might curb law enforcement’s investigative powers with respect to routine traffic stops by potentially creating bright-line restrictions on those powers. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

This Court has held that, during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, asking a driver to exit a vehicle, conducting a drug sniff with a trained canine, or asking a few off-topic questions are “de minimis” intrusions on personal liberty that do not require reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to comport with the Fourth Amendment. This case poses the question of whether the same rule applies after the conclusion of the traffic stop, so that an officer may extend the already-completed stop for a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion or other lawful justification.

On the night of March 27, 2012, police officer Morgan Struble saw a vehicle briefly drive onto the shoulder of a Nebraska highway in violation of Nebraska law. See United States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d 905, 906 (8th Cir. 2014); Brief for Respondent, the United States at 2. Struble stopped the vehicle at 12:06 A.M.

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Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc.

Issues

Does section (30)(A) of the Medicaid Act provide a private right of action for Medicaid providers against states under the Supremacy Clause, even when Congress has not explicitly created the right? 

The Supreme Court will consider whether individual Medicaid providers have a private right of action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce section (30)(A) of the Medicaid Act (“§ (30)(A)”), which requires state Medicaid agencies to take provider costs into account when setting reimbursement rates, when Congress has not explicitly granted a private right of action. Richard Armstrong, the Director of Idaho’s Department of Health and Welfare, argues that individuals do not have a private right of action under § (30)(A) or the Supremacy Clause because a private remedy cannot exist without congressional intent and private litigants should not play a role in determining whether a state gets federal funding. According to Exceptional Child Center, however, when a state law conflicts with federal law, individuals have a private right of action under the Supremacy Clause to bring an injunction and prevent harm that would result from the conflicting state statute. The Court’s ruling will impact the right of individuals to recover under the Supremacy Clause as well as the administration of Medicaid and other statutory schemes that provide funding to states as long as they comply with federal law. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the Supremacy Clause give Medicaid providers a private right of action to enforce § 1396a(a)(30)(A) against a state where Congress did not expressly create enforceable rights under that statute?

Exceptional Child Center, Inc., and four other companies (collectively, “ECC”) offer in-home healthcare and other services for those who are Medicaid-eligible in Idaho. See Inclusion, Inc. v. Armstrong, 835 F. Supp. 2d 960, 961 (D.

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Additional Resources

•    Robert Pear: As Medicaid Rolls Swell, Cuts in Payments to Doctors Threaten Access to Care, The New York Times (Dec. 27, 2014). 

•    Peyton M. Sturges: High Court to Review Medicaid Dispute, Providers' Rights to Force Higher Payments, Bloomberg BNA's Health Law Reporter (Oct. 9, 2014). 

•    Steve Vladeck: Enforcing Medicaid Against Recalcitrant States: The Former HHS Officials' Amicus Brief in Armstrong, PrawfsBlawg (Dec. 23, 2014). ​

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