Astrue v. Ratliff

Issues

Whether, under the Equal Access to Justice Act, fee awards are payable to attorneys or to their clients.

 

Petitioner, Michael J. Astrue (“Astrue”), argues that an award of fees and other expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), is payable to the prevailing party in Social Security cases. Respondent, Catherine G. Ratliff (“Ratliff”), counters that an award of attorneys’ fees should go to the prevailing party’s attorney as compensation for services rendered. Astrue asserts that an award of attorneys’ fees is subject to an administrative offset to satisfy the prevailing party’s debt, if any, to the United States. Ratliff argues that because the award belongs to the party’s attorney and not to the party itself, the award of attorneys’ fees cannot be subject to an offset for a debt that is not his or her own. The Eighth Circuit held that Congress intended attorneys’ fees awarded under EAJA to go to the prevailing party’s attorney and not to the prevailing party. The Supreme Court must resolve whether an award of attorneys’ fees under EAJA is payable to the prevailing party rather than the party’s attorney and, therefore, is subject to an administrative offset for a pre-existing debt owed by the prevailing party to the federal government.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an "award of fees and other expenses" under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d), is payable to the "prevailing party" rather than to the prevailing party's attorney, and therefore is subject to an offset for a pre-existing debt owed by the prevailing party to the United States.

Respondent, Catherine G. Ratliff (“Ratliff”), an attorney, successfully represented two claimants seeking benefits from the Social Security Administration. See Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 801 (8th Cir. 2008). Ratliff then moved for an award of fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C.

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Astrue v. Capato

Issues

Is a child conceived after the death of a biological parent eligible to receive survivor benefits under the Social Security Act regardless of state intestacy laws?

 

Shortly after Robert Nicholas Capato’s death, his wife Karen Capato underwent in vitro fertilization using his frozen sperm and gave birth to twins in 2003. Karen Capato applied for Social Security benefits on behalf of her twins as survivors of a deceased wage earner. The Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied her claim. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) affirmed, ruling that state intestacy law controls eligibility for survivor benefits for posthumously conceived children under the Social Security Act ("Act"). Therefore, the twins were ineligible for benefits under the applicable Florida law. On appeal, the district court affirmed the ALJ’s reading. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and ruled that the plain language of the Act entitles the Capato twins, whose parentage is not in dispute, to survivor benefits. Petitioner Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the SSA, argues that the Act requires the agency to apply state intestacy law to determine whether an applicant is the child of an insured wage earner for the purpose of receiving survivor benefits. In contrast, Respondent Karen K. Capato contends that the Act unambiguously entitles undisputed biological children of married parents to survivor benefits, without referring to state intestacy laws. The Supreme Court’s decision will authoritatively interpret the Act’s mandate on the determination of survivor benefits eligibility, and possibly reflect on the balance between legislative rulemaking and unanticipated progress of science and technology.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a child who was conceived after the death of a biological parent, but who cannot inherit personal property from that biological parent under applicable state intestacy law, is eligible for child survivor benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 401 et seq.

Shortly after Karen and Robert Nicholas (“Nick”) Capato were married in New Jersey in 1999, Nick Capato was diagnosed with cancer. See Capato v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 627 (3rd Cir.

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Astra USA v. Santa Clara County, CA

Issues

Where the federal government contracted with private corporations to create drug price reductions for certain organizations, may third-party beneficiaries of the agreements sue for violations of the agreements despite the lack of explicit federal statutory authority to do so?

Congress enacted Section 602 of the Veterans Health Care Act (“Act”) in 1992 in order to provide relief to certain federally funded organizations for the cost of prescription drugs. The Act requires the federal government and drug manufacturers to enter into pricing agreements which set price ceilings for the drugs. The County of Santa Clara and several other third-party beneficiaries of the pricing agreement (collectively “Santa Clara”) filed suit against several drug manufacturers (“Manufacturers”) under the Act, alleging that the Manufacturers had overcharged them for prescription drugs. The District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Santa Clara’s claim, but the Ninth Circuit reinstated the claim, holding that third-party beneficiaries of the Act have the right to sue for violations of the Act. The Manufacturers subsequently appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court on the grounds that, because there was no federal statutory right of action, Santa Clara lacked standing to sue. The Supreme Court’s decision will affect the rights of third-party beneficiaries of a federal contract, states’ rights to make decisions regarding prescription drugs, and the litigation burden of companies that contract with the federal government.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In the absence of a private right of action to enforce a statute, do federal courts have the federal common law authority to confer a private right of action simply because the statutory requirement sought to be enforced is embodied in a contract?

In 1992, Congress enacted Section 602 of the Veterans Health Care Act (“Act”), which is entitled “Limitations on Prices of Drugs Purchased by Covered Entities.” See County of Santa Clara v. Astra USA Inc., 588 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir.

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Additional Resources

· Health Resources and Services Administration: Pharmacy Affairs and 340BDrug Pricing Programs

· Wex: Third-Party Beneficiary

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Ashcroft v. Raich

 

This case raises the issue of whether Congress's ability to regulate interstate commerce allows it to proscribe the use of medical marijuana. The plaintiff-appellees, Angel McClary Raich and Diane Monson, suffer from "more than serious medical conditions," including, respectively, an inoperable brain tumor and a degenerative spinal disease. Under the advice of their doctors and the auspicious of California's Compassionate Use Act, they both use California-grown marijuana to treat the symptoms of their diseases. Fearing prosecution under the Controlled Substances Act, the plaintiffs sued for declaratory relief in Federal District Court where they were denied the grant of a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit overturned this decision, and the case is now before the Supreme Court. The Court will determine whether the use of California-grown medical marijuana substantially effects interstate commerce based on the four-factor balancing test established in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and refined in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Though none of the factors are particularly weighty in the present case, the majority of them point to Congress' ability to regulate this activity and the Court is likely to overturn the Ninth Circuit's preliminary injunction.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause as applied to the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana for purported personal medicinal use or to the distribution of marijuana without charge for such use.

Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. � 801 et seq.("CSA") as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub .L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236. The CSA establishes five "schedules" of certain drugs and other substances designated "controlled substances." 21 U.S.C.

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Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd

Issues

1. Does the former Attorney General have either absolute or qualified immunity when making the determination of whether to apply for a material witness arrant?

2. Does the person seeking a material witness warrant have to actually intend to obtain further testimony from the subject of the warrant?

 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Respondent Abdullah al-Kidd as a material witness in a terrorism case. Al-Kidd sued the former United States Attorney General, Petitioner John Ashcroft, alleging that he used the material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, as a pretext to hold and investigate al-Kidd as a terrorism suspect in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Ashcroft asserted absolute immunity, claiming that the use of a material arrest warrant constituted a prosecutorial function. He also claimed qualified immunity, on the grounds that there was no established constitutional violation for using a material arrest warrant at the time of the arrest. Al-Kidd contends that Ashcroft is not entitled to either form of immunity because the arrest had an investigative function and no reasonable official could believe that a material witness warrant would authorize the arrest of a suspect without any intent to use the suspect as a witness. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Ashcroft was entitled to neither absolute nor qualified immunity. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine the protection available to government officials by resolving the issue of when the government can use material witness warrants in making arrests.

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the court of appeals erred in denying petitioner absolute immunity from the pretext claim.

2. Whether the court of appeals erred in denying petitioner qualified immunity from the pretext claim based on the conclusions that (a) the Fourth Amendment prohibits an officer from executing a valid material witness warrant with the subjective intent of conducting further investigation or preventively detaining the subject; and (b) this Fourth Amendment rule was clearly established at the time of respondent's arrest.

Abdullah Al-Kidd is a United States citizen. See Brief for Respondent, Abdullah Al-Kidd at 1. After September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) began investigating various terrorist activities. See Brief for Petitioner, John Ashcroft at 3.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

Additional Resources

 The Washington Post, Robert Barnes: Supreme Court to Decide whether Ashcroft can be Sued by Detained Citizen (Oct. 18, 2010)

· The New York Times, Adam Liptak: Justices to Hear Appeal over Liability for Detention (Oct. 18, 2010)

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Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States

 

Arthur Andersen LLP was convicted of witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). The 5th Circuit upheld the conviction, despite Andersen's claims that prosecution did not enter evidence about the numerous documents Andersen did not destroy, that the judge allowed improper evidence of past SEC investigations of Andersen, and that the judge misrepresented the offense in the jury instructions with regards to actual knowledge that certain actions constituted a crime under the circumstances and timing of the commission of the actions. Andersen again challenges the conviction, this time before the U.S. Supreme Court.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Arthur Andersen LLP's conviction for witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) must be reversed because the jury instructions upheld by the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the elements of the offense, in conflict with decisions of the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, and D.C. Circuits.

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Arthur Andersen, LLP, et al. v. Carlisle, et al.

Issues

Whether Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act entitles parties who are not signatories to an arbitration agreement to receive a stay of trial for arbitration, and whether Section 16 of the Act entitles non-signatories to an immediate appeal if the court refuses them a Section 3 stay.

 

Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") allows parties who have agreed to arbitrate to move for a stay of trial proceedings until they have had a chance to attempt arbitration. In addition, Section 16 of the FAA allows an immediate appeal of judgments denying stay under such circumstances. At issue in this case is whether these sections of the FAA extend to non-signing parties affected by an arbitration agreement. Petitioner Arthur Andersen advised Respondent Wayne Carlisle on a business transaction. As a result of this transaction, Carlisle eventually signed a contract, to which Andersen was a not party, that contained an arbitration agreement. After a dispute developed, Andersen sought a stay in the litigation proceedings in order to arbitrate with Carlisle, despite the fact that Andersen had not signed the arbitration agreement. After Andersen appealed the initial denial of its request for a stay, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Andersen's appeal because Sections 3 and 16 of the FAA only apply to signatories of arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court's decision in this case may clarify the scope of the FAA's application to non-signatories, including the availability of appellate review of denials of stays.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether Section 16(a)(l)(A) of the FAA provides appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from an order denying an application made under Section 3 to stay claims involving non-signatories to the arbitration agreement.

(2) Whether Section 3 of the FAA allows a district court to stay claims against non-signatories to an arbitration agreement when the non-signatories can otherwise enforce the arbitration agreement under principles of contract and agency law, including equitable estoppel.

Arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution, outside litigation proceedings, in which parties submit a dispute to an impartial decision-maker for a binding decision. See American Arbitration Association, Arbitration & Mediation.

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Armour v. City of Indianapolis

Issues

Does a city violate the Equal Protection Clause when it forgives the outstanding debt of taxpayers who elected to pay an assessment over the course of several years but refuses to refund similarly situated taxpayers who paid the tax in full?

Court below

 

The Supreme Court will resolve whether a local taxing authority violated the Equal Protection Clause when it forgave the outstanding debt of taxpayers who elected to pay a special assessment over the course of several years while refusing to refund similarly situated taxpayers who paid in full. The Indiana Supreme Court determined that Indianapolis did not violate the Equal Protection Clause despite the large disparity in tax obligations of identically situated taxpayers. Petitioners Christine Armour and other taxpayers argue that where a state has made a determination to treat a group of properties as the same class, it must treat the taxpayers of those properties with rough equality. They assert that forgiving the outstanding debt of some taxpayers without issuing refunds to those who made a single full payment violates the Equal Protection Clause. Respondent City of Indianapolis maintains that the differing treatment is based on legitimate governmental interests and is constitutionally valid.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Equal Protection Clause precludes a local taxing authority from refusing to refund payments made by those who have paid their assessments in full, while forgiving the obligations of identically situated taxpayers who chose to pay over a multi-year installment plan.

Indiana’s Barrett Law allows municipalities to fund public improvements through special assessments levied against and apportioned equally among benefited properties. See City of Indianapolis v. Armour, 946 N.E.2d 553, 556–57 (Ind.

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Arlington Central School Dist. v. Murphy

 

In prior litigation the Murphys, parents of a disabled youth, were determined to be statutorily entitled to receive compensation from the Arlington Central School District  Board of Education for the youth’s private school tuition for a certain period. The Murphys claimed the compensation should include $29,350 paid as fees to an educational consultant. Arlington objected, claiming that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act only allowed payment of attorneys’ fees and the educational consultant was neither an attorney nor an “expert” within the scope of the statute. The District Court held that the statute does not allow payment of fees to a non-lawyer doing work similar to that of an attorney, but does cover expert consulting services. The Second Circuit affirmed, and Arlington petitioned to the Supreme Court, which will consider the scope of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s fee-shifting provision.

In 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a decision requiring Arlington Central School District Board of Education (“Arlington”) to pay certain private school tuition fees for Joseph Murphy, a district student with a disability. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2002).

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Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States

Issues

Under the Fifth Amendment, does temporary, government-induced flooding require compensation to the owner of the flooded property?

 

Petitioner, the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (the “Commission”) sued Respondent, the United States, for a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which compels the government to compensate parties when the government physically seizes property. Specifically, the Commission argues that the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) permanently destroyed trees in a bottomland hardwood forest in Arkansas by intermittently flooding the forest for six years. The United States asserts that the actions of the Corps did not constitute a taking because the Corps did not oust the Commission of possession of the forest, and only a continuous invasion qualifies as a physical taking. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether a temporary invasion is a taking which will affect the meaning of the Takings Clause as it is used in future disputes concerning the destruction of property. 

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Petitioner Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, a constitutional entity of the State of Arkansas, sought just compensation from the United States under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment for physically taking its bottomland hardwood timber through six consecutive years of protested flooding during the sensitive growing season. The Court of Federal Claims awarded $5.7 million, finding that the Army Corps of Engineers' actions foreseeably destroyed and degraded more than 18 million board feet of timber, left habitat unable to regenerate, and preempted Petitioner's use and enjoyment.

The Federal Circuit, with its unique jurisdiction over takings claims, reversed the trial judgment on a single point of law. Contrary to this Court's precedent, a sharply divided 2-1 panel ruled that the United States did not inflict a taking because its actions were not permanent and the flooding eventually stopped. The Federal Circuit denied rehearing en banc in a fractured 7-4 vote.

The question presented is: Whether government actions that impose recurring flood invasions must continue permanently to take property within the meaning of the Takings Clause.

The Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (“the Commission”) is an agency that works to regulate and preserve Wildlife Management Areas in Arkansas. See Our Mission, Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, http://www.agfc.com/aboutagfc/Pages/AboutMission.aspx. One of the areas that the Commission manages (the “Management Area”) is a bottomland hardwood forest in the Upper Mississippi

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