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Petitioner Charles Fowler murdered a local police officer after the officer approached him and his associates, who were preparing to rob a bank. Fowler was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), which makes it a federal crime to murder a witness to a federal crime with the intent of preventing that witness from communicating with federal law enforcement officials. Fowler challenged his conviction, arguing that the government did not show with sufficient certainty that the officer he murdered was reasonably likely to communicate with federal authorities, had he not been killed. Fowler asserts that failing to require the government to show at least a reasonable likelihood of such communication is inconsistent with the statutory language, and would disrupt the balance between state and federal criminal jurisdiction. The United States responds that requiring such a standard would undermine the statute’s purpose of maintaining the integrity of the federal justice system, and that allowing a lower standard will not disrupt the state-federal balance. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify the standard the government must meet in prosecuting Section 1512(a)(1)(C) violations, and resolve uncertainty among the circuit courts on this point.

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This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to determine whether the Georgia courts erred in determining that the prosecution’s peremptory challenges were not based on race discrimination. See Brief for Petitioner, Timothy Tyrone Foster at 2–4; Brief for Respondent, Bruce Chatman, Warden, at 1–2. Petitioner Timothy Tyrone Foster contends that he was denied due process and the right to an impartial  jury,  because the prosecution used peremptory challenges to strike black jurors on the basis of race. See Brief for Petitioner at 2–3. Foster argues that the prosecution’s jury selection notes demonstrate intent to exclude black jurors from the jury and that the prosecution’s purported reasons for striking the black prospective jurors are insufficient in light of the corresponding notes. See id. at 27–28. Respondent Bruce Chatman counters that the prosecution established sufficient justification for striking each prospective black juror and that the notes were prepared in anticipation of a Batson challenge. See Brief for Respondent at 1–2. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will provide greater clarity as to what constitutes a violation  under  Batson v. Kentucky.

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In 2000, T.A.'s parents realized that their son was a troubled teenager, and though it was suspected that he might have a learning disability, his school district determined that he was not disabled and therefore not entitled to special education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. T.A.'s problems continued and in 2003 his parents placed him in a private school. In 2004, a hearing officer determined that T.A. was disabled, and that because Forest Grove School District had failed to offer him free appropriate public education, the district had to reimburse T.A.'s parents for the cost of the private school. The school district appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that damages were not required because T.A.'s parents removed him unilaterally, without his ever having received special education services from a public agency. In this case, the Court will determine whether parents can unilaterally make this decision and then expect the school district to reimburse them, or if they must wait for action by the school district.

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Kevin Powell was arrested on suspicion of illegally owning a firearm and, after allegedly waiving his rights to counsel as required by Miranda v. Arizona, confessed during questioning. Powell was convicted on the basis of that confession. On appeal, Powell's conviction was overturned on the ground that the warnings read to Powell failed to adequately inform him of his right to have an attorney present during questioning. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a suspect must be expressly advised of his or her right to have an attorney present while he or she is being questioned. The Supreme Court's decision will clarify Miranda’s requirements regarding advising a suspect of his or her right to counsel during questioning. This case will resolve a circuit split on the issue and affect law enforcement practices during interrogations.

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This case first asks the Supreme Court to determine whether non-citizens’ claims against government officials who arrested them in connection with the September 11, 2001 attacks and subjected them to harsh conditions during their detention arose in a “new context” under Bivens. Second, it asks whether the government officials were erroneously denied qualified immunity, which would preclude the government officials’ liability for their involvement in the non-citizens’ arrest and detention. Third, this case asks whether the pleading requirements of Ashcroft v. Iqbal are satisfied where the pleading relies on hypothetical scenarios and assumed discriminatory intent. James W. Ziglar, the petitioner, argues that a Bivens remedy is not applicable in this case because Bivens applies to individual government officials’ behavior, not policy concerns such as national security and immigration. Ziglar also argues that the government officials’ actions were reasonable within the context, given the national security concerns, and that the government officials should, therefore, be precluded from liability for their actions. Lastly, Ziglar argues that the respondent Ahmer Iqbal Abbasi failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence to support his claim against the government officials. Meanwhile, Abbasi argues that harsh treatment in federal detention is not a new context under Bivens, that government officials are aware that the Equal Protection Clause categorically prohibits race-based government action, and that Abbasi’s claim satisfied Iqbal’s facial plausibility standard. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact the balance between government officials’ qualified immunity and detained non-citizens’ constitutional rights.

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This case provides the Supreme Court with the opportunity to resolve a conflict over the interplay between the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and the Bankruptcy Code. The parties disagree over whether a creditor may file an accurate proof of claim for a time-barred debt in a bankruptcy proceeding. Petitioner, Midland Funding, LLC (“Midland Funding”) argues that the Bankruptcy Code creates a right to file time-barred claims and that filing such claims does not violate the FDCPA. Midland Funding asserts that filing claims for time-barred debts helps to fulfill the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code, such as collectively addressing all claims against the bankruptcy estate. Respondent, Aleida Johnson, argues alternatively that filing time-barred claims is an unfair, misleading practice that violates the FDCPA and does nothing to further the goals of the bankruptcy process. Johnson contends that creditors file stale claims solely in hopes of taking advantage of malfunctions in the legal process and that these claims waste judicial resources.

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The Supreme Court will decide whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act’s provisions regarding deportation, is unconstitutionally vague. In doing so, the Court will also decide whether it should assess the constitutionality of this provision under the vagueness standard applicable to criminal statutes or under a less strict standard. Attorney General Jeff Sessions argues that the Court should apply a less strict vagueness standard to § 16(b) in this case because of its civil rather than criminal context. Sessions also argues that § 16(b) is not unconstitutionally vague under the proposed lower standard because its language is plainly intelligible. James Garcia Dimaya contends, however, that the Court should apply the vagueness standard applicable to criminal statutes in this case because the Court applied this standard to a deportation statute in Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951). Dimaya also asserts that § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague because it shares the same features that made a provision unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). The outcome of this case will have consequences for the validity of § 16(b) as it is incorporated into other criminal and civil laws and for the government’s ability to remove some aliens from the United States.   

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This case will address the constitutionality of the disparagement clause, or §2(a) of the Lanham Act. Simon Tam, spokesperson for THE SLANTS, an Asian-American dance-rock band, argues that this provision, which allows the USPTO to deny federal registration to marks that “may be disparaging,” poses impermissible censorship of political speech in instances where registrants seek to reappropriate a previously disparaging term. Michelle K. Lee, the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the USPTO, maintains that this provision merely denies federal registration for a government program but does not restrict an individual’s political or commercial speech. The resolution of this case will determine whether the owners of potentially disparaging marks, such as the Washington Redskins, have the right to register their marks, bring suit for infringement, and use government resources for policing new trademark applicants and potential infringement. 

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A Florida court sentenced Joe Elton Nixon to death following a trial in which his lawyer conceded that the prosecution had proven its case, telling the jurors, "I think you will find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the crimes charged, first-degree premeditated murder, kidnapping, robbery, and arson." In the face of seemingly overwhelming evidence against Nixon, the defense lawyer hoped that his frank admission would curry favor with the jurors and compel them to spare Nixon's life. On appeal, Nixon argued that his lawyer's admission was tantamount to a guilty plea, and that the lawyer lacked the authority to enter such a plea without Nixon's consent. The State argued that it was a reasonable trial strategy, not a guilty plea. Nixon claimed his defense lawyer was ineffective; however, Nixon and the state dispute by which standard of ineffectiveness the court should measure the lawyer's performance. Nixon argues that admitting guilt without his consentwas such grave misconduct that it automatically negates any validity the strategy may hold. Florida argues for a more flexible standard that would measure the lawyer's performance against prevailing professional norms and consider whether Nixon was prejudiced by any possible ineffectiveness. A second question is whether the lawyer's statements constituted a guilty plea. Without an affirmative showing that a guilty plea was intelligent and voluntary, it is unconstitutional. Here, it is undisputed that Nixon did not affirmatively acquiesce to defense counsel's strategy. While such a strategy is very likely to have the effect of a guilty plea, namely a criminal conviction, strictly speaking it lacks a waiver of the constitutional rights that accompanies a guilty plea, including the right to be free from self incrimination and the right to a trial by jury.

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After receiving an anonymous tip that Joelis Jardines’ home was being used to grow marijuana, Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) officers conducted a warrantless surveillance of Jardines’ home. During the surveillance, a drug detection dog sniffed the exterior of the home and alerted to a smell of marijuana at the front door. Based on this positive alert, among other indications of marijuana production, the officers were granted a search warrant. The search confirmed that the house was being used as a marijuana grow house and Jardines was charged with drug trafficking and grand theft for stealing electricity. Jardines successfully moved to suppress evidence of the dog sniff outside his home by arguing that the sniff constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed and held that the canine sniff was not a Fourth Amendment search. The Florida Supreme Court ultimately reversed the appellate court’s decision and held that a dog sniff is a substantial government intrusion into the sanctity of the home and constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The State of Florida then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. This decision could affect a crucial method used by DEA agents and police officers to detect and seize illegal substances and will clarify the right held by individuals such as Jardines in preventing invasions of privacy. 

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