Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.

Issues

Should the Federal Circuit review the construction of patent claims de novo or for clear error?

The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s claims construction in a patent infringement case de novo and reversed that court’s decision. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact whether the interpretation of patent claim construction involves questions of law. Sandoz and amici argue that claim construction involves questions of law, and to review interpretations deferentially would cause interpretive contradictions between district courts. However, Teva and amici argue that de novo review would undermine the district courts and lead to over-litigation of issues.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a district court's factual finding in support of its construction of a patent claim term may be reviewed de novo, as the Federal Circuit requires (and as the panel explicitly did in this case), or only for clear error, as Rule 52(a) requires.

Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, and other related companies (collectively, “Teva”), developed and obtained a patent for Copaxone, a drug used in the treatment of multiple sclerosis. See Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. et al., v. Sandoz Inc., 876 F. Supp.

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The authors would like to thank Professor Oskar Liivak for his insights into this case. 

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North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission

Issues

Whether state-action immunity should be given to a state regulatory board that is dominated by professionals in the regulated market.

The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) alleges that the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners (“Board”) has engaged in unfair methods of competition by trying to exclude non-dentists from the teeth-whitening market. The Supreme Court will now determine two legal issues: (1) whether the Board is a public actor or private actor for purposes of federal antitrust liability; and (2) if the Board is a private actor, whether the Board is subject to active supervision by the state. The Board argues that it is a public actor and thus does not need “active supervision” to be immune from federal antitrust law. The FTC argues that the Board is a private actor and is not subject to active state supervision. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case will impact both the efficacy of future state regulatory boards and the balance of federalism.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, for purposes of the state-action exemption from federal antitrust law, an official state regulatory board created by state law may properly be treated as a “private” actor simply because, pursuant to state law, a majority of the board’s members are also market participants who are elected to their official positions by other market participants.

The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners (“Board”), enacted by the Dental Practice Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90–48, is a state agency comprised of six licensed dentists, one licensed dental hygienist, and one consumer member. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v.

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The authors would like to thank Professor George A. Hay for his insight into this case.

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Kansas v. Nebraska and Colorado

Issues

In a water compact between two states, what remedies are available to an injured state if the other state breaches the compact?

The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over disputes arising between states. In this case, Kansas has revived previous litigation regarding a water compact between itself and Nebraska, seeking damages ranging from monetary relief to contempt of court and injunctive relief. Kansas and Nebraska disagree on what type of relief is proper when a state breaches a compact and how the compact at hand should calculate water usage. The Court’s ruling in this case will impact the remedies available for a state when another state breaches a water rights agreement and could serve as important precedent for water rights cases as the Western United States potentially enters into a period of sustained drought.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Should the Court reform the RRCA Accounting Procedures to correct what Nebraska and Colorado contend is a mistake in those procedures? By what amount of water did Nebraska fail to meet the applicable 2006 compliance test? And what is the remedy to which Kansas is entitled as a result? (Report of the Special Master at 14).

On May 3, 2010, Kansas filed a Motion with the Supreme Court of the United States that revived previous litigation between Kansas and Nebraska concerning a water rights dispute. See Report of the Special Master at 9. The dispute reflects ongoing tensions between Kansas and Nebraska concerning a water rights agreement signed in 1943.

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Steve Eder: Kansas vs. Nebraska Heads Back to Court, The Wall Street Journal (Aug. 13, 2012).

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Jennings v. Stephens

Issues

Is a federal habeas petitioner required to file a Certificate of Appealability, a separate motion for appeal, or even both before presenting an alternative argument on appeal in support of the district court's judgment where that argument failed at the district court?

The Supreme Court will decide whether a federal habeas petitioner must file a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”), a cross-notice of appeal, or even both before raising an argument at the court of appeals level that the district court rejected. Jennings, a prisoner on death row, asserts that he was not required to obtain a COA or a cross-notice of appeal in order to present a cross-point in support of the district court’s judgment. Stephens, the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions divisions, argues that the Fifth Circuit did not have jurisdiction to hear Jennings’ alternative claim because Jennings had not timely requested a COA or filed a cross-notice of appeal. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case will have important consequences for habeas corpus applicants like Jennings, a death row inmate, as well as on the judicial efficiency of the courts in hearing habeas corpus appeals.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Did the Fifth Circuit err in reversing the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the punishment stage of a death penalty trial by deferring to a state court prejudice determination that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent?
  2. Did the Fifth Circuit err in holding that the state court reasonably determined that trial counsel made a sound strategic decision not to present any evidence of petitioner's disadvantaged background in a capital case where, in its absence, the jury was deprived of meaningful mitigating evidence that could have resulted in a life sentence?
  3. Did the Fifth Circuit err in holding that the federal doctrine of waiver precludes a federal habeas court from considering an argument made initially in a footnote in a state court brief that was not waived under state law?
  4. Did the Fifth Circuit err in holding that a federal habeas petitioner who prevailed in the district court on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must file a separate notice of appeal and motion for a certificate of appealability to raise an allegation of deficient performance that the district court rejected even though the Fifth Circuit acquired jurisdiction over the entire claim as a result of the respondent's appeal?

On July 19, 1988, Petitioner Robert Mitchell Jennings entered an adult bookstore with the intent to commit a robbery. Jennings v. Stephens, 537 Fed. Appx. 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2013). At the time, Elston Howard, a police officer, was arresting the bookstore clerk.

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Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc., v. Busk et al.

Issues

Must employers compensate employees for the time spent undergoing security screenings at the end of the workday under the Fair Labor Standards Act? 

Jesse Busk and Laurie Castro, employees of Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. (“Integrity”), sued Integrity alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Specifically, the employees alleged that Integrity required post-shift security screenings lasting up to 25 minutes, yet failed to compensate their employees for the time spent undergoing the screenings. Integrity claims that it is immune from liability under the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, which provides that employers are not required to compensate for activities that are postliminary to an employee’s primary work activities. The Supreme Court will address whether under the FLSA, as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act, employers must compensate employees for post-shift security screenings.  The Supreme Court’s decision in the case will reflect its view on the correct balance between the interest of employers in preventing employee theft, and the interest of employees in obtaining compensation for time spent undergoing screenings related to theft prevention or similar activities. This decision will affect the range of activities that employers can require employees to perform with and without compensation. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether time spent in security screenings is compensable under the FLSA, as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act?

Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. (“Integrity”) is a corporation that “provides warehouse space and staffing to clients such as Amazon.com.” Busk v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc., 713 F.3d 525, 527 (9th Cir.

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The authors would like to thank Professor Angela B. Cornell for her assistance in the research for this preview.

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Heien v. North Carolina

Issues

Can a police officer’s misinterpretation of the law provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop? 

On April 29, 2009, Sergeant Matt Darisse arrested Nicholas Heien in North Carolina after a traffic stop that Darisse initiated based on his misinterpretation of relevant state statutes. When Heien tried to exclude evidence that resulted from the traffic stop during his subsequent trial, the trial court denied his request. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that an officer cannot justify a traffic stop when a mistake of law serves as the primary justification for the stop. In December 2012, the North Carolina Supreme Court overturned the appellate court’s ruling. The Supreme Court of the United States will now consider whether a police officer’s mistake of law can serve as the requisite reasonable suspicion needed for a constitutional traffic stop. Heien argues that allowing police officers to base traffic stops on misinterpretations of the law would violate the Fourth Amendment rights of those stopped. North Carolina, however asserts that just as police officers can execute constitutional traffic stops by relying on reasonable mistakes of fact, a police officer can justify a stop if it is based on a reasonable but mistaken interpretation of a statute. The Court’s ruling implicates the Fourth Amendment practices of law enforcement, the right to privacy of individuals, and the right of individuals to be free from restraint. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a police officer’s mistake of law can provide the individualized suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop.

On April 29, 2009, Sergeant Matt Darisse of the Surry County Sheriff’s Department in North Carolina pulled over a vehicle in which Nicholas Heien was a passenger. See State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 352 (N.C. 2012). Darisse initiated the stop because one of the rear brake lights on the vehicle was not working properly.

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The authors would like to thank Professor Sherry Colb of Cornell Law School for her help and for directing them to her work on Heien v. North Carolina. 

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Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., et al.

Issues

Does the filing of a putative class action serve, under the American Pipe rule, to suspend the three-year time limitation in § 13 of the Securities Act with respect to the claims of putative class members?

The Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) requires companies issuing a security to create offering documents that adequately outline the security’s risks to potential investors. Section 13 of the Securities Act requires a plaintiff to file a Securities Act claim within three years to allege the existence of material misstatements or omissions in these offering documents. In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, however, the Supreme Court held that many statutory time limits could be “tolled” or stopped when plaintiffs are potential members of an existing class action dealing with the same legal claim. This case should decide whether or not the time limitation in § 13 is the sort of limit subject to this “American Pipe rule.” The decision has implications for the efficiency of courts and stock issuers alike.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the filing of a putative class action serve, under the American Pipe rule, to suspend the three-year time limitation in § 13 of the Securities Act with respect to the claims of putative class members?

Respondent IndyMac MBS, Inc. (“IndyMac”) is an issuer of a type of security known as mortgage pass-through certificates. See In re IndyMac Mortgage-Backed Securities Litigation, 718 F. Supp. 2d 495, 498–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

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Warger v. Shauers

Issues

May a party moving for a new trial use testimony about juror deliberations to show juror dishonesty during voir dire? 

Upon the return of an unanimous verdict in favor of the defendant in a vehicular accident resulting in personal injury, the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, alleging juror misconduct as a basis for a new trial. That motion relied on a juror’s testimony about statements made during the jury’s deliberation by the foreperson that suggested she had withheld information during the jury selection process. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) (“FRE  606(b)”) allows the introduction of juror testimony only in very limited circumstances, and this case should determine whether the testimony offered here does or does not fall within one of those exceptions.  This case has greater implications for the sanctity of jury deliberations, as well as the balance between the right of civil litigants to a fair trial and the importance of finality in verdicts.  This decision should also clarify for lower federal courts the application of FRE 606(b). 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) permits a party moving for a new trial based on juror dishonesty during voir dire to introduce juror testimony about statements made during deliberations that tend to show the alleged dishonesty.

On August 4, 2006, Respondent Randy Shauers (Respondent’s) pick-up truck collided with the Petitioner Gregory Warger (Petitioner’s) motorcycle. See Brief for Petitioner at 4. Petitioner Warger required surgical amputation of his leg following the collision.

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Stephen A. Miller:, Preview of the Supreme Court’s October Term in 2014, The Legal Intelligencer, (September 4, 2014). 

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Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company, LLC v. Owens

Issues

Is a defendant seeking removal from state to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act required to present evidence supporting jurisdiction in the notice of removal?

In 2012, Brandon W. Owens filed a class action petition in Kansas state court, alleging that Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company and Cherokee Basin Pipeline owed royalty payments derived from certain gas wells. Dart and Cherokee sought to remove the case to federal court, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), commonly known as the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). In their notice of removal, Dart and Cherokee did not include supporting evidence of its allegation that the jurisdictional amount was met. Dart and Cherokee contend that mere allegations of the amount in controversy is sufficient to establish jurisdiction if there is no dispute over that amount. In opposition, Owens argues that the notice of removal has to contain factual evidence supporting federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court will decide how much evidence of the jurisdictional requirements—if any—a CAFA defendant seeking removal is required to include in his or her notice of removal. The resolution of this case will have a significant impact on a defendant’s burden in seeking removal and, in turn, large effects on the availability of a federal forum for many state court defendants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

A defendant seeking removal of a case to federal court must file a notice of removal containing "a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal" and attach only the state court filings served on such defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Consistent with that statutory pleading requirement, the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits require only that a notice of removal contain allegations of the jurisdictional facts supporting removal; those courts do not require the defendant to attach evidence supporting federal jurisdiction to the notice of removal. District courts in those Circuits may consider evidence supporting removal even if it comes later in response to a motion to remand.

Here, in a clean break from Section 1446(a)'s language and its sister Circuits' decisions, the Tenth Circuit let stand an order remanding a class action to state court based upon the district court's refusal to consider evidence establishing federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) because that evidence was not attached to the notice of removal. (That evidence, which was not disputed, came later in response to the motion to remand.)

The question presented is:

Whether a defendant seeking removal to federal court is required to include evidence supporting federal jurisdiction in the notice of removal, or is alleging the required "short and plain statement of the grounds for removal" enough?

In 2012, Respondent Brandon W. Owens filed a class action petition in Kansas state court against Petitioners Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company, LLC and Cherokee Basin Pipeline, LLC (“Dart and Cherokee”).

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Holt v. Hobbs

Issues

Does a prison’s grooming policy, which prohibits all beards except for quarter-inch beards for certain medical reasons, violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act by prohibiting an inmate from growing a half-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs?

In 2000, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) with the intent to provide protection for the free exercise of religion in various contexts, including prisons and jails. In this case, the Supreme Court will consider whether a prison grooming policy prohibiting a half-inch beard grown in accordance with a prisoner’s religious beliefs, violates RLUIPA. Additionally, the Court will have the opportunity to determine the level of deference courts should give prison officials when considering whether a prison policy that substantially burdens inmates’ exercise of religion furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means available. The resolution of this case may impact the balance between the rights of prisoners to practice their religion freely while incarcerated and the government’s interest in prison safety. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the Arkansas Department of Corrections’ no beard grooming policy violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).
  2. Whether a ½ inch beard would satisfy the security goals sought by the policy.
  3. Whether the no beard grooming policy violates Petitioner’s First Amendment right to practice Islam as he believes it is supposed to be practiced by the wearing of the beard.
  4. That the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has decided that the no beard grooming policy does not violate the RLUIPA, but this Court should decide the matter since it has not done so and should rule whether grooming policies of any Department of Correction that do not allow for a religious exception exemption are constitutional.
  5. That the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s decision in this case conflicts with other circuit’s rulings on the matter.
  6. That the ADC grooming policy of no beards is not the least restrictive means of achieving the desired objective of staunching the flow of contraband and identifying prisoners in the event of an escape.

In 2000, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) to provide protection for the free exercise of religion in several contexts, including incarceration. See 42 U.S.C.

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