Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the All Writs Act (“Act”), which controls an inmate’s access to attorneys and investigative services, authorizes courts to order state officials to transport prisoners to medical examinations in habeas corpus proceedings. In addition, this case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether prisoners must first demonstrate that the medical evidence is reviewable by the issuing court and material to a claim of habeas corpus relief before they can be granted an evidence-collecting writ under the Act. Tim Shoop, Warden, argues that Raymond Twyford’s writ, which orders Shoop to transport the Twyford to a medical examination, violates the “agreeable to the usages and principles of law” clause as well as the “necessary or appropriate clause” of the Act. Therefore, Shoop contends that Twyford’s writ must be struck down. Twyford counters by arguing that the writ in question satisfies both clauses of the Act. Consequently, Twyford argues that the writ must be affirmed. The outcome of this case will impact the rights of thousands of inmates in habeas corpus proceedings as well as the power of courts adjudicating habeas corpus claims.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a method-of-execution challenge constitutes a habeas petition or may be brought as a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 petition. Petitioner Michael Nance brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 petition alleging that Georgia’s lethal injection was unconstitutional. Michael Nance argues that method-of-execution claims are Section 1983 claims because they do not end or shorten imprisonment but attack the constitutionality of a given punishment or method of execution. Moreover, even if the claim is properly a habeas petition, Nance contends that it is not successive because method-of-execution claims are not ripe until execution is imminent. Respondent Timothy Ward, Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections, counters that because there are no alternative methods of execution, Ward’s claim effectively bars execution—in other words, it is a habeas petition. Ward adds that Nance’s petition is successive because he already challenged this sentence, and no exceptions apply. This case will impact the timely implementation of justice, and constitutional challenges to state sovereignty and methods of execution.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) must continue enforcing the Migrant Protection Protocols (“MPP”). On October 29, 2021, DHS issued a decision terminating MPP, a Trump administration policy where Border Patrol returns certain undocumented aliens arriving at the southern border to Mexico during their immigration proceedings. The Biden Administration (“President Biden”) argues that DHS permissibly rescinded MPP via agency memoranda because the amended Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) gives DHS discretion over whether to remove, detain, or parole noncitizens. Texas and Missouri respond that DHS’s rescission of MPP has no legal effect because if DHS lacks capacity to detain undocumented aliens, the INA obligates DHS to remove such persons by continuing to enforce MPP. The outcome of this case has significant implications for undocumented aliens seeking asylum in the United States and immigrant communities within the United States, as well as the role of the executive in determining immigration policy.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the contours of state prosecutorial power in Indian country. This case flows from the Supreme Court’s decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which found that a significant portion of eastern Oklahoma was Indian country for criminal law purposes. Oklahoma asserts that, under principles of state sovereignty, it has the authority to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country within the state’s territorial boundaries. Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta counters that a state can prosecute non-Indians for crimes committed in Indian country only when Congress has authorized the state to do so; in all other situations, the federal government has the exclusive authority to prosecute under the General Crimes Act. This case has significant implications for tribal sovereignty and criminal jurisdictional boundaries between states and Indian tribes.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether Section 1930 of the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, which increased filing fees in trustee districts but not in bankruptcy administrator districts, violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. Petitioner Alfred H. Siegel argues that the disparity in fees is non-uniform because it applies to different geographic locations in the United States differently. As a result Siegel, contends that that the fee system is unconstitutional, and asks the Court to grant a full refund of the difference in fees. Respondent John P. Fitzgerald, III, counters that the disparity does not violate the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause, impacting trustee districts and administrator districts in a facially neutral way. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for the delegation of congressional power and the structure of bankruptcy courts.  

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the State of Washington’s workers’ compensation law may apply to certain federal contract workers without violating the intergovernmental immunity doctrine, which prevents state and federal governments from interfering with each other’s sovereignty. The United States argues the intergovernmental immunity doctrine applies and mandates that the state workers’ compensation law apply evenhandedly to federal, state, and private actors. Washington counters that the federal government has waived its intergovernmental immunity by statute, and even if it did not, the intergovernmental immunity doctrine does not require completely equal treatment of federal and non-federal actors. The outcome of this case has important implications for consideration of workplace dangers and the costs associated with workers’ compensation. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a hospital employee, who was not given a Miranda warning by a deputy before he confessed to assaulting a patient, may sue the individual officer for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Petitioner Deputy Carlos Vega contends that he did not violate Terence Tekoh’s Fifth Amendment rights because a Miranda violation is not a de facto constitutional violation. Thus, Vega asserts that Tekoh has failed to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Respondent Terence Tekoh counters that Supreme Court precedent has established a constitutional requirement for police officers to issue Miranda warnings. Therefore, Tekoh argues a prosecutor’s introduction of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda establishes a constitutional violation redressable by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for public safety and the protection of constitutional rights. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), which authorizes relief from a final judgment on the grounds of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” authorizes relief on the grounds that a district court committed an error of law. A federal district court determined that petitioner Dexter Earl Kemp’s motion for relief from legal error under Rule 60(b)(6) should instead be construed as a motion under Rule 60(b)(1) and dismissed Kemp’s petition because it was not presented within the one-year limitations period that applies to motions under Rule 60(b)(1) but not to motions under Rule 60(b)(6). On appeal to the Supreme Court, Kemp argues that, because Rule 60(b)(1) replicated identical state statutory provisions that did not allow relief for legal error, the Court cannot construe Rule 60(b)(1) to authorize relief for legal error. The United States responds that both the plain meaning of Rule 60(b)(1) and the fact that Rule 60(b)(1) replicated a California statute allowing relief for legal error establish that Rule 60(b)(1) allows relief for legal error. Because the Court’s decision on the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1) will determine for how long after entry of final judgment a litigant is entitled to seek relief for legal error, the resolution of this case will affect the expediency and finality of federal civil litigation. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether an agency commits “clear and unmistakable error” when it denies benefits to a veteran by relying on a binding regulation that is later invalidated. Petitioner Kevin George enlisted in the military when he was seventeen years old and was later medically discharged when he was diagnosed with schizophrenia. George sought benefits for the aggravation of his symptoms but was denied because the Board of Veterans’ Appeals relied on a later-invalidated regulation that incorrectly interpreted the statutory requirements for proving aggravation. After the regulation was invalidated in the early 2000s, George brought a claim for revision of the Board’s decision. The Federal Circuit Court, however, denied George’s claim, concluding that the agency had correctly relied on the law as interpreted at the time of its decision. George claims that an agency commits clear and unmistakable error when relying on later invalidated regulations. Respondent Denis McDonough, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, counters that agencies do not commit clear and unmistakable error when relying on binding regulations in existence at the time of decision making. This case has important implications for military veterans’ benefits claims and the efficiency of Veterans’ courts.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Federal Arbitration Act demands that state courts enforce an arbitration agreement’s waiver of the statutory right of action to collect penalties on behalf of the state, despite state law prohibiting such a contractual waiver. Petitioner Viking River Cruises argues that the Federal Arbitration Act requires that arbitration agreements signed by employees must be enforced as written for claims brought under California’s Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) because such claims are individual disputes and incompatible with the procedures of individual bilateral arbitration. Respondent Angie Moriana counters that PAGA claims involve the state, not the individual, and that PAGA’s anti-waiver rule is necessary to bolster the state’s labor law enforcement. The outcome of this case has important implications for the enforcement of state labor codes, the availability of civil remedies for workers, and the effectiveness of arbitration agreements to resolve employment-related disputes.

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