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The case asks the Court to determine whether a defendant can challenge the validity of a removal order for unlawful reentry solely by showing that the order was based on a criminal conviction that is no longer a removable offense without having to meet the procedural requirements of demonstrating administrative exhaustion and no opportunity for judicial review. Respondent Refugio Palomar-Santiago was removed in 1998 for a DUI, and in 2001, DUIs were re-classified as a nonremovable offense. Palomar-Santiago was then found living in the United States in 2017 and was charged with unlawful reentry by Petitioner United States. Palomar-Santiago asserts, as a defense, that the original removal order was unlawful. The United States contends that Palomar-Santiago cannot challenge the validity of the original removal order absent the procedural requirements of administrative exhaustion and judicial review of the original order. Palomar-Santiago counters that procedural rights should not obstruct substantive rights, and that he should be able to challenge the legality of the removal order even absent judicial review. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will implicate immigration procedure and the ability of noncitizens to challenge unlawful removal orders.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a private company can exercise the federal government’s eminent-domain power and also considers the scope of a federal court’s jurisdiction. Once the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity, the Natural Gas Act authorizes private parties to exercise the federal government’s eminent-domain power to secure rights-of-way and compensation to the landowner. Petitioner PennEast Pipeline Company, LLC argues that the Natural Gas Act’s delegation is necessary and ministerial, and there is no insult to state sovereignty in suits such as this. By contrast, Respondent New Jersey et al. contends that this delegation violates the Eleventh Amendment’s guarantee of sovereign immunity to the States. Both PennEast and New Jersey argue that the Third Circuit properly exercised its jurisdiction over the case. The outcome of this case has implications for siting new natural gas pipelines, eminent domain, and states’ rights.

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This case asks the Court to decide whether school officials may regulate and punish students for disruptive speech that occurs off the school campus. Petitioner Mahanoy Area School District argues that schools can regulate speech that is directed at school operations and which causes off-campus harm under Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, even when that speech is made off campus. Respondent B.L. counters that schools only have the authority to regulate students’ speech when that speech is made on the school campus or under the supervision or sponsorship of the school, not merely because the speech’s topic has some relationship to school functions. This case has implications for the extent of students’ free-speech rights and schools’ ability to prevent off-campus bullying.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the EPA’s Renewable Fuel Standards (“RFS”) requires small refineries to have continuously received the hardship exemption since 2011 to qualify for a hardship exemption under Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i). Specifically, the Court must determine whether the statutory phrase “extension” acquires one of two definitions: a narrow definition, preferred by the Tenth Circuit and Respondent Renewable Fuels Association (“RFA”), which supports the case for continuity; or a broad reading, supported by Petitioner HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining (“Cheyenne”), which effectively means to “grant” or “make available.” In selecting the appropriate definition, the Court must decide if and to what extent it should read “extension” apart from its broader statutory context, or consider other factors such as congressional purpose and whether the EPA’s interpretation receives deference. This case has policy implications for the finances of local refineries, economies of local communities, and environmental health.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine how two provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) allocate responsibility for cleaning up environmental sites. CERCLA Section 107 allows a party to recover direct costs of cleaning up a site from responsible parties, while Section 113 allows a party who has already settled its own responsibility to recover “contribution” from other responsible parties. The territory of Guam, which owns a toxic waste dump, sued the United States to help fund the dump cleanup under both Sections 107 and 113. However, the lower court found that the availability of Section 113 barred Guam’s Section 107 claim based on a previous settlement between Guam and the federal government unrelated to CERCLA. Petitioner Guam argues that a settlement that does not mention CERCLA and disclaims any liability determination cannot force a party to bring a Section 113 claim instead of a Section 107 claim. Respondent United States counters that Section 113 broadly encompasses settlements that resolve liability under other laws besides CERCLA. This case has implications for prompt cleanups of environmental hazards across the United States.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a state charitable donor disclosure regulation unconstitutionally infringes on donors’ and charitable organizations’ free speech and association rights. California recently started enforcing its Schedule B regulation, which requires charitable organizations to provide the confidential names of their financial donors. Petitioners Americans for Prosperity Foundation and Thomas More Law Center argue that this compelled disclosure is facially unconstitutional because it fails “exacting” scrutiny and unconstitutional as applied to them because of the extreme risks to their political minority donors. Respondent Matthew Rodriquez, the Attorney General of California, argues that the regulation is necessary to enforce charitable fraud laws and that California can meet its regulatory objectives while simultaneously protecting donors’ confidential data. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine whether charities in California must disclose the names of their donors to state regulators and will also determine the bounds of organizational free association rights.

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This case asks whether the Alaska Native Corporations (“ANCs”) are entitled to relief provided to “Indian Tribes” under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”). The CARES Act incorporates the definition of “Indian tribe[s]” from the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act. Petitioners U.S. Treasury and ANCs argue that Congress expressly included the Alaska Native Corporations in the definition of Indian tribes and that the plain-meaning of the term “recognition” in the statute supports this inclusion. Respondent Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation and Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation argue that the ANCs do not qualify as Indian tribes because they are not formally recognized by a governmental authority or Congress as a sovereign tribe. The Supreme Court’s decision will impact the ability of Alaska Native Corporations to access funding through federal programs. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a defendant who has pled guilty to the possession of a firearm should receive automatic plain-error relief if the defendant was not advised that an element of the offense is that he knew of his status as a felon. Petitioner United States argues that the guilty plea should not be reversed because plain-error review applies and insists that Respondent did not make the requisite showing of case-specific prejudice. Respondent Michael Andrew Gary counters that the guilty plea should be reversed because plain-error review does not apply in this case and that in the event that it does apply, case-specific prejudice is not required due to the error’s classification as “structural.” The outcome of this case will affect the obligations and strategies of criminal defendants and prosecutors, as well as the burden on the judicial system.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether noncitizens residing in the United States under Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) are eligible to receive lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) status if they were not formally inspected and admitted into the United States. Jose Santos Sanchez and Sonia Gonzalez are a married couple from El Salvador who received TPS in 2001 after entering the United States unlawfully in the late 1990s. The couple argues that they are eligible to apply for permanent residency because TPS recipients are deemed, by definition and by Congress, as having met the requirements of formal inspection and admission for the purposes of changing residency status. The government counters that individuals who initially entered the country unlawfully cannot apply for permanent residency because they cannot overcome the requirement of being formally inspected and admitted into the United States, even if they were eventually granted TPS. The outcome of this case has important implications for resolving inconsistent application of the law by federal courts and for understanding the qualifications needed to receive permanent residency in the United States.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether district courts have the discretion to adjust “taxable” appellate costs under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(e). In 2006, a district court entered judgment for Petitioner City of San Antonio and taxed appellate costs against Respondent Hotels.com. In 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court judgment and ordered the City of San Antonio to pay appellate costs to Hotels.com. The City of San Antonio argues that the permissive language of “taxable” in Rule 39(e) and the bifurcated structure of the subdivisions of Rule 39 justify district courts’ discretionary authority to adjust appellate costs after the appellate court has determined which parties are entitled to costs. Hotels.com argues that the mandatory language of Rule 39(e) justifies the Fifth Circuit’s decision and that appellate courts are better equipped to determine the question of appellate costs. The outcome of this case has implications for the allocation of appellate costs between parties in litigation where appellate bonds, penalties, and interest can reach millions of dollars, as well as the efficiency of court proceedings concerning the determination of appellate costs.

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