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This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to clarify the procedure for determining whether a noncitizen who has committed a state-level crime is eligible for cancellation of removal from the United States. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1940 (“INA”) gives the U.S. Attorney General discretion to cancel a noncitizen’s removal if the noncitizen has not committed a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). Clemente Avelino Pereida was convicted of a state-level crime under a divisible statute. Three of the four crimes listed within the statute individually constitute CIMTs, but one crime does not. The convicting court did not specify Pereida’s crime of conviction. Pereida contends that he is not required to prove that he did not commit a CIMT and, therefore, that he is eligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction does not necessarily establish that he committed a CIMT. Attorney General William P. Barr counters that the INA requires noncitizens to prove that they did not commit a CIMT in such instances of ambiguity and that Pereida failed to carry his burden of proof. The outcome of this case has important implications for statutory interpretation and the removability of noncitizens who have prior criminal convictions.

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This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider the extent to which a defendant’s contacts with a forum state must be related to the claim at issue in order to establish specific jurisdiction over the defendant. Petitioner Ford argues that there must be a causal relationship between the defendant’s in-state contacts and the plaintiff’s injury because the court in Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California disregarded the existence of similar causal relationships between the defendant’s in-state contacts and the injuries of third parties. Respondent Charles Lucero counters that a causal connection is not necessary to support specific jurisdiction in cases such as this where the defendant has marketed its products in the forum state and a person suffers an injury from one of those products within that state. The outcome of this case will clarify where manufacturers may expect to be subject to suit and will impact litigants’ ability to engage in forum shopping.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether an Arkansas state law regulating pharmacy benefit managers’ drug reimbursement rates is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Whether ERISA preempts the state law, Act 900, depends on whether Act 900 has an impermissible connection to ERISA or refers to ERISA. Arkansas Attorney General, Leslie Rutledge, argues that ERISA does not preempt Act 900 because Act 900 is simply a basic rate regulation that does not have an impermissible connection to ERISA or refer to ERISA. The Pharmaceutical Care Management Association counters that ERISA, in fact, preempts Act 900, as Act 900 regulates a central part of ERISA plan administration, making it impermissibly connected to ERISA, and refers to ERISA. The Court’s decision in this case will influence the ability of states to regulate pharmacy benefit managers and, by extension, could impact the costs of prescription drugs and the access patients have to pharmacies.

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The waters of the Pecos River are allocated to Texas and New Mexico in accordance with the terms of the Pecos River Compact. When disputes arose between the states regarding each state’s duties under the Compact, the Supreme Court issued an amended decree to regulate such duties and appointed a River Master to calculate and oversee the parties’ obligations. Texas now challenges the River Master’s determination that Texas, rather than New Mexico, should bear the burden of evaporative losses caused as a result of Tropical Storm Odile. Texas argues that the River Master erred in retroactively awarding evaporative loss credits to New Mexico because the River Master lacks authority to do so, and New Mexico’s motion for such credits was untimely. Texas further contends that Article XII of the Compact is inapplicable because the Bureau impounded flood water for public safety reasons, not for use in Texas. New Mexico counters that the River Master correctly granted a one-time retroactive credit for evaporative losses to New Mexico because New Mexico’s motion was timely, and the River Master was permitted to adopt procedures necessary to address novel accounting issues. New Mexico further asserts that Article XII is applicable because the Bureau impounded flood water primarily for Texas’s later use. The outcome of this case has implications for the role of the River Master and the procedures to be followed in future disputes under the Compact. In addition, the outcome of this case will affect the authority granted to court-appointed officers overseeing other interstate contracts, as well as the tolling procedures that other states should look to in resolving disputes arising from such contracts.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide the constitutionality of two provisions of the Delaware Constitution which require that the two major political parties be represented as evenly as possible on Delaware’s highest courts. John Carney, the Governor of Delaware, argues that James R. Adams, who challenges the Delaware Constitution, lacks Article III standing to assert these claims because Adams’ has suffered only a hypothetical injury and that injury was self-inflicted through a personal choice to change political affiliation. Governor Carney additionally contends that the state constitutional provisions are consistent with the First Amendment because judges fall under a policymaking exception to the First Amendment’s prohibition on using political affiliation as job criterion, and because the constitutional provisions are the only viable way to advance the state’s compelling interest in public confidence in the judiciary’s neutrality. Finally, Governor Carney asserts that in the event that the Court strikes down the major party provision, the bare majority provision of the Delaware Constitution is severable and thus should remain intact. Adams responds that he has standing to assert these claims by virtue of Delaware’s denial of any potential judgeship for him based on his political affiliation and the chilling effect that he experiences on his associative freedoms due to the constitutional provisions. Next, Adams contends that the provisions violate the First Amendment and do not fall within the exception for using political association as a job criterion for policymakers; therefore, he argues, the Court should apply strict scrutiny in its review of this alleged First Amendment violation. Finally, Adams asserts that the bare majority provision is not severable from the major party provision and therefore, if one is invalidated, both must be struck down. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect state interests in creating a politically neutral judiciary and the methods states can use to achieve this goal, as well as demonstrate the merits and burdens of associating political affiliations with judicial positions. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), individual federal employees can be sued for money damages. Petitioners Tanzin and other government agents argue that money damages against individuals in their personal capacities are unavailable unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise, which Congress has not done in RFRA. Tanzin also argues that RFRA authorizes relief “against a government,” which does not include individual officials. Tanzin further claims that money damages fall beyond RFRA’s authorization of “appropriate” relief. Respondents Tanvir and others counter that Congress need not expressly authorize money damages, but that rather, money damages are available unless Congress clearly says otherwise. Additionally, Tanvir claims that RFRA authorizes suits against officials, even separate from their official capacity, and that money damages are “appropriate” and even necessary to enforce RFRA. The outcome of this case could affect the separation of powers between the judicial and the executive branches, the financial and operational burdens on the federal government, and the interests of third parties, including religious minority groups.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether, under the Copyright Act of 1976, software interfaces can receive copyright protections that convey exclusive rights to the software author and, if so, under what conditions a secondary use of that software constitutes fair use. Google argues that no copyright protections should extend to Oracle’s Java SE declaring code under copyright law’s merger doctrine. Even if copyright protection is warranted, Google contends that its use of the Java SE declaring code to create its Android platform constitutes fair use due to the transformative nature of and limited copying in the Android platform. Oracle counters that software interfaces deserve the same copyright protections as other works because of the expressive nature of the software. As such, Oracle asserts that Google’s use of Java SE is not fair use because it harmed Oracle’s market for licensing Java SE. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for the use of programming languages in future technology as well as the open-book industry standard for borrowing computer code to further technological advances.

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This case asks the Court to decide whether presidential electors can exercise discretion when  casting their electoral votes for the President and Vice President, even if such votes are inconsistent with the appointing state’s popular vote and violate that state’s law binding electors to the state’s popular vote. For the 2016 general election, the Colorado Democratic Party appointed Michael Baca as one of its nine presidential electors. And when Hillary Clinton won the popular vote in Colorado, state law required Michael Baca to cast his electoral vote for her. Michael Baca, however, voted for John Kasich. Petitioner, the Colorado Department of State (“Colorado”), subsequently removed Michael Baca from office and cancelled his electoral vote. Colorado first argues that Michael Baca lacks standing to sue because he was not personally injured by his removal from office. And second, that Article II of the Constitution and the Twelfth Amendment empowers states to control their electors. Respondents, Michael Baca and two other electors (the “Electors”), counter that they do have standing to sue because their removal from office and cancellation of their vote constitute a concrete, personal injury. Further, the Electors assert that under the text and history of Article II and the Twelfth Amendment, they have discretion when casting their electoral vote. The outcome of this case has implications for the future of the electoral system, the meaning of the popular vote, and the likelihood of fraud and corruption.

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This case asks whether a state may sanction a presidential elector who does not vote according to the state’s legislatively mandated procedures for how presidential electors must vote. The Electoral College is comprised of each state’s electors based on its number of U.S. senators and representatives. Under Article II of the Constitution, each state selects the presidential electors who will cast the state’s allotted votes for the President and Vice President. In Washington State, each political party selects a group of electors who will represent the State if their candidate receives the most votes on Election Day in November. Washington law requires that each of its appointed electors pledge that they will vote for the candidate nominated by their party. Anyone who does not fulfill this pledge and becomes a “faithless elector” is subject to a civil penalty of up to $1,000. Petitioners Chiafalo, Guerra, and John were fined after violating their pledge. They argue that Washington’s law sanctioning faithless electors is unconstitutional because the Constitution forbids the states from controlling or imposing any conditions on its state’s presidential electors. Respondent Washington State counters that the Constitution does not impose any conditions on the methods that states use to select their electors and therefore, states can choose whether or not to impose any restrictions on their presidential electors. The outcome of this case has implications on the 2020 presidential election, the institutional legitimacy of the Electoral College, and state involvement with presidential electors.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the State of Oklahoma has, for decades, been improperly exercising criminal jurisdiction over land within the historical boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) Native American tribe in Eastern Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that Oklahoma had jurisdiction to prosecute a Native American defendant, Jimcy McGirt, for crimes that he committed within Oklahoma’s borders but entirely on the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s historically tribal lands. McGirt, as the Petitioner, argues that because his crime took place on the Muscogee (Creek) reservation and he is an enrolled Seminole-tribe member, only the federal government has jurisdiction to prosecute him in this case. Oklahoma, as the Respondent, counters that the land on which McGirt committed his crimes was never an Indian reservation—instead, Congress classified the land as a dependent Indian community until Congress removed this classification and gave Oklahoma criminal jurisdiction over the community’s land. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it will likely determine whether a substantial portion of Oklahoma is exclusively controlled by the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the federal government, which in turn would have enormous legal, economic, and social implications

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