The Law on Protection of Minors was enacted to protect the physical and mental health of minors and to ensure their legal rights and interests. Article 3 of the Law stipulates that minors shall have the right to survival, development, protection, and participation and that minors, regardless of gender, shall enjoy these rights equally under the law.
Anti-Domestic Violence Law of the People’s Republic of China (2015)
In cases under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning whether they have exhausted alternative non-legal remedies when the facts required to prove exhaustion are connected to the merits of the claim?
This case concerns the right to a jury trial under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Specifically, the PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing suit. Kyle Richards argues that, when the facts needed to demonstrate exhaustion are the same facts which support the merits of his claim, the PLRA requires a jury trial to resolve these disputed facts. Richards asserts that allowing a judge to evaluate the facts of the exhaustion claim and dismiss his case would deprive him of his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on the merits of the case, since the facts underpinning the merits and exhaustion are the same. Thomas Perttu counters that exhaustion is a threshold requirement which plaintiffs must meet before reaching a jury trial on the merits, and it is thus proper for a judge to evaluate exhaustion and gatekeep PLRA cases from reaching a jury. This case will affect litigation under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, define exhaustion’s place as a doctrine of law or equity, and heavily impact the role of the jury in future disputes.
Whether, in cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit on Constitutional rights claims. Richards v. Perttu at 917. Several circuit courts have affirmed that “administrative exhaustion” requires prisoners to properly go through all steps that an agency holds out. Id.
For Article III standing purposes, does Ruben Gutierrez have a redressable injury if it is not clear that a declaratory judgment in his favor would allow him to access the DNA evidence he seeks?
This case asks the Court to determine if Ruben Gutierrez has Article III standing to seek a declaratory judgment in federal court stating that Texas’ denial of access to DNA evidence violates his constitutional rights. Gutierrez contends that he has standing to seek this declaratory judgment because it would significantly increase the likelihood that the prosecutor would subsequently grant him access to the DNA evidence he seeks. Saenz contends that Gutierrez lacks standing because a declaratory judgment would not affect the state’s refusal to grant Gutierrez access to the DNA evidence. This case touches upon the role of the states and the federal government in protecting fundamental rights.
Whether Article III standing requires a particularized determination of whether a specific state official will redress the plaintiff’s injury by following a favorable declaratory judgment.
Ruben Gutierrez was convicted of capital murder in 1999 for the murder of Escolastica Harrison and was sentenced to death in Texas state court. Gutierrez v. Saenz at 1. Harrison lived in a mobile-home park in Brownsville, Texas with her nephew, who was a friend of Gutierrez.
When determining whether to revoke supervised release, does a district court commit error if it relies on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s sentencing factors despite their absence from 18 U.S.C § 3583(e)’s enumerated list?
This case asks the Court to determine whether a district court presiding over a revocation hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) may consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) despite their absence from Section 3583(e)’s enumerated list. Section 3553(a)(2)(A)’s sentencing factors include reflecting the seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the law, and providing just punishment for the offense. Petitioner argues that Section 3583(e)’s list is exhaustive, and omission of the Section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors precludes a district court from considering them to determine revocation of supervised release. Respondent counters that the consideration factors set out in Section 3583 are not exhaustive, and the factors in Section 3553 may be relied upon by a district court when determining the modification or revocation of supervised release. This case touches on important questions regarding the purpose of supervised release, a court’s discretion to revoke and reimprison violators, and the impact that judicial discretion has on the carceral system.
Whether, even though Congress excluded 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) from 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)’s list of factors to consider when revoking supervised release, a district court may rely on the Section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when revoking supervised release.
In 1984, through the Sentencing Reform Act (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3583), Congress abolished the federal parole system and created a new form of post-imprisonment supervision called supervised release. 18 U.S.C.
Do plaintiffs suing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act who are members of “majority groups” have to show “background circumstances” showing their employer discriminates against the majority?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a plaintiff suing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act who is a member of a majority group must provide “background circumstances” to show that their employer discriminates against majority groups. Ames argues that the background circumstances rule treats plaintiffs differently based on their protected characteristics, contradicting the goals of Title VII. The Ohio Department of Youth Services argues that the background circumstances rule is only a method for deciding individual cases and does not discriminate based on a protected characteristic. This case has important implications for how readily individuals can use the civil rights laws to sue, and how courts determine discrimination without direct evidence.
Whether, in addition to pleading the other elements of an employment discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a majority-group plaintiff must show “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”
In 2014, the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“Department”) appointed Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, to be the Administrator of the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA Administrator”); this was an at-will employment position which meant that she could be fired without cause. Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. at 2. Then in 2017, Ginine Trim, a gay woman, was assigned to be Ames’s new supervisor.
Mr and Mrs Y entered into a surrogacy agreement with Mr and Mrs Z following unsuccessful IVF treatments. An embryo was created using Mrs Z and Mr Y’s DNA and was transferred to Mrs Z in May 2018. When Mrs Z was five months pregnant, Mr Y died. X was born in 2019. As part of the surrogacy agreement, Mr and Mrs Y were to apply for a parental order immediately after the birth of the child. Given Mr Y’s sudden death prior to, the birth certificate named Mr Z as the father. Mrs Y wanted to have Mr Y recognised as the father.
Waltham Forest LBC applied for wardship orders in respect of two young girls to be returned from Somaliland, as well as a forced marriage protection order and female genital
The claimant had been registered female at birth but had transitioned to live as a man. He had obtained a gender recognition certificate confirming his gender as male under the law. He suspended testosterone treatment and had intra-uterine insemination with donor sperm.
The appellant was accused of assaulting two partners over an extended period of time. He was charged with sexual assault, and assault of complainant (K); and contraventions of s.39(1) of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, assault, rape, and attempted murder of a second complainant (J).
