Thompson v. Clark

Issues

Does the favorable termination element of a Section 1983 claim alleging unreasonable seizure require a plaintiff to show that the criminal proceedings at issue terminated in a way that affirmatively indicates the plaintiff’s innocence?  

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the “favorable termination” element of a Section 1983 claim alleging unreasonable seizure requires a petitioner to show that the criminal proceedings at issue terminated in a way that is consistent with his innocence. Petitioner Larry Thompson brought a Section 1983 claim against his arresting officers for violating his Fourth Amendment rights after his criminal charges were dismissed “in the interest of justice,” with no further explanation regarding Thompson’s innocence or guilt. Thompson claims that his criminal proceedings terminated favorably, but Respondent Paigel Clark—an arresting police officer— argues that Thompson failed to meet this requirement, asserting that charges must be dismissed in a way that affirmatively indicates innocence. This case has important implications for the future of Section 1983 claims, prosecutorial discretion, and police officer accountability.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the rule that a plaintiff must await favorable termination before bringing a Section 1983 action alleging unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process requires the plaintiff to show that the criminal proceeding against him has “formally ended in a manner not inconsistent with his innocence,” as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit decided in Laskar v. Hurd, or that the proceeding “ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence,” as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit decided in Lanning v. City of Glens Falls.

In January 2014, Petitioner Larry Thompson lived with his fiancé, their newborn child, and his fiancé’s sister, Camille Watson, in Brooklyn, New York. Thompson v. Clark at 182. One night, Watson noticed a rash on the newborn child and called 911 to report that Thompson was abusing his child. Id. When Emergency Medical Technicians (“EMT”) arrived, Thompson confronted them, telling them that no one in the apartment had called 911. Id.

Submit for publication
0

United States v. Tsarnaev

Issues

Should Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s sentence be vacated because (1) the jury was not asked content related questions during voir dire about their exposure to pretrial media; and (2) Tsarnaev’s rights were violated when potentially mitigating evidence was excluded during the sentencing phase?

This case asks the Supreme Court whether the Court of Appeals can invoke a precedential supervisory rule to require specific voir dire questions to potential jurors in high media profile cases. The case further asks if the Eighth Amendment and the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 were violated by not including mitigating evidence that would usually be excluded by the Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 403. Petitioner United States argues that the voir dire process should be left to the district court’s discretion, and there is no requirement to ask content-based questions about media exposure during voir dire. The United States also argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain mitigating evidence because the probative value was outweighed by the potential confusion and prejudice. Respondent Dzhokhar Tsarnaev responds that First Circuit precedent requires district courts to ask content-based questions to potential jurors if requested by one of the parties. Further, Tsarnaev contends that the Eighth Amendment and Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 require mitigating evidence that would normally fall outside the scope of admittable evidence to be included in the sentencing phase. The decision in this case will affect the formation of juries, particularly in high profile cases, and the allowance of evidence in death-penalty cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit erred in concluding that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s capital sentences must be vacated on the ground that the district court, during its 21-day voir dire, did not ask each prospective juror for a specific accounting of the pretrial media coverage that he or she had read, heard or seen about Tsarnaev’s case; and (2) whether the district court committed reversible error at the penalty phase of Tsarnaev’s trial by excluding evidence that Tsarnaev’s older brother was allegedly involved in different crimes two years before the offenses for which Tsarnaev was convicted.

In 2013, Respondent Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and his brother, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, set off two bombs at the Boston Marathon. United States v. Tsarnaev at 36. The bombs killed three people and injured hundreds of others. Id. That night, after Tamerlan and Dzhokhar escaped, the brothers drove Tamerlan’s car past Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Hemphill v. New York

Issues

Does a criminal defendant’s introduction of evidence at trial “open the door” to the government’s admission of responsive evidence that would otherwise be barred by the Confrontation Clause?

This case asks the Supreme Court to balance state criminal evidence rules and Sixth Amendment rights. New York’s opening-the-door rule allows the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence if a party has given an incomplete and misleading impression of the issue. Under this rule, if a criminal defendant “opens the door” to responsive evidence, the defendant also forfeits their right to exclude that evidence on the grounds that it is barred by the Confrontation Clause. Darrell Hemphill contends that New York violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser by ruling that the state’s opening-the-door rule superseded the Confrontation Clause. New York argues that the opening-the-door rule does not infringe on Hemphill’s constitutional rights. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for a defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment and the states’ trial procedures.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, or under what circumstances, a criminal defendant, whose argumentation or introduction of evidence at trial “opens the door” to the admission of responsive evidence that would otherwise be barred by the rules of evidence, also forfeits his right to exclude evidence otherwise barred by the confrontation clause.

On April 6, 2006, Ronell Gilliam and a black man wearing a blue top got into a physical fight with others in the Bronx. People v. Hemphill at 472. Shortly after that fight, this other man pulled a gun and opened fire. Id. This shooting caused a stray 9mm bullet to enter a passing minivan, striking and killing a two-year-old child inside.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John Blume for his insights into this case.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Brown v. Davenport

Issues

May a federal court grant a defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus upon finding a trial error had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the defendant; or, must the court also determine that the state court’s interpretation of Chapman v. California was unreasonable under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996?

This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve a difference in judicial opinion among several federal courts of appeal regarding which standard is appropriate for granting federal habeas relief. Petitioner Ervine Lee Davenport (“Davenport”) contends that the approach taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit in Brecht v. Abrahamson, which requires that a defendant experience a “substantial and injurious effect” due to a trial error, is satisfactory. Respondent Mike Brown (“Brown”), Acting Warden, argues that the standard invoked by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th, and 10th Circuits in Chapman v. California should instead apply. For a federal court to grant relief under Chapman v. California, a trial error must not be “harmless,” and the state court’s interpretation of Chapman v. California must be “unreasonable” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The outcome of this case will affect how much deference federal courts give to state courts’ interpretations of AEDPA, as well as the ability of defendants to successfully obtain relief in federal habeas proceedings. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a federal habeas court may grant relief based solely on its conclusion that the test from Brecht v. Abrahamson is satisfied, or whether the court must also find that the state court’s application of Chapman v. California was unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

On January 13, 2007, Ervine Lee Davenport and Annette White were drinking alcohol and using cocaine at a friend’s house when White began acting belligerently. Davenport v. MacLaren at 2.  Several of White’s friends asked her to leave, and Davenport offered to drive White home. Id. Davenport testified that during the drive, White grabbed the steering wheel and sliced his arm with a box cutter. Id.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Keir Weyble for his guidance and insights into this case.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Wooden v. United States

Issues

Are crimes that occur in sequence during a criminal spree “committed on occasions different from one another” under the Armed Criminal Career Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine how sentencing courts should interpret the “occasions” provision in the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). The ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for defendants who have three or more prior convictions for a serious felony or drug offense occurring on separate occasions. Petitioner William Dale Wooden (“Wooden”) argues that multiple offenses arising from the same criminal opportunity cannot serve as more than one “occasion” under the ACCA. Wooden maintains that his interpretation is consistent with the ACCA’s legislative history and Congressional record. Respondent United States counters that the focus of a sentencing court’s “different occasions” analysis should decide whether the crimes occurred at different times. The United States maintains that its position provides sentencing courts with a straightforward and uniform approach. This case has significant implications for criminal sentencing, recidivism, and the notion of what constitutes a “career” criminal.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether offenses that were committed as part of a single criminal spree, but sequentially in time, were “committed on occasions different from one another” for purposes of a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

While searching for a wanted fugitive, police asked Wooden if they could enter his home. United States v. Wooden at 500. According to the police, Wooden gave them permission to enter. Id. While in his home, police observed Wooden pick up a firearm. Id. One of the officers was aware that Wooden was a convicted felon and that he could not legally possess a firearm.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Geoffrey Corn for his insights into this case.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Servotronics Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC

Issues

Does 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), which authorizes federal district courts to gather evidence “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal,” authorize the gathering of evidence for use in a private international arbitration?

The case would have asked the Court to decide whether 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) authorizes federal district courts to compel discovery for use in a private international arbitration.  Petitioner Servotronics argued that a tribunal in a private international arbitration is a “foreign or international tribunal” within the meaning of Section 1782(a) and thus that the district court should have ordered discovery. In response, Rolls-Royce and Boeing argued that the language of Section 1782(a) only denotes a tribunal with authority derived from a sovereign, not a contract between private parties. The Court’s decision in this case would have affected the availability and efficiency of discovery in private international arbitrations and specified the extent of acceptable federal court involvement in private international arbitrations.  The U.S. Supreme Court removed this case from its oral argument schedule on September 8, 2021, following Servotronics’ motion to dismiss.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the discretion granted to district courts in 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) to render assistance in gathering evidence for use in “a foreign or international tribunal” encompasses private commercial arbitral tribunals, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 4th and 6th Circuits have held, or excludes such tribunals without expressing an exclusionary intent, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 5th and, in the case below, the 7th Circuit, have held.

Rolls-Royce PLC (“Rolls-Royce”) sold a jet engine to the Boeing Company (“Boeing”), which Boeing intended to use on one of its 787 Dreamliner aircraft. Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC at 690. In January 2016, Boeing tested the aircraft at its facility in South Carolina. During testing, a piece of metal became lodged in an engine valve.

Submit for publication
0

Mississippi v. Tennessee

Issues

Can the state of Mississippi obtain damages or injunctive relief without an equitable apportionment of groundwater from the Middle Claiborne Aquifer, which Mississippi claims was stolen by the state of Tennessee through Tennessee’s pumping operations in Shelby County?

Court below
Original Jurisdiction

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine if groundwater should be classified as an interstate resource and fall within federal common law equitable apportionment jurisprudence. The Special Master determined that the Middle Claiborne Aquifer is an interstate resource and that the Supreme Court should allow Mississippi to amend its complaint to include an equitable apportionment claim. Mississippi disputes the Special Master’s conclusions and argues that groundwater naturally flows from its territorial boundaries. Mississippi asserts that Tennessee's underground pumping violates Mississippi’s territorial sovereignty by disrupting the groundwater’s natural flow within Mississippi’s borders. Tennessee argues that the Special Master is correct in identifying the aquifer as an interstate resource, but that the Supreme Court should not allow Mississippi to amend its complaint because any amendment would create additional costly and time-consuming litigation. The outcome of this case has serious implications for interstate water rights and the apportionment of belowground natural resources.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the Court will grant Mississippi leave to file an original action to seek relief from respondents’ use of a pumping operation to take approximately 252 billion gallons of high-quality groundwater; (2) whether Mississippi has sole sovereign authority over and control of groundwater naturally stored within its borders, including in sandstone within Mississippi’s borders; and (3) whether Mississippi is entitled to damages, injunctive, and other equitable relief for the Mississippi intrastate groundwater intentionally and forcibly taken by respondents.

The Middle Claiborne Aquifer is a “hydrogeological unit” that extends through Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama and consists of the “Sparta Sand” in the South and the “Memphis Sand” in the North. Report of the Special Master, Eugene E. Siler, Jr.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

United States v. Zubaydah

Issues

When applying the state secrets privilege, should a court defer to the government’s assessment of the national security risks involved or conduct an independent judicial review?

This case asks the Supreme Court to weigh national security concerns against the need for transparency and accountability when applying the state secrets privilege, a common-law privilege permitting classified information to be protected from discovery. Petitioner the United States argues that the utmost deference is owed to government officials in matters of national security. Respondent Zubaydah argues, however, that courts should review the evidence independently to separate state secrets from non-privileged information. The outcome of this case carries significant implications for judicial transparency, the separation of powers, and civil liberties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred when it rejected the United States’ assertion of the state secrets privilege based on the court’s own assessment of potential harms to the national security, and required discovery to proceed further under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) against former Central Intelligence Agency contractors on matters concerning alleged clandestine CIA activities.

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) sought to obtain intelligence on terrorist activities by developing a secret network of overseas black sites where detainees of the War on Terror were subjected to “enhanced interrogation techniques.” Husayn v. Mitchell at 1125–1127.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Joseph Margulies for his guidance and insights into this case.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Terry v. United States

Issues

Does the First Step Act’s definition of a “covered offense” include violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) because they constitute a violation of a federal criminal statute for which the Fair Sentencing Act has modified the statutory penalties?

This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret the meaning of “covered offense” under Section 404(a) of the First Step Act to determine which crimes fall under its definition, and thus, may be subject to retroactive reduced sentencing. Petitioner Tarahrick Terry pled guilty to possessing with the intent to distribute an unspecified amount of cocaine base (or “crack cocaine”) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) in 2008. In 2010, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act, which amended parts of 21 U.S.C. § 841 to adjust the difference in sentencing between crimes involving crack cocaine and those involving powder cocaine. In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which made the Fair Sentencing Act’s amendments retroactive. Terry, in support of vacatur, argues that violations of Section 841(b)(1)(C) are “covered offenses” under Section 404 of the First Step Act, based on the text of Section 404(a), as well as the statute’s design and history. Adam K. Mortara, as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below, argues that Terry’s offense is not a “covered offense” under Section 404(a) based on a proper construction of the statute and the meaning of the phrases “violation of a Federal criminal statute” and “statutory penalties.” The case has implications for future retroactive sentencing statutory amendments, as well as inmates currently in custody for low-level crack-cocaine offenses before Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether pre-August 3, 2010, crack offenders sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) have a “covered offense” under Section 404 of the First Step Act.

On March 11, 2008, a grand jury indicted Tarahrick Terry with three crimes: (1) being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

United States v. Palomar-Santiago

Issues

Whether a defendant charged with illegal reentry into the United States may challenge the validity of his removal order solely by showing that his crime is no longer a removable offense, even if he has failed to satisfy the procedural requirements for challenging the validity of a removal order during the original proceedings?

The case asks the Court to determine whether a defendant can challenge the validity of a removal order for unlawful reentry solely by showing that the order was based on a criminal conviction that is no longer a removable offense without having to meet the procedural requirements of demonstrating administrative exhaustion and no opportunity for judicial review. Respondent Refugio Palomar-Santiago was removed in 1998 for a DUI, and in 2001, DUIs were re-classified as a nonremovable offense. Palomar-Santiago was then found living in the United States in 2017 and was charged with unlawful reentry by Petitioner United States. Palomar-Santiago asserts, as a defense, that the original removal order was unlawful. The United States contends that Palomar-Santiago cannot challenge the validity of the original removal order absent the procedural requirements of administrative exhaustion and judicial review of the original order. Palomar-Santiago counters that procedural rights should not obstruct substantive rights, and that he should be able to challenge the legality of the removal order even absent judicial review. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will implicate immigration procedure and the ability of noncitizens to challenge unlawful removal orders.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a defendant, charged with unlawful reentry into the United States following removal, automatically satisfies the prerequisites to asserting the invalidity of the original removal order as an affirmative defense solely by showing that he was removed for a crime that would not be considered a removable offense under current circuit law, even if he cannot independently demonstrate administrative exhaustion or deprivation of the opportunity for judicial review.

Mexican-national Refugio Palomar-Santiago received U.S. lawful permanent resident status in 1990. U.S. v. Palomar-Santiago at 2. The next year, Palomar-Santiago was convicted of a felony DUI.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0
Subscribe to