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This case asks the United States Supreme Court to determine whether the “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement extends to the home. The community caretaking exception allows for the warrantless seizure of evidence that police find while fulfilling their community caretaker role, which is unrelated to the “detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence” of criminal activity. Petitioner Edward Caniglia argues that this exception applies only to vehicular searches and seizures, given that the Fourth Amendment affords significantly greater protection to the home over automobiles. Respondents, including the City of Cranston, the police department, and city officials, counter that the community caretaking doctrine applies to the home based on the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness analysis, which permits warrantless searches and seizures when community safety interests outweigh privacy interests. The outcome of this case will affect the balance between privacy concerns and public safety concerns. The outcome will also affect police incentives in exercising their role as community caretakers.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the scope of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), which provides relief against voting policies that result in discrimination against minority populations. The state of Arizona enacted two voting policies that limit the scope of both in-person and mail-in voting. Arizona’s laws allowed it to discard any ballots cast in the wrong precinct on Election Day and criminalized collecting ballots for mailing purposes. Petitioners Arizona Attorney General Mark Brnovich and the state of Arizona  (“Arizona”) argue that these policies are racially neutral and do not discriminate against Black, Hispanic, and Indigenous communities. Respondent Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) contends that these laws disproportionately impacted or—in the case of the prohibition on ballot collection—targeted minority communities, and therefore violated the VRA. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine the extent of the protections granted by the VRA against discrimination as well as the validity of state laws seeking to address voter fraud.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether administrative patent judges are principal or inferior officers under the Appointments Clause. If administrative patent judges are principal officers, the court must also determine the proper remedy for the Appointments Clause violation. Administrative patent judges are executive officers in the U.S. Patent and Trade Office (“USPTO”) who are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce in consultation with the Director of the USPTO (the “Director”). Petitioners United States and Smith & Nephew argue that the Federal Circuit erred in holding that the APJs are principal officers. The United States and Smith & Nephew contend that they are inferior officers because the Director—a principal officer—extensively supervises their work. The United States contends that the Federal Circuit’s remedy of severing the portion of the statute that protected the APJs from being removed except for good cause was appropriate. In contrast, Smith & Nephew contend Arthrex is only entitled to a declaratory judgment, but if the Court grants relief beyond a declaratory judgment, Smith & Nephew agree with the Federal Circuit’s severance remedy. Respondent Arthrex counters that APJs are principal officers because they render decisions on behalf of the United States that are not subject to review by a superior Executive officer. Arthrex further argues that if APJs are principal officers, the Court’s remedy should be to invalidate the entire inter partes review system and allow Congress to fix it as they see fit. This case has drastic implications for past patentability decisions and how patents are reviewed moving forward.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether Social Security claimants must exhaust constitutional legal issues before an intra-agency adjudicative body—such as a Social Security Administration administrative law judge or appeals board—before seeking review of that issue in court. Petitioner Willie Carr argues that a requirement of issue exhaustion is inappropriate for his Appointments Clause challenge because no statute mandates issue exhaustion and a judicially-crafted requirement would break with historical precedent. Respondent Andrew Saul, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, counters that a general rule of judicial economy is applicable here, and that all issues can and must be exhausted before an administrative body before a claimant can seek review. This case has important implications for the procedural ease of new challenges to prior adverse benefits rulings for Social Security claimants, as well as the dockets of reviewing courts.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Florida is entitled to an apportionment of the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin against Georgia. Plaintiff Florida argues that Georgia’s use of the water is unreasonable because of mismanagement and waste and that Georgia’s use harms Florida’s oyster fisheries. Florida argues that it is entitled to relief because even an extra 1,000 cubic feet per second (“cfs”) of water will greatly benefit Florida, whereas the cost to Georgia is low and can be mitigated by water conservation methods. Defendant Georgia argues that Georgia’s use is reasonable because Florida’s models for consumption are incorrect and that the water is used for important purposes such as irrigation. Georgia also argues that a cap on its consumption would yield little benefit to Florida because of how the United States Army Corps of Engineers operates its dams and reservoirs and would be extremely costly for Georgia to implement. The outcome of this case will have implications for the sharing of water resources by neighboring states, state economies, and the environment. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to weigh the privacy interests of individuals under the Fourth Amendment against the government’s interest in enforcing the law. Petitioner Arthur Lange (“Lange”) was arrested in his garage by a police officer who pursued him for violating traffic laws. Though a police officer with probable cause may generally only enter a home after obtaining a warrant, certain exigent circumstances may justify warrantless home entry, including the pursuit of a felony suspect. The United States, in support of affirmance, argues that this warrantless exception should extend to the pursuit of misdemeanor suspects as a category. Lange and Respondent California, both in support of vacatur, counter that a case-by-case exception is more appropriate given the wide variety of misdemeanor offenses. This case has broad implications for individual privacy interests, public safety, and policing.

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This case asks the United States Supreme Court to determine whether a federal court of appeals should presume that an asylum applicant's testimony is credible when the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and an immigration judge (“IJ”) failed to make an explicit adverse credibility determination about the testimony. Ming Dai, an asylum applicant alleging persecution in China for violating the one-child family-planning policy, argues that his testimony must be deemed credible because (1) a federal court of appeals cannot evaluate credibility on its own and (2) the IJ and BIA failed to explicitly state that his testimony lacked credibility as required by the Immigration and Nationality Act in order to make an adverse credibility finding. The government counters that presumed credibility in absence of an explicit adverse credibility determination circumvents the statutory limitation that federal appellate courts are only permitted to reject the IJ or BIA’s determination that an applicant’s testimony is insufficient to meet his burden of proof if no reasonable adjudicator could have reached the same determination. The outcome of this case has important implications for the asylum process, immigration rights for asylum seekers, and the differing roles and responsibilities of administrative agencies and appellate courts. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) allows courts of appeals to review an entire order remanding a removed case back to state court. Normally, Section 1447(d) forbids courts of appeals from reviewing remand orders, except when a federal officer seeks removal or the case involves civil rights. Based on a plain reading of the text and the purpose of the exceptions, BP argues that if a defendant asserts either jurisdictional ground, Section 1447(d) permits a court to review the entire order. Baltimore contends that this reading contravenes the purpose and historical understanding of the proper scope of review. This case has implications for state and federal jurisdiction, climate change, and congressional delegation of power.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit erred when it vacated several Federal Communications’ Commission orders that, among other things, relaxed agency cross-ownership restrictions. Prometheus Radio Project, which challenges the FCC’s orders, claims that the FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it did not consider how repealing cross-ownership restrictions would affect minority and female ownership of broadcast services. The FCC counters that courts owe the agency substantial deference when it considers multiple policy factors in its rulemaking capacity. The Supreme Court’s decision could affect the scope of judicial review of administrative actions, the integrity of local news coverage, and the diversity of broadcast media.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether the Federal Trade Commission’s authority to seek injunctive relief includes requests for monetary recovery as restitution. The FTC sued Petitioner Scott Tucker, his wife, Kim Tucker, and his various businesses (“AMG Capital Management, LLC, et al.”) for deceptive business practices. Tucker argues that the plain language of Section 13(b) does not support the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation to allow monetary restitution as relief. Tucker also contends that such an interpretation may disrupt procedural safeguards in the FTC Act and that the old case law emanating from Porter and its progeny does not control the current case. Citing equity law cases that treat monetary restitution as a part of injunctive relief, the FTC maintains that Tucker’s argument is misleading because it fails to consider that the FTC Act takes into consideration the dual enforcement system of the FTC. Lastly, the FTC argues that Porter and its progeny are still good law and hence control the current case. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for consumer protection, business norms, and adhering to court precedent.

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