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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether two teachers at two Catholic schools are “ministers” and thus fall within the First Amendment’s “ministerial exception.” This exception immunizes religious employers from generally applicable employment-discrimination laws, so long as the employees at issue are considered “ministers.” Petitioners, Our Lady of Guadalupe School and St. James Catholic School (“the Schools”), contend that that under Hosanna-Tabor, an employee’s “job function” is the primary factor that courts should consider when determining whether an employee of a religious organization qualifies as a “minister.” The Schools contend that both teachers at issue here engaged in important religious functions by teaching religion to students. Respondents and teachers, Agnes Morrissey-Berru and Kristen Biel (“Morrissey-Berru”), counter that Hosanna-Tabor established a four-factor test, looking not only to the employee’s religious functions, but also to her title, training, and actions. According to Morrissey-Berru, neither teacher held a ministerial title, received religious training, nor held themselves out to be ministers. Even looking to their religious functions, she contends that teaching religion among other secular subjects is insufficient to make a teacher a minister. The outcome of this case will have implications for religious organizations’ employment practices and the civil-rights protections of their employees.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a grand-jury subpoena served on the president’s accounting firm that demands 10 years’ worth of the president’s financial records comports with the Constitution. President Trump argues that Article II renders the president categorically immune to any criminal process while in office. This is especially so here, President Trump argues, where the Supremacy Clause asserts the primacy of federal interests over those of state courts, and where the criminal nature of the subpoena imposes a stigma. Vance counters that Article II and the Supremacy Clause do not apply where the particular legal process does not implicate or impinge on the president’s official conduct. Vance points to the Court’s centuries-long practice of enforcing presidential subpoenas. The outcome of this case will significantly affect local officials’ ability to launch investigations into matters concerning sitting presidents, as well as presidents’ immunity from grand jury investigations while in office.

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The Supreme Court will determine whether a congressional committee may subpoena a third-party for the financial records of the President of the United States. The United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Second Circuit have both held that congressional committees did not exceed their constitutional authority when they issued subpoenas to President Donald Trump’s accountant and several banks for his personal financial records, because those subpoenas were related to legitimate legislative purposes. Petitioner President Trump argues that Congress may not issue subpoenas for the documents of a sitting President under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Respondents, three Committees of the House of Representatives, argue that Congress has long exercised investigative power over the President as part of its legislative function. This case will likely affect the number and scope of future congressional subpoenas for a President’s personal records.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the government violates the First Amendment when it requires the foreign affiliates of U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations to adopt policies explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking in order to receive federal funding. The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (the “Leadership Act”) authorizes federal funding for nongovernmental organizations to assist their worldwide campaigns against HIV/AIDS and other diseases. But the Act requires fund recipients to adopt a policy that explicitly opposes prostitution and sex trafficking (the “Policy Requirement”). The United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”) administers the Leadership Act and contends that requiring foreign affiliates to comply with the Policy Requirement does not violate the First Amendment rights of these domestic organizations. It explains that First Amendment rights do not extend to the foreign affiliates because foreign entities are not entitled to any First Amendment rights and are legally distinct from their domestic counterparts. The Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. (“AOSI”) counters that the Policy Requirement infringes on its First Amendment rights because it compels speech that is likely to be attributed to AOSI. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for the international network of welfare workers, as well as the government’s control on federal funding.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the addition of a domain suffix such as “.com” to a generic term like “booking” can create a protectable trademark. The Petitioners, United States Patent and Trademark Office and the Department of Justice, contend that the Court’s decision in Goodyear that the addition of a corporate designation such as “Company” or “Inc.” to a generic word does not render the combination protectable, extends to adding a “.com” suffix. The Respondent, Booking.com, counters that the Lanham Act repudiated Goodyear, and advocates for the application of the “primary significance” test which focuses the genericness inquiry on whether the consuming public views the term as signifying the producer rather than the product. The Court’s decision will have implications for online companies that have invested resources in developing their brand recognition using generic terms. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the TCPA’s unsolicited-cellphone-call ban and its government-debt exception are valid under the First Amendment. Attorney General William P. Barr and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (collectively, “the Government”) argue that the government-debt exception is content-neutral because the exception distinguishes permitted and prohibited conduct solely based on economic activity. They also contend that the exception satisfies intermediate scrutiny because the exception strikes the appropriate balance between Congress’s legitimate interests in protecting consumer privacy and preserving public funds. The Government argues that the exception, if invalid, is severable from the cellphone-call ban because the ban stood for twenty-four years before the exception was enacted, and because this history suggests that Congress would prefer to leave the ban in place. The American Association of Political Correspondents, Inc., et al. (collectively, “AAPC”) respond that the ban and the exception are content-based because they restrict permitted call topics and that neither the ban nor the exception survive either strict or intermediate scrutiny because there is no privacy interest to which the cellphone-call ban and the government-debt exception are closely tailored. AAPC refutes that severability is the appropriate remedy because the whole ban is an unconstitutional restriction on speech. The Court’s decision raises concerns about the potential impact on the government’s efforts in protecting consumer privacy and in helping borrowers avoid default on debts owed to or guaranteed by the federal government. The Court’s decision raises concerns about consumers’ privacy interests, the government’s ability to collect debt, and increasing litigation costs.

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The Supreme Court consolidated Trump v. Pennsylvania and Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, two cases challenging the Trump Administration rules allowing employers to opt out of contraceptive-care coverage for their employees. Petitioners Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al. (“Government”) and Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home (“Little Sisters”) assert that the final rules are procedurally and substantively valid because the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury (“the Agencies”) can circumvent the notice-and-comment requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) when, as in here, they have “good cause.” Furthermore, the Government and Little Sisters assert that the Agencies were authorized to make such exemptions under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). Respondents, the States of Pennsylvania and New Jersey (“Pennsylvania”), counter that the final rules are procedurally and substantively invalid because the Agencies violated the APA’s notice-and-comment requirement.  Furthermore, Pennsylvania argues that the power to make such exemptions lies solely with Congress and the Court, and that the Agencies had no authority under the ACA or RFRA. On the second issue in front of the Court, Little Sisters asserts that it has standing in this appeal because it is at risk of harm under the preliminary injunction in question, irrespective of an injunction from the District Court of Colorado. Pennsylvania counters that Little Sisters does not have standing in this appeal because the Colorado District Court’s injunction protects Little Sisters from any harm caused by the preliminary injunction in question. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for the separation of powers, religious freedom, and individual rights.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether Section 1252(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)—which provides that courts do not have jurisdiction to review “final orders of removal” against any noncitizen ordered removed from the country for committing certain criminal offenses—prohibits federal courts of appeals from reviewing the facts underlying orders granting or denying noncitizens relief from deportation under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). Under CAT, the United States cannot remove a noncitizen to a country where they are likely to be tortured. While Section 1252(a)(2)(C) strips courts of the ability to review “any final order of removal,” Nasrallah argues that CAT orders are distinct orders that fall outside this phrase. Barr, on the other hand, argues that Section 1252(a)(2)(C) intends to include CAT orders within the phrase “final order of removal” and thus limits judicial review of the facts underlying those orders. The outcome of this case will affect the number of opportunities that criminal noncitizens have to challenge the accuracy of the facts underlying a denial of their claim for CAT relief.

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This case asks whether the President of the United States is unconstitutionally restricted from removing the director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). Established through part of the Dodd-Frank Act and in response to the financial crisis in 2008, the CFPB regulates the financial markets and enforces consumer protections. The CFPB is headed by a single director who is removable by the President only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Petitioner Seila Law LLC and Respondent CFPB both argue that this removal restriction violates separation of powers because it impermissibly restricts the President’s ability to remove an executive officer. The Court-appointed Amicus Curiae maintains that so long as the President has the exclusive removal power, a modest restriction on that power is constitutional. The outcome of this case has implications on accountability mechanisms used by administrative agencies, state consumer protection regulators, and industries regulated by the CFPB.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) may obtain disgorgement in civil actions under its power to seek equitable relief, even though the Supreme Court has previously ruled that disgorgement is a penalty rather than an equitable remedy at least under some circumstances. Petitioners Liu and Wang contend that the Supreme Court ruled in Kokesh v. SEC that disgorgement was a penalty, and that therefore the SEC lacks the authority to order Liu and Wang to disgorge any ill-gotten gains in connection with their investment fund. The SEC counters that Kokesh held disgorgement to be a penalty only for statute of limitations purposes. The outcome of this case has implications on the SEC’s effectiveness in future civil actions at deterring financial crime and at making the victims of financial crime whole.

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