Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a semi-automatic rifle equipped with a bump stock device is considered a “machinegun” under the National Firearms Act of 1934. A bump stock device is a rifle attachment that increases a semi-automatic rifle’s rate of fire. In 2018, in response to a mass shooting in Las Vegas, the government issued a new regulation interpreting the National Firearms Act, which prohibits machineguns, to also prohibit bump stock devices. Michael Cargill, who was forced to surrender several bump stock devices to the government, argues that a bump stock is not a machinegun, because a bump stock does not allow a semi-automatic rifle to fire more than one shot “by a single function of the trigger” or allow such a weapon to fire “automatically.” The government contends that a bump stock is a machinegun, and that legislative history and congressional intent support its interpretation of the statute. The outcome of this case has important ramifications on the risk of mass shootings and deaths in crowded areas, Second Amendment rights, and the ability of federal agencies to interpret federal statutes.

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Petitioner Coinbase seeks to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that a subsequent contract regarding the terms for a contest with the contest platform’s registered users limits the scope of the platform’s general user agreement on arbitration and how that scope is determined. The parties dispute whether original agreement’s text forecloses subsequent modification and whether the Federal Arbitration Act and California contract law govern that determination. The outcome of this case carries implications for contract predictability, the authority of arbitrators, and the power of the Federal Arbitration Act.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider to what extent nationally-chartered banks should be shielded from state banking regulations on mortgage escrow accounts. Alex Cantero argues that the Second Circuit’s standard for preemption based on control is improper, and that the Court must evaluate the actual impact the interest-on-escrow law has on bank operations. Bank of America maintains that the state law is preempted because it both impermissibly exerts control over bank operations and also significantly hinders national banks’ exercise of their federally-granted powers. This case has significant implications not only for mortgage escrow accounts but also for states’ capacity to regulate other practices and products of federally-chartered banks.

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This challenge to administrative action by numerous states, including Ohio (“Ohio et al.”) asks the Court to determine whether a stay of enforcement of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) default emissions regulations, named the “Good Neighbor Provision,” is appropriate, pending review of the legality of the EPA’s action under the Clean Air Act (CAA). Ohio et al. maintain that they are requesting a stay, which should be approved when considering the irreparable harm to state parties as a result of the implementation of the federal-default rule. Meanwhile, the EPA claims Ohio et al. are actually requesting an injunction, which should only be granted in exceptional circumstances. Ohio et al. further argue that the agency’s disapproval of their state-level implementation plans was an “arbitrary and capricious” action because the EPA failed to consider that state courts would limit the applicability of the federal-implementation plan, leading to a less effective rule. The EPA counters that its consideration of the “reasonableness” of the plan was adequate at the time of its initial promulgation and that it was not required to consider subsequent legal action. The outcome of this case has significant implications regarding the transition to greener energy, specifically related to economic costs, and the success of environmental goals.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Corner Post, Inc.’s (“Corner Post”) claim under the Administrative Procedure Act was barred under a particular statute of limitation, and whether that six-year statute began running 2011 when the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (“Federal Reserve”) published their regulation, or in 2018 when Corner Post was first founded and affected by it. Corner Post asserts that interpreting statutes of limitations to start when harm is inflicted on plaintiffs is consistent with historic models of statutory interpretation and fairness. The Federal Reserve counters that the statute in question was clear in its terms and intentions to give administrative agencies a distinct time period during which to expect legal challenges, and as such the six-year statute would begin with the promulgation of the regulation. The outcome of this case has serious implications for administrative law and statutory interpretation, particularly with respect to the practicability of suing agencies for long-standing policies.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a copyright plaintiff can recover damages for infringements over three years before the filing of a lawsuit if the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the infringement within three years of the filing of the lawsuit. Petitioners Warner Chappell Music, Inc., and Artist Publishing Group, LLC, contend that the discovery rule, which provides that a claim accrues when plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the infringement, is inapplicable because the statute of limitations commences at the time of infringement, marking the completion of the cause of action. Additionally, Petitioners assert that applying the discovery rule would contravene Congress’s intent, as the language pertaining to the discovery rule is intentionally absent from the copyright provision. On the other hand, Respondents Nealy and Music Specialist, Inc. argue that Petitioners’ challenge on the discovery rule exceeds the scope of the issue presented to the Supreme Court, as the lower courts already presumed the application of the discovery rule in this case. Respondents also posit that introducing a separate damages bar—a cap on damages that can be awarded to a plaintiff—in federal copyright cases would undermine Congress’s purpose, as copyright law does not impose such a bar. This case will affect the scope of infringement cases initiated by copyright holders and alter the burden of proof for each party in future copyright cases.

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This case asks the Court to determine whether the Federal Arbitration Act’s (FAA) exemption includes employees who do not work within the transportation industry but conduct work related to transportation. Employee Petitioners argue that the Court should not adopt the Second Circuit's interpretation that industry is dispositive because doing so would be inconsistent with the ruling in Saxon. Additionally, Petitioners argue that Congress specifically phrased the statute to include all workers whose work aided the transportation industry. Employer Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the Court should consider industry as dispositive because this would be consistent with the ruling in Circuit City. Further, Respondents argue that workers who historically fell under similar acts passed by Congress have been those who worked within the transportation industry and—in the case of seamen—had employment contracts that distinguished them as such. This case touches on important questions regarding discrepant treatment of employees and the availability of arbitration as an alternative to judicial action. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify the ambit and enforceability of Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, also known as the Disqualification Clause, which states that “[n]o person shall. . . hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, who, having previously taken an oath. . . as an officer of the United States . . . to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same.” Former President Donald Trump contends that he is not subject to Section Three disqualification because he has not served as a qualifying oath–taking “officer of the United States”; because his actions on January 6th, 2021 were protected speech, not insurrection; and because the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of Section Three was legally incorrect. A group of Colorado electors and Colorado Secretary of State Jena Griswold respond that the President is an “officer of the United States” such that Section Three applies to Trump; that Trump engaged in insurrection on January 6th, 2021 and does not qualify for First Amendment protection in that regard; and that the Colorado Supreme Court properly applied Section Three. This case has significant implications for democratic norms and institutions, parties’ and voters’ interests in elections, and the bounds of political activity.

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This case, along with its companion case Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, asks the Supreme Court to consider the government’s interpretation of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act and the reach and constitutionality of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Under Chevron, courts defer to reasonable executive agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language. Relentless, Inc. contends that the partial industry funding component of the government’s at-sea monitors program relies on a faulty interpretation of the governing statute, and that Chevron deference itself is an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers and an abdication of interpretive responsibility by the judiciary. The Department of Commerce counters that its interpretation of the statute is both correct and  entitled to deference. The outcome of this case could have seismic consequences for administrative law, statutory interpretation, and the balance of power between the federal judiciary and the administrative state.

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This case asks the court to determine whether investors may bring a private claim against an issuer under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for an omission without an associated misleading statement, known as a “pure omission,” based on the disclosure requirements set by Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K. Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation argues that investors cannot bring a private claim for a pure omission because the text and statutory context of § 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and Item 303 do not support such claims. In opposition, Moab Partners, L.P. argues that investors may bring a private claim for a pure omission because Supreme Court precedent and statutes comparable to § 10(b) indicate that investors may bring such claims. This case touches on important questions regarding disclosure requirements, issuer liability for omissions, and the suitability of enforcement of securities regulations through private lawsuits.

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