Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation

Issues

Must a federal court hearing state law claims brought under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act apply the forum state’s choice-of-law rules or federal common law to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a federal court should apply the forum state's choice-of-law rules or federal common law in cases brought against a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). Petitioner David Cassirer contends that the forum state's choice-of-law rules should apply, arguing that Congress intends state law to apply so that results in cases against a foreign national and against a foreign state are the same. Thus, Cassirer argues that, in this case, California substantive law should apply. In response, Respondent Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation (“TBCF”) contends that federal common law should apply because jurisdiction under FSIA is more analogous to federal question jurisdiction rather than diversity jurisdiction. In this case, TBCF argues that Spanish law should govern. This case has important policy implications for foreign relations, international justice, and the separation of powers.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a federal court hearing state law claims brought under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act must apply the forum state’s choice of law rules to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue, or whether it may apply federal common law.

In Nazi Germany, in 1939, Lilly Neubauer—David Cassirer’s great-grandmother—was forced to “sell” a Pissarro painting to a Berlin art dealer. Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation  at 6. The Nazi government demanded that Lilly sell the painting under threat of imprisoning her in Germany. Id. Both parties and the district court have concluded that the painting was forcibly taken from Lilly.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Concepcion v. United States

Issues

Whether drug offenders that are eligible for a sentencing reduction based on Section 404(b) of the First Step Act are entitled to have intervening legal factors and developments considered at their resentencing?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the First Step Act requires or merely allows courts to consider post-sentencing developments during First Step Act sentence modifications. Petitioner Carlos Concepcion argues that the First Step Act requires courts to consider post-sentencing legal and factual developments during sentence modifications. Respondent United States counters that the First Step Act grants courts the discretion to consider post-sentencing developments during sentence modifications. The outcome of this case will impact the sentencing of many low-level drug offenders as well as a court’s authority over resentencing under Section 404 of the First Step Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, when deciding if it should “impose a reduced sentence” on an individual under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018, a district court must or may consider intervening legal and factual developments?

In 2006, Petitioner Carlos Concepcion (“Concepcion”) was arrested on felony drug charges. Concepcion v. United States at 283. Federal investigators alleged Concepcion was involved in the illegal sale of at least 27.5 grams of crack cocaine and 186.34 grams of powdered cocaine. Id. In 2008, Petitioner Carlos Concepcion pled guilty to one count of possessing with intent to distribute or distributing at least 5 grams of crack cocaine. Id.

Additional Resources

 

Submit for publication
0

Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate

Issues

Does Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”), which imposes a $250,000 cap on the amount of post-election funds a campaign can use to reimburse a candidate’s personal loans, impermissibly burden a candidate’s First Amendment right to free speech; and does a party seeking to invalidate a regulation implemented pursuant to that statutory provision have standing to challenge the statute?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”), which bars a campaign from disbursing more than $250,000 in post-election contributions to refund a candidate’s personal loans, violates the First Amendment. The Federal Election Commission (“the FEC”) contends that Senator Cruz’s current inability to obtain full reimbursement for his loan was not caused by Section 304, and that Cruz therefore lacks standing to challenge Section 304. Senator Ted Cruz and Ted Cruz for Senate (collectively, “Ted Cruz”) counter that Section 304 directly injures them, and that the statute should be held unconstitutional under the First Amendment for unjustifiably deterring candidates from exercising their free speech right to contribute to their own campaigns. The outcome of this case has implications for litigants who must establish standing to challenge allegedly unconstitutional government action in the courts, and the constitutionality of limits on the use of post-election funds for loan-repayment.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether appellees have standing to challenge the statutory loan-repayment limit; and whether the loan-repayment limit violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

In order to guard against actual and apparent quid pro quo corruption, Congress promulgated federal campaign financing restrictions through the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”). Ted Cruz for Senate v. Fed.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Shurtleff v. City of Boston

Issues

Whether the City of Boston violated the First Amendment by denying a private party’s application to fly a Christian flag on a flagpole in front of Boston City Hall when the City had approved all 284 previous flag-raising applications; whether the flagpole is a designated public forum for the purposes of the First Amendment; and whether designating a private party’s flag in a public forum government speech inappropriately expands the definition of government speech.

In this case, the Supreme Court must decide whether the City of Boston violated the First Amendment by refusing to fly a flag bearing a Latin cross on a flagpole in front of City Hall. Boston allowed private parties to apply for permission to raise and display their flags on one of three flag poles in front of City Hall. Before Boston rejected Petitioner Harold Shurtleff’s application to fly a flag bearing a Latin cross, it had approved every one of the 284 applications it received. Shurtleff argues that Boston designated the flagpole as a public forum for private speech and committed unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by refusing to fly Shurtleff’s flag because it bore a Christian symbol. Boston responds that, because the flags flown in front of City Hall are government speech, not private speech, Boston could evaluate flag-raising applications with reference to content and viewpoint, without running afoul of the First Amendment. Interested parties on either side of the case warn of potential chilling effects on private speech, as well as the risk of hostility from the government or from private parties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s failure to apply the Supreme Court’s forum doctrine to the First Amendment challenge of a private religious organization that was denied access to briefly display its flag on a city flagpole, pursuant to a city policy expressly designating the flagpole a public forum open to all applicants, with hundreds of approvals and no denials, conflicts with the Supreme Court’s precedents holding that speech restrictions based on religious viewpoint or content violate the First Amendment or are otherwise subject to strict scrutiny and that the establishment clause is not a defense to censorship of private speech in a public forum open to all comers;

(2) whether the First Circuit’s classifying as government speech the brief display of a private religious organization’s flag on a city flagpole, pursuant to a city policy expressly designating the flagpole a public forum open to all applicants, with hundreds of approvals and no denials, unconstitutionally expands the government speech doctrine, in direct conflict with the court’s decisions in Matal v. Tam, Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. and Pleasant Grove City v. Summum; and

(3) whether the First Circuit’s finding that the requirement for perfunctory city approval of a proposed brief display of a private religious organization’s flag on a city flagpole, pursuant to a city policy expressly designating the flagpole a public forum open to all applicants with hundreds of approvals and no denials, transforms the religious organization’s private speech into government speech, conflicts with the Supreme Court’s precedent in Matal v. Tam, and circuit court precedents in New Hope Family Services, Inc. v. Poole, Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, Eagle Point Education Association v. Jackson County School District and Robb v. Hungerbeeler.

The City of Boston (“Boston”) owns and operates three flagpoles in City Hall Plaza, all of which stand conspicuously in front of the seat of its municipal government. Shurtleff v. City of Boston, at 82. The first flagpole flies the United States and POW/MIA flags, the second flies the Commonwealth of Massachusetts flag, and the third typically flies Boston’s flag. Id.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Issues

Is the 30-day deadline to file a petition for the Tax Court to review its prior determination classified as a jurisdictional requirement that adheres to the exact amount of days prescribed and is not subject to certain fair exceptions or as a claim-processing rule subject to pausing the running time period for just considerations?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a 30-day filing deadline serves as a flexible procedural rule or a limitation on the Tax Court’s jurisdiction. Petitioner Boechler argues that the filing deadline is a procedural rule that is subject to the remedy of equitable tolling to effectively grant extensions in appropriate circumstances. Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue counters that the 30-day filing deadline proscribes a jurisdictional prerequisite, limiting the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to only those petitions that were timely filed within the 30-day period. The outcome of this case has important implications for the treatment of tax law, interpretation of filing deadlines within interconnected statutory schemes, and disparate outcomes for low-income taxpayers.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the deadline established by 26 U.S.C. 6330(d)(1) for seeking Tax Court review of a determination of the Internal Revenue Service Independent Office of Appeals following a collection due process hearing is a jurisdictional requirement or a claim-processing rule subject to equitable tolling.

In June 2015, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) notified a small North Dakota law firm, Boechler, P.C. (“Boechler”), about missing tax document submissions. Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, at 762.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Gallardo v. Marstiller

Issues

Under the federal Medicaid Act, does a Medicaid program have authority to recover reimbursement for its payment of a beneficiary’s medical expenses by taking funds from a legal recovery which compensates for future medical expenses for that beneficiary?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether, pursuant to the federal Medicaid Act, a state Medicaid program may recover reimbursement for its payment of a beneficiary’s past medical expenses by allocating funds from a portion of the participant’s settlement that compensates for future medical expenses. Florida law requires Medicaid beneficiaries to assign any rights to reimbursement for medical care from third parties to the state. In this case, Gianinna Gallardo contends that a state cannot collect reimbursement for future medical expenses from a Medicaid beneficiary’s settlement against a third party. In response, Simone Marstiller, Secretary of the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration, counters that the state may recover reimbursement for both past and future medical expenses because the Florida statute does not explicitly bar recovery for future medical care. The outcome of this case will affect how the burden of Medicaid costs is allocated between individuals and the state and federal governments.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the federal Medicaid Act provides for a state Medicaid program to recover reimbursement for Medicaid’s payment of a beneficiary’s past medical expenses by taking funds from the portion of the beneficiary’s tort recovery that compensates for future medical expenses.

In 2008, Gianinna Gallardo, a 13-year-old student, was hit by a truck after exiting her school bus. Brief for Petitioner, Gianinna Gallardo, at 16. She sustained severe physical injuries and remains in a continual vegetative state. Id. Since Ms.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Garland v. Gonzalez

Issues

Are detained noncitizens entitled to bond hearings after six months of detention; and do courts have jurisdiction to grant these detainees classwide injunctive relief?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the due process rights of noncitizens detained within the United States immigration system for over six months. Attorney General Merrick Garland argues that these detainees are not entitled to bond hearings before immigration judges after six months of detention and maintains that courts may not grant them classwide injunctive relief. Class action representative Esteban Aleman Gonzalez counters that the Due Process Clause requires that noncitizen detainees receive bond hearings before immigration judges and asserts that detainees may receive classwide injunctive relief. The outcome of this case will have impacts on the functioning of the federal immigration system as well as the safety of detainees.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether an alien who is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 is entitled by statute, after six months of detention, to a bond hearing at which the government must prove to an immigration judge that the alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) whether, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), the courts below had jurisdiction to grant classwide injunctive relief.

Respondent Esteban Aleman Gonzalez is a class representative for two combined class action suits. See Gonzales v. Barr, at 764. All class representatives are noncitizens who entered the United States due to torture or persecution in their home countries, and then unlawfully re-entered the U.S.

Submit for publication
0

Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez

Issues

Does an alien have the right to a bond hearing, at which the government must prove that the detainee is dangerous or a flight risk, after being held in custody for six months?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the government must prove to an immigration judge by clear and convincing evidence, that an alien who has been detained for six months is a flight risk or dangerous to the community. In 2018, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents detained Antonio Arteaga-Martinez, a native and citizen of Mexico, who had illegally entered the United States in September 2012. The parties differ on whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231 requires a bond hearing after six months of detention, or whether the Department of Homeland Security needs to prove that an alien is a flight risk or danger to the community. The government, represented by Tae Johnson, maintains that neither are required based on the plain meaning of the statute. Further, Johnson claims that current Immigration and Customs Enforcement policies satisfy due process requirements, citing mechanisms such as required hearings, review processes, and access to attorneys. In response, Arteaga-Martinez argues that a bond hearing is required after six months of detention, and that the Department of Homeland Security must then prove that the immigrant is a flight risk or a danger to the community. Mr. Arteaga-Martinez adds that due process is not met by the government’s scheme. This case has important implications for immigrant rights and the administration of immigration law.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an alien who is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 is entitled by statute, after six months of detention, to a bond hearing at which the government must prove to an immigration judge by clear and convincing evidence that the alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community.

 

Respondent Antonio Arteaga-Martinez (“Arteaga-Martinez”) is a native and citizen of Mexico. Brief for Petitioner, Tae D. Johnson at 6. Arteaga-Martinez entered the United States four times over the past twenty years. Id. He first came to the United States in February 2000, and, after being stopped at the border, voluntarily returned to Mexico. Id.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Issues

Should the Supreme Court grant immediate stay of OSHA's emergency order requiring the employees of all businesses with one hundred or more employees to either be vaccinated or submit to weekly testing?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a stay should be issued against the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (“OSHA”) vaccine-or-testing regime for businesses with 100 or more employees. Petitioner the National Federation of Independent Business argues that the Court should stay the emergency temporary standard because it is likely that the emergency temporary standard at issue exceeds OSHA's authority, and the businesses will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay. In response, Respondent OSHA argues that Congress explicitly authorizes it to address COVID-19 exposure at the workplace; and therefore, an emergency temporary standard is lawful when OSHA determines, based on substantial evidence, that it is necessary to address the immediate risk of COVID-19. The Court’s decision on this case could have significant impacts on the economy, constitutionally protected liberties, and public health.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Supreme Court should issue a stay of OSHA's vaccine-or-testing regime for all businesses with 100 or more employees.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Biden v. Missouri

Issues

Can the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services continue to temporarily enforce a mandate requiring health care workers at Medicare- and Medicaid-certified facilities to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 notwithstanding a district court injunction prohibiting the rule’s enforcement?

This case asks the Supreme Court to grant a stay of a district court injunction that currently blocks the Biden Administration from enforcing a mandate requiring certain healthcare workers to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19. The Biden Administration argues that the Supreme Court should issue a stay because the mandate is statutorily authorized, and its enforcement is in the public interest. The State of Missouri and nine other states (collectively “Missouri”) counter that the Supreme Court should reject the Biden Administration’s application for a stay and maintain enjoinment of the mandate throughout the pending litigation. The outcome of this case has significant implications for the Biden Administration’s pandemic-related authority and the role that the Supreme Court will play in either upholding or invalidating such authority.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Supreme Court should issue a stay of the injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri blocking a federal rule that requires all health care workers at facilities that participate in Medicare and Medicaid programs to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they are eligible for a medical or religious exemption.  

On November 5, 2021, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (“CMS”), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), promulgated 86 Fed. Reg.

Additional Resources

 

Submit for publication
0
Subscribe to