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Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Rodriquez

Issues

Does California’s Schedule B charitable donor disclosure requirement violate the First Amendment?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a state charitable donor disclosure regulation unconstitutionally infringes on donors’ and charitable organizations’ free speech and association rights. California recently started enforcing its Schedule B regulation, which requires charitable organizations to provide the confidential names of their financial donors. Petitioners Americans for Prosperity Foundation and Thomas More Law Center argue that this compelled disclosure is facially unconstitutional because it fails “exacting” scrutiny and unconstitutional as applied to them because of the extreme risks to their political minority donors. Respondent Matthew Rodriquez, the Attorney General of California, argues that the regulation is necessary to enforce charitable fraud laws and that California can meet its regulatory objectives while simultaneously protecting donors’ confidential data. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine whether charities in California must disclose the names of their donors to state regulators and will also determine the bounds of organizational free association rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the exacting scrutiny the Supreme Court has long required of laws that abridge the freedoms of speech and association outside the election context – as called for by NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson and its progeny – can be satisfied absent any showing that a blanket governmental demand for the individual identities and addresses of major donors to private nonprofit organizations is narrowly tailored to an asserted law-enforcement interest.

California has a law that requires charitable organizations to submit various tax forms to the state, including Schedule B to IRS Form 990 (“Schedule B”), which contains certain donor information. Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra at 1183. That information is normally considered confidential.

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Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation

Issues

Are Alaska Native Regional Corporations and Alaska Native Village Corporations considered “Indian tribe[s]” under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act? 

This case asks whether the Alaska Native Corporations (“ANCs”) are entitled to relief provided to “Indian Tribes” under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”). The CARES Act incorporates the definition of “Indian tribe[s]” from the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act. Petitioners U.S. Treasury and ANCs argue that Congress expressly included the Alaska Native Corporations in the definition of Indian tribes and that the plain-meaning of the term “recognition” in the statute supports this inclusion. Respondent Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation and Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation argue that the ANCs do not qualify as Indian tribes because they are not formally recognized by a governmental authority or Congress as a sovereign tribe. The Supreme Court’s decision will impact the ability of Alaska Native Corporations to access funding through federal programs. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Alaska Native regional and village corporations established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act are “Indian Tribe[s]” for purposes of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act.

In March of 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) to provide financial relief from the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. Confederated Tribes v.

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United States v. Gary

Issues

Is a criminal defendant who pleads guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon automatically entitled to plain-error relief if the district court failed to advise the defendant that a necessary element of the offense was knowledge of his status as a felon?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a defendant who has pled guilty to the possession of a firearm should receive automatic plain-error relief if the defendant was not advised that an element of the offense is that he knew of his status as a felon. Petitioner United States argues that the guilty plea should not be reversed because plain-error review applies and insists that Respondent did not make the requisite showing of case-specific prejudice. Respondent Michael Andrew Gary counters that the guilty plea should be reversed because plain-error review does not apply in this case and that in the event that it does apply, case-specific prejudice is not required due to the error’s classification as “structural.” The outcome of this case will affect the obligations and strategies of criminal defendants and prosecutors, as well as the burden on the judicial system.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a defendant who pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a), is automatically entitled to plain-error relief if the district court did not advise him that one element of that offense is knowledge of his status as a felon, regardless of whether he can show that the district court’s error affected the outcome of the proceedings.

On January 17, 2017, Michael Andrew Gary, who had previously been convicted of a felony, was discovered with a gun in his vehicle following a traffic stop. United States v. Gary at 2.

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Sanchez v. Mayorkas

Issues

Can noncitizens who were granted Temporary Protected Status in the United States after their home country experienced unsafe conditions apply for a green card when the noncitizens were not formally inspected and admitted into the United States?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether noncitizens residing in the United States under Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) are eligible to receive lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) status if they were not formally inspected and admitted into the United States. Jose Santos Sanchez and Sonia Gonzalez are a married couple from El Salvador who received TPS in 2001 after entering the United States unlawfully in the late 1990s. The couple argues that they are eligible to apply for permanent residency because TPS recipients are deemed, by definition and by Congress, as having met the requirements of formal inspection and admission for the purposes of changing residency status. The government counters that individuals who initially entered the country unlawfully cannot apply for permanent residency because they cannot overcome the requirement of being formally inspected and admitted into the United States, even if they were eventually granted TPS. The outcome of this case has important implications for resolving inconsistent application of the law by federal courts and for understanding the qualifications needed to receive permanent residency in the United States.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4), a grant of temporary protected status authorizes eligible noncitizens to obtain lawful-permanent-resident status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255.

Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) protects foreign nationals within the United States from removal “during armed conflict, environmental disasters, or other extraordinary conditions in their homelands.” Sanchez v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. at 244–245. 8 U.S.C.

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City of San Antonio, Texas v. Hotels.com, L.P.

Issues

May district courts deny or reduce appellate costs deemed “taxable” under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether district courts have the discretion to adjust “taxable” appellate costs under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(e). In 2006, a district court entered judgment for Petitioner City of San Antonio and taxed appellate costs against Respondent Hotels.com. In 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court judgment and ordered the City of San Antonio to pay appellate costs to Hotels.com. The City of San Antonio argues that the permissive language of “taxable” in Rule 39(e) and the bifurcated structure of the subdivisions of Rule 39 justify district courts’ discretionary authority to adjust appellate costs after the appellate court has determined which parties are entitled to costs. Hotels.com argues that the mandatory language of Rule 39(e) justifies the Fifth Circuit’s decision and that appellate courts are better equipped to determine the question of appellate costs. The outcome of this case has implications for the allocation of appellate costs between parties in litigation where appellate bonds, penalties, and interest can reach millions of dollars, as well as the efficiency of court proceedings concerning the determination of appellate costs.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit alone has held, district courts “lack[] discretion to deny or reduce” appellate costs deemed “taxable” in district court under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(e).

In 2006, the City of San Antonio filed a class action lawsuit against online travel companies (“OTCs”), including Hotels.com, Hotwire, Orbitz, and Travelocity, for failure to pay municipal hotel occupancy taxes in full. City of San Antonio v.

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Minerva Surgical Inc. v. Hologic Inc.

Issues

When a party transfers a patent to a third party and the third party later sues the transferring party for patent infringement, can the transferring party claim the patent is invalid?

This case asks the Supreme Court to rule on the validity of the assignor estoppel doctrine. Under this doctrine, an assignor of a patent may not, in a suit against the assignee, claim that the patent is invalid. Petitioner Minerva Surgical Inc. argues assignor estoppel is not supported in the Patent Act and Court precedent favors the doctrine’s abolition. Respondent Hologic Inc. counters that assignor estoppel is implicit in the Patent Act and that stare decisis dictates that the Court uphold assignor estoppel. The outcome of this case has significant policy implications regarding the proper balance of the public interest in challenging potentially invalid patents and the interest in promoting equity and fair dealing in the assignor–assignee relationship.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a defendant in a patent infringement action who assigned the patent, or is in privity with an assignor of the patent, may have a defense of invalidity heard on the merits.

This case involves U.S. Patents Nos. 6,782,183 (“’183 patent”) and 9,095,348 (“’348 patent”). Hologic, Inc. v. Minerva Surgical at 1260. Both patents lay claim to various devices and procedures related to endometrial ablation treatment, which are used to treat abnormally heavy menstrual bleeding. Id. at 1260–61. Csaba Truckai is listed as the inventor of both patents.

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Greer v. United States

Issues

May a circuit court of appeals review matters outside the trial record when applying plain-error review based on an intervening United States Supreme Court decision, Rehaif v. United States?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the proper evidentiary scope of plain-error review under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the bounds of the reviewing court’s discretion to provide the defendant a remedy for such an error. A jury found the petitioner, Gregory Greer, guilty of possessing a firearm as a felon. However, the prosecution did not prove to the jury that Greer knew about his felony status—a fact that the Supreme Court subsequently held is an element that the prosecution must prove. On review, the appellate court found that there was no plain error in Greer’s case because he had stipulated to his felony status before the jury trial. Greer contends that the appellate court could not consider evidence on plain-error review that was not presented to the jury at trial, given the text of Rule 52 and Greer’s constitutional rights to trial by jury and due process. The United States responds that a reviewing court may look to matters outside the trial record in order to determine whether an error at trial meets the requirements that allow the court to exercise its remedial discretion, such as whether the error prejudiced the outcome of the trial or adversely affects the reputation of the judicial proceedings. The outcome of the Supreme Court’s decision will have important implications for matters of fundamental fairness and the balance between judge and jury.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, when applying plain-error review based on an intervening United States Supreme Court decision, Rehaif v. United States, a circuit court of appeals may review matters outside the trial record to determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights or impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial.

In August 2017, police officers engaged Petitioner Gregory Greer in conversation outside of a hotel room in Jacksonville, Florida. United States v. Greer, 798 Fed. Appx. 483, 484–85 (2020). After observing Greer touch the right side of his waistband several times, the officers informed Greer that they would conduct a pat-down search.

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Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System

Issues

Can a defendant in a securities class action rebut the presumption of class-wide reliance recognized in Basic Inc. v. Levinson by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements to show that the statements had no impact on the price of the security; and does a defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption have only a burden of production or also the ultimate burden of persuasion?

This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether a defendant in a securities class action may rebut the Basic presumption by pointing to the generic nature of the misstatements and by showing that those misstatements did not affect the price of the defendant’s securities. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. argues that courts must consider evidence of the generality of alleged misstatements when determining whether to certify a shareholder class in a securities class action suit. Goldman further argues that defendants only bear the burden of producing some proof that their misstatement did not negatively impact the stock price, while plaintiffs bear the burden of persuading the Court that investors relied on the defendant’s alleged misstatements. The Arkansas Teacher Retirement System counters that the lower courts properly weighed the evidence presented at the class certification stage of the litigation, including the generic nature of the misstatements, when it decided to grant certification of plaintiffs’ shareholder class. ATRS also argues that the defendants implicitly bear both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion when rebutting the presumption because they must make a showing that the particular misrepresentation at issue did not affect the stock’s market price. The outcome of this case will have implications on the availability of class-action lawsuits for investors and the risk of class-action litigation for corporate defendants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether during the certification stage of a securities class action, a defendant may rebut the Basic presumption by arguing that the generic nature of the alleged misstatements is evidence that such misstatements did not affect the price of the defendant’s securities, and whether the defendant bears the burden of persuasion when seeking to rebut the Basic presumption.

Between 2006 and 2010, Goldman Sachs (“Goldman”), an investment bank, made public statements regarding its efforts “to address potential conflicts of interest” and its dedication to “complying fully with the letter and spirit” of laws and ethical standards. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. V. Goldman Sachs Grp at 258.

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Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System

Issues

Can a defendant in a securities class action rebut the presumption of class-wide reliance recognized in Basic Inc. v. Levinson by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements to show that the statements had no impact on the price of the security; and does a defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption have only a burden of production or also the ultimate burden of persuasion?

This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether a defendant in a securities class action may rebut the Basic presumption by pointing to the generic nature of the misstatements and by showing that those misstatements did not affect the price of the defendant’s securities. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. argues that courts must consider evidence of the generality of alleged misstatements when determining whether to certify a shareholder class in a securities class action suit. Goldman further argues that defendants only bear the burden of producing some proof that their misstatement did not negatively impact the stock price, while plaintiffs bear the burden of persuading the Court that investors relied on the defendant’s alleged misstatements. The Arkansas Teacher Retirement System counters that the lower courts properly weighed the evidence presented at the class certification stage of the litigation, including the generic nature of the misstatements, when it decided to grant certification of plaintiffs’ shareholder class. ATRS also argues that the defendants implicitly bear both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion when rebutting the presumption because they must make a showing that the particular misrepresentation at issue did not affect the stock’s market price. The outcome of this case will have implications on the availability of class-action lawsuits for investors and the risk of class-action litigation for corporate defendants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether during the certification stage of a securities class action, a defendant may rebut the Basic presumption by arguing that the generic nature of the alleged misstatements is evidence that such misstatements did not affect the price of the defendant’s securities, and whether the defendant bears the burden of persuasion when seeking to rebut the Basic presumption.

Between 2006 and 2010, Goldman Sachs (“Goldman”), an investment bank, made public statements regarding its efforts “to address potential conflicts of interest” and its dedication to “complying fully with the letter and spirit” of laws and ethical standards. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. V. Goldman Sachs Grp at 258.

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National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston

Issues

Do the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s restrictions on “non-cash education-related benefits” for college athletes violate federal antitrust law under the Sherman Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) eligibility rules, which limit student-athletes from receiving compensation in order to preserve “amateurism,” violate federal antitrust law under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act proscribes restrictions on commerce or trade among the several states. The student-athletes assert that the NCAA’s compensation restrictions, under a “rule of reason” standard of federal antitrust law, are unlawful restraints of trade that generate anticompetitive effects. In response, the NCAA argues that the challenged compensation system passes muster under the “rule of reason” standard because it preserves a clear line of demarcation between amateur college sports and professional sports while promoting socially important non-commercial values. This case has implications for intercollegiate athletics, joint ventures, and antitrust law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erroneously held, in conflict with decisions of other circuits and general antitrust principles, that the National Collegiate Athletic Association eligibility rules regarding compensation of student-athletes violate federal antitrust law.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) governs intercollegiate sports by administering rules related to its member schools’ student

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