Gallardo v. Marstiller

Issues

Under the federal Medicaid Act, does a Medicaid program have authority to recover reimbursement for its payment of a beneficiary’s medical expenses by taking funds from a legal recovery which compensates for future medical expenses for that beneficiary?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether, pursuant to the federal Medicaid Act, a state Medicaid program may recover reimbursement for its payment of a beneficiary’s past medical expenses by allocating funds from a portion of the participant’s settlement that compensates for future medical expenses. Florida law requires Medicaid beneficiaries to assign any rights to reimbursement for medical care from third parties to the state. In this case, Gianinna Gallardo contends that a state cannot collect reimbursement for future medical expenses from a Medicaid beneficiary’s settlement against a third party. In response, Simone Marstiller, Secretary of the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration, counters that the state may recover reimbursement for both past and future medical expenses because the Florida statute does not explicitly bar recovery for future medical care. The outcome of this case will affect how the burden of Medicaid costs is allocated between individuals and the state and federal governments.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the federal Medicaid Act provides for a state Medicaid program to recover reimbursement for Medicaid’s payment of a beneficiary’s past medical expenses by taking funds from the portion of the beneficiary’s tort recovery that compensates for future medical expenses.

In 2008, Gianinna Gallardo, a 13-year-old student, was hit by a truck after exiting her school bus. Brief for Petitioner, Gianinna Gallardo, at 16. She sustained severe physical injuries and remains in a continual vegetative state. Id. Since Ms.

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Garland v. Gonzalez

Issues

Are detained noncitizens entitled to bond hearings after six months of detention; and do courts have jurisdiction to grant these detainees classwide injunctive relief?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the due process rights of noncitizens detained within the United States immigration system for over six months. Attorney General Merrick Garland argues that these detainees are not entitled to bond hearings before immigration judges after six months of detention and maintains that courts may not grant them classwide injunctive relief. Class action representative Esteban Aleman Gonzalez counters that the Due Process Clause requires that noncitizen detainees receive bond hearings before immigration judges and asserts that detainees may receive classwide injunctive relief. The outcome of this case will have impacts on the functioning of the federal immigration system as well as the safety of detainees.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether an alien who is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 is entitled by statute, after six months of detention, to a bond hearing at which the government must prove to an immigration judge that the alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) whether, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), the courts below had jurisdiction to grant classwide injunctive relief.

Respondent Esteban Aleman Gonzalez is a class representative for two combined class action suits. See Gonzales v. Barr, at 764. All class representatives are noncitizens who entered the United States due to torture or persecution in their home countries, and then unlawfully re-entered the U.S.

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Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez

Issues

Does an alien have the right to a bond hearing, at which the government must prove that the detainee is dangerous or a flight risk, after being held in custody for six months?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the government must prove to an immigration judge by clear and convincing evidence, that an alien who has been detained for six months is a flight risk or dangerous to the community. In 2018, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents detained Antonio Arteaga-Martinez, a native and citizen of Mexico, who had illegally entered the United States in September 2012. The parties differ on whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231 requires a bond hearing after six months of detention, or whether the Department of Homeland Security needs to prove that an alien is a flight risk or danger to the community. The government, represented by Tae Johnson, maintains that neither are required based on the plain meaning of the statute. Further, Johnson claims that current Immigration and Customs Enforcement policies satisfy due process requirements, citing mechanisms such as required hearings, review processes, and access to attorneys. In response, Arteaga-Martinez argues that a bond hearing is required after six months of detention, and that the Department of Homeland Security must then prove that the immigrant is a flight risk or a danger to the community. Mr. Arteaga-Martinez adds that due process is not met by the government’s scheme. This case has important implications for immigrant rights and the administration of immigration law.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an alien who is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 is entitled by statute, after six months of detention, to a bond hearing at which the government must prove to an immigration judge by clear and convincing evidence that the alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community.

 

Respondent Antonio Arteaga-Martinez (“Arteaga-Martinez”) is a native and citizen of Mexico. Brief for Petitioner, Tae D. Johnson at 6. Arteaga-Martinez entered the United States four times over the past twenty years. Id. He first came to the United States in February 2000, and, after being stopped at the border, voluntarily returned to Mexico. Id.

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National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Issues

Should the Supreme Court grant immediate stay of OSHA's emergency order requiring the employees of all businesses with one hundred or more employees to either be vaccinated or submit to weekly testing?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a stay should be issued against the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (“OSHA”) vaccine-or-testing regime for businesses with 100 or more employees. Petitioner the National Federation of Independent Business argues that the Court should stay the emergency temporary standard because it is likely that the emergency temporary standard at issue exceeds OSHA's authority, and the businesses will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay. In response, Respondent OSHA argues that Congress explicitly authorizes it to address COVID-19 exposure at the workplace; and therefore, an emergency temporary standard is lawful when OSHA determines, based on substantial evidence, that it is necessary to address the immediate risk of COVID-19. The Court’s decision on this case could have significant impacts on the economy, constitutionally protected liberties, and public health.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Supreme Court should issue a stay of OSHA's vaccine-or-testing regime for all businesses with 100 or more employees.

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Biden v. Missouri

Issues

Can the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services continue to temporarily enforce a mandate requiring health care workers at Medicare- and Medicaid-certified facilities to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 notwithstanding a district court injunction prohibiting the rule’s enforcement?

This case asks the Supreme Court to grant a stay of a district court injunction that currently blocks the Biden Administration from enforcing a mandate requiring certain healthcare workers to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19. The Biden Administration argues that the Supreme Court should issue a stay because the mandate is statutorily authorized, and its enforcement is in the public interest. The State of Missouri and nine other states (collectively “Missouri”) counter that the Supreme Court should reject the Biden Administration’s application for a stay and maintain enjoinment of the mandate throughout the pending litigation. The outcome of this case has significant implications for the Biden Administration’s pandemic-related authority and the role that the Supreme Court will play in either upholding or invalidating such authority.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Supreme Court should issue a stay of the injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri blocking a federal rule that requires all health care workers at facilities that participate in Medicare and Medicaid programs to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they are eligible for a medical or religious exemption.  

On November 5, 2021, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (“CMS”), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), promulgated 86 Fed. Reg.

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United States v. Taylor

Issues

Does attempted robbery under the Hobbs Act qualify as a “crime of violence” under a federal law that imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for using a gun during a crime of violence?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether attempted robbery under the Hobbs Act qualifies as a “crime of violence” under a federal statute that imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for using a gun during a crime of violence. The United States argues that the Hobbs Act treats an attempted and a completed robbery no differently for the purposes of determining a crime of violence; moreover, even if the attempted use of physical force does not cover attempted robbery, the threatened use of such force does include attempted Hobbs Act robbery. In response, Justin Taylor argues that an attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence, because it does not require an act that would constitute the attempted use or threatened use of force. The outcome of this case has important implications for consistency in the application of law and proportionality in the sentencing system.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)’s definition of “crime of violence” excludes attempted Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).

In 2003, respondent Justin Taylor (“Taylor”) agreed to sell marijuana to Martin Sylvester (“Sylvester”). United States v. Taylor at 205. He then conspired with an unnamed co-conspirator to steal Sylvester’s money instead. Id.

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CVS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Doe

Issues

Does Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act’s prohibition on discrimination based on disability provide a cause of action for plaintiffs who allege that a neutral policy disproportionately burdened them?

This case would have asked the Court to determine whether Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination based on disability, provides a cause of action for disparate impact claims. Numerous John Does use CVS Pharmacy’s prescription plan for medication to treat HIV/AIDS, which only allows drugs to be dispensed through mail or CVS pharmacies. These John Does sued, arguing that this plan had a disparate impact on individuals living with HIV/AIDS and meaningfully impacted their health. Petitioners CVS Pharmacy et al. contend that claims under Section 504, which is incorporated in Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, require evidence of discriminatory intent or differential treatment. Respondents John Doe, et al., argue that Section 504 provides for disparate impact claims. Although this case will no longer be argued in front of the Court, due to an agreement for dismissal by the parties, the case could have had implications for the administration of health insurance and pharmacy benefits programs, and the risk of litigation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 — and by extension Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which incorporates the “enforcement mechanisms” of other federal antidiscrimination statutes — provides a disparate-impact cause of action for plaintiffs alleging disability discrimination.

Petitioners, CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Caremark L.L.C. and Caremark California Specialty Pharmacy, L.L.C., (collectively “CVS”) are all affiliates of CVS Health Corporation. Doe v. CVS Pharmacy, at 1207. Respondents John Doe et al. (“Does”) are enrolled in CVS’s prescription benefit plan for medication to treat HIV/AIDS.

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Carson v. Makin

Issues

Can a state restrict students’ access to a state-sponsored financial assistance program when the aid would fund attending private religious schools with religious teaching?

This case asks the Supreme Court to balance state public school funding schemes and First Amendment religious freedoms. Maine enacted a law for School Administrative Units without public secondary schools that allows them to provide tuition assistance for students to attend approved, nonsectarian private schools. Carson, Gillis, and Nelson (collectively “Carson”) contend that the nonsectarian requirement constitutes religious discrimination in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Makin, in her official capacity as the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Education, counters that Maine’s public school funding scheme is permissible because its purpose of funding secular public education implicates only religious “use” and not religious “status.” The outcome of this case has heavy implications for religious freedom, state school funding schemes, and accessibility to schooling.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a state violates the religion clauses or equal protection clause of the United States Constitution by prohibiting students participating in an otherwise generally available student-aid program from choosing to use their aid to attend schools that provide religious, or “sectarian,” instruction.

Maine’s constitution mandates the state legislature to require towns to provide “support and maintenance” of public schools at the towns’ own expenses. Carson v. Makin at 25. To do so, the legislature divided the state into 260 school administrative units (“SAUs”) and required that each SAU “make suitable provisions” to maintain and support public schools. Id. Less than half of the SAUs contain a public secondary school. Id.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Nelson Tebbe for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Hughes v. Northwestern University

Issues

Whether allegations that an employer 403(b) retirement plan charged excessive fees when lower cost investment products and services were available are sufficient to bring a claim for a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the standard to bring a claim that applies to a breach of fiduciary duty under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) for allegations of excessive investment fees and recordkeeping fees. April Hughes and other employees at Northwestern University brought suit, claiming Northwestern’s breach of fiduciary duty in ERISA retirement plans, pointing to a large investment option menu and higher-than-average fees. In particular, petitioner April Hughes and others argue that an ERISA’s fiduciary duty of care stems from trust law, and that Northwestern’s imprudent investment and recordkeeping decisions caused excessive fees and breached their duty of care. Respondent Northwestern University answers that context-specific scrutiny is the proper standard for fiduciary duty under ERISA, and that its plan’s cost reflects its prudent investment and recordkeeping decisions. The outcome of this case will impact those people that participate in savings programs that are offered by their employers and the employers themselves, as well the fiduciary duties of said employers, the rights of the beneficiaries, and the available investment options of the beneficiaries. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether allegations that a defined-contribution retirement plan paid or charged its  participants fees that substantially exceeded fees for  alternative available investment products or services are sufficient to state a claim against plan fiduciaries for breach of the duty of prudence under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974?

April Hughes, Laura Divane, and others (collectively referred to as “Hughes”), employees at Northwestern University (“Northwestern”), entered into defined contribution plans, administered and developed by their employer Northwestern, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Divane, et al. v. Northwestern University, et al. at 983.

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Patel v. Garland

Issues

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, when can a federal court review a decision that a noncitizen was not eligible to request relief from removal proceedings?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) allows a federal court to review decisions by an executive agency holding that a noncitizen was not eligible for relief from removal. The Eleventh Circuit claimed judicial review of such decisions was barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and declined to review a Board of Immigration Appeals decision, which held that because Petitioner Pankajkumar Patel (“Patel”) had previously made a false statement to a federal agency, he was not eligible for such relief. Patel appealed, arguing that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) merely bars judicial review of decisions to grant relief, not the prerequisite eligibility decisions. Respondent Attorney General Merrick Garland (“Garland”) interprets the provision to bar judicial review of any discretionary decision, including some eligibility decisions, although he agrees that the Eleventh Circuit erred in holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) prohibits judicial review of Patel’s particular eligibility decision. This case has important implications for the future of immigration law and procedure, the status of noncitizens in the United States, and the jurisdiction of federal courts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) preserves the jurisdiction of federal courts to review a non-discretionary determination that a noncitizen is ineligible for certain types of discretionary relief from removal.

Patel came to the United States from India with his family in 1992. Patel v. Att’y Gen. (“Patel I”) at 1322. Patel entered the country unlawfully in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Under this statute, the government must either admit or parole foreign citizens upon entry.

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