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Rent-A-Center, West v. Jackson

Issues

Can a party be bound by an arbitration clause to arbitrate, rather than litigate, the validity of the arbitration clause?

 

Respondent Antonio Jackson was an employee of Petitioner Rent-A-Center West, Inc. (“RAC”). Jackson sued RAC, alleging racial discrimination. Because Jackson had signed an arbitration clause as part of his employment contract, RAC asked the court to refer the case to arbitration. Jackson, however, argued the employment contract was unconscionable and therefore invalid. The arbitration clause contains a provision that only an arbitrator can decide validity. Jackson argues that a court must decide the validity of the arbitration clause before requiring arbitration. RAC argues that the parties agreed in the contract to submit this question to arbitration. The Ninth Circuit held that, when a party attacks the validity of an arbitration clause because of unconscionability, a court must decide its validity. The Supreme Court’s decision will influence how arbitration clauses will function in the future and the degree of court involvement in arbitration agreements.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Is the district court required in all cases to determine claims that an arbitration agreement subject to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") is unconscionable, even when the parties to the contract have clearly and unmistakably assigned this "gateway" issue to the arbitrator for decision?

Respondent Antonio Jackson was an employee of Petitioner Rent-A-Center West, Inc. (“RAC”). See Jackson v. Rent-A-Center West, Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 2009). While employed by RAC, Jackson was repeatedly passed over for promotion until he complained to his store manager and human resources. See Jackson v.

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Renico v. Lett

Issues

Does a trial court judge’s decision to declare a mistrial after the jury foreman stated that the jurors were not going to be able to reach a unanimous verdict violate double jeopardy?

 

Reginald Lett was convicted of second-degree murder in a Michigan state court in his second trial for the same offense. In his first trial, the judge determined that the jury was deadlocked and declared it a mistrial. Lett then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. His petition was granted. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling on the basis that Lett’s Fifth Amendment right to be free from Double Jeopardy had been violated because the trial court had not used “sound discretion” in finding a “manifest necessity” to declare a mistrial and terminate the ongoing proceedings. This case presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to clearly articulate what state courts must do before declaring a mistrial to avoid running afoul of the Fifth Amendment.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a habeas case, erred in holding that the Michigan Supreme Court failed to apply clearly established Supreme Court precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in denying relief on double jeopardy grounds in the circumstance where the State trial court declared a mistrial after the foreperson said that the jury was not going to be able to reach a verdict.

Reginald Lett was convicted for the shooting death of Adesoji Latona at a liquor store in Detroit, Michigan on August 29, 1996. See Lett v. Renico, 507 F.Supp.2d 777, 779 (E.D. Mich.

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Additional Resources

·      Wex: Habeas Corpus

·      Wex: Double Jeopardy

·      Wex: Fifth Amendment

·      CRS Annotated Constitution: Reprosecution Following Mistrial

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Reichle v. Howards

Issues

1. Whether one may make a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim against one’s arresting officers if there was probable cause for one’s arrest.

2. Whether the court below erred by denying qualified and absolute immunity to Secret Service agents when the arrest they performed did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

 

Respondent Steven Howards criticized and touched Vice President Cheney while the Vice President was on a meet-and-greet at a local shopping center. Petitioners Virgil Reichle and Dan Doyle, two Secret Service Agents, confronted Howards, and subsequently arrested him for assault. However, the state prosecutor dropped the charges against Howards, who then brought a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim against the Agents. The district court denied the Agents’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Agents could not benefit from qualified immunity under the circumstances. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court must now resolve whether one may raise a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim when there was probable cause for one’s arrest. A decision for Howards may deter law enforcement officers from making arrests for fear of retaliatory arrest claims, while a decision for the Agents may enable officers to more easily target and punish speech which they oppose.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether, as the Tenth Circuit siding with the Ninth Circuit held here, the existence of probable cause to make an arrest does not bar a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim; or whether, as the Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held, probable cause bars such a claim, including under Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006).

2. Whether the Tenth Circuit erred by denying qualified and absolute immunity to petitioners where probable cause existed for respondent’s arrest, the arrest comported with the Fourth Amendment, it was not (and is not) clearly established that Hartman does not apply to First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims, and the denial of immunity threatens to interfere with the split-second, life-or-death decisions of Secret Service agents protecting the President and Vice President.

In 2006, Respondent Steven Howards visited the Beaver Creek Mall in Beaver Creek, Colorado to bring his older son to a piano recital. See Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir.

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Rehberg v. Paulk

Issues

Whether a government official who acts as a “complaining witness” in grand jury proceedings is entitled to absolute immunity from a Section 1983 claim after presenting false testimony.

 

Relying on false testimony, three grand juries indicted Petitioner Charles Rehberg for varying charges. After the indictments were dismissed, Rehberg brought a private suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several parties, including Respondent James Paulk, who had testified before all three grand juries. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Paulk, an investigator in the district attorney’s office, was entitled to absolute immunity for his testimony. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether a government official who acts as a “complaining witness” is entitled to absolute immunity under Section 1983. Rehberg argues that complaining witnesses were never given absolute immunity under common law, and that a lesser grant of qualified immunity is more appropriate under the circumstances. Paulk, on the other hand, contends that a decision to withhold absolute immunity will discourage public officials from giving complete and objective testimony before grand juries.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983), this Court held that law enforcement officials enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for perjured testimony that they provide at trial. But in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), this Court held that law enforcement officials are not entitled to absolute immunity when they act as “complaining witnesses” to initiate a criminal prosecution by submitting a legally invalid arrest warrant. The federal courts of appeals have since divided about how Briscoe and Malley apply when government officials act as “complaining witnesses” by testifying before a grand jury or at another judicial proceeding. The question presented in this case is: 

Whether a government official who acts as a “complaining witness” by presenting perjured testimony against an innocent citizen is entitled to absolute immunity from a Section 1983 claim for civil damages.

Petitioner Charles Rehberg sent anonymous faxes parodying and criticizing the Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital in Albany, Georgia, seeking to raise public awareness about the hospital’s unethical billing and accounting practices. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 835 (11th Cir. 2010).

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Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick

Issues

Whether the registration requirement contained in § 411(a) of the Copyright Act is jurisdictional, denying district courts jurisdiction over claims arising from the infringement of unregistered copyrights.

 

Freelance writers, led by Letty Cotton Pogrebin, brought a class action lawsuit against publishers, led by Reed Elsevier, Inc., for copyright infringement, claiming that the publishers electronically reproduced their works without authorization. The majority of the claims in the class related to alleged infringements of unregistered copyrights. With the approval of the District Court, the parties settled the lawsuit. The Second Circuit held, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to certify a class or to approve a settlement with respect to claims arising from unregistered copyrights. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 411(a) will determine whether claims relating to unregistered copyrights can be settled in class actions along with claims arising from registered work. An affirmation of the Second Circuit’s opinion may make settlements more difficult.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts over copyright infringement actions?

Petitioners, Reed Elsevier, Inc., et al. (“Reed Elsevier”), are publishers of electronic content, such as the New York Times Co. and archival database operators, such LexisNexisSee Brief for Petitioners, Reed Elsevier Inc., et al.

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Additional Resources

·      Civil Procedure and Federal Courts Blog, Law Professor Blogs Network: Case of Interest--Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick

·      NY Times: Supreme Court to Revisit a Case on Breach of Copyright

·      Wired: Supreme Court to Hear Freelance Writers' Settlement

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Ransom v. MBNA America Bank, N.A.

Issues

Whether an above-median debtor may claim a vehicle ownership cost deduction for vehicles the debtor owns outright.

 

This case reflects a lack of certainty in the bankruptcy code regarding the proper treatment of the vehicle ownership deduction when calculating an above-median Chapter 13 debtor’s disposable income. Courts are split on whether the deduction can be taken where the debtor owns a vehicle in full and is not responsible for monthly payments on the vehicle. Jason Ransom filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 and claimed a vehicle ownership deduction based on his ownership of an automobile that he owned free and clear. The Ninth Circuit found that the vehicle ownership deduction was not permitted if there was no existing obligation on the vehicle. Ransom argues that the court misinterpreted the statute and failed to recognize that a plain reading of the statute supports the deduction. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify the availability of the vehicle ownership deduction to Chapter 13 debtors who own their vehicles outright.​

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, in calculating the debtor's "projected disposable income" during the plan period, the bankruptcy court may allow an ownership cost deduction for vehicles only if the debtor is actually making payments on the vehicles.

Jason Ransom ("Ransom") is a single man living in Nevada. See Ransom v. MBNA, 577 F.3d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir.

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Additional Resources

· Bankruptcy Case Blog, Tracy Keeton: A Fork in the Road: Courts Split on Transportation Ownership Deductions (Apr. 6, 2010)

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RadLAX Gateway Hotel v. Amalgamated Bank

Issues

Whether a bankrupt debtor under a Chapter 11 plan can sell collateral assets free and clear of liens and at the same time prohibit a secured creditor from using its credit to bid on the assets.

 

RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC and related entities obtained a secured $142 million loan in 2007 to construct the Radisson Hotel at Los Angeles International Airport. Substantially all of RadLAX’s assets were designated as collateral for this loan. However, still saddled with $120 million of debt, RadLAX filed for bankruptcy in August 2009. RadLAX proposed a Chapter 11 reorganization plan that called for an auction sale of all its assets, free and clear of liens. The plan prohibited secured lenders from credit bidding, i.e. using their loan amounts to offset the asset prices at the auction. Amalgamated Bank, representing the lender, objected to the plan, arguing that the plan violatedSection 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court agreed and rejected RadLAX’s plan. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case may affect the balance of power between debtors and secured creditors in bankruptcy proceedings.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a debtor may pursue a Chapter 11 plan that proposes to sell assets free of liens without allowing the secured creditor to credit bid, but instead providing it with the indubitable equivalent of its claim under Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Code.

This case involves the interpretation of Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”). See 11 U.S.C.

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Additional Resources

Bloomberg Businessweek: RadLax, Madoff, AMR, MF Global, Hostess, Ambac: Bankruptcy (Mar. 15, 2012)

HotelNewsNow.com: Hotel Credit Bidding Draws Supreme Court’s Eye (Dec. 22, 2011)

New York Times DealBook: High Court Spotlight on Right to ‘Credit Bid’ (Dec. 14, 2011)

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Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.

 

In the latest Supreme Court case on patent law, LG Electronics, Inc. (LGE) sued Quanta Computers, Inc. (Quanta) for patent infringement. A patent license agreement between LGE and Intel allowed Intel to use LGE's patents but required Intel to notify its customers, including Quanta, that its license did not extend to third-party purchasers' combinations of Intel and non-Intel components. LGE alleges that Quanta infringed LGE's patents by combining Intel and non-Intel components. LGE argued that Intel's sale to Quanta did not exhaust LGE's rights as a patent holder, allowing LGE to sue Quanta. Quanta, however, argued that Intel's authorized sale to Quanta exhausted LGE's patent rights. The Federal Circuit agreed with LGE, holding that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply because the notice provided by Intel to Quanta created a conditional sale, and that sales of patented devices do not exhaust a patent holder's methods claims. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether a patent holder can sue customers who use patented components purchased from licensees. The outcome of this case will clarify the exhaustion doctrine generally and will help define the scope of patent holders' rights, including their ability to collect royalties from and sue downstream users of their patents.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Federal Circuit erred by holding, in conflict with decisions of this Court and other courts of appeals, that respondent's patent rights were not exhausted by its license agreement with Intel Corporation, and Intel's subsequent sale of product under the license to petitioners.

LG Electronics, Inc. (LGE), a Korean company, owns patents that relate to personal computers. See LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir.

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Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services

Issues

Whether Powerex Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of a corporation that is wholly owned by the government of Canada, is an “organ” of Canada and, thus, entitled to the benefits of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), including the right to remove suits brought against them in state court to federal court. Also, whether the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the District Court’s remand order, despite the fact that 28 USC §1447(d) prohibits appellate review of an order remanding a case to the state court from which it is removed.

 

Alleging illegal manipulation of the electricity market, the State of California and individual energy customers (collectively, “California energy customers”), brought suit in California state court against Powerex Corp., a Canadian corporation that is wholly owned by a corporation that is—in turn—wholly owned by the Canadian government. Powerex removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) which gives “organs” of foreign states the right to remove suits brought against them in state court to federal court. The District Court concluded that Powerex did not qualify as an “organ” of a foreign state under FSIA and remanded the case to state court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s determination that Powerex is not an “organ” of a foreign state and thus not entitled to the benefits of the FSIA. In this case, the Supreme Court will likely provide a new test for determining what constitutes an “organ” of a foreign state under the FSIA. The Supreme Court will also decide the threshold question of whether the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the District Court’s remand.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether an entity that is wholly and beneficially owned by a foreign state’s instrumentality, and whose sole purpose is to perform international treaty and trade agreement obligations for the benefit of the foreign state’s citizens, may nonetheless be denied status as an “organ of a foreign state” under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976(FSIA), 28 USC § 1603(b)(2), based on an analysis of sovereignty that ignores the circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation, conduct, and operations on behalf of its government.
  2. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the District Court’s remand order, notwithstanding 28 USC §1447(d).

The Petitioner, Powerex Corp. (“Powerex”), is a Canadian corporation wholly owned by BC Hydro, a Canadian corporation that is wholly owned by the Canadian governmentAmicus Curiae Brief for the United States at 2.

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Pottawattamie County, IA v. McGhee

Issues

Can a prosecutor who knowingly procures false testimony and introduces such testimony at trial be subject to a §1983 civil suit?

 

In 2005, Curtis W. McGhee and Terry J. Harrington, both convicted of murder in 1978, sued Pottawattamie County, Iowa, and former county attorneys Joseph Hrvol and David Richter under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, that the Pottawattamie prosecutors coerced false testimony from third party witnesses and then introduced that testimony in their murder trials. The prosecutors argued that they were immune from the lawsuit based on the doctrine of absolute immunity, but both the district court and the Eighth Circuit disagreed. The Supreme Court’s decision will reveal the extent to which prosecutors are immune from liability for their pre-trial misconduct. This clarification may affect the way prosecutors try cases, and will, undoubtedly, influence the degree to which defendants can hold their prosecutors accountable for due process violations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a prosecutor may be subjected to a civil trial and potential damages for a wrongful conviction and incarceration where the prosecutor allegedly (1) violated a criminal defendant's "substantive due process" rights by procuring false testimony during the criminal investigation, and then (2) introduced that same testimony against the criminal defendant at trial.

In 1978, Petitioners Joseph Hrvol and David Richter obtained convictions and life sentences against Respondents Curtis McGhee and Terry Harrington for the murder of retired police captain John Schweer in Council Bluffs, Iowa the previous year. See McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, 547 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2008).

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