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Solid waste processing has been a contentious issue since the 1980s when local governments were implicated in environmental lawsuits regarding solid waste disposal. Local governments tried to take control of the issue, but found that they faced commerce clause issues when they tried to protect their local facilities by passing ordinances to ensure enough tipping fees through flow control ordinances. This case represents the latest attempt by local governments to protect local waste processing facilities by requiring that local solid waste be directed to the publicly owned facility. In a key case, C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994), the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance similar to the one at issue in this case because it was discriminatory to other waste processing facilities and placed a burden on interstate commerce. In this case, the Second Circuit ruled that because the ordinance at issue favored a public facility rather than a private facility as in Carbone, it passed the discrimination test. The Court also held that it passed a balancing test whereby the court balances the local interest and the burden on interstate commerce. At stake in this case are the local governments' interests in sustaining environmentally sound local processing plants that represent significant sunk cost versus interstate waste hauling and out of state processing plants hoping to sustain their businesses.

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Five railroad employees filed claims through their union, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (“Brotherhood”), contesting disciplinary charges imposed by the Union Pacific Railroad (“Railroad”). The National Railroad Adjustment Board dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the Brotherhood had failed to submit written evidence that the parties had met in conference. The District Court affirmed the Board’s decision. However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in favor of the Brotherhood. The Seventh Circuit found that the due process rights of the Brotherhood were denied, because it was not clear when and how evidence of conferencing should be presented, and dismissal for reasons that were not clear at the time of filing functioned as a denial of its due process rights. The Railroad subsequently appealed this decision to the Supreme Court arguing that because submission of evidence is solely within the arbitrator’s discretion, the Board’s award should be final and binding. In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court’s decision will test the scope of the federal government’s power to review arbitration disputes between private parties. The Court’s decision will also affect future labor disputes and collective bargaining agreements in the railroad industry.

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Following a serious car accident, James McCutchen received $66,866 to pay for his medical expenses from a benefit plan administered by his employer, US Airways. The Plan included a provision requiring beneficiaries to reimburse US Airways for claims “out of any monies recovered from a third party.” After receiving the Plan benefits, McCutchen hired counsel and sued third parties who were involved in accident, recovering a $10,000 settlement from one of the drivers involved in the accident and $100,000 in underinsured motorist coverage. US Airways subsequently sued McCutchen to recover the money they initially paid him by seeking “appropriate equitable relief” under ERISA Section 502(a)(3). US Airways maintains that the term “appropriate” in Section 502(a)(3) refers to the requirement that the type of “equitable relief” a plaintiff seeks be suitable under the circumstances to enforce the terms of the benefit plan and does not allow courts to use equity to rewrite contractual terms. McCutchen argues that courts have the authority to determine what constitutes “appropriate equitable relief” within the meaning of ERISA Section 502(a)(3) and, thus, are not required to enforce express plan terms. Supporters of the lower court’s decision argue that allowing courts to provide equitable relief would increase fairness and encourage beneficiaries to seek recovery from third parties. Opponents counter that affirming the lower court’s decision will increase ERISA litigation and threaten the financial viability of employee health benefit plans.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether class certification or collective action may proceed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) or the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), when liability determinations and damage calculations will turn on statistical analysis that assumes all class members, regardless of actual differences between them, are identical to a statistical average. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Peg Bouaphakeo, et al., No. 14–1146, at i.  The Court will also consider whether Rule 23(b)(3) or the FLSA permits class or collective action when the putative class contains uninjured members without legal rights to damages. See id. Tyson argues that the use of statistical averages masks differences between class members that not only create individual questions of law and fact, but also result in uninjured class members being awarded damages. See Brief for Petitioner, Tyson Foods, Inc. at 18-19. Additionally, Tyson argues that the use of statistical averages also prevents it from raising defenses that it would otherwise be entitled to employ. See id. at 33. But Bouaphakeo claims that Tyson’s failure to keep statutorily required records of the amount of time that employees worked necessitated the use of statistical analysis, and such use was necessary and proper to prove liability and damages through a just and reasonable inference. See Brief for Respondents, Peg Bouaphakeo, et al. at 33-35. Bouaphakeo further contends that uninjured class members were not awarded damages, and that Tyson was not prevented from raising defenses. Id. at 57-60. The Court’s decision may affect litigation costs for businesses, economic growth, and the use of statistical analysis in class action proceedings. See Brief for Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. (“Chamber”), in Support of Petitioner at 20–21, 23; Brief of Amicus Curiae American Independent Business Alliance, in Support of Respondent at 3–6; Brief of Amici Curiae Civil Procedure Professors, in Support of Respondents at 9–11.

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By the beginning of 2008, Michael Turner was six thousand dollars behind in his child support payments. A South Carolina family court eventually ordered Turner to appear to explain his failure to make any payments for the past year and a half. Turner alleged his personal and physical problems rendered him unable to pay. The family court imposed civil contempt sanctions as a result of Turner’s failure to comply with the earlier court order to pay child support. Turner appealed his twelve-month sentence, arguing that because there was a possibility that he would face imprisonment, the court should have provided him with counsel. The Supreme Court’s decision will likely determine whether indigent defendants in civil cases are entitled to representation where there is a possibility of incarceration, although the Court could possibly determine that it does not have jurisdiction to hear the case.

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Travelers Casualty & Surety Company of America (“Travelers”) is appealing a Ninth Circuit decision denying it attorney fees for claims governed entirely by federal bankruptcy law. Travelers maintains that it is entitled to the indemnity rights it negotiated for under its private contract with Pacific Gas and Electric (“Pacific Gas”). Travelers relies on precedent to conclude that the substantive rights under a private contract are governed by state law and therefore the Ninth Circuit decision is wrongly decided and should be reversed. Pacific Gas argues that the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded in prior cases that attorneys’ fees pursuant to a private contract may be granted in cases where the rights are governed by state law, but not when they are peculiar to federal bankruptcy law. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that state law cannot govern federal issues such as indemnity of attorney fees for claims resulting from objections to debt restructuring plans and disclosure statements implemented by a company under Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Ninth Circuit is concerned that a decision in support of non-prevailing creditors whose conditional rights have not been triggered or impaired in cases where the debtor has not defaulted in bankruptcy cases would flood the court dockets with these premature claims. The Supreme Court decision will resolve whether private parties can contract for rights which have not been explicitly granted by federal bankruptcy law. The decision will impact the legal protective strategies that creditors use to shield their investments from debtors who have filed for bankruptcy.

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In 1983, Ulysses Tory retained Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. as his attorney in a personal injury lawsuit. Dissatisfied with Cochran's manner of representation, Tory complained that Cochran was conspiring with the City of Los Angeles against him. Tory threatened Cochran and claimed that he would "settle" his conspiracy claims against Cochran if Cochran quickly paid him $10 million…." Cochran consequently withdrew as Tory's lawyer.  Tory made subsequent requests for money, which Cochran ignored. 

In the 1990's, Tory and a group of people began picketing outside Cochran's office and the Los Angeles Superior Court. Tory had brought the picketers to these locations. In 2000, Tory wrote to Cochran demanding more money.  In October of that year, Cochran filed this lawsuit against Tory and alleged causes of action for defamation and invasion of privacy. A preliminary injunction was granted and the case was tried in March 2002. The trial court held that Cochran was entitled to a permanent injunction.  The permanent injunction forever prohibits Tory from all future speech in any public forum, regardless of content or context, about Cochran, an admitted public figure. Tory appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which ultimately affirmed the permanent injunction decision of the lower court.  Now the United States Supreme Court must decide whether a permanent injunction as a remedy in a defamation action, preventing all future speech about an admitted public figure, violates the First Amendment.

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The Supreme Court will consider whether a state offense that is “described in” a federal criminal statute must meet all elements of the statute, including jurisdictional requirements, to constitute an aggravated felony. See Brief for Petitioner, Jorge Luna Torres at 2. Petitioner Jorge Luna Torres argues that under the plain meaning of the aggravated felony definition, the New York offense of arson is not described in the federal arson offense because it does not satisfy the federal statute’s interstate commerce requirement. See id. But U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch contends that it is reasonable to interpret that a state offense may constitute an aggravated felony under the relevant federal offense, even if the conduct does not meet a jurisdictional element. See Brief for Respondent, Loretta E. Lynch at 17. The Court’s ruling will clarify the definition of “aggravated felony,” and impact the relationship between immigration law and criminal law, particularly with respect to immigrants facing deportation. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. (“NACDL”), in Support of the Petitioner at 1.

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Following an automobile stop in Manhattan, New York police officers ran Petitioner Jose Tolentino’s driver’s license through a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) database, discovering that his driver’s license had been suspended and that he had at least ten suspensions for failure to answer a summons or to pay a fine. Tolentino was indicted by a grand jury for aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. On appeal, Tolentino argues his DMV records must be suppressed because they were the fruit of an unlawful stop. Respondent State of New York argues that, even if the stop was unlawful, the exclusionary rule should not be extended to apply to information the government already possessed, since such an application would be unreasonable. The Supreme Court will have to balance the cost of suppressing highly probative evidence against the potential benefit of discouraging police from conducting random automobile stops without probable cause.

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Sean Carter was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and rape, and was sentenced to death in Ohio. His counsel filed a federal habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and requested a pre-petition competency hearing to determine whether Carter was competent to participate in the federal habeas proceeding. The district court granted both the petition and the request. Two years later, the district court determined that Carter was incompetent and dismissed his petition while also stopping the one-year statute of limitations. When the warden at the facility where Carter is imprisoned challenged the district court's decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that even though the district court was justified in finding Carter incompetent, the proper course of action was to stay, rather than dismiss, the habeas proceedings until Carter was competent. Another warden now argues that a district court does not have the authority to stay federal habeas proceedings, nor does Carter have a right to competence in his own habeas proceedings. How the Supreme Court decides this case will determine the balance between recognizing the finality of state-court criminal judgments and allowing federal courts to use their discretion to implement stays in federal habeas proceedings where a capital prisoner’s competence to assist counsel is questionable.

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