Credit Suisse Securities (USA) v. Billing

Issues

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) heavily regulates public offerings of securities. Does the SEC’s jurisdiction automatically displace the application of antitrust law to these offerings, or does antitrust immunity for an offering of securities only occur when Congress has specifically expressed the intent to exempt a particular practice from antitrust liability?

 

Glen Billing and other investors filed a class action lawsuit against Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd. and other Wall Street investment firms, alleging that the firms violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, by artificially inflating the prices of securities in initial public offerings. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, splitting with other courts, held that since Congress had not specifically immunized this conduct from antitrust liability, the Sherman Act should apply despite the Securities and Exchange Commission’s regulation of this area. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will help resolve whether conduct already heavily regulated by the SEC should be automatically immune from antitrust liability, or whether antitrust immunity should only be granted where Congress has expressed a specific intent to immunize the conduct at issue.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, in a private damages action under the antitrust laws challenging conduct that occurs in a highly regulated securities offering, the standard for implying antitrust immunity is the potential for conflict with the securities laws or, as the Second Circuit held, a specific expression of Congressional intent to immunize such conduct and a showing that the SEC has power to compel the specific practices at issue..

Glen Billing and other investors filed a class action lawsuit against Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd. (“Credit Suisse”) and other Wall Street investment firms. In re Initial Public Offering Antitrust Litigation, 287 F.Supp.2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“In re IPO”). Billing alleged that the firms had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.

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Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds

Issues

Should Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 be construed as a statute of repose, and, if so, is it permissible to toll a statute of repose until the disclosure requirements of Section 16(a) have been met?

 

Vanessa Simmonds brought suit under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in order to recoup profits realized by Credit Suisse and other investment banks in the course of engaging in short swing trading. The defendants engaged in such trading as underwriters during a series of lucrative initial public offerings in the early 2000s. Section 16(b) limits lawsuits to a two-year period following the date on which profits from trading were realized. In this case, Credit Suisse argues that the two-year time limit enunciated in Section 16(b) begins at the time the defendant realized profits, and constitutes a period of repose, which should not be extended under any circumstance. Simmonds argues that the Section 16(b) time limit should be interpreted in context with Section 16(a), which mandates disclosure in SEC filings of private transactions. Simmonds contends that, when read together, sections 16(a) and 16(b) suggest the time limit should toll until the plaintiff learns of the transaction. The Supreme Court's decision will affect the disclosure policies of investment banks and the time period during which directors can be held liable for short-swing purchases and sales.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the two-year time limit for bringing an action under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), is subject to tolling, and, if so, whether tolling continues even after the receipt of actual notice of the facts giving rise to the claim.

In this case, respondent Vanessa Simmonds challenges the conduct of fifty-four underwriters in their activities related to a series of Initial Public Offerings (“IPOs”) of equity securities in the stock market boom of 1998 to 2000. See 

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Additional Resources

Wex: Statute of Repose

Wex: Statute of Limitations

Securities and Exchange Commission: Securities Exchange Act of 1934

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Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville

Issues

Does disclosing sexual harassment for the first time during an employer’s self-initiated internal investigation constitute protected activity under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, such that employees who disclose sexual harassment in this way are protected from being demoted or fired for doing so?

 

Vicky Crawford, a former employee of the Metro School District for Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, brought a Title VII anti-retaliation suit against her employers when she was fired from her job after participating in an internal investigation into sexual harassment rumors. During the investigation, Crawford confirmed the rumors by discussing specific incidents of sexual harassment. Crawford was fired shortly after the investigation was completed. Crawford filed a Title VII anti-retaliation suit, which the trial court dismissed at summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit upheld this decision, ruling that Title VII did not extend to employees who had taken part in an employer’s internal investigations but had not themselves instigated Equal Employment Opportunity Commission claims. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Metropolitan School District claims that a broader reading of the Act would open up employers to countless Title VII claims, which could discourage employers from initiating internal investigations. Crawford contends that declining to extend the provisions of the anti-retaliation clause to employees who merely participate in internal investigations will discourage employees from taking part in such investigations due to the fear of retaliation, which will render such investigations pointless. How the Supreme Court decides the case will determine the scope of Title VII as applied to employee participation in internal investigations as well as what protections Title VII offers to employees and employers alike.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the anti-retaliation provision of section 704(a) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act protect a worker from being dismissed because she cooperated with her employer’s internal investigation of sexual harassment?

In 2002, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) opened an internal investigation into allegations of sexual harassment against Dr. Gene Hughes (“Hughes”), the employee-relations director for the Metro School District. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., 211 Fed. Appx.

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Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville

Issues

Does disclosing sexual harassment for the first time during an employer’s self-initiated internal investigation constitute protected activity under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, such that employees who disclose sexual harassment in this way are protected from being demoted or fired for doing so?

 

Vicky Crawford, a former employee of the Metro School District for Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, brought a Title VII anti-retaliation suit against her employers when she was fired from her job after participating in an internal investigation into sexual harassment rumors. During the investigation, Crawford confirmed the rumors by discussing specific incidents of sexual harassment. Crawford was fired shortly after the investigation was completed. Crawford filed a Title VII anti-retaliation suit, which the trial court dismissed at summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit upheld this decision, ruling that Title VII did not extend to employees who had taken part in an employer’s internal investigations but had not themselves instigated Equal Employment Opportunity Commission claims. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Metropolitan School District claims that a broader reading of the Act would open up employers to countless Title VII claims, which could discourage employers from initiating internal investigations. Crawford contends that declining to extend the provisions of the anti-retaliation clause to employees who merely participate in internal investigations will discourage employees from taking part in such investigations due to the fear of retaliation, which will render such investigations pointless. How the Supreme Court decides the case will determine the scope of Title VII as applied to employee participation in internal investigations as well as what protections Title VII offers to employees and employers alike.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the anti-retaliation provision of section 704(a) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act protect a worker from being dismissed because she cooperated with her employer’s internal investigation of sexual harassment?

In 2002, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) opened an internal investigation into allegations of sexual harassment against Dr. Gene Hughes (“Hughes”), the employee-relations director for the Metro School District. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., 211 Fed. Appx.

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Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A.

Issues

If a United States corporation resold foreign-manufactured goods obtained through a third party importer, may the reselling United States corporation defend on the grounds that the first sale doctrine applies and thus they are not liable for copyright infringement after the first sale of the goods?

 

Costco Wholesale Corporation sold watches manufactured in Switzerland by Omega S.A. without Omega’s prior authorization. Omega sued under the Copyright Act, claiming the sale of the watches was an infringement of their United States copyright. Costco defended on the grounds of the first sale doctrine, which currently provides a defense for reselling goods manufactured in the United States that are resold by retailers or distributors. Costco claims that the doctrine applies to foreign-manufactured goods as well. The district court granted Costco’s motion for summary judgment, but the Ninth Circuit reversed the ruling. The Supreme Court must now decide whether the  first sale  doctrine applies to goods manufactured abroad. The Court’s decision will influence copyright law, property rights, and the ability of retailers to resell goods.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Ninth Circuit correctly held that the first sale doctrine does not apply to imported goods manufactured abroad.

Omega is a corporation that manufactures high-end watches in Switzerland. See Omega v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, 541 F.3d 982, 983 (9th Cir.

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Corley v. United States

Issues

Whether federal law requires that a confession  taken  more than six hours after a defendant's arrest, and before the defendant appears before the magistrate judge, must be suppressed if there was unreasonable delay in bringing the defendant before the judge.

 

When Johnnie Corley was arrested for assaulting an officer and interrogated about the robbery of a credit union, he did not confess to a role in the robbery until more than six hours after his arrest. Moreover, Corley did not appear before a magistrate judge until the next day. After the District Court found Corley guilty, the Third Circuit affirmed. Corley is now appealing to the Supreme Court of the United States. His case will determine whether, if there was unreasonable delay in bringing a suspect before a magistrate judge, the suspect's confession is still valid. The Supreme Court's decision will affect suspects' rights and the procedure that police must follow during a confession.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3501 - read together with Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 5(a), McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) - requires that a confession taken more than six hours after arrest and before presentment be suppressed if there was unreasonable or unnecessary delay in bringing the defendant before the magistrate judge.

    Federal law enforcement officials identified Johnnie Corley as one of three men who robbed the Norsco Federal Credit Union in Norristown, Pennsylvania, on June 16, 2003. See U.S. v. Corley, 500 F.3d 210, 212 (3d Cir.

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    Connick v. Thompson

    Issues

    Is a single failure by prosecutors to provide exculpatory evidence to a defendant sufficient to establish failure-to-train liability against a District Attorney’s office?

     

    John Thompson was wrongfully imprisoned for 18 years following a trial during which the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence, in violation of Brady v. Maryland. Thompson brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the district attorney's office is liable for failing to properly train its employees on the requirements of Brady. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found in favor of assigning liability to the district attorney's office. Petitioners, including District Attorney Harry Connick, appealed to the Supreme Court. Connick claims that there was no obvious need to train prosecutors regarding Brady standards and that liability should not attach to the office when there was no notice that the training program needed reform. Respondent Thompson contends that the prosecutors’ lack of training amounted to a deliberate indifference to preserving constitutional rights and that liability may properly attach to the district attorney's office without a past history of violations. This decision will determine the extent to which a municipality may be liable for a single action by one of its employees.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Does imposing failure-to-train liability on a district attorney's office for a single Brady violation contravene the rigorous culpability and causation standards of Canton and Bryan County?

    In April 1985, shortly before his murder trial, a Louisiana state court convicted Respondent John Thompson of attempted armed robbery. See Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293, 296 (5th Cir. 2009). Several weeks later in May 1985, the same court convicted Thompson of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. See Thompson v. Connick, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29717 at *2 (E.D. La.

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    Additional Resources

    · Wex: Brady Rule

    · Law.com, Tony Mauro: Clement Lines Up Ex-Prosecutors, Seeks Argument Time in Misconduct Case (Aug. 25, 2010)

    · New Orleans Times-Picayune, Katy Reckdahl: Appeals Court Upholds $14 Million Judgment Against Orleans DA Office (Dec. 20, 2008)

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    Conkright v. Frommert

    Issues

    Whether a district court must defer to an ERISA plan administrator’s proposed remedy for an ERISA violation, where the violation resulted from a prior interpretation by the plan administrator.

     

    Courts generally give deference to discretionary decisions made by ERISA pension plan administrators. This case will test the limits of that deference and will decide if a court is obligated to defer to a plan administrator’s proposed remedy for an ERISA violation, when the cause of the violation itself was the administrator’s prior interpretation. Petitioners and their amici argue that allowing judges to involve themselves in ERISA pension plan determinations without deferring to decisions made by the plan administrator will increase the costs and uncertainty of maintaining pension plans. Respondents and their amici, on the other hand, argue that deferring repeatedly to a plan administrator will increase costs through more and prolonged litigation, and will be unfair to plan participants who justifiably rely on promised benefits to plan for retirement.

    ​

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    1. Whether the Second Circuit erred in holding, in conflict with decisions of thisCourt and other Circuits, that a district court has no obligation to defer to an ERISA plan administrator's reasonable interpretation of the terms of the plan if the planadministrator arrived at its interpretation outside the context of an administrativeclaim for benefits.

    2. Whether the Second Circuit erred in holding, in conflict with decisions of other Circuits, that a district court has "allowable discretion" to adopt any "reasonable"interpretation of the terms of an ERISA plan when the plan interpretation issue arises in the course of calculating additional benefits due under the plan as a result of an ERISA violation.

     

    The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C.

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    Additional Resources

    •       FindLaw: Pension Plans and ERISA

    •       United States Department of Labor: ERISA

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    Cone v. Bell

    Issues

    Whether the procedural bar prevents federal habeas courts from reviewing habeas petitions that state courts dismissed based on state procedural rules against re-litigating fully adjudicated claims, and whether federal courts can review state application of such rules.

     

    Gary Cone was convicted and sentenced to death in the Criminal Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, for the murder of two people. Subsequent to Cone’s direct appeal, the state made available documents that both supported Cone’s defense that he was a drug addict at the time of the killings and impeached the testimonies of several witnesses. Respondent Bell argues for the state that Cone is procedurally barred from raising his grounds for relief in a federal habeas corpus review, as state courts already rejected it and Cone failed to properly argue it in the state courts. Petitioner Cone, however, argues that there should not be a procedural bar in this case because he did not receive the new information until his second request for post-conviction review, so the courts erroneously found that his claim had been previously decided. He also argues that it is the federal court’s duty in federal habeas review to examine grounds for relief based on federal law.  The Supreme Court’s decision in this case could implicate the methods by which individuals convicted in state court can litigate their claims, both in state courts and upon federal habeas corpus review. Additionally, the Court’s decision could clarify the roles of state and federal courts in an area of law with implications for the federalist structure.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    The question presented is whether petitioner is entitled to federal habeas review of his claim that the State suppressed material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, which encompasses two sub-questions:
    1. Is a federal habeas claim “procedurally defaulted” because it has been presented twice to the state courts?
    2. Is a federal habeas court powerless to recognize that a state court erred in holding that state law precludes reviewing a claim?

    In 1982, Gary Bradford Cone, a Vietnam veteran, was found guilty and sentenced to death in a Tennessee criminal court for the murder of two elderly people during the commission of a robbery. See Cone v. Bell, 492 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir.

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