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In 1997 and 1998, the Oneidas re-purchased title to parcels of aboriginal land within Sherrill, New York, in open market transactions. Sherrill subsequently assessed property taxes, which the Oneidas ignored, asserting that the properties are contained within the Oneida Indian Reservation and therefore are considered to be "Indian Country", which is nontaxable by state municipalities. Sherrill sent the Oneidas notices of tax delinquency, held a tax sale where Sherrill repurchased the parcels, then initiated eviction proceedings. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York found in favor of the Oneidas. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court and also found that the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek, 7 Stat. 550, did not require the Oneidas to abandon their lands in the state of New York in exchange for land in Kansas, and further, that a reservation continues to exist even if a tribe ceases to exist and is protected under the Non-Intercourse Act. The Supreme Court must now assess the Second Circuit Court's interpretations.

This case consists of four separate questions, which ultimately address whether properties reacquired by the Oneida Indian Nation of New York are subject to taxation by the City of Sherrill, New York and Madison County, New York.

1. Whether alleged reservation land is Indian Country pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and this Court's decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) where the land was neither set aside by the federal government nor superintended by the federal government?

2. Whether alleged reservation land was set aside by the federal government for purposes of Indian Country analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't where the alleged reservation was established by the State of New York in the 1788 Treaty of Fort Schuyler, and not by any federal treaty, action or enactment?

3. Whether the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek, which required the New York Oneidas to permanently abandon their lands in New York, resulted in the disestablishment of the Oneida's alleged New York reservation?

4. Whether alleged reservation land may (i) remain Indian Country or (ii) be subject to the protections of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, or Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, if the tribe claiming reservation status and Non-Intercourse Act protection ceases to exist?

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Officer Jeff Quon, a City of Ontario, California SWAT team member, was given a pager by his Department for communication. Although Quon was told that the pager communications were not private, a supervisor allowed Quon to use the pager for personal use so long as Quon reimbursed the department for overage charges, which Quon did. After determining the current payment system was not efficient, the Department ordered a review of the content of the text messages, ostensibly for the purpose of determining how many of the text messages were for business purposes. The search revealed Quon had sent personal messages to friends, as well as sexually explicit texts to both his wife and mistress. Quon sued the City of Ontario for violating his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Ontario, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted summary judgment in favor of Quon. The Ninth Circuit found the search to be unreasonable in light of Quon’s legitimate expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court will address a government worker’s Fourth Amendment rights, while also potentially addressing the Constitutional protection afforded to newer forms of communication, such as text messages.

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A boom in wireless communications has prompted the building of more facilities for wireless services. While necessary to manage the growing demand for wireless services, these facilities can be unpopular neighbors in a community. Although the Communications Act requires a local government to respond within a reasonable time period to requests for building these facilities, the law does not specify what exactly is a reasonable time period. In 2008, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") set timeframes on zoning authorities for processing requests to build wireless facilities. The Petitioner Cities of Arlington, Texas, and New Orleans, Louisiana, challenged the FCC’s timeframes by arguing that the FCC overstepped its power under the Communications Act. When the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the FCC acted within its power, Arlington and New Orleans challenged that the Fifth Circuit improperly submitted its own judgment to that of the FCC on the question of the FCC’s scope of authority. Arguing to uphold the decision of the Fifth Circuit, Respondent FCC contends that Congress intended to empower the FCC to interpret the Communications Act in all its provisions. Differing from the FCC, Respondent Cellco (a partnership of four corporations) argues that although Congress did not empower the FCC to determine the limits of its own authority, the Fifth Circuit was right to defer to the FCC on these timeframes in particular. If the U.S. Supreme Court holds for Arlington and New Orleans, the uniformity in timely construction of wireless facilities may suffer. However, a holding for the FCC may allow the FCC and other agencies to expand their own powers at the expense of local governments. Further, if the U.S. Supreme Court holds for Cellco and the FCC, local governments may lose the flexibility and power to respond to local concerns. 

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Prior to the 2008 primary elections, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation dedicated to educating the American public about their rights and the government, produced a politically conservative ninety-minute documentary entitled Hillary: The Movie ("The Movie"). This documentary covers Hillary Clinton's record while in the Senate, the White House as First Lady, and during her bid for the presidential  Democratic nominee, and contains express opinions about whether she would be a good choice for President. However, The Movie falls within the definition of "electioneering communications" under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA")-a federal enactment designed to prevent "big money" from unfairly influencing federal  elections-which , among other things, prohibits corporate financing of "electioneering communications" and imposes mandatory disclosure and disclaimer requirements on such communications. The District Court for the District of Columbia denied Citizens United's motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") from enforcing these provisions of the BCRA against Citizens United. The questions the Supreme Court will have to decide are (1) whether BCRA's disclosure requirements imposed on "electioneering communications" are to be upheld against all as-applied challenges' (2) whether BCRA's disclosure requirements are overly burdensome and fail a strict scrutiny test  as-applied  to The Movie; (3) whether The Movie is a "clear plea for action to vote," subjecting it to the "electioneering communications" corporate prohibition; and (4) whether The Movie constitutes an advertisement, making it subject to the BCRA's disclosure and disclaimer regulations.

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CIGNA Corporation changed its employee retirement plan from a traditional defined benefits plan to a cash balance plan. Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), companies that change their retirement plan must release a summary plan description (“SPD”) that outlines the changes for employees in a manner that the average employee can understand. CIGNA released an SPD that described the change but did not mention a “wear-away” period during which the enrolled employees would continue earning credits under the plan while their minimum benefit would remain the same for a period of time. The Respondents, current and former CIGNA employees, sued in federal court, alleging that the inconsistency between the SPD and the actual benefit plan violated ERISA. The district court found for the plaintiffs, using a standard of “likely harm” to determine whether the employees were harmed by the inconsistency between the SPD and the original plan, and the Second Circuit affirmed. CIGNA appealed, arguing that a showing of “detrimental reliance” on the part of the employees is required before they can receive a remedy. The Court’s decision will likely affect the contents of SPDs and the availability of pension benefit plan class actions.

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The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”) requires employers to pay employees one-and-a-half times their normal wages for any time worked over forty hours in a given week, but exempts “outside salesmen” from this overtime pay requirement. Respondent GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) refused to pay overtime to petitioners Michael Christopher and Frank Buchanan, whom it employed as pharmaceutical sales representatives, because it considered them to be “outside salesmen.” Christopher and Buchanan sued, arguing that they were not “outside salesmen” under the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation. The Supreme Court will determine whether that interpretation is entitled to deference and whether Christopher and Buchanan are subject to the FLSA’s outside salesman exemption.

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The Hastings Christian Legal Society (“CLS”) required that members agree with its core religious beliefs and pledge to live accordingly. Due to this requirement, the University of California-Hastings College of Law refused to recognize CLS as a registered student organization. Specifically, CLS’s membership requirement violated a nondiscrimination policy prohibiting registered student organizations from discriminating on the basis of religion or sexual orientation. CLS argued that Hastings violated its First Amendment right to free association and free exercise of religion by denying it an exemption from the nondiscrimination policy. The Ninth Circuit rejected CLS’s claims, holding that the school’s policy was viewpoint-neutral and reasonable in light of the school’s educational mission. The Supreme Court’s decision will settle a circuit split over whether a public school can require a religious student organization to open its membership to all students, regardless of their beliefs

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This case raises important issues regarding the nature of the federal government's contractual obligations, particularly in the context of ongoing relations with the Native American nations. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split between the between the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals over whether Indian tribes were contractually or statutorily entitled to recover administrative costs incurred while performing self-determination contracts under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act ("ISDA"). The Court must decide whether the government is obligated to fully fund programs based on contracts with the tribes, whether there are any limits to what the government is required to provide under these arrangements, and whether the government possessed the funding to cover the administrative costs of these programs.

In 1975, Congress passed the ISDA to promote tribal autonomy and self-governance by allowing Indian tribes to manage programs and services that benefit Indian tribes but which had previously been administered by the federal government. Congress believed that transferring control of these programs would help tribes develop leadership skills crucial to the realization of self-government. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 450. The ISDA requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secretary") to enter into contracts with any tribe that requests control of a federally-funded service program. Tribes that enter into such "self-determination contracts" must receive the same amount of federal funding that the Secretary would have been provided ("the secretarial amount") to operate the program. Tribes then manage, on behalf of themselves, these programs which the Secretary would otherwise manage on their behalf.

By 1987, many tribes had implemented ISDA programs for education, health, and job training. Unfortunately, government funding was sometimes insufficient to cover the full cost of the programs; while funding levels comprehended direct program costs, additional administrative costs that the Secretary had not previously incurred were not included in the funds distributed to the tribes. In an effort to rectify this problem, Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1988, which required the Secretary to provide contract support costs ("CSC") for the full administrative costs incurred by the tribes. However, these funds are "subject to the availability of appropriations," ("the Appropriations Clause") and "the Secretary is not required to reduce funding for programs, projects, or activities serving a tribe to make funds available to another tribe or tribal organization." 25 U.S.C § 450j-1(b). In addition to the availability clause in 25 U.S.C § 450j-1(b), Congress tried to contain cost escalation by passing the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999 Pub.L. No. 105-277, § 314, (1998), which imposed a mandatory cap on the total amount of CSC funding for new and expanded self-determination programs.

In resolving the circuit split over whether the Indian tribes were entitled to recover costs incurred in performing self-determination contracts under ISDA, the Court will examine the appropriations clause of the ISDA as well as the 1998 Omnibus Act to determine the limits of the government's obligations to fund administrative costs. If the Court agrees with the Tenth Circuit and rules that the government incurs no liability because Congress limited the amount of money available to the tribes for administrative costs, the ruling may discourage Indian tribes from entering into self-determination contracts, thus defeating one of the primary policy objectives of the ISDA. Such a ruling may have a chilling effect and discourage future private parties from contracting with the government, fearing that the government might abuse its power and retroactively limit the funds available to pay the contract. However, if the Court agrees with the Federal District, Congress's ability to limit cost overruns and instill financial discipline could be severely curtailed. In the long run, this may discourage Congress from relinquishing control of programs and services traditionally managed by the federal government.

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James McCoy alleges that Chase Bank (“Chase”) retroactively increased his credit card interest rate, without notice, in violation of the Truth in Lending Act’s Regulation Z. The Regulation has since been revised to require notice in this particular situation. McCoy argues that the plain language of Regulation Z mandated that he receive notice prior to an increase of his interest rate. Chase argues that the bank provided adequate notice. In support of its argument, Chase cites unofficial commentary promulgated by Federal Reserve Board, the agency which implements the Truth in Lending Act. The Supreme Court’s ruling will clarify the level of notice required prior to raising interest rates, and will provide advice on what sources may be used in interpreting complex statutes.

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The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724, 725 (7th Cir. 2007) held that failure to report to a penal institution constitutes a violent crime under the Armed Career Criminals Act. Petitioner Deondery Chambers pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 188 months in jail under the Armed Career Criminals Act because of his prior conviction for failing to report on schedule to a penal institution. Without the additional punishment mandated by the Armed Career Criminals Act, Chambers’ sentencing range would have been 130 to 162 months. The U.S. Supreme Court considers in this case whether or not a defendant’s failure to report for confinement involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another such that it constitutes a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminals Act.

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