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The issue in the case is whether 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) provides a freestanding exception to attachment immunity or only eliminates Bancec’s presumption of separate status for a foreign state and its instrumentalities, without altering the criteria for overcoming immunity contained in other provisions of § 1610. Section 1610(g) is part of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, under which foreign sovereigns are presumed immune from suits and attachment. Jenny Rubin, a U.S. citizen injured in a Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem, argues that § 1610(g) provides a freestanding exception to attachment immunity because an interpretation subjecting § 1610(g) to the other provisions of § 1610 creates unresolvable inconsistencies within the statute and significantly limits the reach of subsection (g). Iran counters that § 1610(g) does not provide a freestanding exception to attachment immunity because subsection (g) can still be given its intended effect even when subjecting it to § 1610’s other provisions. Iran further argues that the clearest interpretation of subsection (g) is that it merely eliminates the Bancec presumption. From a policy perspective, this case is significant because it could improve the ability of terror victim judgment-creditors to collect judgments from a terror-sponsoring sovereign that is refusing to pay, and it will affect uniformity between U.S. and many other nations regarding attachment immunity laws.

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The Court will decide whether § 3702(1) of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”), which prohibits state authorization of sports gambling, is a lawful preemption of New Jersey’s 2014 law repealing previous state bans on sports gambling or is a violation of the Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering doctrine. The issue was originally presented when the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) sued New Jersey claiming PASPA preempted a 2012 New Jersey law which legalized and regulated sports gambling. There, the Third Circuit held that PASPA did not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine because it did not require states to act. In response, New Jersey enacted a 2014 law which repealed existing state-law bans of sports gambling. The NCAA once again filed suit and the case once again rose through the Third Circuit. Christie claims PASPA’s prohibition of authorization of sports gambling violates the anti-commandeering doctrine because requiring states to maintain prohibitions is just as harmful to federalism as is requiring states to act. The NCAA contends that PASPA is a lawful preemption of state law, and even if § 3702(1)’s prohibition of authorization is unlawful, the rest of PASPA’s provisions should remain in effect. The Court’s decision will determine the scope of the Tenth Amendment and could have significant consequences for the legality of sports gambling nationwide.

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In 2011, Petitioner Timothy Carpenter was arrested on suspicion of participating in a string of armed robberies in and around Detroit. In the course of the investigation, FBI agents acquired transactional records from Carpenter’s cell phone carrier. The government sought this data pursuant to the Stored Communications Act, which allows law enforcement to obtain communications records by demonstrating “specific and articulable facts” that the records are relevant to an ongoing investigation, rather than probable cause that a crime has been committed. The trial court denied Carpenter’s motion to suppress the records, and a jury convicted him of firearms violations and violations of the Hobbs Act. On appeal, Carpenter maintained that the acquisition of his cellular data without a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights, but the Sixth Circuit held that such a seizure did not constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. Carpenter now challenges this classification of cell site data, arguing that the seizure of such data does constitute a search, and that the data is distinct from phone and bank records, which have not been afforded Fourth Amendment protection. This case could have significant consequences for the government’s ability to collect data that reveals a cell phone user’s location.  

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This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether the anti-retaliation provision of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”) provides protection for individuals who report fraud or corporate misconduct internally and not to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Although the statutory definition of “whistleblower,” as well as previous SEC interpretation of the statute, indicate that an individual must report misconduct to the SEC to reap the benefits of the anti-retaliation provision, the SEC has recently changed its interpretation. Under its new interpretation, the SEC has found that even those who only report to internal senior management have a right to these protections. Digital Realty Trust, Inc. (“DRT”) argues that the SEC’s interpretation is at odds with the clear meaning of the Dodd-Frank Act’s provisions and was not issued in a procedurally valid manner. Paul Somers, a former employee of DRT, counters that the term “whistleblower” in the Dodd-Frank Act is ambiguous and that the SEC’s interpretation is reasonable and valid. With this decision, the Supreme Court will determine the statutory rights of securities violation whistleblowers and what procedures whistleblowers must use when reporting in order to invoke the anti-retaliation protections prescribed by the Dodd-Frank Act.

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The Supreme Court will determine whether state courts can hear claims filed solely under the Securities Act of 1933 as “covered class actions.” The case arises out of a decrease in Cyan, Inc.’s stock prices, which led investors, including the Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, to sue as a class in state court for alleged disclosure violations. Cyan argues that California state courts could not hear this case, because the Securities Act’s legislative history and existing regulatory structure suggests that Congress intended for all class actions filed under the Securities Act to be tried in federal courts. Beaver, on the other hand, claims that Congress intended to give state and federal courts concurrent jurisdiction—i.e., both state and federal courts can hear this case. The stakes of the case are also in dispute: organizations supporting Cyan claim that a Beaver victory would promote inconsistent Securities Act decisions in federal and state courts, encourage forum shopping, and harm the capital markets. Beaver’s supporters disagree, asserting that the effects of a decision in its favor would be minimal.

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This case arises from a suit in which ComplementSoft claimed SAS Institute infringed its patent and SAS responded by petitioning the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) for a determination on the validity of ComplementSoft’s patent. SAS argues that, based on a straightforward reading of 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and the legislative history of the America Invents Act (“the Act”), the PTAB must issue a final written decision on each of the petitioner’s claims. Relying on the same methods of analysis, ComplementSoft reaches the opposite conclusion, arguing that the PTAB must be allowed discretion to select specific claims for review. The Director of the Patent and Trademark Office, which sits above the PTAB, also asserts that the PTAB must have discretion in selecting claims for review. Accordingly, the Court’s decision will affect the efficiency of the PTAB’s review proceedings and impact how parties petition the PTAB.

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The Supreme Court will decide whether inter partes review— a proceeding used by the Patent Trial and Appeals Board to reexamine the validity of existing patents—is constitutional. Oil States Energy Services, the patent owner, argues that inter partes review is unconstitutional because patents are private property rights that have historically been reviewable by courts. Oil States Energy Services further contends that patent rights can be eliminated only by an Article III court with a jury. In contrast, Greene’s Energy Group, the alleged patent infringer, counters that patents are public rights or “revocable privileges” and thus, Congress may assign an administrative agency to decide disputes involving patents. Furthermore, Greene’s Energy Group claims that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial does not apply to administrative proceedings, and that even if it did, there is no jury trial right for equitable claims, such as revocation of patent rights. The Supreme Court’s decision may either reinforce the administrative state and the ability of non-Article III tribunals to adjudicate certain claims, or instead, curtail the administrative state and instill trust in district courts to determine patent validity. 

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The Supreme Court will decide whether a statute directing the federal courts to promptly dismiss a pending lawsuit, without amending the underlying law on which the lawsuit was brought, violates the Constitution’s separation of powers principles. Petitioner David Patchak argues that the Gun Lake Act, which removes subject-matter jurisdiction from any federal court to hear his case, is unconstitutional because it determines the outcome of pending litigation without changing the substantive law on which his lawsuit was first brought, specifically sovereign immunity law. Patchak believes that the statute grants the Legislature too much power over judicial matters. Respondents the Secretary of the Interior, et al. and the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians (the “Gun Lake Tribe”) argue that, because the statute merely dictates the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, it is well within Congress’ constitutional powers. The Secretary and the Gun Lake Tribe maintain that if statutes like the Gun Lake Act are unconstitutional, the Judiciary will have too much power because courts will be able to determine their own jurisdiction, limited only by their own discretion. This case will provide clarity on the line of cases regarding Congress’ ability to affect pending litigation and govern the specificity with which Congress will need to draft jurisdictional statutes in the future.         

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The Supreme Court will decide whether transactions conducted through entities named in 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) are protected from avoidance in bankruptcy. Petitioner Merit Management Group, LP (“Merit”) claims that Respondent FTI Consulting, Inc. (“FTI”) may not avoid the transfer because the transfers to and from Citizens Bank are protected under the safe harbor provision of § 546(e), which precludes avoidance involving certain financial institutions and markets. Respondent FTI says that Merit is wrongly applying § 546(e) to the component transfers, and that the only relevant transfer is the overall transfer, which is not protected by the safe harbor provision. If the Supreme Court allows protections that would enable creditors to undo payouts, the resulting uncertainties may lead to market destabilization; conversely, the removal of such protections may enable the exploitation of intermediaries as a channel for prohibited transactions. 

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Carlos Manuel Ayestas brought a state habeas petition after he was sentenced to death in Texas for murder. After the state denied his petition in 2008, Ayestas petitioned for federal habeas relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Ayestas requested funding for “investigative, expert, or other services” under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f) to help support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Ayestas’s claim and denied his § 3599(f) motion, finding that he had not demonstrated a “substantial need” for investigative assistance. Ayestas now challenges this substantial need test on appeal, arguing that it is inconsistent with the text, history, and purpose of § 3599(f). The Director of the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Lorie Davis, on the other hand, argues the test is proper in light of the requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. This case will allow the court to determine the appropriate statutory interpretation of § 3599(f), as well as its applicability to federal habeas proceedings. The case could have significant consequences for the resources available to capital defendants bringing ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

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