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Under what is known as the class-of-one theory, an individual plaintiff can bring an Equal Protection claim against a state actor for "irrational and wholly arbitrary treatment." The person is a "class-of-one" when she alleges that the government is subjecting only her to differing and unique treatment compared to others similarly situated. This differs from a traditional Equal Protection claim, in which a person alleges discriminatory acts by the government against an entire group of people treated differently because of a protected characteristic like race. Anup Engquist brought such a claim against her employer, the Oregon Department of Agriculture, alleging that it arbitrarily failed to promote her to a position for which she was qualified, allowed a supervisor with whom she had an acrimonious relationship to harass and degrade her, and eventually laid her off. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in overturning the District Court that found in her favor on the Equal Protection claim, held that the class-of-one theory is inapplicable to decisions made by state employers with regard to their employment decisions. Engquist has appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that there is no basis in the Equal Protection Clause for a limitation on class-of-one claims in the employment context. The Oregon Department of Agriculture and the Ninth Circuit assert that class-of-one cases are appropriate when the government is acting as regulator, but not as employer.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether automotive “service advisors” qualify for the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (“FLSA”) mandatory overtime pay requirements. Encino Motorcars, LLC, a Mercedes-Benz dealership in California, contends that these employees are primarily “servicem[e]n . . . engaged in . . . servicing automobiles” and thus they are clearly captured within the law’s exceptions. Similarly, Encino argues that even if the statute is sufficiently ambiguous on the matter, the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the statute is unreasonable and unentitled to judicial deference. Hector Navarro and other employees assert that construing the statute’s exception to include service advisors would violate the text, spirit, and purpose of the FLSA. Relatedly, they maintain that the Department’s interpretation is entirely reasonable and thereby warrants deference from the Court. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case could affect the terms of employment between America’s 45,000 service advisors and their employers. 

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This case derives from a reimbursement action brought by Empire HealthChoice Assurance, a private healthcare provider, against a federal employee who received health care benefits under the terms of a contract brought into being by the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act. The District and Circuit courts held that federal law did not govern the action, and that the action should have been raised under state contract law in state court. The Supreme Court must now decide whether the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act creates a federal common law basis for Empire’s claim, and thus whether the federal courts have jurisdiction over cases brought to enforce provisions of contracts created under the Act.

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Elmer and Dorothy Cullers created the EC Term of Years Trust (“the Trust”) to reduce the impact of federal taxes on their estate. When the IRS claimed the Cullers had transferred property to the Trust to avoid paying taxes, the Trust opened a bank account to pay the back-taxes. The IRS levied on the account.  Afterwards , the Trust sought to recover the funds under 26 U.S.C. § 7426 (wrongful levy statute) and 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (tax refund statute). At  issue in this case  is whether 26 U.S.C. § 7426, with its shorter statute of limitations, is the exclusive remedy for wrongful levy actions by third parties, or whether third parties may alternatively seek relief under the more general tax refund provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1346, which has a longer statute of limitations. The Court’s  decision in this case  will determine whether wrongful levy claimants will have this longer statutory period during which to bring suit against the U.S. The Court’s decision will also implicitly give weight to particular methods of statutory interpretation and ways of determining congressional intent.

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In 2003, a jury found that eBay, an online auction website, was violating various patents owned by MercExchange. The district court nevertheless refused to issue a permanent injunction that would have barred eBay from continuing to use the patented methods. The Federal Circuit of Appeals granted the injunction against eBay and held that permanent injunctions were the “general rule” in patent infringement cases. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a patentee has an automatic right to a permanent injunction after a finding of infringement. If the Court upholds the “near-automatic injunction rule,” then patent holders will have a powerful remedy that can give them tremendous leverage in litigation. However, upholding the rule may also make it easier for “patent trolls” to continue benefiting from genuine innovators. If the Court instead finds that patent holders do not automatically have the right to an injunction, infringers will be able to continue using the patented product, thereby subverting the purposes of patent law. Not granting automatic injunctions may also encourage more patent infringement. How the Supreme Court decides the case will depend on its interpretation of important precedents and how it weighs these important social implications.

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In 2003, the Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania fired its police chief, Charles J. Guarnieri, Jr. Guarnieri filed a grievance leading to arbitration and his reinstatement. When Guarnieri returned to his position, Duryea issued him a number of directives limiting the tasks he could and could not do  on  the job. Guarnieri filed a second grievance, leading to modification of the directives. Subsequently, Guarnieri sued Duryea in District Court alleging that Duryea issued the directives in retaliation for his filing of the 2003 grievance, violating his First Amendment right to petition. After a jury found for Guarnieri in District Court, Duryea appealed to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit held that the First Amendment protects public employees in filing grievances concerning any matter, even those of a personal nature. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether public employees may sue their employers for  retaliation,  when the alleged retaliation is for the filing of grievances based on private matters rather than issues of public concern.

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Dura Pharmaceuticals is a publicly traded company that developed and marketed prescription pharmaceuticals for the treatment of allergies and asthma. Investor plaintiffs brought a class action securities fraud action against Dura under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, alleging that Dura knowingly misrepresented the success of the clinical trials for one of their asthma products, transferred the losses incurred from product development to subsidiary corporations in order to perpetuate the perception of high earnings for the parent company, and made repeated public statements regarding the success of its drug sales when sales were actually declining. The plaintiffs also claimed that Dura executives sold approximately $400 million of their personally-held Dura stock, actions which raise suspicions of insider trading.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the pleading requirements of §10(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that the lower court misinterpreted the loss causation element of §10(b) and that the lower court should have considered the plaintiffs' allegations collectively in order to determine whether the pleading requirements had been met. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to provide a clear standard on these two pleading requirement issues.

The Supreme Court will now resolve the question of whether or not plaintiff investors met the pleading requirements to bring a cause of action for federal securities fraud under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act against Dura Pharmaceuticals.

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In a November 2000 bench trial, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois convicted Lawrence Owens of first-degree murder. See Owens v. Duncan, 781 F.3d 360, 361 (7th Cir. 2015). In the trial judge’s verdict, the judge referenced facts not presented as evidence during the trial. See id. at 363-64. The facts related to Owens’ motive for committing the crime, which is not an element of the offense under Illinois law. The Illinois State Appellate court affirmed the trial court’s verdict. The court found the trial judge’s comments “baseless” but harmless error because the prosecution presented sufficient eyewitness testimony to convict. See id. at 361-62.  Fifteen years later, the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted Owens habeas corpus relief on the grounds that his due process rights were violated. See id. at 364-65. The Seventh Circuit found that the trial court unconstitutionally convicted based on  facts  not in evidence. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) precluded the Seventh Circuit from granting habeas relief. See Brief for Petitioner, Stephen Duncan, Warden at i, 2. The AEDPA enables federal courts to hear habeas proceedings in which defendants allege that states violated their constitutional rights. However, section 2254(d) provides that courts cannot hear habeas proceedings unless the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” Representing the state of Illinois, Stephen Duncan, warden of the Lawrence Correctional Center in Sumner, IL, contends that there was no clearly established federal law to apply to Owens’ case. See id. at i, 16, 18, 24. But Owens argues that the Seventh Circuit accurately identified his constitutional right to be convicted based only on evidence presented at trial. See Brief for Respondent, Lawrence Owens at 25. The Court’s decision will affect the balance of power between state and federal courts, and the finality and validity of state court convictions. See Brief of Washington et al., in Support of Petitioner at 3, 5.

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A series of reforms passed by the California Assembly in 2008 and 2009 reduced the state’s payments made to California Medicaid providers. Respondents Independent Living Center of Southern California, the California Pharmacists Association, and Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, claiming that the payment reductions violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A), which requires that state Medicaid plans comply with federal law or lose federal funding. Petitioner Toby Douglas, the Director of the Department of Health Care Services for the State of California, argues that health care providers cannot sue to enforce § 30(A) because the statute does not grant any enforceable rights, and Congress did not intend for private parties to sue to enforce the statute. Conversely, the health care providers argue that the Supremacy Clause permits private parties to sue if they have suffered an injury from state action, and they assert that Congress did not explicitly disallow private lawsuits in § 30(A). The Supreme Court’s decision will affect the predictability of federal law, the ability of private parties to bring lawsuits to enforce federal law, and the availability of health care to Medicaid beneficiaries.

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On August 3, 2010, President Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”), which reduced the disparity between the amounts of crack and powder cocaine required to trigger certain minimum mandatory sentences under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Petitioners Edward Dorsey and Corey Hill were both arrested for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute prior to the FSA’s passage, but were both sentenced after the FSA was enacted. Under the pre-FSA guidelines, they received ten-year prison sentences, but under the new FSA guidelines, both would have received substantially shorter prison sentences. Dorsey, Hill, and the United States government all argue that Congress intended for the FSA to apply immediately, and therefore, all prisoners sentenced after August 3, 2010, including Dorsey and Hill, should have been sentenced according to the FSA. Miguel Estrada, a court-appointed amicus curiae writing in support of the judgments below, argues that nothing indicates that Congress intended for immediate effectiveness and that the federal Saving Statute prevents retroactive application of new statutes that would eliminate previously incurred penalties. The decision in these cases will have implications for the consistent application of the FSA to prisoners falling within this particular sentencing window, as well as potential social costs and burdens on the justice system.

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