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In 2003, the Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania fired its police chief, Charles J. Guarnieri, Jr. Guarnieri filed a grievance leading to arbitration and his reinstatement. When Guarnieri returned to his position, Duryea issued him a number of directives limiting the tasks he could and could not do  on  the job. Guarnieri filed a second grievance, leading to modification of the directives. Subsequently, Guarnieri sued Duryea in District Court alleging that Duryea issued the directives in retaliation for his filing of the 2003 grievance, violating his First Amendment right to petition. After a jury found for Guarnieri in District Court, Duryea appealed to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit held that the First Amendment protects public employees in filing grievances concerning any matter, even those of a personal nature. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether public employees may sue their employers for  retaliation,  when the alleged retaliation is for the filing of grievances based on private matters rather than issues of public concern.

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Dura Pharmaceuticals is a publicly traded company that developed and marketed prescription pharmaceuticals for the treatment of allergies and asthma. Investor plaintiffs brought a class action securities fraud action against Dura under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, alleging that Dura knowingly misrepresented the success of the clinical trials for one of their asthma products, transferred the losses incurred from product development to subsidiary corporations in order to perpetuate the perception of high earnings for the parent company, and made repeated public statements regarding the success of its drug sales when sales were actually declining. The plaintiffs also claimed that Dura executives sold approximately $400 million of their personally-held Dura stock, actions which raise suspicions of insider trading.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the pleading requirements of §10(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that the lower court misinterpreted the loss causation element of §10(b) and that the lower court should have considered the plaintiffs' allegations collectively in order to determine whether the pleading requirements had been met. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to provide a clear standard on these two pleading requirement issues.

The Supreme Court will now resolve the question of whether or not plaintiff investors met the pleading requirements to bring a cause of action for federal securities fraud under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act against Dura Pharmaceuticals.

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In a November 2000 bench trial, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois convicted Lawrence Owens of first-degree murder. See Owens v. Duncan, 781 F.3d 360, 361 (7th Cir. 2015). In the trial judge’s verdict, the judge referenced facts not presented as evidence during the trial. See id. at 363-64. The facts related to Owens’ motive for committing the crime, which is not an element of the offense under Illinois law. The Illinois State Appellate court affirmed the trial court’s verdict. The court found the trial judge’s comments “baseless” but harmless error because the prosecution presented sufficient eyewitness testimony to convict. See id. at 361-62.  Fifteen years later, the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted Owens habeas corpus relief on the grounds that his due process rights were violated. See id. at 364-65. The Seventh Circuit found that the trial court unconstitutionally convicted based on  facts  not in evidence. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) precluded the Seventh Circuit from granting habeas relief. See Brief for Petitioner, Stephen Duncan, Warden at i, 2. The AEDPA enables federal courts to hear habeas proceedings in which defendants allege that states violated their constitutional rights. However, section 2254(d) provides that courts cannot hear habeas proceedings unless the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” Representing the state of Illinois, Stephen Duncan, warden of the Lawrence Correctional Center in Sumner, IL, contends that there was no clearly established federal law to apply to Owens’ case. See id. at i, 16, 18, 24. But Owens argues that the Seventh Circuit accurately identified his constitutional right to be convicted based only on evidence presented at trial. See Brief for Respondent, Lawrence Owens at 25. The Court’s decision will affect the balance of power between state and federal courts, and the finality and validity of state court convictions. See Brief of Washington et al., in Support of Petitioner at 3, 5.

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A series of reforms passed by the California Assembly in 2008 and 2009 reduced the state’s payments made to California Medicaid providers. Respondents Independent Living Center of Southern California, the California Pharmacists Association, and Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, claiming that the payment reductions violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A), which requires that state Medicaid plans comply with federal law or lose federal funding. Petitioner Toby Douglas, the Director of the Department of Health Care Services for the State of California, argues that health care providers cannot sue to enforce § 30(A) because the statute does not grant any enforceable rights, and Congress did not intend for private parties to sue to enforce the statute. Conversely, the health care providers argue that the Supremacy Clause permits private parties to sue if they have suffered an injury from state action, and they assert that Congress did not explicitly disallow private lawsuits in § 30(A). The Supreme Court’s decision will affect the predictability of federal law, the ability of private parties to bring lawsuits to enforce federal law, and the availability of health care to Medicaid beneficiaries.

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On August 3, 2010, President Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”), which reduced the disparity between the amounts of crack and powder cocaine required to trigger certain minimum mandatory sentences under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Petitioners Edward Dorsey and Corey Hill were both arrested for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute prior to the FSA’s passage, but were both sentenced after the FSA was enacted. Under the pre-FSA guidelines, they received ten-year prison sentences, but under the new FSA guidelines, both would have received substantially shorter prison sentences. Dorsey, Hill, and the United States government all argue that Congress intended for the FSA to apply immediately, and therefore, all prisoners sentenced after August 3, 2010, including Dorsey and Hill, should have been sentenced according to the FSA. Miguel Estrada, a court-appointed amicus curiae writing in support of the judgments below, argues that nothing indicates that Congress intended for immediate effectiveness and that the federal Saving Statute prevents retroactive application of new statutes that would eliminate previously incurred penalties. The decision in these cases will have implications for the consistent application of the FSA to prisoners falling within this particular sentencing window, as well as potential social costs and burdens on the justice system.

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JWM Investments, Inc., a company wholly owned by Respondent John McDonald, entered into a contract with Petitioner Domino’s Pizza under which it the parties agreed that JVM would build and lease to Domino’s four restaurant buildings.  After the relationship began to sour, McDonald, an African-American, demanded that Domino's perform their end of the bargain. Another petitioner Deborah Pear Phillips, employee of Domino's, refused to sign contractually required "estoppel certificates," and the general counsel for Domino's said that it would perform the contracts only if McDonald would agree to amend them, which he refused to do. McDonald claimed that Petitioners' decision to breach the contracts was motivated by racial discrimination and sued under 42 U.S.C § 1981, which protects the right to make and enforce contracts. Petitioners argue that McDonald does not have standing to sue because he was not personally a party to the contract. The Supreme Court will thus decide whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981 creates a cause of action in one who is not a party to a contract, but who sustained personal injuries as a result of a breach of that contract, where the breach was motivated by racial discrimination against him.

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The Supreme Court’s  ruling in this case  may impact the scope of tribal sovereignty and the economic relationships between tribes and nonmembers. Dollar General argues that Indian tribal courts should not be permitted to decide tort claims involving non-tribal members, while the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians argues that Indian tribal courts should be permitted to decide civil tort claims. See Brief for Petitioner at 44; Brief for Respondent at 25. The parties support their arguments with divergent applications of the exceptions set forth in Montana v. United States. See Brief for Petitioner at 48; Brief for Respondent at 19, 22, 27, 49. The Court, when deciding which application of Montana is proper, will consider whether any type of consent existed between the parties, whether allowing the tribal court to hear tort claims will over-broaden the Montana category exception, and whether the tribe’s inherent sovereign authority permits tribal courts to decide tort claims. See Brief for Petitioner at 48, 49, 55; Brief for Respondent at 19–23, 25, 27, 49. 

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Petitioner Barbara Dolan sustained serious injuries when she tripped over a stack of letters, packages, and other mail that an employee of the United States Postal Service left on her porch. She sued the United States Postal Service and the United States in federal court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that the United States Postal Service employee's negligence that led to her fall made them responsible for her injuries. The district court dismissed Dolan's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and found that the "negligent transmission" exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act barred claims for physical injury, as well as those for damaged or delayed mail. In granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court must determine the scope of the statutory exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, and whether it truly extends to "any claim" arising out of negligent transmission, including those for physical injury to individuals, or whether it is limited to claims for damaged mail.

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In 2007 petitioner, Brian Russell  Dolan,  pled guilty to assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico sentenced Dolan to 21 months in prison. At sentencing, the district court recognized that restitution was required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, but declined to issue a specific restitution order without first receiving more information regarding payments owed. Two hundred and nine days after sentencing, the district court issued a restitution order requiring Dolan to pay $104,649.78. Dolan, claiming that 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) precludes ordering restitution more than 90 days after sentencing, argued that the district court lacked the authority to order restitution. The United States, on the other hand, insists that a district court’s failure to meet the 90-day deadline does not extinguish its authority to order restitution. Both the district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected Dolan’s claim, holding instead that district courts retain permanent authority to impose restitution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether a district court may enter a restitution order beyond the time limit prescribed in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5).

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The dispute in this case centers on Washington's Public Records Act ("PRA"), which requires state and local governments to make public the identities of referendum petition signers. Petition signers challenged the constitutionality of this disclosure, but the Ninth Circuit held that disclosure of petition signers’ identities serves an important government interest and promotes government accountability. Specifically, petitioners, John Doe #1, et al. ("Doe #1"), argue that petition signing is core political speech and, therefore, is subject to First Amendment protections. Respondents, Washington Secretary of State Sam Reed, et al. ("Reed"), contend that petition signing, especially the signing of referendum petitions, is not political speech. Rather, Reed asserts that signing a referendum is a legislative act and a "quintessentially public" exercise. Thus, in Doe #1 v. Reed the Supreme Court must decide 1) whether petition signers’ First Amendment rights to privacy in political speech, association, and belief requires strict scrutiny when a state compels public release of identifying information and 2) whether compelled disclosure of petition signers’ identities is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.

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