Uruguay passed a comprehensive law to protect the rights of transgender persons (Law No. 19684. 2018 of October 26, 2018). The purpose of this law is to ensure the right of transgender individuals in Uruguay to a life free of discrimination and stigmatization, for which comprehensive mechanisms, measures and policies for prevention, care, protection, promotion and reparations are established (Article 3 of Law No. 19684).
In 2013, Uruguay passed a law on equal marriage (Law No. 19075 of August 5, 2013), making it the second Latin American country to do so, after Argentina. The law provides that in all regulations governing the institution of marriage, or related to it where differential references are made based on sex, married couples must be understood as spouses or marital partners or others of a similar nature that do not alter the substantive content of the regulation and that do not distinguish based on the sex of the person (Article 28 of Law No. 19075).
Uruguay passed a comprehensive law on gender violence in 2017 (Law No. 19580 of December 22, 2017, as implemented by Decree No. 339/019 of November 11, 2019). The law is intended to guarantee the right of women to enjoy a life free of gender-based violence (Article 1 of Law No. 19580). The law applies to women of all ages, including trans women, women of different socioeconomic statuses, races, and religions, without distinction or discrimination (Article 1 of Law No. 19580).
Uruguay decriminalized abortion in 2012 pursuant to Law No. 18987 of October 22, 2012, as implemented by Decree No. 375/012 of November 22, 2012. This law made abortion legal during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy (Article 4 of Decree No. 375/012), subject to certain exceptions. For example, if the pregnancy is the result of rape, this time limit is extended to 14 weeks. Furthermore, this law makes clear that abortion is permitted at any time if (i) the pregnancy poses a serious risk to a woman’s health or life (Article 16 of Decree No.
May a party challenge a state subpoena in federal court on First Amendment grounds without first being compelled to comply with the subpoena in state court?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide if a party subject to a state investigatory subpoena may seek relief in federal court without first being held in contempt in state court for refusing to comply with the subpoena. In his capacity as the Attorney General of New Jersey, Respondent Matthew Platkin issued a subpoena to Petitioner First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. (“First Choice”), requesting that it turn over donor information. The subpoena was issued in relation to Platkin’s investigation of alleged deceptive and fraudulent practices by First Choice in its solicitation of donations and administration of reproductive healthcare. First Choice argues that a federal forum should be available to hear its claims because the organization and donors are both suffering injuries-in-fact from the chilling of their First Amendment rights. Platkin argues that First Choice’s alleged injury is too speculative to constitute an injury-in-fact that would allow for Article III jurisdiction. This case has significant policy implications for the First Amendment rights and safety of organizations and their donors who are targets of state subpoenas and who seek federal relief from state investigations.
Whether, when the subject of a state investigatory demand has established a reasonably objective chill of its First Amendment rights, a federal court in a first-filed action is deprived of jurisdiction because those rights must be adjudicated in state court.
Federal and state governments have the power to issue subpoenas to procure information related to an alleged wrongdoing. Brief for Respondent, Matthew Platkin at 3. In New Jersey, if someone fails to comply with a subpoena sent by the Attorney General, the Attorney Ge
Given the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, are claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 barred where a plaintiff who has already been punished under a law challenged as unconstitutional seeks purely prospective relief? Are such claims barred even where the plaintiff never had access to federal habeas relief?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide the parameters for plaintiffs to seek relief for laws challenged as unconstitutional under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Petitioner Gabriel Olivier argues that the Fifth Circuit improperly applied Heck v. Humphrey to his case because he is not seeking to disturb his previous conviction under the ordinance he is challenging; rather, he is seeking to prevent future prosecution, which aligns with how the court has previously interpreted § 1983. Olivier also contends that because he was never in custody, he is not foreclosed from seeking relief under § 1983, unlike individuals in custody who must instead seek federal habeas relief. Respondents, the City of Brandon, Mississippi et al., (“the City”) counter that Heck bars § 1983 relief where civil lawsuit success would shorten the length of criminal punishment or imply the conviction is substantively invalid, which applies to Olivier’s challenge, since he attacked both his punishment and conviction. The City also maintains that Olivier’s eligibility for § 1983 relief does not depend on whether he has access to federal habeas relief. This outcome of this case will have significant ramifications for access to judicial review and state sovereignty.
(1) Whether this court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey bars claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking purely prospective relief where the plaintiff has been punished before under the law challenged as unconstitutional; and (2) whether Heck v. Humphrey bars Section 1983 claims by plaintiffs even where they never had access to federal habeas relief.
This case concerns the intersection between claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and federal habeas corpus. See Olivier v.
Can a service provider be held liable for materially contributing to copyright infringement if it has mere knowledge of another’s direct infringement, and does that mere knowledge suffice to find willfulness under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)?
This case asks whether a service provider can be held liable for materially contributing to copyright infringement if it has mere knowledge of another’s direct infringement, and whether such knowledge alone makes infringement willful under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Cox contends that providing technology at arm’s length is not a material contribution and that its response to customer infringement was not willful unless it knew its own conduct was infringing. Sony argues that supplying a product to known infringers qualifies as a material contribution and that awareness of facilitating illegal activity meets the willfulness standard of § 504(c). The outcome of this case has implications for consumer fairness and innovation incentives.
(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit erred in holding that a service provider can be held liable for "materially contributing" to copyright infringement merely because it knew that people were using certain accounts to infringe and did not terminate access, without proof that the service provider affirmatively fostered infringement or otherwise intended to promote it; and (2) whether the 4th Circuit erred in holding that mere knowledge of another's direct infringement suffices to find willfulness under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
Copyright owners, under the Copyright Act, have the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, perform, display, or prepare derivative works based upon their copyrighted works. Sony Music Entertainment v.
If the Board of Immigration Appeals concludes that undisputed facts do not constitute “persecution,” does a federal court of appeals have to defer to that judgment?
This case involves a decision made by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), determining that certain facts did not amount to persecution. Petitioners Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana and his family contend that whether the undisputed facts meet the legal threshold of persecution is primarily a legal question, and so federal courts must apply de novo review. Respondent Attorney General Pamela Bondi counters that whether an asylum seeker has met their burden of proving persecution is a fact-intensive inquiry, and substantial-evidence review should apply. The outcome of this case could impact the consistency of asylum petitions moving forward, the efficiency of judicial review in asylum cases, and may implicate further understanding of Loper Bright.
Whether a federal court of appeals must defer to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ judgment that a given set of undisputed facts does not demonstrate mistreatment severe enough to constitute “persecution” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
Petitioners are Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, his wife, and their minor child. Urias-Orellana v. Garland at 1. Urias-Orellana and his family are citizens of El Salvador.
Article 364.1 of the Cuban Penal Code imposes a prison sentence of four to ten years to those who induce, cooperate, or promote prostitution or sexual commerce, own, manage, operate, or finance establishments where prostitution takes place, or derive benefits from such activities. The penalties increase to eight to twenty years if threats, coercion, abuse of authority are used, or if the victim is under the care of the offender, among other aggravating circumstances.
Article 388 of the Penal Code of Cuba addresses the issue of discrimination and imposes severe penalties on those who engage in discriminatory acts or incite discrimination.
