Law No. 6570 modifies Article 9 of Paraguay’s Labor Code and prohibits workplace discrimination on the basis of sex, among other criteria.
Law No. 5422 (2015) amending Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, and 13 of Law No. 45/1991 establishing the binding divorce of marriage, is the most recent legislation on divorce in Paraguay. This law expands upon the enumerated causes for divorce in Article 4 of Law No. 45. The most notable addition to the list is recognition that the commission of any criminal act against one’s spouse or children is a cause for divorce. This law also removes the requirement established in Law No.
Law No. 45 established binding divorce proceedings in Paraguay by modifying the country’s Civil Code, which previously did not allow for divorce. Article 1 requires a judicial decision to finalize a divorce and, under Article 4, the spouses must allege one of the enumerated causes for divorce. However, the causes for divorce listed in Article 4 have since been modified by Law No.
Law No. 6202 (2018) adopting standards for the prevention of sexual abuse and the comprehensive care of children and adolescent victims of sexual abuse, addresses the sexual abuse and rape of children and adolescents, specifically measures for prevention and victim care. It provides that the government shall create and distribute programs to support victims of sexual abuse and to prevent and eradicate such abuse.
Law No. 3440 (2008) amends various provisions of Law No. 1160/1997, Penal Code, and, among other criminal acts, imposes penalties for rape and abortion.
When the government takes and sells a delinquent taxpayer’s property that is worth more than what the taxpayer owes, does the delinquent taxpayer get reimbursed according to the fair market value of the property, or according to what the government actually sold it for?
This case asks how delinquent taxpayers should be compensated when their forcefully forfeited property is worth more than their underlying tax debt, and that forfeited property is auctioned off in a foreclosure proceeding. Petitioner Pung argues that he is entitled to compensation according to the true market value of the property because not doing so would be a taking without just compensation. Respondent Isabella County argues that the actual sale price is the correct benchmark, and any loss sustained by the delinquent taxpayer is within the bounds of the Fifth Amendment. Pung further argues that the government returning the difference between the unpaid tax and the actual sale price, rather than the fair market value of the property, to delinquent taxpayers is an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Isabella County counters that this case does not involve a fine, so Eighth Amendment protections against excessive fines do not apply. This case touches on important questions regarding economic consequences of tax delinquency and the impact of foreclosures on communities.
1. Whether, after foreclosing on and selling a property to collect delinquent taxes, the government provides just compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause when it pays the former property owner the difference between the property’s auction sale price and the tax debt, even though it is significantly less than the fair market value of the property.
2. Whether a government violates the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause when it forecloses on real property worth more than needed to satisfy a tax debt and pays the former property owner only the difference between the property’s auction sale price and the tax debt.
Michigan’s General Property Tax Act (“GPTA”) empowers local governments to levy property taxes, as well as allow exemptions to those taxes. MICH. COMP.
Must a plaintiff bringing a claim under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act prove that the defendant trafficked in property confiscated by the Cuban government in which the plaintiff holds a claim, or instead in property the plaintiff would have owned at the time of trafficking had no expropriation occurred?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (“the Act”), passed to compensate United States nationals for property seized by the Cuban Regime, provides a private cause of action only for property interests held at the time the Act was passed. Petitioner Havana Docks Corporation, whose facilities were confiscated by the Cuban government in 1960, argues that limiting the cause of action to present-day interests violates the original objectives of the Act. Although its ownership would have expired in 2004, Havana Docks asserts that it retains a continuing property interest according to the Act. Respondent cruise lines, including Royal Caribbean Cruises, contend that the Act only protects specific types of property interests and that they did not “traffic” in Havana Docks’ property according to the statute’s definition. The outcome of the case has implications for United States foreign policy goals in Cuba as well as U.S. nationals’ ability to receive compensation for past confiscations by the Cuban government.
Whether a plaintiff under Title III of the LIBERTAD Act must prove that the defendant trafficked in property confiscated by the Cuban government as to which the plaintiff owns a claim, or instead that the defendant trafficked in property that the plaintiff would have continued to own at the time of trafficking in a counterfactual world “as if there had been no expropriation.”
In 1905, the Cuban government granted a company, Compañia del Puerto, a concession—an agreement to build and operate a pier at Havana’s port at its own expense. Havana Docks Corp. v.
Can Title III of the Helms-Burton Act alone allow U.S-based plaintiffs to sue Cuban instrumentalities, such as Cuban state-owned oil companies, which would normally be given sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?
This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether Title III of the Helms-Burton Act alone abrogates Cuban instrumentalities’ sovereign immunity, or whether plaintiffs must also show an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). The FSIA states that foreign states and their instrumentalities are immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, except for actions based on commercial activity causing a direct effect in the United States or expropriation, which applies when rights to property taken in violation of international law are at issue. Petitioner, Exxon Mobil Corporation (“Exxon”) argues that Title III of the Helms-Burton Act satisfies the clear-statement rule that Congress requires to abrogate foreign sovereign immunity under FSIA. Respondents, Corporación CIMEX and related corporations (collectively “CIMEX”) posit that Congress did not create a clear exception to FISA and that Title III suits must fit within the existing exceptions in FISA that allow for suits against countries or instrumentalities that typically enjoy sovereign immunity. This case touches on the interpretation of Congress’s intent in enacting the Helms-Burton Act and the balancing of interests between recognition of sovereign states and fairness in outcomes.
Whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, or whether parties proceeding under that act must also satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
Before Fidel Castro rose to power, Exxon Mobile Corporation (“Exxon”), then known as Standard Oil, owned multiple subsidiaries in Cuba. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
● Amy Howe, Court Asks for Government’s Views in Decades-Old Exxon Dispute with Cuba, SCOTUSBlog (May 5, 2025).
● Walter Liu, A 60-Year Grievance: Exxon Takes on Sovereign Immunity; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, Harvard Undergraduate Law Review (October 8, 2025).
● Walter Spak, Cuban Immunity Crisis: How Sovereign Immunity Impacts Enforcing the Helms-Burton Act Against Business Ventures in Cuba, American University Business Law Review (2023).
Can a federal district court use its equitable powers to set aside the thirty-day time limit in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for defendants removing a case to federal court?
This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a federal district court can set aside the thirty-day time limit in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for removing a case from state court to federal court. Enbridge Energy, LP, Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., and Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. (“Enbridge”) contend that the law is non-jurisdictional, and therefore, courts may set the time limit aside. Additionally, Enbridge argues that when the statute was enacted, Congress did not rebut the general presumption in favor of equitable tolling. The Attorney General of Michigan (“the Attorney General”) asserts that the time limit is mandatory. The Attorney General further argues that Congress did rebut the presumption of equitable tolling through the law’s text, the broader statutory scheme, and legislative history. This case directly impacts fairness to litigants across the United States as well as institutional stability in foreign affairs.
Whether district courts have the authority to excuse the thirty-day procedural time limit for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).
In Association pour le Progrès et la Défense des Droits des Femmes Maliennes (APDF) and Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) v. Republic of Mali, the African Court examined whether Mali’s 2011 Persons and Family Code was compatible with the state’s binding obligations under African and international human rights law relating to the protection of women and children.
