Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B establishes the comprehensive civil rights statutory infrastructure prohibiting sex and gender based discrimination across employment, labor organizations, housing, credit, and related economic relationships, and provides enforcement through the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). Section 4
Article I of the original 1780 Massachusetts Declaration of Rights stated that all men are born free and equal and possess natural, essential, and unalienable rights to life, liberty, property, and happiness.
May a state prevent transgender girls who have not undergone male puberty from participating in girls’ sports?
This case asks the Court to decide whether states may prevent transgender girls from participating in girls’ sports. West Virginia argues that its statute does not violate Title IX because it makes no distinction on the basis of gender identity and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it passes intermediate scrutiny based on the state’s interest in competitive fairness. B.P.J. argues that the statute violates Title IX by discriminating against transgender girls and violates the Equal Protection Clause because the statute is not substantially related to the state’s goal of competitive fairness. This case raises significant concerns about fairness within women’s sports and the safety of transgender and cisgender athletes.
(1) Whether Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prevents a state from consistently designating girls' and boys' sports teams based on biological sex determined at birth; and (2) whether the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment prevents a state from offering separate boys' and girls' sports teams based on biological sex determined at birth.
In April 2021, West Virginia passed H.B. 3293 (the “Act”), a statute preventing students who were biologically male at birth from participating in contact or competitive sports designated for female students. W. VA.
Do laws that limit participation in women’s and girls’ sports to biological females violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether laws that limit participation in women’s and girls’ sports to biological females violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Petitioner Bradley Little, the Governor of Idaho, argues that the prohibition on males participating in women’s sports does not violate equal protection because it is substantially related to the important state interest of promoting women’s equality in athletics. Respondent Lindsay Hecox counters that the prohibition violates equal protection by discriminating against a quasi-suspect classification of transgender people. Moreover, Hecox argues the prohibition is not substantially related to the government’s interest in fair athletic competitions. The outcome of this case will have significant ramifications for participation in women’s sports and the ongoing interpretation of gender discrimination law.
Whether laws that seek to protect women's and girls' sports by limiting participation to women and girls based on sex violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.
In March 2020, Idaho categorically banned transgender women’s and girls’ participation in women’s student athletics with the enactment of the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act (“FWSA”). Hecox v.
Is the New Jersey Transit Corporation, as an arm of the State of New Jersey, entitled to interstate sovereign immunity, thereby barring out-of-state negligence claims against it?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation (“NJ Transit”) is an arm of the State of New Jersey entitled to interstate sovereign immunity. Cedric Galette initiated a negligence lawsuit against NJ Transit under Pennsylvania law. NJ Transit filed a motion to dismiss the suit based on interstate sovereign immunity, a common law doctrine under which a sovereign cannot be sued without its consent. Galette argues that although the Legislature of the State of New Jersey (“the State”) established the entity as an “instrumentality” of the State, NJ Transit’s structure, as well as the lack of direct state liability for its adverse judgements, demonstrate it is not an arm of the State for sovereign immunity purposes. NJ Transit counters that NJ Transit was created as an arm of New Jersey entitled to sovereign immunity, emphasizing statutory language calling it an instrumentality of the State, its governmental powers, essential public function, gubernatorial control, and dependence on state funding. The outcome of this case will impact federalism and state sovereignty as well as economic consequences for state-affiliated commercial entities.
Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation is an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes.
On August 9, 2018, Cedric Galette was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Julie McCrey. Galette v. NJ Transit and Julie E. McCrey at 2. While the vehicle was stopped on a street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, it was struck by a New Jersey Transit vehicle, causing physical injuries to Galette.
Where a federal contractor attempts to remove a case to federal court under the federal-officer removal statute, what is the correct standard for determining whether removal is proper where the activity giving rise to the lawsuit is not expressly the subject of the government contract on which removal is based?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide how the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which allows federal officers and persons “acting under an officer” to remove lawsuits from state to federal courts, applies to federal contractors after a 2011 amendment. In this case, it specifically asks whether three gas and oil’s companies’ production of crude oil sufficiently relates to their contracts to furnish refined aviation gasoline for the federal government during World War II. Chevron, one of the companies involved in this suit, argues that the federal-officer removal statute applies broadly to defendants requesting removal and that wartime oil refining was inherently related to its production of crude oil at the time. Plaquemines Parish, one of multiple jurisdictions that sued the companies for environmental damage, counters that, because Chevron’s refining contracts with the federal government did not address crude production, that production does not sufficiently “relate to” the refining, as required by the 2011 amendment. This case raises significant issues regarding the scope of federal contractors’ ability to litigate in federal forums, the willingness of companies to contract with the federal government, and the effectiveness of congressional amendments over established federal caselaw.
(1) Whether a causal-nexus or contractual-direction test survives the 2011 amendment to the federal-officer removal statute, which provides federal jurisdiction over civil actions against “any person acting under [an] officer” of the United States “for or relating to any act under color of such office”; and (2) whether a federal contractor can remove to federal court when sued for oil-production activities undertaken to fulfill a federal oil-refinement contract.
Under the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), a defendant may remove a state-court suit to federal court if, among other things, the defendant was “acting under” a federal officer and if the suit is “for or relating to any act under color of such office.” Plaquemines Parish v.
Charalambia Lazaridou v. The Republic of Cyprus, through the Educational Service Commission, Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus, Decisions of 20 February 2024, Application Nos. 152/2018 and 62/2019
Zoukof et al. v. The Republic of Cyprus, Supreme Court of Cyprus (25 July 1990 in Case No. 912/89)
Papagiannis et al. v. Industrial Training Authority, Supreme Court of Cyprus (19 June 1992, Case No. 652/89 & 676/89)
N.S. v. The Republic of Cyprus, Cyprus Court of Appeal, Criminal Appeal No. 99/2021
