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This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split regarding the interpretation of the stop-time rule in the context of removal proceedings and to determine what it means to be considered “inadmissible” under the rule. The stop-time rule is a limitation on the Attorney General’s power to cancel the removal of an alien and applies, in part, when the alien commits an offense listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) that renders the alien “inadmissible.” Andre Martello Barton (“Barton”) argues that he cannot be deemed “inadmissible” under the stop-time rule because he was not seeking admission into the United States and, as a result, was never adjudicated as inadmissible. Alternatively, Barton asserts that it is a legal impossibility for him to be rendered “inadmissible” because he is an already-admitted lawful permanent resident of the United States. U.S. Attorney General William Barr counters that, for stop-time purposes, an alien is “inadmissible” if the alien is convicted of or admits to committing an offense listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), regardless of whether the alien is seeking admission or already admitted. The outcome of this case has important implications for the removability of lawful permanent residents who have prior criminal convictions.

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This case arises out of an incident in 2004 when the Athos I, a ship that CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. (“CARCO”) had chartered, collided with an abandoned anchor near CARCO’s designated port. This case asks the Supreme Court to decide how to interpret the charter agreement’s “safe berth” clause, under which CARCO was obligated to designate a safe destination port for the Athos I. CARCO argues that, under the safe berth clause, it was obligated only to exercise due diligence in selecting a safe port. Frescati Shipping Co. (“Frescati”), the Athos I’s owner, counters that the clause is better interpreted as a warranty of safety that gives rise to strict liability. The outcome of this case will determine the contours of a charterer’s obligations under safe berth clauses and the degree to which industry actors can efficiently bargain to allocate risks before accidents occur.

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This case asks whether a police officer has reasonable suspicion to pull over a vehicle if the officer knows only that the vehicle’s registered owner has a suspended driver’s license, but the officer is unsure whether the registered owner is driving the vehicle. Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, police officers may initiate brief stops of drivers who they reasonably suspect are committing a crime. In the present case, police deputy Mark Mehrer observed a moving vehicle and determined that the vehicle belonged to Charles Glover, who had a suspended license. Mehrer pulled over Glover’s vehicle after assuming that Glover was driving and thus violating the law. The State of Kansas argues that Mehrer had reasonable suspicion to stop Glover, because the Fourth Amendment allowed him to make the commonsense assumption that the driver of a vehicle owns that vehicle. Glover counters that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment right against illegal searches and seizures, because without that assumption, Mehrer had no reason to stop his vehicle. The outcome of this case has implications for drivers’ privacy, public safety, and the amount of discretion police officers possess in deciding when to stop a vehicle.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether Congress has the power to revoke States’ sovereign immunity from federal copyright infringement under the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (“CRCA”). Frederick Allen, a videographer, and his video production company argue that the CRCA is a valid exercise of Congress’s enforcement power under the Intellectual Property Clause (“Clause”) of the Constitution. Allen and his company also argue that the CRCA is valid because it enforces his due process rights under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Roy Cooper, the governor of North Carolina, argues that the CRCA is unconstitutional and that Congress’s Section 5 power to abrogate state sovereign immunity does not apply in this case. The outcome of this case has important implications for copyright holders and copyright enforcement, as well as for determining the extent of Congress’ power to abrogate state sovereign immunity.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether pollution added to navigable waters through a nonpoint source is regulated by the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). A point source is a discernable, confined, and discrete conveyance that includes pipes, ditches, and other clearly discernable means from which pollutants are or can be discharged into navigable waters. County of Maui (“Maui”) contends that pollutants that enter navigable waters through nonpoint sources, like groundwater, are too attenuated to attach liability under the CWA. Maui argues that pollutants that enter navigable waters through nonpoint sources are not added “directly to” navigable water and thus fall outside the scope of 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A), the statute that codifies which pollutant discharges are subject to the CWA’s permit requirements. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund (“HWF”) counters that Maui’s reading is underinclusive and that the CWA’s intended purpose is to regulate pollutants not just added directly to navigable waters, but also those that were simply added to navigable waters. HWF argues that discharges of pollutants to nonpoint sources which then enter navigable waters fall within the meaning of “discharge of a pollutant” under the CWA. The outcome of this case has important implications for the continued viability of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System’s permit program, the divide between federal and state control of groundwater regulations, and the fiscal impact that the CWA has on individual landowners.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether general allegations that disclosure of fraud is always inevitable and that disclosure sooner rather than later is always more prudent satisfy the “more harm than good” pleading standard of Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer. The Retirement Plans Committee of IBM argues that a rule that disclosure sooner rather than later is always prudent is too broad and will result in liability in cases in which fiduciaries did not disclose information as soon as possible, but nonetheless acted prudently. In contrast, Jander asserts that Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) fiduciaries should not be held to a different standard of prudence than all other ERISA fiduciaries, and that raising the pleading standard would make the standard impossible to meet. The outcome of this case will affect companies’ ability to provide ESOPs to their employees and employees’ access to ESOPs. This case will also have important implications for the stability and protection of employees’ retirement benefits.

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The Supreme Court will decide if the Appointments Clause governs the appointment of members of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (the “Board”). In response to Puerto Rico’s debt crisis, Congress enacted the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act of 2016 (PROMESA), which created the Board that institutes Title III proceedings on behalf of Puerto Rico. In 2017, a number of creditors filed complaints seeking to dismiss the Board’s debt adjustment proceedings, challenging President Obama’s appointment of the board members. On appeal, the First Circuit held that the Board members’ appointments are unconstitutional but sustained the Board’s Title III proceedings under the de facto officer doctrine. The Board and other Petitioners argue that the Board members’ appointments are constitutional because the Appointments Clause does not apply when Congress acts in the U.S. territories pursuant to its Article IV authority. The creditors and other Respondents counter that all constitutional safeguards, including the Appointments Clause, always apply in the U.S. territories. The outcome of this case has implications for Congress’s authority in providing administrative structures to govern the U.S. territories.

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The Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”) limits the use of the I-9 and “any information contained in or appended to such form” to the enforcement of specific federal immigration and criminal laws. In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether this limitation contained in IRCA prevents states from using information contained on the I-9 form to prosecute individuals where that same identifying information is found on documents other than the I-9. Kansas argues that the language of IRCA does not preempt Kansas from prosecuting respondents, including Ramiro Garcia, for false information provided on his K-2 and W-4 forms, even if that same information was also found on his I-9 form. Kansas asserts that such prohibitions would limit the traditional police power of the state. Garcia argues that the language of IRCA prevents states from prosecuting individuals for identity theft in work authorization based on false information contained on both the I-9 and other forms. Garcia asserts that such state prosecutions would interfere with the federal enforcement scheme and strong federal interest in employment verification. The Court’s decision in this case will determine whether state or federal law applies to the prosecution of undocumented individuals in similar cases and will affect the employment of unauthorized workers from the perspective of both employers and employees.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred when it granted respondent Lee Boyd Malvo’s habeas corpus petition to reconsider his life-imprisonment-without-parole sentence, yet declined to decide whether Malvo’s sentence was mandatory or discretionary. Petitioner warden Randall Mathena argues that Malvo’s sentence must stand because the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama expressly limited availability of habeas relief to juveniles sentenced to life imprisonment without parole under mandatory sentencing schemes, and because the precedent upon which the Supreme Court based that opinion does not support expanding the rule to discretionary sentencing schemes. Malvo counters that he should be resentenced because the Supreme Court precedent and the Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana—extending Miller retroactively to cases on collateral review—requires sentencing judges to take juveniles’ youth into account during sentencing, even if the sentence occurred before Miller. Malvo further contends that even if he were sentenced pursuant to a “discretionary” sentencing scheme, his life sentence violates Miller because the sentencing judge failed to consider, on account of his juvenile status, his lessened moral blameworthiness and greater capacity for change, therefore entitling him to resentencing. The outcome of this case will affect how the criminal justice system treats juveniles and victims, whether the system will preserve the distinction between discretionary and mandatory sentencing schemes.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the one-year statute of limitations in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) begins once a violation occurs or once the violation is discovered. Petitioner Kevin Rotkiske, whose FDCPA lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations, argues that the Court should apply the discovery rule and determine that the limitations period begins when the violation is discovered. He argues that the FDCPA should be interpreted in light of common law and precedent which hold that the discovery rule is applicable to suspend statutes of limitations. Respondent Paul Klemm counters that the Court need only read the FDCPA’s plain language to determine that Congress intended the statute-of-limitations period to begin at the time the violation occurred. He too points to precedent that supports his argument that Congress knows how to implement the discovery rule but—based on the FDCPA’s explicit language—chose not to do so. This case has implications for the purpose and history of the FDCPA and its statute of limitations and could affect blameless victims and marginalized communities.

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