Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a foreign party can file a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) when they suffer injury to their intangible property. Respondent Vitaly Smagin alleges that Petitioner Ashot Yegiazaryan violated RICO by injuring his intangible property: a judgment Smagin previously secured against Yegiazaryan in the United States. Yegiazaryan argues that plaintiffs can only bring a RICO claim if the injury underlying such a claim has a domestic, and not foreign, locus. Accordingly, Yegiazaryan contends that the alleged injury to the judgment occurred outside of the United States and therefore is not cognizable under RICO. In contrast, Smagin argues that the injury occurred in the United States and consequently falls under RICO. The Court’s decision will impact the scope of RICO, as well as relations between the United States and other sovereigns.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the government violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment when the government forfeits a homeowner’s property due to a property tax delinquency and keeps the surplus proceeds of that property’s sale.  Petitioner Geraldine Tyler argues that her equity interest in her condominium is private property protected by the Takings Clause, and that the government violated the Takings Clause by selling her home and retaining proceeds in excess of her debt to the government.  She further contends that the forfeiture serves punitive rather than remedial purposes and thus is an excessive fine under the Excessive Fines Clause.  Respondent Hennepin County asserts that the government has the sovereign power to foreclose on properties to hold tax delinquents accountable.  Hennepin County also argues that tax forfeitures do not violate the Excessive Fines Clause because they are remedial and not punitive.  This case’s holding will impact the constitutional limit on the government’s power over individual property rights and the government’s ability to promote Minnesota productive land use.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally expresses congressional intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indigenous tribes. The Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians argues that the Bankruptcy Code’s language is unclear, ambiguous, and subject to reasonable alternative interpretations, which fails to meet the high bar of an unequivocal expression of Congress’s intent. Brian W. Coughlin counters that there is no requirement for an explicit reference to Indigenous tribes, and that the ordinary meaning of the word “governmental unit” clearly shows Congress’s intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indigenous tribes. This case touches on essential questions regarding tribal self-governance and abuse of the system of sovereign immunity.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether litigants can preserve purely legal issues for appellate review without having to raise such issues in a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law. This case also asks whether a trial court’s rejection of a litigant’s motion for summary judgment as a matter of law constitutes a final judgment subject to appellate review. Petitioner Neil Dupree argues that the Court should allow the preservation for appeal of purely legal issues rejected by the trial court in summary judgment without raising them again in a Rule 50 motion, according to the principles of the final judgment rule and interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent Kevin Younger counters that the Court must require litigants to file a Rule 50 motion to preserve legal issues for appellate review because a rejection of a motion for summary judgment does not constitute an appealable final judgment. This case also has implications for judicial efficiency and economy.

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This case asks the Court to determine whether the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729, which punishes individuals who “knowingly present[], or cause[] to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval,” applies if, regardless of their subjective belief about the lawfulness of their conduct, defendants’ conduct is consistent with an objectively reasonable reading of an ambiguous statute. The United States argues that, under common law and the FCA’s text, when individuals make arguments that they believe are false, they can be liable even if they did not definitively know they were lying. The United States further argues that individuals receiving government funds have a duty to ask for clarification and determine the proper law, and thus are liable for advancing false claims against the government. In opposition, SuperValu argues that an individual’s subjective belief is irrelevant under the FCA because interpretations of ambiguous statutes cannot be objectively verified; thus, an individual is not liable if the statute is ambiguous, and the individual’s interpretation is objectively reasonable. SuperValu also states that, because the FCA is a punitive statute, the burden is on the government to clarify the statute and give individuals notice. This case touches on issues of efficient government fraud prosecution, separation of powers, and Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a plaintiff suing under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 must plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the allegedly misleading registration statement. Slack Technologies argues that the text of the statute reflects congressional intent to limit liability to only those who bought shares registered under the relevant registration statement. Slack additionally argues that past judicial and regulatory precedent supports this theory. Fiyyaz Pirani counters that the text of the statute reflects congressional intent to create broad liability by including a range of securities so as to protect investors. Pirani contends that this particular issue is novel and was undecided prior to the district court decision below. The outcome of this case will determine the extent to which investors are protected by the Securities Act of 1933 and the availability of remedial measures to investors under the Act.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether nexus to a pending or ongoing investigation or legal proceeding is necessary for an offense to be considered as “an offense relating to obstruction of justice” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). Pugin argues that the phrase has historical meaning and that interpretation in favor of the noncitizen and the rule of lenity should apply. Attorney General Merrick Garland counters that the phrase has an ordinary meaning, and the Court should defer to the Board Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) interpretation following Chevron deference. This case has implications on how the BIA should apply the rule of lenity and how much deference the BIA should receive.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to reconsider the appropriate standard of undue hardship that an employer must demonstrate before it may be excused from its duty to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious belief or practice under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This case also asks the Supreme Court whether Title VII permits employers to demonstrate undue hardship solely by showing that any accommodation would burden other employees. Gerald Groff contends that the Hardison de minimis test was incorrect and should be overruled and that the plain language of Title VII requires employers to prove that their businesses directly suffered undue hardship. DeJoy argues that the Hardison de minimis test should be reaffirmed but clarified and that burdens on coworkers can support a finding of undue hardship. The outcome of this case has significant implications for the protection of religious practice and belief in the workplace.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether “true threats,” which are unprotected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, may be established under a subjective or objective test. Billy Raymond Counterman argues that historical common law practice and Supreme Court precedents require that a speaker subjectively know or intend their speech to be threatening in order for the speech to be a “true threat” unprotected by the First Amendment. On the other hand, Colorado argues that a context-driven objective test is supported by precedent and permissible under the First Amendment. This case has implications for the balance between protecting people from the harmful effects of threatening speech and preventing unjust censorship of political, religious, and artistic expression.

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This case asks the Court to analyze 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i), to determine whether statutes criminalizing “encouragement or inducement” of immigration violations violate the First Amendment. The United States argues that subsection (A)(iv) is constitutional because solicitation and facilitation of illegal actions is not protected under the First Amendment. The United States further states that subsection (A)(iv) primarily punishes conduct rather than speech, and that subsection (A)(iv) cannot be challenged by an individual who was prosecuted under § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i). Hansen counters that subsection (A)(iv) unconstitutionally prohibits abstract advocacy of illegal action. Hansen also argues that subsection (A)(iv) punishes large amounts of protected speech in addition to conduct, and that Hansen was convicted under both subsection (A)(iv) and subsection (B)(i). This case touches on important questions regarding free speech, immigration advocacy, and state criminal statutes.

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