City of Grants Pass, Oregon v.

Issues

Do fines for camping on public land constitute cruel and unusual punishment of homeless people?

This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve a dispute between the City of Grants Pass, Oregon, and a class of homeless residents of Grants Pass represented by Gloria Johnson. Petitioner Grants Pass contends that its anti-camping ordinances do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Respondent Johnson argues that the city’s ordinances amount to criminalization of the status of homelessness, contravening the Eighth Amendment. This case could impact the balance of power between federal, state, and local government and may clarify the limits on criminalizing conduct like camping outside at night.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.

The homeless population in Grants Pass, Oregon exceeds the available shelter for homeless people. Johnson v.

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Department of State v. Muñoz

Issues

(1) Does the government infringe upon a U.S. citizen’s constitutionally protected interest when it denies the citizen’s non-citizen spouse a visa? (2) If such an interest exists, does merely notifying the visa applicant that their visa was rejected under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) suffice in providing that citizen with due process?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the government infringes upon a U.S. citizen’s constitutionally protected interest when it denies their non-citizen spouse’s visa, and if so, whether the government’s citation of a statute as its reasoning is sufficient to provide that citizen with due process. Sandra Muñoz, a U.S. citizen, married Luis Asencio-Cordero, a non-citizen, and petitioned the government to grant her husband an immigration visa. The government denied the application, giving only a citation to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) as the reason. The government argues that Muñoz has no statutory or constitutional right to appeal the visa denial nor any right to further explanation of the reasoning behind the decision. Muñoz argues that the denial of her husband’s visa infringes upon her constitutionally protected liberty interests, and that she is entitled to further explanation about the denial under due process. This case has important ramifications for U.S. citizens with noncitizen spouses who wish to live together in the United States, for national security, and the ability of Congress to exercise oversight over agencies.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether a consular officer's refusal of a visa to a U.S. citizen's noncitizen spouse impinges upon a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen; and (2) whether, assuming that such a constitutional interest exists, notifying a visa applicant that he was deemed inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) suffices to provide any process that is due.

In July 2010, Sandra Muñoz, a U.S. citizen, married Luis Asencio-Cordero, a citizen of El Salvador who first arrived in the United States in 2005. Muñoz v. Department of State at 8–9. Muñoz filed an immigration petition for Asencio-Cordero which was approved, and Asencio-Cordero returned to El Salvador in April 2015 to interview for his immigrant visa at the local U.S. consulate.

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Thornell v. Jones

Issues

When considering a state court’s analysis of prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland v. Washington (1984), when must a federal habeas court defer to factual and credibility findings of the district court and consider non-statutory aggravating evidence––including attacks on the mitigation case put on by the prisoner––in determining whether counsel’s deficient performance actually prejudiced the prisoner?

This case asks whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit improperly overruled a district court when granting a defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim on habeas review. The IAC claim arose in an Arizona capital murder case in which Respondent Danny Lee Jones argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to secure psychology and neurology professionals in support of mitigating evidence relating to Jones’s mental health. Petitioner Ryan Thornell, the director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to accord proper deference to the district court’s fact-finding as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, Thornell argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to consider Arizona’s state sentencing laws as well as improperly weighed aggravating factors in Jones’s case. Jones rejects these claims, arguing that the Ninth Circuit properly adjudicated his claim with respect to both law and fact. This case has significant implications with respect to the proper standard of deference between appellate courts and district courts and raises concerns about finality and state sovereignty in enforcement of criminal statutes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit violated this court’s precedents by employing a flawed methodology for assessing prejudice under Strickland v. Washington when it disregarded the district court’s factual and credibility findings and excluded evidence in aggravation and the state’s rebuttal when it reversed the district court and granted habeas relief.

On March 26, 1992, in Bullhead City, Arizona, Danny Lee Jones and his friend Robert Weaver spent the day in Weaver’s garage consuming alcohol and using crystal methamphetamine. Jones v. Ryan at 1009. At some point, Jones and Weaver fought, which concluded when Jones struck Weaver multiple times in the head with a bat, killing Weaver. Id. Jones proceeded to enter Weaver’s house, strike Weaver’s grandmother in the head with the bat, and kill Weaver’s seven-year-old daughter.

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Snyder v. United States

Issues

Does a prohibition on “corruptly accepting anything of value, intending to be influenced or rewarded” include gratuities, or does it only prohibit bribes?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether 18 U.S.C. Section 666—the statute for federal-funds bribery—also criminalizes gratuities. Snyder, a former mayor in Indiana, steered city contracts to a local company and then accepted from that company a fabricated consulting job worth $13,000. A jury convicted him of accepting an illegal gratuity under the statute. Snyder argues that the law only criminalizes bribes, however, because Congress has removed the language from the statute that used to refer to gratuities. The United States argues that the statute criminalizes gratuities through the word “rewarded,” while the word “influenced” refers to bribes. This case raises concerns about federal intrusion on state interests depending on how broadly courts will construe federal criminal statutes that seek to prohibit gratuities. It may also affect the outcome of how federal prosecutors will combat corruption at the state and local levels.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) criminalizes gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions a state or local official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions.

James Snyder became mayor of Portage, Indiana, in 2012. United States v. Snyder at 2. At the time, he was behind on both his personal taxes and his business’s payroll taxes.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors Daniel R. Alonso and Stephen P. Garvey for their excellent guidance and insights into this case.

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Fischer v. United States

Issues

Can individuals be found guilty of obstructing an official proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) when the proceeding did not involve investigations or evidence? 

This case asks the Court to determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act covers obstructive conduct interfering in official proceedings that are unrelated to investigations and evidence. Petitioner argues that the Court should interpret § 1512(c)(2) as only covering obstructive conduct interfering in official proceedings that involve investigations and evidence, and points to textual analysis, principles of statutory construction, and the Court’s interpretations of similar statutes in Yates v. United States and Begay v. United States for support. Respondent counters that the Court should interpret § 1512(c)(2) as a catch-all provision covering all obstructive conduct and rejects the textual analysis and principles of statutory construction argued by the petitioner while pointing to 18 U.S.C. § 1503 for support. This case touches on important questions regarding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the usage of § 1512(c)(2) to cover rioters’ conduct during the January 6 Capitol Building storming, such as sentencing fairness and providing notice to parties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit erred in construing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), which prohibits obstruction of congressional inquiries and investigations, to include acts unrelated to investigations and evidence.

On January 6, 2021, Joseph Fischer participated in the “Stop the Steal” rally in Washington, D.C. Brief for Petitioner at 3. Fischer also allegedly participated in the mob that entered the Capitol Building and forced Congress to halt its certification of the 2020 presidential election results.

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Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio

Issues

May a plaintiff bring a § 1983 suit alleging malicious prosecution on account of baseless charges, even if one or more of the charges was supported by probable cause?

In this case, the Supreme Court must decide whether Jascha Chiaverini’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against the City of Napoleon, Ohio may proceed, although some of the charges filed against Chiaverini were based on probable cause. Jascha Chiaverini argues that state common law governs his lawsuit, and that as such the charge-specific rule, in which any baseless charge allows a § 1983 to proceed, applies. The City of Napoleon argues that Petitioner presents a false binary between the “any-crime” rule and the charge-specific rule that leads to a framework that is incompatible with the intent and meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This case has implications for the viability of malicious prosecution suits filed under § 1983 and the reach of Fourth Amendment protections against baseless charges.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claims are governed by the charge-specific rule, under which a malicious prosecution claim can proceed as to a baseless criminal charge even if other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause, or by the “any-crime” rule, under which probable cause for even one charge defeats a plaintiff’s malicious-prosecution claims as to every other charge, including those lacking probable cause.

Plaintiff Jascha Chiaverini is the manager of Diamond and Gold Outlet, a jewelry store owned by co-plaintiff Chiaverini, Inc. and located in Napoleon, Ohio. Jascha Chiaverini, et al. v. City of Napoleon, et al. at 2. On November 16, 2016, Chiaverini purchased jewelry items from Brent Burns but was later contacted by David and Christina Hill, who claimed the jewelry was stolen. Id.

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Harrow v. Department of Defense

Issues

Does 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A), which sets a 60-day limit for a federal employee to appeal to the  U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for a final decision rendered by the Merit Systems Protection Board, set a jurisdictional limit for the Federal Circuit?

This case asks the court to interpret whether the 60-day time limit for a federal employee to appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit imposed by U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) amounts to a jurisdictional requirement that strictly bars claims brought after 60 days. Stuart Harrow maintains that the language in 28 U.S.C. § 1295, which grants jurisdiction to claims “pursuant to” § 7703(b)(1)(A), is simply a cross-reference and not conditional. Harrow further argues that Congress likely did not intend to create such a harsh bar when enacting § 7703(b)(1)(A), considering that many federal employee claims are brought without a lawyer. The Department of Defense counters that “pursuant to” should mean “conforming to,” which sets a conditional requirement, not a reference. The Department of Defense further notes that the Court’s precedents have already decided that § 7703(b)(1)(A) is a jurisdictional requirement; and, Harrow is attempting to artificially parse the statute to reach a favorable result. The case’s outcome will significantly impact methods of Congressional intent interpretations and federal appeal procedures.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the 60-day deadline in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) for a federal employee to petition the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to review a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board is jurisdictional.

Stuart R. Harrow (“Harrow”) was an employee of a sub-agency of the United States Department of Defense (“DOD”). Harrow v. Department of Defense, 2022 WL 1495611, 1 (Merit Systems Protection Bd.).

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Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine

Issues

Should the Court uphold the FDA’s modifications to the usage conditions of the drug mifepristone and defer to the FDA’s expertise before issuing preliminary relief, and do associations of doctors or medical groups have Article III legal standing to challenge the FDA's modifications due to safety concerns?

This case presents the Supreme Court with the issue of whether the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) can uphold its modifications to the usage guidelines of the drug mifepristone despite challenges from the Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, who assert that these changes are capricious and unnecessarily elevate patient risk. Petitioner, the FDA, argues that Respondent, the Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, lacks standing and that the FDA’s mifepristone-related decisions were based on solid clinical data and expert evaluations affirming the drug's safety and effectiveness. Respondent, the Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, contends that it has standing and that the FDA's actions in 2016 and 2021 lack adequate safety studies and do not provide a cogent rationale for the modifications, thereby jeopardizing patient and healthcare provider safety. The Court's decision will determine whether mifepristone will stay subject to the lower court's injunction or if the FDA's decision to relax usage guidelines in 2016 and 2021 stands as justified.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether respondents have Article III standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration’s 2016 and 2021 actions with respect to mifepristone’s approved conditions of use; (2) whether the FDA’s 2016 and 2021 actions were arbitrary and capricious; and (3) whether the district court properly granted preliminary relief.

In 1996, the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) received a new drug application (“NDA”) for the drug mifepristone from the Population Council.

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Erlinger v. United States

Issues

Does it violate a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to due process or Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury when a sentencing judge, rather than a jury, determines whether a defendant’s prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to define the contours of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights when subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984’s (“ACCA”) occasions clause in light of the Court’s decision in Wooden v. United States. The ACCA authorizes enhancing a criminal defendant’s sentence when the defendant’s three prior convictions were committed “on occasions different from one another.” Under Wooden, that clause requires determining whether the previous offenses occurred on different occasions or, rather, arose “from a single criminal episode.” Paul Erlinger argues that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment prohibit a sentencing judge from making that determination, rather a jury must decide the factual questions necessary under the ACCA beyond a reasonable doubt.  Nick Harper, court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below, counters that the Constitution does not require the occasions clause to be decided by a jury because history and Supreme Court precedent authorize legislatures to assign recidivism-related determinations to sentencing judges. The outcome of this case has implications for criminal defendants’ rights at sentencing.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Constitution requires a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant’s prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

Petitioner Paul Erlinger (“Erlinger”) pled guilty to being a felon in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) on April 20th, 2018.

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Connelly v. Internal Revenue Service

Issues

Should a deceased shareholder’s stock valuation for federal estate tax purposes include company-owned life insurance proceeds used to buy back the shareholder’s stock?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether life insurance proceeds acquired by a corporation to redeem a deceased shareholder’s stock are a corporate asset when calculating the shareholder’s interest in the corporation for federal estate tax purposes. Connelly, the petitioner, argues that life insurance proceeds used to fulfill a corporation’s obligation to redeem a shareholder’s stock should not increase the taxable value of the estate because a closely held corporation’s obligation to redeem stock is a liability that offsets the value of life insurance proceeds. Connelly further contends that the estate tax valuation method used by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), which includes insurance proceeds in the company’s share value, is detrimental to closely held corporations because it forces them to overspend on life insurance and redemption arrangements. The IRS counters that life insurance proceeds, which enhance a company’s equity, should not be offset by stock redemption obligations in share valuation. The IRS also contends that taxing life insurance proceeds aligns with legislative goals to tax a deceased shareholder’s property at its fair market value, emphasizing that the Connelly family’s undervaluation of shares bypasses market value impacts. The outcome of this case will affect estate planning strategies and the effectiveness of life insurance-funded redemption agreements that intend to ensure closely held business’s continuity of ownership.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the proceeds of a life-insurance policy taken out by a closely held corporation on a shareholder in order to facilitate the redemption of the shareholder’s stock should be considered a corporate asset when calculating the value of the shareholder’s shares for purposes of the federal estate tax.

Michael Connelly and Thomas Connelly (“Connelly”), who were brothers, owned all the shares of Crown C corporation (“Crown”). Connelly v. United States at 414. The brothers and Crown entered into a stock purchase agreement to ensure a seamless transfer of ownership in the event of either brother’s death.

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