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The Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Company sought to recover export tax payments after a federal court found the 1978 tax unconstitutional. Clintwood filed timely administrative refund claims under the IRS Tax Code within its three-year statute of limitations, and received repayments with interest for 1997 to 1999. However, Clintwood also filed an Export Clause damages claim for tax payments from 1994 to 1996 under the Tucker Act, which has a longer six-year statute of limitations. The government argued that the Tax Code provides the exclusive remedy for such refunds, while Clintwood argued that the Tucker Act alternative best remedies the government's unconstitutional taxation. The Court of Federal Claims found that Clintwood was entitled to receive damages, but not interest, under the Tucker Act. On appeal, the Federal Circuit awarded Clintwood both damages and interest for its 1994 to 1996 payments. The Supreme Court will determine whether Clintwood can file claims for repayment of unconstitutional taxes under the Tucker Act, and whether these alternative claims include interest awards. In addition to affecting the outcome of similar pending cases, the Court's decision will likely affect all taxpayers by determining the amount of reimbursement for taxes later found to be unconstitutional.

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This case provides the Supreme Court with the opportunity to determine whether the United States Government ("Government") can use uncounseled tribal court convictions to satisfy the predicate offense requirement outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 117(a). Section 117(a) is a domestic assault statute under which the Government may prosecute a person who has committed sexual assault within the U.S. or Indian country and who has already been twice convicted in State, Federal, or Indian court, of assault against a spouse or intimate partner. The Government argues that it may use Bryant’s prior convictions in his § 117 prosecution because the convictions did not violate the U.S. Constitution but were instead obtained on tribal lands where the Constitution is inapplicable. The Government further argues that using the convictions would not violate due process because the statute passes the rational-basis standard of review and is consistent with the principles of comity. Bryant counters, arguing that the Court’s precedent establishes a bright-line rule that invalidates convictions obtained in a manner that violates the Constitution, including Bryant’s convictions here, and that the Government’s reading of Court precedent is overly broad. Bryant further contends that allowing these convictions would lead to either admittance of an abundance of suspect convictions or a complex process requiring courts to determine the validity of each conviction. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case will significantly impact the validity of tribal court judgments for purposes of predicate-offense crimes as well as the ability of prosecutors to prevent domestic abuse crimes in Indian Country.

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Respondent James Bormes used the U.S. government’s online pay system to pay for a lawsuit that he had filed electronically. Following the transaction, the website displayed the last four digits of his credit card and the card’s expiration date. Bormes then sued the government, alleging that it had violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") by displaying the expiration date. The United States argued that it had sovereign immunity with respect to claims under the FCRA because the Act did not explicitly apply to the U.S. government. When Bormes countered that he could sue the government under the Little Tucker Act, which provides a remedy for those with claims against the government of less than $10,000, the government contended that the Little Tucker Act applied only in situations where parties could not otherwise recover. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court must first determine the scope of the Tucker Acts' waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity regarding claims brought under the Little Tucker Act for suits based on violations of the FCRA. As the country’s largest employer, creditor, and lender, the U.S. government could see a massive increase in litigation and potential liability as a result of this decision. Additionally, the Supreme Court may address how explicit Congress must act in order to exempt the federal government from liability.

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Respondent Xavier Alvarez, an elected member of the Three Valleys Water District, lied about receiving a Congressional Medal of Honor during a board meeting. His lie violated the Stolen Valor Act, which Congress enacted to preserve the value of military awards, and he was criminally convicted and sentenced to probation. Alvarez challenged the facial constitutionality of the Act under the First Amendment, and prevailed on appeal. The United States argues that a “breathing space” test should apply because the Act only limits knowingly false factual statements, and that under this test the Act does not violate the First Amendment. Alvarez counters that strict scrutiny should apply because the Act imposes a content-based restriction, and under strict scrutiny, the Act is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech. The ruling in this case may affect the value of military awards, as well as the legal treatment of other false representations.

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Solid waste processing has been a contentious issue since the 1980s when local governments were implicated in environmental lawsuits regarding solid waste disposal. Local governments tried to take control of the issue, but found that they faced commerce clause issues when they tried to protect their local facilities by passing ordinances to ensure enough tipping fees through flow control ordinances. This case represents the latest attempt by local governments to protect local waste processing facilities by requiring that local solid waste be directed to the publicly owned facility. In a key case, C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994), the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance similar to the one at issue in this case because it was discriminatory to other waste processing facilities and placed a burden on interstate commerce. In this case, the Second Circuit ruled that because the ordinance at issue favored a public facility rather than a private facility as in Carbone, it passed the discrimination test. The Court also held that it passed a balancing test whereby the court balances the local interest and the burden on interstate commerce. At stake in this case are the local governments' interests in sustaining environmentally sound local processing plants that represent significant sunk cost versus interstate waste hauling and out of state processing plants hoping to sustain their businesses.

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Five railroad employees filed claims through their union, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (“Brotherhood”), contesting disciplinary charges imposed by the Union Pacific Railroad (“Railroad”). The National Railroad Adjustment Board dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the Brotherhood had failed to submit written evidence that the parties had met in conference. The District Court affirmed the Board’s decision. However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in favor of the Brotherhood. The Seventh Circuit found that the due process rights of the Brotherhood were denied, because it was not clear when and how evidence of conferencing should be presented, and dismissal for reasons that were not clear at the time of filing functioned as a denial of its due process rights. The Railroad subsequently appealed this decision to the Supreme Court arguing that because submission of evidence is solely within the arbitrator’s discretion, the Board’s award should be final and binding. In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court’s decision will test the scope of the federal government’s power to review arbitration disputes between private parties. The Court’s decision will also affect future labor disputes and collective bargaining agreements in the railroad industry.

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Following a serious car accident, James McCutchen received $66,866 to pay for his medical expenses from a benefit plan administered by his employer, US Airways. The Plan included a provision requiring beneficiaries to reimburse US Airways for claims “out of any monies recovered from a third party.” After receiving the Plan benefits, McCutchen hired counsel and sued third parties who were involved in accident, recovering a $10,000 settlement from one of the drivers involved in the accident and $100,000 in underinsured motorist coverage. US Airways subsequently sued McCutchen to recover the money they initially paid him by seeking “appropriate equitable relief” under ERISA Section 502(a)(3). US Airways maintains that the term “appropriate” in Section 502(a)(3) refers to the requirement that the type of “equitable relief” a plaintiff seeks be suitable under the circumstances to enforce the terms of the benefit plan and does not allow courts to use equity to rewrite contractual terms. McCutchen argues that courts have the authority to determine what constitutes “appropriate equitable relief” within the meaning of ERISA Section 502(a)(3) and, thus, are not required to enforce express plan terms. Supporters of the lower court’s decision argue that allowing courts to provide equitable relief would increase fairness and encourage beneficiaries to seek recovery from third parties. Opponents counter that affirming the lower court’s decision will increase ERISA litigation and threaten the financial viability of employee health benefit plans.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether class certification or collective action may proceed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) or the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), when liability determinations and damage calculations will turn on statistical analysis that assumes all class members, regardless of actual differences between them, are identical to a statistical average. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Peg Bouaphakeo, et al., No. 14–1146, at i.  The Court will also consider whether Rule 23(b)(3) or the FLSA permits class or collective action when the putative class contains uninjured members without legal rights to damages. See id. Tyson argues that the use of statistical averages masks differences between class members that not only create individual questions of law and fact, but also result in uninjured class members being awarded damages. See Brief for Petitioner, Tyson Foods, Inc. at 18-19. Additionally, Tyson argues that the use of statistical averages also prevents it from raising defenses that it would otherwise be entitled to employ. See id. at 33. But Bouaphakeo claims that Tyson’s failure to keep statutorily required records of the amount of time that employees worked necessitated the use of statistical analysis, and such use was necessary and proper to prove liability and damages through a just and reasonable inference. See Brief for Respondents, Peg Bouaphakeo, et al. at 33-35. Bouaphakeo further contends that uninjured class members were not awarded damages, and that Tyson was not prevented from raising defenses. Id. at 57-60. The Court’s decision may affect litigation costs for businesses, economic growth, and the use of statistical analysis in class action proceedings. See Brief for Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. (“Chamber”), in Support of Petitioner at 20–21, 23; Brief of Amicus Curiae American Independent Business Alliance, in Support of Respondent at 3–6; Brief of Amici Curiae Civil Procedure Professors, in Support of Respondents at 9–11.

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By the beginning of 2008, Michael Turner was six thousand dollars behind in his child support payments. A South Carolina family court eventually ordered Turner to appear to explain his failure to make any payments for the past year and a half. Turner alleged his personal and physical problems rendered him unable to pay. The family court imposed civil contempt sanctions as a result of Turner’s failure to comply with the earlier court order to pay child support. Turner appealed his twelve-month sentence, arguing that because there was a possibility that he would face imprisonment, the court should have provided him with counsel. The Supreme Court’s decision will likely determine whether indigent defendants in civil cases are entitled to representation where there is a possibility of incarceration, although the Court could possibly determine that it does not have jurisdiction to hear the case.

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Travelers Casualty & Surety Company of America (“Travelers”) is appealing a Ninth Circuit decision denying it attorney fees for claims governed entirely by federal bankruptcy law. Travelers maintains that it is entitled to the indemnity rights it negotiated for under its private contract with Pacific Gas and Electric (“Pacific Gas”). Travelers relies on precedent to conclude that the substantive rights under a private contract are governed by state law and therefore the Ninth Circuit decision is wrongly decided and should be reversed. Pacific Gas argues that the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded in prior cases that attorneys’ fees pursuant to a private contract may be granted in cases where the rights are governed by state law, but not when they are peculiar to federal bankruptcy law. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that state law cannot govern federal issues such as indemnity of attorney fees for claims resulting from objections to debt restructuring plans and disclosure statements implemented by a company under Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Ninth Circuit is concerned that a decision in support of non-prevailing creditors whose conditional rights have not been triggered or impaired in cases where the debtor has not defaulted in bankruptcy cases would flood the court dockets with these premature claims. The Supreme Court decision will resolve whether private parties can contract for rights which have not been explicitly granted by federal bankruptcy law. The decision will impact the legal protective strategies that creditors use to shield their investments from debtors who have filed for bankruptcy.

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