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Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC, brought a securities fraud class action against Charter Communications' vendors Scientific Atlanta and Motorola, alleging a scheme in which Charter contracted with the vendors to purchase set-top cable boxes at higher-than-normal prices and sell advertising at higher-than-normal rates. These transactions served to artificially inflate Charter's stock price. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that Stoneridge's claim was foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), in which the Court determined that mere "aiders and abettors" of fraud cannot be held liable.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Thus, the issue before the Supreme Court is whether a party may be held liable for fraud where it made no misleading public statements (or omissions), and had no duty to do make disclosures, but engaged in transactions with a public corporation designed to artificially enhance the public corporation's financial statements.  How the Supreme Court decides this case may set a new standard for determining whether third-parties can be held liable for investor-related fraud.

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AnimalFeeds filed a class action lawsuit against the four major parcel tanker transportation companies, including Stolt-Nielsen, alleging antitrust violations. As per a written contact between the parties, the case was referred to an arbitration panel. The contract, however, is silent as to whether class arbitrations are permissible. Stolt-Nielsen argues that the silence in the agreement should mean that class arbitration is not permitted, while AnimalFeeds claims the decision should be left to the arbitrators. The arbitrators decided to allow class arbitration, but the district court (S.D.N.Y.) refused. The Second Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court's decision will place an economic burden on the losing side and may affect international businesses decisions on whether to select a forum in the United States.

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In 1994, J. Howard Marshall II, a very wealthy oil executive, married Vickie Lynn Marshall (“Vickie”), a model and actress who worked under the name Anna Nicole Smith. J. Howard Marshall died shortly thereafter, leaving the bulk of his estate to his son E. Pierce Marshall (“Pierce”). Vickie filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 1996, and Pierce brought a defamation claim against her in the bankruptcy court. Vickie made a compulsory counterclaim, alleging that Pierce had tortiously interfered with J. Howard Marshall’s intent to give her part of his estate. The bankruptcy court rendered a judgment in favor of Vickie. Pierce eventually appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the bankruptcy court’s decision on the grounds that Vickie’s counterclaim was not a “core” proceeding, and therefore was improperly before the bankruptcy court. Vickie’s estate, represented by her executor Howard K. Stern, argues that the Ninth Circuit erroneously applied 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) because the provision categorically establishes compulsory counterclaims as core proceedings. The estate of Pierce Marshall asserts that the counterclaim raised in this case deals with a tort claim that arises under state law, and is therefore not part of the core proceedings. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether Congress intended for 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) to categorize all compulsory counterclaims as core proceedings and, if this was Congress’ intent, whether this intent is constitutional.

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In 2008, Vincent Staub received a favorable jury verdict in an employment discrimination trial against his former employer, Proctor Hospital. Proctor Hospital appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed the verdict based on the "cat's paw" theory of employer liability. The court held that unless the ultimate decision maker was under the "singular influence" of another employee, only the decision maker's unlawful reasons for adverse employment decisions are actionable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the motivations of other employees who influence employment actions, but do not make the ultimate decision, may be taken into consideration in employment discrimination suits.

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In the late 1980s, Dr. Mark Holodniy, a Stanford University researcher, conducted part of his research at a private biotechnology company. The result of his work, which was partially funded by the government, was an improved method for testing the effectiveness of HIV treatments. Over the next few years, Roche Molecular Systems, the owner of the biotechnology company at which Dr. Holodniy conducted his research, incorporated his invention into its publicly sold HIV-testing kits. At roughly the same time, Stanford, Dr. Holodniy’s employer, began the process of patenting the invention under the University and Small Business Patent Procedure Act, commonly known as the Bayh-Dole Act. In 2005, Stanford sued Roche for patent infringement, arguing among other things that the Bayh-Dole Act gave Stanford the exclusive first right to acquire ownership of Holodniy’s invention. The district court ruled for Stanford, but the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that an assignment of ownership rights in an earlier confidentiality agreement between Holodniy and the biotechnology company trumped Stanford’s ownership rights. Now, the Supreme Court must decide whether the Bayh-Dole Act prevents individual inventors from assigning to third parties their ownership rights in federally funded inventions.

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In her Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) suit against Sprint, Ellen Mendelsohn sought to use the testimony of other Sprint employees who claimed to have experienced age discrimination at Sprint. This evidence falls into the category sometimes called "me too" testimony, because the employees did not share a supervisor with Mendelsohn and were not parties in Mendelsohn's litigation. The district court rejected the "me too" testimony, interpreting a past Tenth Circuit ruling to mean that testimony of other employees was admissible only if the other employees worked under the same supervisor and were fired around the time Sprint fired Mendelsohn. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the same-supervisor requirement only applied in discriminatory discipline actions, not in cases like Mendelsohn involving allegations of company-wide discrimination.� Currently, four circuits hold that "me too" evidence is irrelevant and thus inadmissible, while another five circuits hold that such evidence is excludable at the discretion of the court. The Tenth Circuit's holding departs from both of these views. By deciding Sprint v. Mendelsohn, the Supreme Court will resolve this circuit split regarding "me too" evidence. The Court's decision will affect the ability of employees to prove company-wide discrimination. Its ruling will be particularly important because it will apply not only to ADEA, but also to suits brought under a range of federal anti-discrimination statutes.�

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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires long-distance telephone companies, such as Sprint and AT&T, to fairly compensate payphone service providers (PSPs) when consumers use the companies' access codes to complete long-distance calls on payphones. About 1,400 PSPs assigned their rights "of collection" to a third-party aggregator, American Public Communications Council Services (APCC), in order for APCC to sue Sprint and AT&T for inadequate compensation on the PSPs' behalf. While the District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed APCC's suit for lack of standing under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, it later vacated its ruling and denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ultimately found that APCC had standing to sue as well as the private right to sue in federal court.

On appeal, the Supreme Court will determine whether an assignment of claims "for purposes of collection" establishes standing for a third-party assignee.  The Court will examine whether APCC meets the standing requirements of injury-in-fact and redressability.  A decision for APCC could allow future parties to bring collective suits while bypassing legislative safeguards, such as those established for class actions. On the other hand, a decision for Sprint and AT&T may frustrate enforcement of the Telecommunications Act by preventing efficient collection efforts.

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In 2004, local youths broke into a Southern Union storage center that was improperly storing mercury; the incident resulted in a spill and cleanup effort. Southern Union was charged with storing hazardous waste without a permit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. After a jury found Southern Union guilty, the district court judge determined that the violation had continued for 762 days and imposed a fine of $38 million. On appeal, Southern Union argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi required that the jury determine the period of the violation, not the judge. Southern Union contends that if the determination of the period of violation is left to the judge, the court could impose a fine in excess of the actual violation, violating Southern Union’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. In contrast, the United States asserts that Apprendi is not applicable because it dealt with deprivations of life and liberty interests, not the criminal fines that are at issue here. The decision in this case has implications for consistent treatment of defendants and the efficiency of courts.

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Harvey Leroy Sossamon, III is an inmate at a Texas state prison. The prison warden refused to allow cell-restricted inmates to attend religious services and denied all inmates use of the prison chapel for religious purposes. In 2006, Sossamon filed suit against the State of Texas and various state and prison officials, alleging that the Texas prison violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). Sossamon sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Texas, holding that Texas has sovereign immunity under the 11th Amendment and is not liable for damages. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Sossamon argues here that the words “appropriate relief,” as provided by RLUIPA, unambiguously waives the state's immunity from damages. Texas counters that “appropriate relief” does not amount to clear notice which is required before a state may waive its sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine the protection afforded to states under RLUIPA and may deter states from implementing policies which violate the Act.

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