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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) may obtain disgorgement in civil actions under its power to seek equitable relief, even though the Supreme Court has previously ruled that disgorgement is a penalty rather than an equitable remedy at least under some circumstances. Petitioners Liu and Wang contend that the Supreme Court ruled in Kokesh v. SEC that disgorgement was a penalty, and that therefore the SEC lacks the authority to order Liu and Wang to disgorge any ill-gotten gains in connection with their investment fund. The SEC counters that Kokesh held disgorgement to be a penalty only for statute of limitations purposes. The outcome of this case has implications on the SEC’s effectiveness in future civil actions at deterring financial crime and at making the victims of financial crime whole.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether, under the Suspension Clause, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) is constitutional as applied to noncitizens who have secretly entered the United States. Petitioner Department of Homeland Security argues that noncitizens entering clandestinely, treated properly as seeking initial admission to the United States, are entitled to no due process protections; that such noncitizens are not entitled to habeas corpus under the Suspension Clause; and that even if the Suspension Clause does apply, the statute’s provision of administrative review and limited judicial review are sufficient. Respondent Thuraissigiam counters that notwithstanding the Government’s misreading of applicable law, clandestinely entering noncitizens within the United States are entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment; that the Suspension Clause does apply to individuals in immigration proceedings; and that the statute provides an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus. This case has implications for states’ resource spending, revenue collection, and citizen welfare. Additionally, this case’s outcome could impact federal courts’ work load, depending on whether federal courts must open up to a new class of alien-petitioners.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether Louisiana’s law, requiring physicians who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at local hospitals, comports with the Court’s precedent. The parties agree that the Louisiana law at issue in this case is substantially similar to the Texas law that the Supreme Court struck down in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. June Medical Services argues that precedent from Whole Woman’s Health and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey control and that Louisiana’s Act is unconstitutional because it unduly burdens women seeking abortions. Doctor Rebekah Gee on behalf of Louisiana argues that June Medical Services lacks standing to bring forth a claim on behalf of their patients and further asserts that Whole Woman’s Health does not control the outcome of this case because the Louisiana Act does not unduly burden women seeking abortions. The outcome of this case has important implications on access to abortion services for women of color and could impact lower courts’ fact-finding authority.

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These two consolidated cases ask the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether the Mineral Leasing Act authorizes the United States Forest Service to grant a right-of-way under the national trail system. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the Forest Service lacks authority to grant a right-of-way for a natural gas pipeline under the Appalachian Trail, which is administered by the National Park Service. The Forest Service and Atlantic Coast Pipeline, the respective Petitioners in each case, contend that the Forest Service has authority under the Mineral Leasing Act to grant a right-of-way under any trail that crosses through national forest land owned by the Forest Service. The Respondents, Cowpasture River Preservation Association et al., counter that the Appalachian Trail is National Park land and, accordingly, only Congress—not the Forest Service—may grant a right-of-way. The Court’s decision in these cases will influence future pipeline development, environmental preservation, and the economies of communities along the Appalachian Trail.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i)’s federal criminal prohibition against encouraging or inducing illegal immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain is facially unconstitutional. The Petitioner, the United States, argues that these provisions do not criminalize speech protected under the First Amendment because “encourage” and “induce” refer only to the facilitation or solicitation of illegal immigration and not to protected speech. The United States thus argues that these provisions have a legitimate sweep because they primarily regulate conduct. The Respondent, Evelyn Sineneng-Smith, counters that “encourage” and “induce” have expansive meanings that extend beyond facilitative conduct. Sineneng-Smith claims that these provisions primarily function to criminalize a wide array of speech that is protected under the First Amendment. The outcome of this case will affect the ways in which citizens may advocate for immigration reform and the nature of professional immigration advice.

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The Supreme Court will decide whether a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim counts as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Section 1915 contains a “three-strikes rule” holding a prisoner liable for litigation costs incurred when filing a civil lawsuit if the prisoner has had three or more prior civil lawsuits dismissed. Petitioner Arthur J. Lomax argues that a court’s dismissal of a complaint without prejudice does not count towards the three-strikes rule that would ban him from filing future legal complaints without filing fees. Lomax supports this argument by noting that dismissal without prejudice does not fall within the meaning of “dismissal” in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Respondent Christina Ortiz-Marquez asserts that this type of dismissal does count towards the three-strike rule because the statute does not differentiate between dismissal with or without prejudice. The Court’s decision will affect a prisoner’s ability to bring civil actions while incarcerated.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether it can retroactively apply portions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to impose punitive damages on a foreign nation. Monicah Opati seeks to recover punitive damages from the Republic of Sudan for its role in al Qaeda’s 1998 embassy bombings. Opati contends that under Republic of Austria v. Altmann, the Act’s immunity exception for foreign states applies retroactively, thereby reaching the al Qaeda bombings even though they occurred prior to the current statute’s enactment. The Republic of Sudan counters that Altmann does not apply here; and, the FSIA’s plaint text does not allow plaintiffs such as Opati to recover punitive damages retroactively under the Act’s immunity exception for foreign states. This case’s outcome implicates the amount of deference given to political branches and could change the balance between plaintiffs suing under FSIA and defendant foreign states.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the categorical approach under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) should apply to “serious drug offense” determinations. Petitioner Eddie Lee Shular argues that under the ACCA, a “serious drug offense” must be considered under the same offense-matching categorical approach that is applied to a “violent felony” under the Act. Shular further argues that the “serious drug offense” provision of the statute requires a mens rea element in the prior state offense in order to qualify under the ACCA. Respondent United States counters that the categorical approach is not applicable to the “serious drug offense” provision of the ACCA, and that a mens rea element is not a requirement under the Act. The outcome of this case will affect uniformity in the criminal justice system, constitutional avoidance, and the ability of courts to limit detrimental effects and disparate impacts.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the New York Convention permits a non-signatory to an international arbitration agreement to compel a signatory to arbitrate. GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. argues that non-signatories may compel a signatory to arbitrate by invoking equitable estoppel because it is available for domestic arbitration under Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act. GE further argues that this is permissible because the Convention contemplates that countries will apply their pro-arbitration domestic laws. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, et al. disagrees, arguing that the Convention’s text and structure impose a baseline writing requirement to show consent to arbitration. The Court’s decision will affect business parties’ calculation of their arbitration liabilities and how carefully they draft the scope of their arbitration agreements.

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This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to consider the extent to which there is “room for play in the joints” between the Religion Clauses in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, namely the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. While the Free Exercise Clause forbids the government from burdening religious practice, the Establishment Clause forbids the government from advancing it. But in some instances, the government may operate in the sphere of religion—what is known as the “room for play between the joints”—without running afoul of either provision. Article X, Section 6(1) of the Montana Constitution excludes religious entities from participating in some generally applicable funding programs. In drafting the provision, legislators sought to erect a greater barrier between church and state. However, the provision may also have unduly burdened religious practice. Kendra Espinoza, Jeri Ellen Anderson, and Jaime Schaefer—mothers who wish to use state-administered scholarship funds to send their children to religious schools—argue that Article X, Section 6(1) violates the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by forbidding scholarship recipients from using the funds to cover tuition expenses at religiously-affiliated schools. The Montana Department of Revenue counters that Article X, Section 6(1) does not violate the Free Exercise Clause or the Equal Protection Clause and does not create hostility toward religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. Instead, the Department contends that Article X, Section 6(1) creates a greater barrier between church and state. The outcome of this case will impact other religious entities’ ability to participate in government benefit programs, and it will impact the national debate over school choice programs.

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