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Richlin Security Service Company entered into two contracts with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now part of the Department of Homeland Security, to provide security guard services for detainees being held at the Los Angeles International Airport. Due to a mutual mistake, Richlin's employees were misclassified as "Guard I" instead of "Guard II" in the contracts, which resulted in their underpayment. Richlin litigated this case four times before the Department of Transportation Contract Appeals Board, which awarded Richlin payment for worker's compensation premiums, payroll taxes, and wages. Richlin then applied pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act for reimbursement of attorney fees, expenses and costs associated with the underlying litigation. Although Richlin was fully compensated for attorney's fees, the Board only awarded Richlin reimbursement of paralegal services at cost rather than the amount billed, resulting in a $40,000 deficiency in recovery. Richlin appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the Board's decision. Richlin argues that paralegal services should be reimbursed under "attorney's fees" because paralegals perform substantive work which contributes to attorney work product. The United States contends that Congress intended for paralegal services to be considered "expenses" under the EAJA, which are reimbursed at cost. The outcome of this case will impact citizens and organizations that rely on the EAJA to bring claims against the government for vindication of rights.

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The Ninth Circuit recently granted criminal defendant Steven Martell Collins’ habeas corpus petition on the grounds that the prosecution unconstitutionally used a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror on account of her race. Although the prosecutor convinced the trial judge that the dismissal was not racially motivated and was therefore acceptable, the Ninth Circuit found the trial judge’s decision to be unreasonable despite the fact that the decision was affirmed on numerous occasions throughout the state court system and at the Federal District Court. The Ninth Circuit held that, despite the statutory deference granted to the original fact-finder by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, such deference was inappropriate here. The Supreme Court will likely interpret § 2254 to determine whether the Ninth Circuit exceeded its authority when it held that the trial judge was unreasonable in accepting the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for dismissing the juror.

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Billy Joe Reynolds, a registered sex offender, was convicted for failing to update his registration upon moving from Missouri to Pennsylvania. Under the newly enacted Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), sex offenders are required to update the federal registry within three days of a change of residence. An Interim Rule issued by the Attorney General applied the statute retroactively to all sex offenders convicted before SORNA’s enactment, including Reynolds. Reynolds challenged the legality of the Interim Rule but the circuit court dismissed his case for lack of standing. In the current suit, Reynolds argues that SORNA’s registration requirements are not applicable to individuals with pre-SORNA convictions. Reynolds adds that the Interim Rule made SORNA’s registration requirements applicable to him, thus giving him standing to challenge the Rule. The Supreme Court's decision will determine whether pre-SORNA sex offenders can state a claim against the Interim Rule, thus potentially delaying the government’s efforts in creating an effective national sex offender registry system. The decision may also prevent the government from issuing harsh new registration requirements without notice to individuals in Reynolds’s situation.

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Respondent Antonio Jackson was an employee of Petitioner Rent-A-Center West, Inc. (“RAC”). Jackson sued RAC, alleging racial discrimination. Because Jackson had signed an arbitration clause as part of his employment contract, RAC asked the court to refer the case to arbitration. Jackson, however, argued the employment contract was unconscionable and therefore invalid. The arbitration clause contains a provision that only an arbitrator can decide validity. Jackson argues that a court must decide the validity of the arbitration clause before requiring arbitration. RAC argues that the parties agreed in the contract to submit this question to arbitration. The Ninth Circuit held that, when a party attacks the validity of an arbitration clause because of unconscionability, a court must decide its validity. The Supreme Court’s decision will influence how arbitration clauses will function in the future and the degree of court involvement in arbitration agreements.

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Reginald Lett was convicted of second-degree murder in a Michigan state court in his second trial for the same offense. In his first trial, the judge determined that the jury was deadlocked and declared it a mistrial. Lett then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. His petition was granted. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling on the basis that Lett’s Fifth Amendment right to be free from Double Jeopardy had been violated because the trial court had not used “sound discretion” in finding a “manifest necessity” to declare a mistrial and terminate the ongoing proceedings. This case presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to clearly articulate what state courts must do before declaring a mistrial to avoid running afoul of the Fifth Amendment.

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Respondent Steven Howards criticized and touched Vice President Cheney while the Vice President was on a meet-and-greet at a local shopping center. Petitioners Virgil Reichle and Dan Doyle, two Secret Service Agents, confronted Howards, and subsequently arrested him for assault. However, the state prosecutor dropped the charges against Howards, who then brought a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim against the Agents. The district court denied the Agents’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Agents could not benefit from qualified immunity under the circumstances. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court must now resolve whether one may raise a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim when there was probable cause for one’s arrest. A decision for Howards may deter law enforcement officers from making arrests for fear of retaliatory arrest claims, while a decision for the Agents may enable officers to more easily target and punish speech which they oppose.

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Relying on false testimony, three grand juries indicted Petitioner Charles Rehberg for varying charges. After the indictments were dismissed, Rehberg brought a private suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several parties, including Respondent James Paulk, who had testified before all three grand juries. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Paulk, an investigator in the district attorney’s office, was entitled to absolute immunity for his testimony. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether a government official who acts as a “complaining witness” is entitled to absolute immunity under Section 1983. Rehberg argues that complaining witnesses were never given absolute immunity under common law, and that a lesser grant of qualified immunity is more appropriate under the circumstances. Paulk, on the other hand, contends that a decision to withhold absolute immunity will discourage public officials from giving complete and objective testimony before grand juries.

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Freelance writers, led by Letty Cotton Pogrebin, brought a class action lawsuit against publishers, led by Reed Elsevier, Inc., for copyright infringement, claiming that the publishers electronically reproduced their works without authorization. The majority of the claims in the class related to alleged infringements of unregistered copyrights. With the approval of the District Court, the parties settled the lawsuit. The Second Circuit held, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to certify a class or to approve a settlement with respect to claims arising from unregistered copyrights. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 411(a) will determine whether claims relating to unregistered copyrights can be settled in class actions along with claims arising from registered work. An affirmation of the Second Circuit’s opinion may make settlements more difficult.

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This case reflects a lack of certainty in the bankruptcy code regarding the proper treatment of the vehicle ownership deduction when calculating an above-median Chapter 13 debtor’s disposable income. Courts are split on whether the deduction can be taken where the debtor owns a vehicle in full and is not responsible for monthly payments on the vehicle. Jason Ransom filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 and claimed a vehicle ownership deduction based on his ownership of an automobile that he owned free and clear. The Ninth Circuit found that the vehicle ownership deduction was not permitted if there was no existing obligation on the vehicle. Ransom argues that the court misinterpreted the statute and failed to recognize that a plain reading of the statute supports the deduction. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify the availability of the vehicle ownership deduction to Chapter 13 debtors who own their vehicles outright.​

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RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC and related entities obtained a secured $142 million loan in 2007 to construct the Radisson Hotel at Los Angeles International Airport. Substantially all of RadLAX’s assets were designated as collateral for this loan. However, still saddled with $120 million of debt, RadLAX filed for bankruptcy in August 2009. RadLAX proposed a Chapter 11 reorganization plan that called for an auction sale of all its assets, free and clear of liens. The plan prohibited secured lenders from credit bidding, i.e. using their loan amounts to offset the asset prices at the auction. Amalgamated Bank, representing the lender, objected to the plan, arguing that the plan violatedSection 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court agreed and rejected RadLAX’s plan. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case may affect the balance of power between debtors and secured creditors in bankruptcy proceedings.

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