Snyder v. Louisiana

Issues

1. Did the Louisiana Supreme Court misapply Miller-El v. Dretke by failing to address several factors supporting a claim of intentional discrimination by the prosecution in a capital trial, including comparisons to the O.J. Simpson trial, the elimination of all African-Americans from the jury by peremptory challenge, differences in the questioning of black and white prospective jurors, and a manner of excluding minority prospective jurors that indicated a pattern of discrimination?

2. Did the Louisiana Supreme Court erroneously apply the standard of review from Rice v. Collins, a federal habeas corpus case that employed a strict standard not applicable in the present case?

 

An all-white Louisiana jury found Allen Snyder, an African-American man, guilty of murder and sentenced him to death. At trial, the prosecution used peremptory strikes to exclude all black prospective jurors from the jury. The prosecution compared the case to the O.J. Simpson case -- before trial, to reporters, and during sentencing, to the jury. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the Louisiana Supreme Court to reconsider its finding of no discriminatory jury selection in light of Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). On remand, a narrow majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirmed its initial ruling. Snyder argues that the court misapplied Miller-El by failing to consider "all relevant circumstances" of the prosecution's discriminatory intent at trial and by according the trial court's findings an excessive degree of deference. The State of Louisiana contends that the court properly considered the case according to Miller-El's principles and rightfully excluded evidence not on the record from its analysis. The Supreme Court's decision will influence how future courts and litigants identify and prevent unlawful racial discrimination in jury selection.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Petitioner Allen Snyder, a black man, was convicted and sentenced to death by an all-white jury in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, for the fatal stabbing of his wife's male companion. Prior to trial, the prosecutor reported to the media that this was his "O.J. Simpson case." At trial, the prosecutor peremptorily struck all five African-Americans who had survived cause challenges and then, over objection, urged the resulting all-white jury to impose death because this case was like the O.J. Simpson case, where the defendant "got away with it." On initial review, a majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court ignored probative evidence of discriminatory intent, including the prosecutor's O.J. Simpson remarks and argument, and denied Mr. Snyder's Batson claims by a 5-2 vote.

This Court directed the court below to reconsider Mr. Snyder's Batson claims in light of Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). See Snyder v. Louisiana, 545 U.S. 1137 (2005). On remand, a bare majority adhered to its prior holding, once again disregarding substantial evidence establishing discriminatory intent, including the prosecutor's references to the O.J. Simpson case, the totality of strikes against African-American jurors, and evidence showing a pattern of practice of race-based peremptory challenges by the prosecutor's office. In addition, the majority imposed a new and higher burden on Mr. Snyder, asserting that Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006), permitted reversal only if "a reasonable factfinder [would] necessarily conclude the prosecutor lied" about the reasons for his strikes. Three justices, including the author of the original opinion, dissented, finding the prosecutor's reference to the O.J. Simpson case in argument to an all-white jury, made "against a backdrop of the issues of race and prejudice," supported the conclusion that the State improperly exercised peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory fashion.

The Louisiana Supreme Court's consideration of Mr. Snyder's Batson claims on remand from this Court raises the following important questions:

1. Did the majority below ignore the plain import of Miller-El by failing to consider highly probative evidence of discriminatory intent, including the prosecutor's repeated comparisons of this case to the O.J. Simpson case, the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to purge all African-Americans from the jury, the prosecutor's disparate questioning of white and black prospective jurors, and documented evidence of a pattern of practice by the prosecutor's office to dilute minority presence in petit juries?

2. Did the majority err when, in order to shore up its holding that Mr. Snyder had failed to prove discriminatory intent, it imported into a direct appeal case the standard of review this Court applied in Rice v. Collins, an AEDPA habeas case?

3. Did the majority err in refusing to consider the prosecutor's first two suspicious strikes on the ground that defense counsel's failure to object could not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because Batson error does not render the trial unfair or the verdict suspect -- i.e., that failure to raise a Batson objection can never result in prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) - a holding directly conflicting with decisions from inter alia the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the Alabama and Mississippi Supreme Courts?

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Smith v. Texas

Issues

If the Supreme Court reversed and remanded Smith’s case to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals after finding that the jury had not been able to adequately consider the mitigating evidence, was the Court of Criminal Appeals’ finding that the violation was a harmless error consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision?

Must a defendant prove that a jury instruction that violated his constitutional rights caused him egregious harm?

 

LaRoyce Lathair Smith, who was sentenced to death in 1991, appears before the Supreme Court for the second time. Smith argues that the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals denied his petition for state habeas corpus relief in contravention of the analysis standards handed down in the Supreme Court’s first opinion. In addition, Smith argues that the Criminal Court of Appeals applied a heightened egregious harm standard to a procedural issue that it failed to consider on direct appeal. Texas, on the other hand, contends that the Criminal Court of Appeals was justified in reconsidering issues not addressed by the Supreme Court and asserts that the standards applied were the prevailing state standards for evaluating Smith’s claim. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case should clarify the proper way for state courts to evaluate defendants’ claims attacking the constitutionality of jury instructions regarding mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of capital cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004), this Court summarily reversed the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and found constitutional error under Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Penry I), and Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (Penry II). Is it consistent with this Court’s remand in this case for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to deem the error in petitioner’s case harmless based on its view that jurors were in fact able to give adequate consideration and effect to petitioner’s mitigating evidence notwithstanding this Court’s conclusion to the contrary?

Can the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, based on a procedural determination that it declined to adopt in its original decision that this Court then summarily reversed, impose on remand a daunting standard of harm (“egregious harm”) to the constitutional violation found by this Court?

In 1991, 19 year old LaRoyce Lathair Smith was convicted of the capital murder of his coworker, who Smith had pistol whipped and shot. Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 38 (2004) (“Smith I”). After Smith was convicted, the jury was tasked with deciding Smith’s sentence. Id. at 39.

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Smith v. Spisak

Issues

Whether the Sixth Circuit applied the proper standards for determining whether a convicted murderer was unfairly affected by jury instructions and his own counsel’s statements during sentencing, when counsel repeatedly referred to the terrible nature of his own client’s acts in closing arguments at the penalty phase of the trial.

 

Respondent, Frank Spisak (“Spisak”), was convicted on four counts of aggravated murder and four other felony counts for engaging in a shooting spree on and around Cleveland State University in 1982. The jury recommended, and the judge accepted, a death sentence. After the Ohio state courts denied Spisak’s appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ordered a new penalty phase of the trial. The Circuit Court held that defense counsel’s deficient performance during the trial’s sentencing phase functionally denied Spisak his Sixth Amendment right to effective legal representation. The Sixth Circuit held further that the jury instructions regarding sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment, because the jury may have misunderstood them to require a unanimous rejection of the death penalty before considering a life sentence. On its second time before the United States Supreme Court, Ohio argues that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") requires the federal courts to defer to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision to deny Spisak’s Sixth and Eighth Amendment claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Did the Sixth Circuit contravene the directives of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") and Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006), when it applied Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), to resolve in a habeas petitioner's favor questions that were not decided or addressed in Mills?
  2. Did the Sixth Circuit exceed its authority under AEDPA when it applied United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), to presume that a habeas petitioner suffered prejudice from several allegedly deficient statements made by his trial counsel during closing argument instead of deferring to the Ohio Supreme Court's reasonable rejection of the claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)?

In 1983, Frank Spisak (“Spisak”) was convicted of murdering a minister and three students in a racially and homophobically motivated shooting spree at Cleveland State University and was sentenced to death. See Spisak v. Mitchell, 465 F.3d 684, 688 (6th Cir.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John Blume and Professor Faust Rossi for their insights on this case. John Blume is a Professor of Law at Cornell Law School and the Director of the Cornell Death Penalty Project. Faust Rossi is the Samuel S. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques at Cornell University and a co-author of the Brief of Amici Curiae Steven Lubet, et al., in support of Respondent.

Additional Resources

·      Wex: Law about Criminal Procedure

·      Capital Punishment in Context: Juror’s Understandings and Misunderstandings

·      Charles Doyle, Federation of American Scientists: Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty (Jun. 3, 1996)

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Smith v. Cain

Issues

Whether evidence proffered by Smith, which he claims was suppressed and thus not available to the defense at trial, is material, and whether there is a reasonable possibility that this evidence could have affected the outcome of the trial.

 

Petitioner Juan Smith was the sole person convicted of killing five people in a Louisiana home. His conviction was primarily based on the testimony of a witness, a survivor of the shooting, who identified Smith as one of the gunmen responsible for the crime. In subsequent applications for review, Smith contended that his trial was unfair because the prosecution intentionally suppressed material evidence. In this case, Smith argues that the suppression of that evidence constituted a violation of his constitutional due process rights; he supports this argument by seeking to show that the suppressed evidence undermines confidence in the jury’s verdict against him. While Smith insists that he is entitled to a new trial, Respondent Burl Cain, warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary, insists that the evidence was neither material nor suppressed, thus opposing a new trial. This case may affect the standard to which a prosecutor is held with regard to disclosure of evidence.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In this criminal case, the state trial court, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, and the Louisiana Supreme Court, without making any factual findings, or providing any reasons for their rulings, denied Petitioner Juan Smith post-conviction relief. Smith contends that the state courts reached this result only by disregarding firmly established precedents of this Court regarding suppression of material evidence favorable to a defendant and presentation of false or misleading evidence by a prosecutor.

1. Is there a reasonable probability that, given the cumulative effect of the Brady and Napue/Giglio violations in Smith’s case, the outcome of the trial would have been different?

2. Did the Louisiana state courts ignore fundamental principles of due process in rejecting Smith’s Brady and Napue/Giglioclaims?

A Louisiana state court convicted Petitioner Juan Smith of participating in the 1995 shooting murder of five people, and sentenced Smith to life in prison without parole. See Brief for Petitioner, Juan Smith at 2; Brief for Respondent

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Smith v. Bayer Corp.

Issues

Whether the Anti-Injunction Act’s relitigation exception allows a federal court to enjoin parties seeking a class certification in state court under state procedural rules when the federal court previously denied certification of a similar class with similar issues under federal procedural rules.

 

Bayer Corporation manufactured and distributed Baycol, a prescription cholesterol medication that was linked to thirty-one deaths. After removing Baycol from the market, Bayer was sued by thousands of individuals. These individual claims, including the claim of an individual seeking economic damages under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, were consolidated for pre-trial motions in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. Two other individuals separately sued Bayer under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act in West Virginia state court. The federal district court denied class certification of the West Virginia economic damages claim, determining that such claims required individual damages. Bayer moved to enjoin certification of the economic damages claim in West Virginia state court based on the district court's decision. The district court granted the injunction and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the claim fit the “relitigation exception” to the Anti-Injunction Act because the decision met the requirements of collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the relitigation exception applies when the parties and issues involved in two actions are not entirely identical and whether a court can have jurisdiction over an absent class member or a nonparty if a class does not actually exist because the court denied certification. This decision may affect the ability of individuals to bring class actions in state court or, alternatively, the ability of defendants in federal class actions to efficiently preclude similar state court claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Among the elements for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be used in support of the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act are requirements that the state parties sought to be estopped are the same parties or in privity with parties to the prior federal litigation and that issues necessary to the resolution of the proceedings are also identical. In determining whether issues are identical, courts have also recognized that state courts should have discretion to apply their own procedural rules in a manner different from their federal counterparts. Can the district court's injunction be affirmed when neither the parties sought to be estopped nor the issues presented are identical? ??

2. It is axiomatic that everyone should have his own day in court and that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he has not been made a party by designation or service of process. One exception to this rule are absent members of a class in a properly conducted class action because of the due-process protections accorded such absent members once class certification has been granted. Does a district court have personal jurisdiction over absent members of a class for purposes of enjoining them from seeking class certification in state court when a properly conducted class action had never existed before the district court because it had denied class certification and due-process protections had never been afforded the absent members?

From 1997 to 2001, Bayer Corporation ("Bayer") manufactured and distributed Baycol, a prescription medicine designed to lower cholesterol. See Smith v. Bayer, 593 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir.

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Additional Resources

· Forbes, Daniel Fisher: Class-Action Foes Have Trifecta Before Supreme Court (Dec. 20, 2010)

· Mass Tort Litigation Blog, Elizabeth Burch: Supreme Court to Hear Case on the Anti-Injunction Act's Relitigation Exception(Oct. 7, 2010)

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Skinner v. Switzer

Issues

Must a convicted capital murderer bring a federal habeas corpus claim in order to assert his due process right to access to DNA evidence, or may he bring his claim as a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?

 

Florida convicted petitioner Henry Skinner of capital murder and sentenced him to death. Although Skinner admits that he was present at the scene of the murders, he maintains his innocence. Skinner now seeks access to biological evidence for DNA testing, which he claims will prove that he is innocent of the murders. After unsuccessfully filing two habeas corpus claims, Skinner filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim to attempt to gain access to the evidence. The Fifth Circuit denied Skinner’s motion to stay his execution, but Skinner appealed that decision and the Supreme Court agreed to hear Skinner’s case. The Court must now decide whether a demand for access to biological evidence may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or whether the claim falls within the realm of habeas corpus law and was thus improperly filed. The Supreme Court’s decision will not only decide Skinner’s fate, but also clarify the scope and procedure of habeas corpus claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May a convicted prisoner seeking access to biological evidence for DNA testing assert that claim in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or is such a claim cognizable only in a petition for writ of habeas corpus?

In 1995, Henry Skinner was convicted of murdering his girlfriend and her two sons in their Pampa, Texas home, and sentenced to death. See Brief for Petitioner, Henry W.

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Additional Resources

· Wex: Habeas Corpus

· Wex: Civil Rights

· Human Genome Project: DNA Forensics

· Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Dave Montgomery: U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Texas Death Row Inmate’s Case (May 24, 2010)

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Skilling v. United States

Issues

Is the federal statute making it a crime for someone to “deprive another of the intangible right of honest services” unconstitutionally vague?

When an entire community is outraged by the events giving rise to a criminal trial, is it possible to draw a jury that does not share the community’s presumed prejudice? If so, what standard should a court use to determine if the presumption of prejudice has been overcome?

 

Former Enron Corporation executive Jeffrey K. Skilling was convicted by a federal jury in Houston, Texas of numerous counts of conspiracy, securities fraud and insider trading relating to Enron’s bankruptcy. After the Fifth Circuit upheld Skilling’s conviction, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve two key issues. First, the court will determine the scope and constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which makes it a crime for an employee of a corporation to fraudulently deprive the corporation of that employee’s “intangible honest services.” Second, the Court will determine whether and to what extent the government was required to prove—to the satisfaction of the parties and the district court—that no member of the Houston jury that convicted Skilling was actually prejudiced by the widespread negative media attention the Enron bankruptcy received in the Houston area before and during Skilling’s initial trial. The rulings on these issues may give much needed guidance to the lower courts in dealing with vague statutes, and may affect the scope of Sixth Amendment rights for every criminal defendant.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the federal "honest services" fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, requires the government to prove that the defendant's conduct was intended to achieve "private gain" rather than to advance the employer's interests, and, if not, whether § 1346 is unconstitutionally vague.

2. When a presumption of jury prejudice arises because of the widespread community impact of the defendant's alleged conduct and massive, inflammatory pretrial publicity, whether the government may rebut the presumption of prejudice, and, if so, whether the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no juror was actually prejudiced.

Jeffrey K. Skilling, former President, COO and CEO of the now-defunct Enron Corporation, was convicted by a federal jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas on numerous counts of conspiracy, securities fraud, making false representations to auditors, and insider trading, all relating to his role in the highly-publicized failure of Enron. See U.S. v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 534 (5th Cir.

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Sinochem International v. Malaysia International Shipping

Issues

Whether the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania erred in dismissing this suit on the ground of forum non conveniens before conclusively establishing personal jurisdiction.

 

The forum non conveniens motion asks a court to dismiss a pending case so that the dispute may be pursued in a different, more appropriate forum. This option is increasingly popular in cases where the defendant wishes to move the case from the courts of one nation to another. In this case, a shipment from the United States to China went awry, and the parties pursued litigation in both Chinese and American courts. In one of the suits, a federal district court granted a forum non conveniensmotion, although it had not conclusively established that it had jursidiction over the parties. If the Supreme Court reasons that a forum non conveniens motion may be resolved before jurisdiction is determined, then litigants will benefit from expedient court decisions in appropriate forums. However, if the Court finds that a lower court may not dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens before conclusively establishing jurisdiction, then litigants will be faced with the potential of lengthy proceedings in inappropriate forums. The Court's decision in this case will thus affect parties involved in duplicative litigation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a district court must first conclusively establish jurisdiction before dismissing a suit on the ground of forum non conveniens.

In 2003, a Chinese company called Sinochem contracted with an American company called Triorient Trading Inc. ("Triorient") for the purchase of a large quantity of steel coils to be loaded for shipment to China by April 30, 2003. Pursuant to the contract, Sinochem opened a letter of credit with its bank in China to provide security to Triorient. In addition, Triorient would get paid only once a valid bill of lading stating that the coils had been loaded was issued.

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Simmons v. Himmelreich

Issues

Does the judgment bar of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2676, bar a subsequent action against federal employees when the original claim against the United States, brought under Section 1346(b), was dismissed pursuant to the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception in Section 2680?

 

Walter Himmelreich brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) suit against the United States during his federal prison sentence in 2010. The suit was subsequently dismissed under the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception. The exception states that courts do not have jurisdiction over claims “based upon the exercise or performance . . . [of] a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or [a government] employee.” Himmelreich later brought suit against prison officials, alleging various constitutional violations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned the district court’s decision to dismiss that complaint on the basis of the FTCA's judgment bar, which the district court determined barred plaintiffs from bringing claims against government employees that had previously received judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether a dismissal under the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception in Section 2680 is a “judgment” that would bar future claims under the FTCA’s judgment bar. Simmons argues that a dismissal on the grounds of the discretionary-function exception constitutes a judgment, and that the judgment bar should apply. Himmelreich argues that a dismissal on the grounds of the discretionary-function exception has no claim-preclusive effect and thus fails to trigger the judgment bar. The decision in this case will clarify the proper scope of the FTCA's judgment bar and may impact government employees’ exposure to liability.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does a final judgment in an action brought under Section 1346(b) dismissing the claim on the ground that relief is precluded by one of the FTCA’s exceptions to liability, 28 U.S.C. 2680, bar a subsequent action by the claimant against the federal employees whose acts gave rise to the FTCA claim?

Walter Himmelreich is a federal prisoner who filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") against the United States in 2010 and a second complaint alleging various causes of action against numerous 

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Sheriff v. Gillie

Issues

Are lawyers, appointed by the state attorney general to collect debts owed to the state, exempt from the provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act when collecting such debts; and if not, does using official letterhead of the Attorney General constitute a violation of the Act?

 

The Supreme Court will consider whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) applies to lawyers, known as “special counsel,” appointed by a state Attorney General to collect debts owed to the state, during the performance of their duties. Various lawyers and their firms, appointed as special counsel by the Ohio Attorney General, argue that special counsel are properly defined as state “officers,” making special counsel exempt from the FDCPA. Pamela Gillie and Hazel Meadows, Ohio debtors, counter that special counsel are not “officers” but independent contractors subject to the FDCPA’s requirements. Gillie and Meadows also argue that use of Attorney General letterhead by special counsel to collect a debt is a “false, deceptive, or misleading representation” in violation of Section 1692e of the FDCPA. The Court’s decision could alter state sovereignty to collect debts and the power of state attorneys general.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Are special counsel—lawyers appointed by the Attorney General to undertake his duty to collect debts owed to the State—state “officers” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C)?

2. Is it materially misleading under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e for special counsel to use Attorney General letterhead to convey that they are collecting debts owed to the State on behalf of the Attorney General?

As Ohio’s chief law enforcement officer, the Attorney General (the “OAG”) is charged with collecting debts owed to state entities under Ohio law. Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones, LLC, 37 F. Supp. 3d 928, 931 (S.D.

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