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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), which authorizes relief from a final judgment on the grounds of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” authorizes relief on the grounds that a district court committed an error of law. A federal district court determined that petitioner Dexter Earl Kemp’s motion for relief from legal error under Rule 60(b)(6) should instead be construed as a motion under Rule 60(b)(1) and dismissed Kemp’s petition because it was not presented within the one-year limitations period that applies to motions under Rule 60(b)(1) but not to motions under Rule 60(b)(6). On appeal to the Supreme Court, Kemp argues that, because Rule 60(b)(1) replicated identical state statutory provisions that did not allow relief for legal error, the Court cannot construe Rule 60(b)(1) to authorize relief for legal error. The United States responds that both the plain meaning of Rule 60(b)(1) and the fact that Rule 60(b)(1) replicated a California statute allowing relief for legal error establish that Rule 60(b)(1) allows relief for legal error. Because the Court’s decision on the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1) will determine for how long after entry of final judgment a litigant is entitled to seek relief for legal error, the resolution of this case will affect the expediency and finality of federal civil litigation. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether an agency commits “clear and unmistakable error” when it denies benefits to a veteran by relying on a binding regulation that is later invalidated. Petitioner Kevin George enlisted in the military when he was seventeen years old and was later medically discharged when he was diagnosed with schizophrenia. George sought benefits for the aggravation of his symptoms but was denied because the Board of Veterans’ Appeals relied on a later-invalidated regulation that incorrectly interpreted the statutory requirements for proving aggravation. After the regulation was invalidated in the early 2000s, George brought a claim for revision of the Board’s decision. The Federal Circuit Court, however, denied George’s claim, concluding that the agency had correctly relied on the law as interpreted at the time of its decision. George claims that an agency commits clear and unmistakable error when relying on later invalidated regulations. Respondent Denis McDonough, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, counters that agencies do not commit clear and unmistakable error when relying on binding regulations in existence at the time of decision making. This case has important implications for military veterans’ benefits claims and the efficiency of Veterans’ courts.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Federal Arbitration Act demands that state courts enforce an arbitration agreement’s waiver of the statutory right of action to collect penalties on behalf of the state, despite state law prohibiting such a contractual waiver. Petitioner Viking River Cruises argues that the Federal Arbitration Act requires that arbitration agreements signed by employees must be enforced as written for claims brought under California’s Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) because such claims are individual disputes and incompatible with the procedures of individual bilateral arbitration. Respondent Angie Moriana counters that PAGA claims involve the state, not the individual, and that PAGA’s anti-waiver rule is necessary to bolster the state’s labor law enforcement. The outcome of this case has important implications for the enforcement of state labor codes, the availability of civil remedies for workers, and the effectiveness of arbitration agreements to resolve employment-related disputes.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether an act of Congress which allows veterans to sue states in their state court violates Article I of the Constitution. Leroy Torres, a veteran who served in Iraq, filed an employment discrimination case in Texas state court against his former state employer after it failed to provide relief for military injuries. The Texas courts found that Torres could not draw the state into a lawsuit using Texas courts. Torres argues that the text, history, and precedent of the Constitution’s war powers require Texas to participate in the suit. The state employer counters that if a private party were to subject Texas to its own judicial system, it would violate principles of sovereign immunity. This case has important implications for injured veterans’ ability to obtain relief from unlawful discrimination and can potentially radically reshape the balance of power between federal and state courts in deciding war powers questions.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a train that has stopped temporarily in a rail yard as part of its journey is considered “in use” on a railroad’s line and subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA) and other safety regulations. LeDure asserts that precedent cases under related legislation apply to the LIA and argues the term “use” encompasses locomotives, like UP5683, stopped en route to a destination, furthering the goal of the statutes to protect employees. Union Pacific counters that the precedent under similar statutes does not interpret “use” to encompass sidelined locomotives, and that the LIA contains unique aspects that limit the “use” of locomotives to their main purpose of actively hauling railcars. The outcome of this case has important implications for the safety and compensation of employees and the expectations of railroad operations.

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This case asks the Supreme Court whether an airline ramp supervisor is exempt from arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Federal Arbitration Act codifies the federal policy for disputes to go through arbitration, exempting workers that engage in interstate commerce. Southwest Airlines argues that Saxon must resolve her dispute through arbitration because Saxon is not an exempt employee under the Act. Saxon argues that her work as a ramp supervisor includes loading and unloading cargo that travels interstate, so she is exempt from mandatory arbitration. The outcome of this case has implications for defining the limits of the Federal Arbitration Act and how courts define a worker operating in interstate commerce.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a private commercial arbitral tribunal is a “foreign or international tribunal” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1782, a federal law that governs international judicial assistance. International judicial assistance refers to aid provided by one sovereign government to another in judicial proceedings. In ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd, Petitioner ZF Automotive US, Inc. contends that, based on the plain meaning and legislative history of § 1782, it does not apply to private commercial arbitral tribunals located in foreign nations. Respondent Luxshare, Ltd. counters that the dictionary definitions and legal use of the terms “foreign” and “tribunal” show that the statute does apply to private commercial arbitration. In AlixPartners, LLC v. Fund for Protection of Investor Rights in Foreign States, Petitioner AlixPartners, LLC argues that its arbitral panel does not qualify under § 1782 simply due to the international nature of the parties or the dispute because that does not turn the panel itself into an “international tribunal.” Respondent Fund for Protection of Investors’ Rights in Foreign States counters that the arbitral panel does constitute an international tribunal because it is resolving a dispute over whether one country violated its obligations under a treaty. These cases implicate the fair and efficient resolution of arbitral disputes, party autonomy, and international comity.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to assess whether arbitration clauses in contracts may be waived by entering litigation. The FAA provides standards that courts must apply when enforcing contractual agreements to arbitrate disputes. Robyn Morgan argues that the FAA requires courts to interpret arbitration agreements to be no less and no more enforceable than other contractual provisions. Therefore, Morgan contends that she does not need to show that she was prejudiced in order to establish that her employer, Sundance, Inc. (“Sundance”), waived an agreement to arbitrate. Sundance counters that the FAA merely provides minimum standards for arbitration clauses, and even if it did not, proving waiver in this instance requires a showing of prejudice. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for arbitration proceedings and employment contracts.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether, under the Hague Convention, a court may consider ameliorative measures, such as protective orders or custody determinations, to prevent grave danger to a child when ordering a child back to their home country. The Hague Convention requires that children abducted in violation of parental custody rights must be returned to their country of habitual residence. Narkis Golan, a United States citizen living in Italy, brought her Italian-born child to the United States, and did not return to Italy because she was a victim of domestic abuse by her Italian husband, Isaac Saada. Saada then sued Golan under the Hague Convention. Golan claims that her case falls under an exception within the Hague Convention that stops the return of the child if there is risk that the child will be in grave danger. While the lower court found sufficient ameliorative measures to prevent potential danger and granted Saada’s petition, Golan argues that the ameliorative measures are counter to the goals of the Hague Convention and should not be required or considered, especially where there is domestic violence. Saada responds that ameliorative rights must be considered to fairly assess the child’s return to their habitual residence. The outcome of this case could affect the safety of children, Hague Convention proceedings, and cooperation between foreign nations.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether state legislators have a right to intervene in a lawsuit filed against the state of North Carolina concerning the constitutionality of the state’s voter-ID law when the Attorney General is already representing the state in the matter. Petitioners Philip E. Berger, President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate and Timothy K. Moore, Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives argue that Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) and North Carolina law grant state legislators the right to intervene on behalf of the state in judicial proceedings. Petitioners further maintain that Rule 24 only requires state agents to establish a minimum standard of inadequate representation to intervene in litigation involving their state’s interests. Respondents North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP and other North Carolina NAACP branches counter that Rule 24(a)(2) does not allow an additional party to join the case when its interests are identical to the existing party’s interests. Moreover, the Respondents argue that state legislators need to demonstrate a higher standard of inadequacy to show that the Attorney General is inadequately representing the state to join the case. The outcome of this case has important implications for the role of state governments in litigation, future parties that are or will be engaged in litigation with the states, and the judiciary.

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