Stanford University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc.

Issues

May an employee of a university receiving government funding assign the rights in an invention to a third party without the university’s consent, or does the university retain the rights to the invention under the Bayh-Dole Act?

 

In the late 1980s, Dr. Mark Holodniy, a Stanford University researcher, conducted part of his research at a private biotechnology company. The result of his work, which was partially funded by the government, was an improved method for testing the effectiveness of HIV treatments. Over the next few years, Roche Molecular Systems, the owner of the biotechnology company at which Dr. Holodniy conducted his research, incorporated his invention into its publicly sold HIV-testing kits. At roughly the same time, Stanford, Dr. Holodniy’s employer, began the process of patenting the invention under the University and Small Business Patent Procedure Act, commonly known as the Bayh-Dole Act. In 2005, Stanford sued Roche for patent infringement, arguing among other things that the Bayh-Dole Act gave Stanford the exclusive first right to acquire ownership of Holodniy’s invention. The district court ruled for Stanford, but the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that an assignment of ownership rights in an earlier confidentiality agreement between Holodniy and the biotechnology company trumped Stanford’s ownership rights. Now, the Supreme Court must decide whether the Bayh-Dole Act prevents individual inventors from assigning to third parties their ownership rights in federally funded inventions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a federal contractor university’s statutory right under the Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212, in inventions arising from federally funded research can be terminated unilaterally by an individual inventor through a separate agreement purporting to assign the inventor’s rights to a third party.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a team of scientists working at Stanford University and Cetus Corporation laboratories developed a method to discern the efficacy of HIV drug treatments. See Stanford Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 583 F.3d 832, 837 (Fed. Cir.

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· Bloomberg.com: Stanford-Roche Patent Fight Draws U.S. Supreme Court Review (Nov. 1, 2010)

· Economist: Innovation’s Golden Goose (Dec. 12, 2002)

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Sprint/United Management v. Mendelsohn

 

In her Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) suit against Sprint, Ellen Mendelsohn sought to use the testimony of other Sprint employees who claimed to have experienced age discrimination at Sprint. This evidence falls into the category sometimes called "me too" testimony, because the employees did not share a supervisor with Mendelsohn and were not parties in Mendelsohn's litigation. The district court rejected the "me too" testimony, interpreting a past Tenth Circuit ruling to mean that testimony of other employees was admissible only if the other employees worked under the same supervisor and were fired around the time Sprint fired Mendelsohn. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the same-supervisor requirement only applied in discriminatory discipline actions, not in cases like Mendelsohn involving allegations of company-wide discrimination.� Currently, four circuits hold that "me too" evidence is irrelevant and thus inadmissible, while another five circuits hold that such evidence is excludable at the discretion of the court. The Tenth Circuit's holding departs from both of these views. By deciding Sprint v. Mendelsohn, the Supreme Court will resolve this circuit split regarding "me too" evidence. The Court's decision will affect the ability of employees to prove company-wide discrimination. Its ruling will be particularly important because it will apply not only to ADEA, but also to suits brought under a range of federal anti-discrimination statutes.�

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Sprint Communications v. APCC Services, Inc.

Issues

Does an assignment of a claim "for purposes of collection" gives an otherwise uninvolved third-party assignee sufficient interest under Article III to bring a lawsuit in its own name?

 

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires long-distance telephone companies, such as Sprint and AT&T, to fairly compensate payphone service providers (PSPs) when consumers use the companies' access codes to complete long-distance calls on payphones. About 1,400 PSPs assigned their rights "of collection" to a third-party aggregator, American Public Communications Council Services (APCC), in order for APCC to sue Sprint and AT&T for inadequate compensation on the PSPs' behalf. While the District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed APCC's suit for lack of standing under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, it later vacated its ruling and denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ultimately found that APCC had standing to sue as well as the private right to sue in federal court.

On appeal, the Supreme Court will determine whether an assignment of claims "for purposes of collection" establishes standing for a third-party assignee.  The Court will examine whether APCC meets the standing requirements of injury-in-fact and redressability.  A decision for APCC could allow future parties to bring collective suits while bypassing legislative safeguards, such as those established for class actions. On the other hand, a decision for Sprint and AT&T may frustrate enforcement of the Telecommunications Act by preventing efficient collection efforts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the assignment of a claim "for purposes of collection" confers standing on assignees which have no personal stake in the case and which avowedly litigate only "on behalf of" the assignors.

The Communications Act of 1934, codified at 47 U.S.C. Chapter 5, created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an independent federal agency regulating interstate and international radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable communications. Congress amended the Act in 1990 by passing the Telephone Operator Consumer Services Improvement Act, codified at 47 U.S.C.

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Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins

Issues

Can a plaintiff who has suffered no concrete harm sue in federal court for a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act without violating Article III of the US Constitution?

 

This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to decide whether plaintiffs may file lawsuits in federal court simply by showing that a defendant violated a federal statute. On the one hand, Spokeo, Inc. argues that Article III of the United States Constitution requires the plaintiff to show that he was sufficiently harmed by the violation of the statute. See Brief for Petitioner, Spokeo, Inc. at 11–13. On the other hand, Robins contends that although he might not meet the injury-in-fact requirement, he was in fact harmed by the incorrect information that was listed on Spokeo, Inc.’s website. See Brief for Respondent, Thomas Robins at 34. According to Robins, the fact that Congress created a private right of action in the Fair Credit Reporting Act combined with the fact that Spokeo, Inc. violated the statute is enough to file a lawsuit. See Brief for Respondent at 15. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will implicate class action lawsuits involving large corporations, as well as potentially alter the likelihood that corporations will settle claims to prevent significant financial consequences. See Brief for Amici Curiae Ebay Inc. et al., in Support of Petitioner at 13–14; see Brief for Time Inc. and Seven Media Organizations, in Support of Petitioner at 20.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May Congress confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal statute?

The issues in this case arise from the information that Petitioner Spokeo, Inc. provides to its users about other individuals through its online services. See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1892, 191 L. Ed. 2d 762 (2015). Spokeo, Inc.

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Southern Union Co. v. United States

Issues

When the court imposes a criminal fine, do the principles of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) apply, requiring that the jury find all issues of fact necessary to determine the amount of the fine?

 

In 2004, local youths broke into a Southern Union storage center that was improperly storing mercury; the incident resulted in a spill and cleanup effort. Southern Union was charged with storing hazardous waste without a permit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. After a jury found Southern Union guilty, the district court judge determined that the violation had continued for 762 days and imposed a fine of $38 million. On appeal, Southern Union argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi required that the jury determine the period of the violation, not the judge. Southern Union contends that if the determination of the period of violation is left to the judge, the court could impose a fine in excess of the actual violation, violating Southern Union’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. In contrast, the United States asserts that Apprendi is not applicable because it dealt with deprivations of life and liberty interests, not the criminal fines that are at issue here. The decision in this case has implications for consistent treatment of defendants and the efficiency of courts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendment principles that this Court established in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny, apply to the imposition of criminal fines.

Southern Union Company (“Southern Union”), a distributor of natural gas, acquired an old gas manufacturing plant in Rhode Island (“the Tidewater property”) as part of its new operations in Massachusetts and Rhode Island in 2000. See United States v.

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Sossamon v. Texas

Issues

Whether the term “appropriate relief” as provided in the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act should be interpreted to include monetary damages or instead should be interpreted to include only injunctive and declaratory relief?

 

Harvey Leroy Sossamon, III is an inmate at a Texas state prison. The prison warden refused to allow cell-restricted inmates to attend religious services and denied all inmates use of the prison chapel for religious purposes. In 2006, Sossamon filed suit against the State of Texas and various state and prison officials, alleging that the Texas prison violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). Sossamon sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Texas, holding that Texas has sovereign immunity under the 11th Amendment and is not liable for damages. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Sossamon argues here that the words “appropriate relief,” as provided by RLUIPA, unambiguously waives the state's immunity from damages. Texas counters that “appropriate relief” does not amount to clear notice which is required before a state may waive its sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine the protection afforded to states under RLUIPA and may deter states from implementing policies which violate the Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an individual may sue a state or state official in his official capacity for damages for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000cc et seq. (2000 ed.).

Petitioner Harvey Leroy Sossamon, III has been an inmate of the Robertson Unit of the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice since 2002. See Brief of Respondents, Texas et al.

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Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.

Issues

Can a state prohibit the nonconsensual sale of doctors’ prescribing information contained in nonpublic prescription drug records, or is such a restriction an improper infringement on the free speech of pharmaceutical companies?

 

In 2007, Vermont passed Act 80, which prohibits prescription drug companies from obtaining patients’ personal information for marketing purposes without the prescribing physician’s consent. The pharmaceutical companies sued the state of Vermont, seeking an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of Act 80 on the grounds that it was an unconstitutional restriction on their right to commercial speech. Vermont argues that Act 80 does not regulate speech protected by the First Amendment, and that the law is related to Vermont’s interests of protecting medical privacy, controlling health care costs, and protecting public health. On the other hand, the pharmaceutical companies argue that Act 80 is unconstitutional because it discriminates against the speech of pharmaceutical manufacturers and it is not related to Vermont’s state interests. The Supreme Court’s decision will affect patients’ and physicians’ privacy, the marketing of prescription drugs, and the status of other laws protecting consumer privacy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a law that restricts access to information in nonpublic prescription drug records and affords prescribers the right to consent before their identifying information in prescription drug records is sold or used in marketing runs afoul of the First Amendment.

When filling prescriptions, Vermont pharmacies collect personal data about the patients and sell the data to data miningcompanies. See IMS Health, Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 2010).

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Snyder v. Phelps

Issues

Does an individual’s interest in suing to recover for the disruption of a family member’s funeral outweigh the disrupter’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech?

 

Respondents Fred W. Phelps, Shirley L. Phelps-Roper, and Rebekah A. Phelps-Davis (“the Phelpses”) protested at the military funeral of Petitioner Albert Snyder’s son, holding signs saying "God Hates the USA," "Thank God for 9/11," and other phrases. Snyder successfully sued the Phelpses for intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion, and conspiracy, and the jury awarded Snyder $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the jury verdict, holding that the Phelpses’ statements were protected under the First Amendment and thus could not be subject to a civil lawsuit. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the statements should be protected because they are rhetorical hyperbole, as opposed to verifiable fact, and because the statements address matters of public concern. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will implicate individuals’ free speech and privacy interests and the states’ interest in protecting their citizens through tort law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Does the Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell standard for state tort recovery apply when a private citizen is suing another private citizen concerning a private matter?

2. Does the First Amendment’s freedom of speech tenet trump the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of religion and peaceful assembly?

3. Does an individual attending a family member’s funeral constitute a captive audience who is entitled to state protection from unwanted communication?

Petitioner Albert Snyder’s son, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew A. Snyder, was killed in action while deployed in Iraq. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2009). Respondents Fred W. Phelps, Sr., Shirley L. Phelps-Roper, and Rebekah A. Phelps-Davis (“the Phelpses”) are members of the Westboro Baptist Church, Inc. (“WBC”), which is also a party to the action.

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Snyder v. Louisiana

Issues

1. Did the Louisiana Supreme Court misapply Miller-El v. Dretke by failing to address several factors supporting a claim of intentional discrimination by the prosecution in a capital trial, including comparisons to the O.J. Simpson trial, the elimination of all African-Americans from the jury by peremptory challenge, differences in the questioning of black and white prospective jurors, and a manner of excluding minority prospective jurors that indicated a pattern of discrimination?

2. Did the Louisiana Supreme Court erroneously apply the standard of review from Rice v. Collins, a federal habeas corpus case that employed a strict standard not applicable in the present case?

 

An all-white Louisiana jury found Allen Snyder, an African-American man, guilty of murder and sentenced him to death. At trial, the prosecution used peremptory strikes to exclude all black prospective jurors from the jury. The prosecution compared the case to the O.J. Simpson case -- before trial, to reporters, and during sentencing, to the jury. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the Louisiana Supreme Court to reconsider its finding of no discriminatory jury selection in light of Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). On remand, a narrow majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirmed its initial ruling. Snyder argues that the court misapplied Miller-El by failing to consider "all relevant circumstances" of the prosecution's discriminatory intent at trial and by according the trial court's findings an excessive degree of deference. The State of Louisiana contends that the court properly considered the case according to Miller-El's principles and rightfully excluded evidence not on the record from its analysis. The Supreme Court's decision will influence how future courts and litigants identify and prevent unlawful racial discrimination in jury selection.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Petitioner Allen Snyder, a black man, was convicted and sentenced to death by an all-white jury in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, for the fatal stabbing of his wife's male companion. Prior to trial, the prosecutor reported to the media that this was his "O.J. Simpson case." At trial, the prosecutor peremptorily struck all five African-Americans who had survived cause challenges and then, over objection, urged the resulting all-white jury to impose death because this case was like the O.J. Simpson case, where the defendant "got away with it." On initial review, a majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court ignored probative evidence of discriminatory intent, including the prosecutor's O.J. Simpson remarks and argument, and denied Mr. Snyder's Batson claims by a 5-2 vote.

This Court directed the court below to reconsider Mr. Snyder's Batson claims in light of Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). See Snyder v. Louisiana, 545 U.S. 1137 (2005). On remand, a bare majority adhered to its prior holding, once again disregarding substantial evidence establishing discriminatory intent, including the prosecutor's references to the O.J. Simpson case, the totality of strikes against African-American jurors, and evidence showing a pattern of practice of race-based peremptory challenges by the prosecutor's office. In addition, the majority imposed a new and higher burden on Mr. Snyder, asserting that Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006), permitted reversal only if "a reasonable factfinder [would] necessarily conclude the prosecutor lied" about the reasons for his strikes. Three justices, including the author of the original opinion, dissented, finding the prosecutor's reference to the O.J. Simpson case in argument to an all-white jury, made "against a backdrop of the issues of race and prejudice," supported the conclusion that the State improperly exercised peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory fashion.

The Louisiana Supreme Court's consideration of Mr. Snyder's Batson claims on remand from this Court raises the following important questions:

1. Did the majority below ignore the plain import of Miller-El by failing to consider highly probative evidence of discriminatory intent, including the prosecutor's repeated comparisons of this case to the O.J. Simpson case, the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to purge all African-Americans from the jury, the prosecutor's disparate questioning of white and black prospective jurors, and documented evidence of a pattern of practice by the prosecutor's office to dilute minority presence in petit juries?

2. Did the majority err when, in order to shore up its holding that Mr. Snyder had failed to prove discriminatory intent, it imported into a direct appeal case the standard of review this Court applied in Rice v. Collins, an AEDPA habeas case?

3. Did the majority err in refusing to consider the prosecutor's first two suspicious strikes on the ground that defense counsel's failure to object could not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because Batson error does not render the trial unfair or the verdict suspect -- i.e., that failure to raise a Batson objection can never result in prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) - a holding directly conflicting with decisions from inter alia the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the Alabama and Mississippi Supreme Courts?

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Smith v. Texas

Issues

If the Supreme Court reversed and remanded Smith’s case to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals after finding that the jury had not been able to adequately consider the mitigating evidence, was the Court of Criminal Appeals’ finding that the violation was a harmless error consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision?

Must a defendant prove that a jury instruction that violated his constitutional rights caused him egregious harm?

 

LaRoyce Lathair Smith, who was sentenced to death in 1991, appears before the Supreme Court for the second time. Smith argues that the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals denied his petition for state habeas corpus relief in contravention of the analysis standards handed down in the Supreme Court’s first opinion. In addition, Smith argues that the Criminal Court of Appeals applied a heightened egregious harm standard to a procedural issue that it failed to consider on direct appeal. Texas, on the other hand, contends that the Criminal Court of Appeals was justified in reconsidering issues not addressed by the Supreme Court and asserts that the standards applied were the prevailing state standards for evaluating Smith’s claim. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case should clarify the proper way for state courts to evaluate defendants’ claims attacking the constitutionality of jury instructions regarding mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of capital cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004), this Court summarily reversed the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and found constitutional error under Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Penry I), and Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (Penry II). Is it consistent with this Court’s remand in this case for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to deem the error in petitioner’s case harmless based on its view that jurors were in fact able to give adequate consideration and effect to petitioner’s mitigating evidence notwithstanding this Court’s conclusion to the contrary?

Can the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, based on a procedural determination that it declined to adopt in its original decision that this Court then summarily reversed, impose on remand a daunting standard of harm (“egregious harm”) to the constitutional violation found by this Court?

In 1991, 19 year old LaRoyce Lathair Smith was convicted of the capital murder of his coworker, who Smith had pistol whipped and shot. Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 38 (2004) (“Smith I”). After Smith was convicted, the jury was tasked with deciding Smith’s sentence. Id. at 39.

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