Brigham City v. Stuart

Issues

Whether officers who entered a private home because they believed a fight was occurring inside violated the Fourth Amendment, or are the officers protected under either the emergency aid exception or the exigency exception.

Court below

 

The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable government intrusion by prohibiting unlawful searches and seizures without a warrant. Two related exceptions to this rule are relevant in this case: the emergency aid exception and the exigent circumstance exception. This case will help define the type of conduct that must occur in order for an officer to validly invoke either the exigent circumstance or the emergency aid exception. The Court’s decision will help sharpen the line between permissible and impermissible police involvement and define the level of protection individuals continue to have under the Fourth Amendment.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Does the "emergency aid exception" to the warrant requirement recognized in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), turn on an officer's subjective motivation for entering the home?

2. Was the gravity of the "emergency" or "exigency" sufficient to justify, under the Fourth Amendment, the officers' entry into the home to stop the fight?

On July 23, 2001, at approximately 3:00 a.m., four Brigham City, Utah police officers were dispatched to respond to a complaint about a loud party. Brief for Petitioner at 2.

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Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co.

Issues

In a civil suit brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), does the victim have to rely on the fraudulent mailing when considering its actions? If so, does that person have to be the person who brings the lawsuit, or can another person harmed by the same fraud bring a suit?

 

This case concerns a civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). Cook County, Illinois auctions tax liens to the public. The winning bidder pays the back taxes and can then recover the amount of the delinquent taxes from the property owner, along with a penalty. If the taxpayer doesn't pay, the winning bidder gains ownership of the property on which the lien was placed. Multiple bidders often tie in the auction, so bidders must submit affidavits that they are not using agents to gain an unfair advantage through relation with other bidders. Phoenix Bond and Indemnity Company ("Phoenix") brought a RICO suit against John Bridge for mail fraud, alleging that he submitted false affidavits which stated that it was unrelated to other bidders. The District Court dismissed the suit, stating that Phoenix was not the party that relied on the fraudulent mailings and therefore lacked standing to sue Bridge. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will determine whether only those parties who were the target of a fraudulent communication can bring a civil suit seeking damages under RICO.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether reliance is a required element of a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud and, if it is, whether that reliance must be by the plaintiff.

The Treasury Office in Cook County, Illinois conducts an annual auction in which the tax liens of property owners who fail to pay real estate taxes are sold to the public. Brief for Petitioner 3. The buyer of the lien must pay Cook County for any delinquent tax and any outstanding interest on the property. Id.&nbs

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Brendlin v. California

Issues

When does a passenger in an automobile become “detained” during a traffic stop and thereby gain the ability to challenge the stop under the Fourth Amendment?

 

Bruce Brendlin was a passenger in a car driven by Karen Simeroth when she was the subject of a traffic stop by a County Deputy Sherriff. During the stop, the Deputy discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia in the car and on Brendlin. Brendlin was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine and moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the original traffic stop was unreasonable, and therefore in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied his motion, and the California Supreme Court upheld the denial on the basis that Brendlin had not been “seized” under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and thus could not challenge the stop. Brendlin appeals to the Supreme Court, arguing that he was effectively seized by the initial stop, and therefore should be able to challenge it. California argues that Brendlin was not seized, because he should have felt free to leave the scene of the traffic stop, and did not actually submit to the application of force or to a show of police authority.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a passenger in a vehicle subject to a traffic stop is thereby “detained” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, thus allowing the passenger to contest the illegality of the traffic stop.

Early in the morning of November 21, 2001, a vehicle driven by Karen Simeroth was stopped by Deputy Sheriff Robert Brokenbrough in Yuba City, California under suspicion of an expired inspection. See People v. Brendlin, 38 Cal. 4th 1107, 1111 (Cal. 2006).

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Brewer v. Quarterman; Abdul-Kabir, fka Cole v. Quarterman

Issues

1. Could the jury give constitutionally sufficient consideration to mitigating evidence of childhood abuse and mental illness through deliberations on the deliberateness of the defendant’s action or on his future dangerousness?

2. Even if it is theoretically possible that jurors could sufficiently consider such evidence, is it reasonably likely that the prosecution’s reminders to answer the questions narrowly prevented the jurors from actually considering such mitigating evidence?

3. Has the Fifth Circuit drawn and unconstitutional line by distinguishing chronic, untreatable mental illness from other mental illnesses?

 

Brent Ray Brewer and Jalil Abdul-Kabir, the petitioners in these cases, are two inmates on death row in Texas. They are seeking writs of habeas corpus from the federal courts to overturn their death sentences. During the sentencing phase of their trials, the jury was asked to determine whether the defendant killed “deliberately,” and whether he would constitute a “continuing threat to society.” The juries in both cases returned two “yes” answers, which dictated a sentence of death under state law. The inmates argue that these questions did not give the jury a meaningful basis on which to consider mitigating evidence of childhood abuse and mental illness. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the habeas corpus petition for Abdul-Kabir but granted it for Brewer. The Fifth Circuit, in ruling for the state on both petitions on appeal, held that the jury instruction enabled the jury to consider mitigating evidence in their deliberations on the future dangerousness question. Therefore, it held that the state court did not misapply  federal  law, and the writ of habeas corpus could not be granted. The inmates disagree with this conclusion and are now making an as-applied challenge to the Texas statute before the U.S. Supreme Court. These cases could have a significant impact on the ongoing national debate about the appropriateness of applying the death penalty on the mentally ill.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Do the former Texas “special issue” capital sentencing jury instructions—which permit jurors to register only a “yes” or “no” answer to two questions, inquiring whether the defendant killed “deliberately” and probably would constitute a “continuing threat to society”—permit constitutionally adequate consideration of mitigating evidence about a defendant’s mental impairment and childhood mistreatment and deprivation, in light of this Court’s emphatic statement in Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 48 (2004), that those same two questions “had little, if anything, to do with” Smith’s evidence of mental impairment and childhood mistreatment)?

2. Do this Court’s recent opinions in Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (“Penry II”) and Smith, both of which require instructions that permit jurors to give “full consideration and full effect” to a defendant’s mitigating evidence in choosing the appropriate sentence, preclude the Fifth Circuit from adhering to its prior decisions—antedating Penry II and Smith—that reject Penry error whenever the former special issues might have afforded some indirect consideration of the defendant’s mitigating evidence?

3. Has the Fifth Circuit, in insisting that a defendant show as a predicate to relief under Penry that he suffers from a mental disorder that is severe, permanent or untreatable, simply resurrected the threshold test for “constitutional relevance” that this Court emphatically rejected in Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004)?

4. Where the prosecution, as it did here, repeatedly implores jurors to “follow the law” and “do their duty” by answering the former Texas special issues on their own terms and abjuring any attempt to use their answers to effect an appropriate sentence, is it reasonably likely that jurors applied their instructions in a way that prevented them from fully considering and giving effect to the defendant’s mitigating evidence?

Brent Ray Brewer was convicted and sentenced to death in Texas for the murder of Robert Laminack. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Brewer v. Dretke, No. 05-11287 (May 30, 2006) (“Brewer Petition for Cert.”). At trial, counsel for Brewer introduced mitigating evidence indicating that Brewer suffered mental illness and an abusive childhood. Id. at 3.

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Bradshaw v. Stumpf

 

John Stumpf and his accomplice, Clyde Wesley, were convicted of the murder of Mary Jane Stout. Stumpf, in his appeal to the Supreme Court, argues that the prosecutor unfairly used inconsistent theories to prove that both he and Wesley were guilty for the murder – -- even though a single shot was used to kill Stout. Stumpf thus claims his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution were violated. Stumpf also argues that his guilty plea at trial was entered unknowingly and involuntarily because he did not understand the elements of the crime. The Supreme Court, in making its decisions, will have to address the role of the prosecutor in a criminal proceeding, the rights of the defendant under the Due Process Clause, and the extent to which a defendant can later invalidate his earlier plea of guilty.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

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BP America Production Co. v. Burton

Issues

In its attempt to recover gas and oil royalties through administrative orders, is MMS, a government agency, bound by the six-year statute of limitations that governs actions for money damages brought by the United States?

 

The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. 181 et seq., and other statutes charge the Secretary of the Interior with leasing federal and Indian lands for development of oil and gas resources. The Minerals Management Service ("MMS") administers the leases. In the wake of a dispute over royalties, the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”), sought to recover, through administrative order, contractual damages which arose more than six years beforehand. Petitioners, producers of natural gas, claim that the collection of these damages is barred by the limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2415. MMS claims that this limitation period does not apply because the statute only applies to actions in court and not to administrative proceedings. The Supreme Court’s ruling will affect the parity of contractual relations between private citizens and the government with respect to the resolution of contract disputes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether - contrary to the decision below but consistent with decisions of the Tenth and Federal Circuits - the limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) applies to federal agency orders requiring the payment of money claimed under a lease or other agreement.

Under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. 181 et seq. and other statutes, the Secretary of the Interior leases federal and Indian lands for development of oil and gas resources. Brief for Respondents at 2. Petitioner BP America Production Co. ("BP") is the successor in interest to oil and gas producers Amoco Production Company ("Amoco") and Atlantic Richfield Company and Vastar Resources, Inc.

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Boyle v. United States

Issues

Does the United States need to prove the existence of a group with an identifiable structure, that goes beyond the racketeering activities at issue, in order to prove an association-in-fact enterprise under the RICO Act?

 

A jury convicted Edmund Boyle of racketeering and racketeering conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") and sentenced him to 151 months in prison for his participation in a string of bank robberies. Boyle appealed his conviction to the Second Circuit, arguing that the United States misinterpreted the scope of an "enterprise" under RICO. Boyle argued that RICO did not apply because the United States could not prove that the group of bank robbers was an enterprise if it could not prove the group had a formal, ascertainable structure. The United States argued that the individuals were an enterprise and that they did not need to prove a formal structure existed under RICO. The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted Boyle's petition to determine a three-way circuit split over what constitutes an enterprise under the RICO statute. The outcome of this case will affect the scope of the RICO Act and will impact the ability of law enforcement to prosecute individuals under the RICO Act.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Does proof of an association-in-fact enterprise under the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c)-(d), require at least some showing of an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages an exceptionally important question in the administration of federal justice, civil and criminal, that has spawned a three-way circuit split?

    Indictment and Trial

    In 2003, a New York grand jury indicted Edmund Boyle and eight other men on Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act conspiracy charges, claiming that they all participated in a series of bank robberies as members of an organization called the "Night Drop Crew." See Brief for Petitioner Edmund Boyle at 5-6,

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    Boumediene v. Bush; Al Odah v. United States

    Issues

    Does the Military Commissions Act of 2006 ("MCA") preclude federal jurisdiction over all habeas corpus petitions filed by non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and if so, does the MCA violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, which states that habeas cannot be suspended except in times of rebellion or invasion?

    Regardless of whether the detainees have rights under the Suspension Clause or the Constitution, are the Combatant Status Review Tribunals and D.C. Circuit Court review (as established by the Detainee Treatment Act) an adequate and effective substitute for the constitutional right to habeas corpus?

     

    Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States come to the Supreme Court as the latest chapter in the ongoing battle over the scope of rights that detainees at Guantanamo Bay have.�� In early 2002, six humanitarian workers were arrested in Bosnia and transported to Guantanamo Bay.� They, along with other non-citizen detainees, seek to exercise the constitutional right of habeas corpus to appear before a federal court to contest their detention. Currently, a military tribunal determines whether a detainee is properly detained at Guantanamo as an "enemy combatant." The D.C. Circuit found that the Military Commissions Act ("MCA"), which precludes federal jurisdiction over the detainees' habeas claims, applies to the detainees, and that detainees are not entitled to the constitutional writ of habeas corpus because they are "without presence or property within the U.S."

    On appeal before the Supreme Court are several important constitutional issues, including whether the MCA's suspension of habeas corpus for non-citizen Guantanamo detainees is consistent with the Constitution.� Additionally, the Court will likely examine whether Combatant Status Review Tribunals and D.C. Circuit review constitute an adequate substitute for habeas corpus.� Finally, the Court may delimit the scope of constitutional rights possessed by non-citizen Guantanamo detainees. The Court's decision will significantly impact both detainee rights and limits to the military's wartime powers, as well as clarify the judiciary's position in the system of checks and balances with the executive and legislative branches.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Boumediene v. Bush:

    1. Whether the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, validly stripped federal court jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by foreign citizens imprisoned indefinitely at the United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay.

    2. Whether Petitioners' habeas corpus petitions, which establish that the United States government has imprisoned Petitioners for over five years, demonstrate unlawful confinement requiring the grant of habeas relief or, at least, a hearing on the merits.

    Al Odah v. United States:

    1. Did the D.C. Circuit err in relying again on Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), to dismiss these petitions and to hold that petitioners have no common law right to habeas protected by the Suspension Clause and no constitutional rights whatsoever, despite this Court's ruling in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), that these petitioners are in a fundamentally different position from those in Eisentrager, that their access to the writ is consistent with the historical reach of the writ at common law, and that they are confined within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States?

    2. Given that the Court in Rasul concluded that the writ at common law would have extended to persons detained at Guantanamo, did the D.C. Circuit err in holding that petitioners' right to the writ was not protected by the Suspension Clause because they supposedly would not have been entitled to the writ at common law?

    3. Are petitioners, who have been detained without charge or trial for more than five years in the exclusive custody of the United States at Guantanamo, a territory under the plenary and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law and of the Geneva Conventions?

    4. Should section 7(b) of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which does not explicitly mention habeas corpus, be construed to eliminate the courts' jurisdiction over petitioners' pending habeas cases, thereby creating serious constitutional issues?

    These consolidated cases involve federal court jurisdiction over petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by foreign nationals detained at the United States Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay. The writ of habeas corpus allows a detained person to challenge the lawfulness of their detention in court.

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    Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank Professor Sital Kalantry and Professor David Wippman for their insights into this case.

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    Boulware v. United States

     

    Michael Boulware was convicted of filing false tax returns, tax evasion, and conspiracy to make false statements to a federally insured financial institution in Hawaii District Court in 2001. He appealed his conviction to the Ninth Circuit on various grounds multiple times. In his current appeal, he argues that the funds he diverted from his closely held corporation, Hawaiian Isles Enterprises, qualified under Sections 301 and 316 of the U.S. Tax Code as a non-taxable return of capital. If this is true, he argues, the government failed to meet its burden of proof in showing a tax deficiency because it did not establish that the funds Boulware diverted were taxable as income. However, the Ninth Circuit upheld his conviction based on its decision in United States v. Miller, which established that in a criminal tax evasion case, a defendant must show not only that a diversion of funds meets the requirements in the Tax Code to be a non-taxable return of capital, but also that the shareholder and/or corporation intended it to be one at the time the diversion was made. Since Boulware could not make this showing, he failed to demonstrate that the diversion qualified as a nontaxable return of capital under Miller. Boulware has challenged his conviction and argues that the Miller "contemporaneous intent" requirement has no basis in the statutory text of the Tax Code and creates a disparity in treatment of defendants in civil and criminal tax cases, and for these reasons should be overturned. The Supreme Court, in answering the question of what requirements must be fulfilled for a diversion to qualify as a return of capital, will resolve a conflict in positions between the Second and the Ninth Circuits.

     
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