City of Los Angeles v. Naranjibhai Patel

Issues

Does the Fourth Amendment provides grounds for facial challenges of a statute or ordinance, and if so, is an ordinance that requires hotel guests to supply information to a hotel guest registry and authorizes police to inspect such a registry without a warrant or pre-compliance judicial review constitutional? 

Patel, with other Los Angeles motel and hotel owners, challenged Los Angeles Municipal Code 41.49 (“Section 41.49”) alleging that it violated the Fourth Amendment on its face. Asserting that it had a compelling interest in fighting crimes such as human trafficking and prostitution, which frequently involve hotels and motels in their operation, the City of Los Angeles responded that inspections under Section 41.49 are reasonable, and constitutional applications of Section 41.49 exist. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether similar laws and ordinances not only in California but also in other states, as well as in other industries, can continue to operate, and whether a compelling government interest in crime deterrence can justify consentless police searches free of judicial review.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. To resolve a split between the Ninth and Sixth Circuits are facial challenges to ordinances and statutes permitted under the Fourth Amendment?
  2. To resolve a spilt between the Ninth Circuit and the Massachusetts Supreme Court, does a hotel have an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in a hotel guest registry where the guest supplied information is mandated by law and that ordinance authorizes the police to inspect the registry? If so, is the ordinance facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment unless it expressly provides for pre-compliance judicial review before the police can inspect the registry?

Respondents (“Patel”) are the Los Angeles Lodging Association and “approximately forty hotel owners,” including Naranjibhai Patel, who operate their businesses in Los Angeles.

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Ohio v. Clark

Issues

  1. Whether someone who must report suspected child abuse is considered an agent of law enforcement under the Confrontation Clause.
  2. Whether a child’s statements to a teacher about child abuse are “testimonial” statements for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.

The Supreme Court will determine whether teachers who are obligated to report suspected child abuse are agents of law enforcement and whether a child’s out-of-court statements to a teacher about child abuse are testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Ohio asserts that a child’s statements made to teachers about potential child abuse are not testimonial because their primary purpose is not intended to further investigation, but rather to protect children. Also, Ohio argues and that teachers that must report suspected child abuse to authorities are not agents of the state. Darius Clark counters that teachers intend to report the potential child abuse when they question children and thus, teachers are agents of the state in doing so. The Additionally, Clark contends that the children’s statements are testimonial because they are meant to further the prosecution of the suspected abuser. The Court’s ruling impacts the admissibility of children’s statements about potential child abuse under the Confrontation Clause when children make statements to teachers who are obligated to report suspected child abuse to state authorities. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Does an individual’s obligation to report suspected child abuse make that individual an agent of law enforcement for purposes of the Confrontation Clause?
  2. Do a child’s out-of-court statements to a teacher in response to the teacher’s concerns about potential child abuse qualify as “testimonial” statements subject to the Confrontation Clause?

T.T. had two children, L.P. and A.T., and lived with her boyfriend Darius Clark. See State v. Clark, 999 N.E.2d 592, 594 (Ohio 2013). While L.P., T.T.’s three-year-old son, was at the William Patrick Day Head Start Center in Cleveland, Ohio, on March 17, 2010, one of his preschool teachers noticed that his eye was bloodshot.

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The authors would like to thank Professor Valerie Hans of Cornell Law School for her insights into this case. 

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King v. Burwell

Issues

Can the IRS give tax credits to participants of federally-run health insurance marketplaces established under the Affordable Care Act?

In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). The ACA, in part, provides tax credits for insurance premiums to eligible citizens that obtain insurance through “Exchanges,” which are health insurance marketplaces. The IRS interpreted the ACA to permit tax credits to all eligible citizens regardless of whether the Exchange is federally or state-run. In this case, the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to resolve whether the ACA, which grants tax credits to individuals who obtained insurance through state-established Exchanges, also extends those tax credits to federally-established Exchanges. Several Virginia residents contend that the plain text of the ACA shows that Congress only intended for state-established Exchanges receive tax credits and that the Chevron deference is inapplicable because of the unambiguous meaning of the text. The government counters that tax credits are available to “applicable taxpayers”—a status determined independent of the type of Exchange within a citizen’s state—and, also, that the Chevron deference applies because the government’s interpretation avoids creating conflicts within the ACA. This case will profoundly impact the balance of federalism, the separation of power between the legislative and executive branches, and the American healthcare marketplace. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code, which was enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), authorizes federal tax-credit subsidies for health insurance coverage that is purchased through an "Exchange established by the State under section 1311" of the ACA.

The question presented is whether the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") may permissibly promulgate regulations to extend tax-credit subsidies to coverage purchased through Exchanges established by the federal government under section 1321 of the ACA.

In 2010, to help increase health care insurance coverage, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 2014).

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Chappell v. Ayala

Issues

Does a state court’s determination that a trial court committed a harmless error amount to an “adjudication on the merits,” as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), thereby limiting a federal court’s ability to review the trial court’s conviction only when the standards stated in the aforementioned provision are met?

The Supreme Court will determine to what extent federal courts can evaluate state court determinations of federal error regarding a federal question. Kevin Chappell, Warden of the State of California, contends that federal courts must grant significant deference to state court determinations denying federal habeas relief for convicted defendants based on a finding that any error that occurred during a trial was a harmless error. Hector Ayala, a prisoner, counters that federal courts should have the opportunity to independently review federal habeas petitions for error and determine how much prejudice the defendant suffered when state courts determined an error was harmless. The Supreme Court’s decision will impact the level of deference afforded to state courts in determinations of harmless error and will affect the jury selection process. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Was a state court's rejection of a claim of federal constitutional error on the ground that any error, if one occurred, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt an “adjudicat[ion] on the merits” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), so that a federal court may set aside the resulting final state conviction only if the defendant can satisfy the restrictive standards imposed by that provision?; and
  2. Did the court of appeals properly applied [sic] the standard articulated in Brecht v. Abrahamson?

In 1985, Hector Ayala was charged with “three counts of murder, one count of attempted murder, one count of robbery and three counts of attempted robbery.” See Ayala v. Wong, 756 F.3d 656, 660. In 1989, jury selection began with the review of over 200 juror questionnaires followed by juror interviews by the court and parties.

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Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

Issues

Is Arizona’s use of a commission to adopt congressional districts permissible under the Constitution and 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c), and does the Arizona Legislature have standing to bring suit to challenge such a commission?

In 2000, Arizona passed Proposition 106, which formed the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (“AIRC”). The AIRC’s purpose is to manage congressional districts. Prior to the referendum, the Arizona State Legislature (“Legislature”) had the power to determine congressional districts through the traditional legislative process. In 2012, the Legislature filed suit in the U.S. District of Arizona to challenge the legitimacy of the AIRC. A three-judge district court dismissed the suit, holding that the AIRC could remain in charge of redrawing congressional districts. The Legislature appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether the Elections Clause and 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) permit Arizona to use the AIRC to redraw congressional districts. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Do the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution and 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) permit Arizona’s use of a commission to adopt congressional districts?
  2. Does the Arizona Legislature have standing to bring this suit?

In Arizona prior to 2000, the Arizona State Legislature (“Legislature”) had the authority to alter and decide congressional districts through the ordinary legislative process. See AZ State Legislature v. AZ Independent Redistricting Committee, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1049 (D. Ariz.

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Henderson v. United States

Issues

May a court order the government to transfer or sell firearms to a third party on behalf of a convicted felon, who may not possess firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 992(g)?

In this case, the Supreme Court of the United States will have the opportunity to resolve a circuit split and determine whether a convicted felon may request that the government transfer possession of a felon’s non-contraband firearms to a third party. Henderson, a convicted felon, requested that the FBI transfer possession of the firearms to a third party interested in purchasing the firearms. The FBI denied his request, asserting that convicted felons may not possess firearms and that a transfer to a third party would give Henderson constructive possession in violation of federal law. Henderson, however, argues that his inability to possess firearms under federal law does not terminate his entire ownership interest in non-contraband firearms. The Supreme Court’s ruling will implicate ownership rights of convicted felons’ non-contraband firearms.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

“The general rule is that seized property, other than contraband, should be returned to its rightful owner once * * * criminal proceedings have terminated.” Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302, 304 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Farrell, 606 F.2d 1341, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. La Fatch, 565 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1977))). 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), however, makes it “unlawful for any person * * * who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year * * * to * * * possess * * * any firearm.”

The question presented is whether such a conviction prevents a court under Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or under general equity principles from ordering that the government (1) transfer non-contraband firearms to an unrelated third party to whom the defendant has sold all his property interests or (2) sell the firearms for the benefit of the defendant. The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits and the Montana Supreme Court all allow lower courts to order such transfers or sales; the Third, Sixth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, by contrast, bar them.

Petitioner Tony Henderson is a former Border Patrol Agent who was charged with distributing marijuana, a felony under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See U.S. v. Henderson, 555 Fed. Appx. 851, 852 (11th Cir. 2014). He was arrested on June 7, 2006.

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Coleman v. Tollefson et al.

Issues

Under the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, does a dismissal of a frivolous or meritless suit at the district court level count as a third strike, precluding a subsequent suit, or must the appeals process be final for the strike to take effect?

The Supreme Court will decide whether, under the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“§ 1915”), a district court’s dismissal of a suit counts as a strike while it is still pending on appeal or before the time for seeking appellate review has passed. Andre Lee Coleman, a prisoner in Michigan, was barred under § 1915 from proceeding on a fourth action in forma pauperis while the decision from a previous action was on appeal in district court. Coleman argues that the district court improperly dismissed his action when it counted the pending appeal of his action as a third strike in accordance with § 1915(g). However, Tollefson counters that the strike should be in effect after the district court dismissal due to the PLRA’s text and Congress’s desire to ban meritless claims. This decision has the potential to affect how the statute is interpreted in the lower courts and the caseload volume of court dockets.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Under the "three strikes" provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), does a district court's dismissal of a lawsuit count as a "strike" while it is still pending on appeal or before the time for seeking appellate review has passed?

Andre Lee Coleman is a prisoner in the state of Michigan, and he has filed at least three actions or appeals of the type proscribed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Coleman v. Tollefson et al., 733 F.3d 175, 176 (6th Cir.

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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.

Issues

Does an employer violate Title VII by refusing to hire an applicant or by discharging an employee based on a religious observance when the applicant or employee failed to provide actual knowledge to the employer, through explicit notification, of the applicant’s or employee’s need for a religious accommodation?

The Supreme Court will determine whether an employer can be liable under Title VII for refusing to hire a candidate or dismissing an employee only if the employer had actual knowledge, gained by the candidate’s or employee’s explicit notification, that the candidate or employee required a religious accommodation. The EEOC argues that an employer violates Title VII when the employer refuses to hire an applicant or dismisses an employee based on “a religious observance and practice” that could be reasonably accommodated. Abercrombie & Fitch counters that its denial of an exception to a religion-neutral store policy—a look policy considered crucial to the vitality of its business—is not intentional discrimination under Title VII. The Supreme Court’s decision will implicate Title VII’s role in religion-neutral work policies as well as who bears the burden of raising the need for religious accommodations in the workplace.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's * * * religion." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(l). "Religion" includes "all aspects of religious observance and practice" unless "an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate" a religious observance or practice "without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j).

The question presented is whether an employer can be liable under Title VII for refusing to hire an applicant or discharging an employee based on a “religious observance and practice” only if the employer has actual knowledge that a religious accommodation was required and the employer’s actual knowledge resulted from direct, explicit notice from the applicant or employee. 

Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (“Abercrombie”) is an American clothing company with stores across the United States that operates under several names, including Abercrombie & Fitch, Abercrombie Kids, and Hollister Co. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.

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Tibble v. Edison International

Issues

Does ERISA time-bar claims brought against fiduciaries (for a breach of the duty of prudence) if the initial breach occurred more than six years before filing, but allegedly harmed the beneficiaries within the last six years?

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether the ERISA’s six-year filing window prohibits a claim that 401(k) plan fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence by offering higher-cost mutual funds to plan participants, despite identical lower-cost mutual funds being available, when fiduciaries initially chose the higher-cost mutual funds more than six years before the claim was filed. A group of employee-beneficiaries argue that plan fiduciaries have an “ongoing” duty of prudence under ERISA and the failure to remove an imprudent investment gives rise to a new six-year period. Edison International, the employer, counters that case should be dismissed because the record does not reflect the question that the Court granted certiorari for; or, in the alternative, that the judgment below should be affirmed because there is no reversible error. The resolution of this case could have implications concerning the future cost of ERISA-governed benefits plan, and the scope of fiduciary duties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a claim that ERISA plan fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence by offering higher-cost retail-class mutual funds to plan participants, even though identical lower-cost institution-class mutual funds were available, is barred by 29 U.S.C. § 1113(1) when fiduciaries initially chose the higher-cost mutual funds as plan investments more than six years before the claim was filed?

Respondent Edison International (“Edison”) is a holding company with interests in electrical utilities and other energy concerns, with a full-time workforce of over 14,000 employees. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F. 3d. 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013); Facts at a Glance, Edison International (last visited Feb.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Robert Hockett for his support with this preview.

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Kerry v. Din

Issues

Does the refusal of a U.S. citizen’s alien spouse’s visa application bestow upon the citizen an enforceable constitutionally protected interest?

The Supreme Court will decide whether refusing the visa application of a U.S. citizen’s alien-spouse triggers the citizen’s constitutionally protected interests, and whether the citizen may challenge this refusal. Secretary of State Kerry argues that a citizen’s liberty interests are not implicated because neither the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) nor the Due Process Clause confer upon the citizen a legally cognizable interest in the consular officer’s determination, and consular officers’ determinations should not be challenged in court because judicial review would conflict with the consular nonreviewability doctrine and congressional intent in establishing the INA. In opposition, Din, a U.S. citizen, argues that the consular officer’s determination conflicts with the Court’s jurisprudence, which establishes a fundamental right to marry and to benefit from the associational interests in marriage, and that the consular officer’s determination should be subjected to judicial review in order to protect citizens’ liberty interests from arbitrary restrictions. The Court’s ruling in this case implicates the ability of the government to prevent disclosure of confidential information related to national security concerns and the ability of citizens to live with their alien spouse in the United States.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether a consular officer’s refusal of a visa to a U.S. citizen’s alien spouse impinges upon a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen; and
  2. Whether respondent is entitled to challenge in court the refusal of a visa to her husband and to require the government, in order to sustain the refusal, to identify a specific statutory provision rendering him inadmissible and to allege what it believes he did that would render him ineligible for a visa.

Fauzia Din, a U.S. citizen, married Kanishka Berashk, an Afghani national, in September 2006. See Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2013). Din shortly thereafter filed a visa petition in order for Berashk to be admitted into the United States.

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  • Lawrence Hurley: Supreme Court to Weigh Spouse Rights Over Denied Visa, Reuters (Oct. 2, 2014).
  • Ian R. Macdonald: SCOTUS Grants Certiorari to Two Immigration-Based Cases for 2015 Term: Will the Government Have to Explain its Exercise of “Discretion”?, The National Law Review (Oct. 15, 2014).
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