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This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to decide the constitutionality of a statute requiring a defendant to initiate a civil case to obtain reimbursement of costs, fees, and restitution after the reversal of conviction of a crime. This case arises out of Shannon Nelson’s conviction for sexual assault, which was overturned after she served prison time and paid various fees. The Colorado Supreme Court found that due process did not require a refund because a defendant could receive compensation by filing a civil suit under the Exoneration Act. Nelson argues that Colorado’s requirement improperly places the burden of proof on the defendant to prove his or her innocence in order to recover fees paid for a conviction that was later overturned. Colorado asserts that Nelson did not necessarily have an automatic right to the refund of her criminal penalties and that, even if she did, Colorado’s requirement satisfies due process. This case poses questions about a state’s ability to affect the presumption of innocence through statutes that influence the scope of due process.

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With Lewis and Clarke, the Supreme Court will venture into the relatively unfamiliar legal territory of tribal sovereign immunity for individuals employed by Indian tribes. The case arises out of an automobile accident between Brian and Michelle Lewis and William Clarke, an employee of the Mohegan Sun Casino, which is owned by the Mohegan tribe. In a lawsuit brought by the Lewises, Clarke successfully convinced the Connecticut Supreme Court that he was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. The Lewises argue that sovereign immunity does not apply when a tribal employee is sued in his individual capacity because the finances of the tribe are not formally at risk. Clarke counters that the finances of the tribe are at risk in this suit, and thus, the sovereign immunity of the tribe should extend to him because he was acting within the scope of his tribal employment. To some, the voyage of Lewis and Clarke into the obscure realm of tribal sovereign immunity for individuals imperils tribal coffers; to others, the regulatory power of the states is at stake.

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In 1989 the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef, off the Alaska coast, spilling millions of gallons of oil into Prince William Sound. In the years following the spill, Exxon would pay millions of dollars in private claims and over a billion dollars to settle government suits under environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). An additional class action suit by private parties sought compensatory damages for economic harm, as well as punitive damages (a civil penalty for particularly egregious conduct). In the final suit, an Alaska district court awarded roughly $20 million in compensatory damages against Exxon-and $5 billion in punitive damages. The Ninth Circuit eventually reduced the punitive damages award to $2.5 billion but upheld the decision to award such damages. Exxon now asks the United States Supreme Court to strike down the award of punitive damages or reduce its amount. In addressing Exxon's petition, the Court must set maritime law standards for punitive damage awards against a ship's owner for acts of the ship's master. The Court will also consider whether Congress meant penalties under the CWA to be the full punishment for a spill, excluding punitive damages under maritime law.

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Respondents Leroy Haeger, et. al (“the Haegers”) were injured during a vehicle accident as a result of a failed tire, which was manufactured by Petitioner Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (“Goodyear”). After the case settled, the Haegers discovered that Goodyear did not disclose several tests that it performed on the tire; the Haegers then moved the court to sanction Goodyear for its discovery misconduct. The district court relied on its inherent powers to sanction Goodyear and its counsel. Goodyear argues that the Supreme Court should limit inherent authority sanctions to those fees and costs directly caused by the claimed misconduct. The Haegers argue that although compensatory damages must be causally linked to the sanctioned misconduct, when the sanctionable misconduct is not limited to a single, discrete instance, but instead is so pervasive as to undermine or affect the whole litigation, an award of the entire amount of attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the party who is victim to the misconduct may be appropriate to compensate that party. The outcome of this case could potentially affect the scope of district courts’ inherent power to impose sanctions for discovery misconduct, when the courts cannot rely on the Rules or other statutory authority. The case will show whether a more exacting causation standard or a more discretionary standard should be used by the district court to impose sanctions under its inherent powers. 

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide the Fourteenth Amendment’s “one-person, one-vote” principle requires states to apportion eligible voters equally across districts. See Reply Brief for Appellants, Sue Evenwel et al. at 2. The Texas Constitution requires that the State legislature reapportion its legislative districts after each federal decennial census. See Evenwel et al. v. Perry et al., 14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, at 2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2014). In 2013, Texas adopted a new redistricting plan (“Plan S172”). See id. at 2. Texas drew its senatorial districts based only on total population. See id. at 2–3. Sue Evenwel is a registered Texas voter. See id. at 2. Evenwel argues that the one-person,  one-vote  principle requires states to divide their districts so that they each comprise a substantially equal number of eligible voters. See Brief for Appellants, Sue Evenwel et al. at 19. Texas Governor Greg Abbott contends that the Constitution does not require states to utilize any specific measure, and thus they are free to equalize districts on the basis of total population. See Brief for Appellees, Greg Abbott et al. at 43–44. The Court’s decision could affect the voting power of eligible voters, and the method and amount of data collection states must engage in to constitutionally apportion voting districts.  

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The Court must consider whether New York’s surcharge ban that requires merchants to label price differences as a cash discount rather than a credit-card surcharge unconstitutionally restricts speech. Petitioners Expressions Hair Design et al. argue that criminalizing truthful speech about credit-card costs violates the First Amendment because it prevents the free flow of accurate ideas amongst the public. Eric T. Schneiderman, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of New York, on the other hand, asserts that the law regulates conduct and not speech; thus, the price controls fall outside of the ambit of the First Amendment entirely. The outcome of this case will impact how a state can restrict the actions and language of merchants with respect to different forms of payments by consumers. 

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Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), state prisoners have one year to file their federal writ of habeas corpus petitions after their state conviction becomes final, but the one-year limitations period may be tolled for "properly filed" state habeas petitions that are "pending." In 1991, a jury convicted Reginald Chavis of attempted first degree murder. After unsuccessfully appealing his conviction, Chavis filed two rounds of state habeas petitions. The courts denied all of Chavis's state petitions, and Chavis filed a federal habeas petition on August 30, 2000. The state claims that the one-year limitations period applicable to Chavis's federal habeas corpus petition expired during the three years that passed between his first round of petitions to the California Court of Appeal and the filing of his first habeas petition with the California Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held that Chavis's petition was "pending" and thus entitled to tolling for the three-year interval. It based its decision of the fact that the California Supreme Court did not dismiss the petition as untimely but rather decided it on the merits.

The Supreme Court's ruling will turn on an interpretation of the term "pending."  If the Court agrees with Chavis that the federal court should presume from a state court's silence that the petitioner's filing was "pending," then the Court will affirm the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the three-year interval was tolled. But if the Supreme Court finds that a federal court must conduct an independent determination of timeliness under state law, then the Court must remand this case for further proceedings to determine whether Chavis's petition would be considered timely under California law. This case is significant because it will determine what a federal court must do when the state court is silent on the issue of whether the prisoner's filing was timely under state law. Thus, it may have an impact on federalism, comity, and finality, as well as the intended function of the writ of habeas corpus.

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This case will decide what unified standard public schools must provide students under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). IDEA requires schools in receipt of federal funds to provide an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) for each student with a disability. The IEP must comply with each student’s right to Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”). Should the school district fail to comply, parents are permitted to enroll their child into private school and seek reimbursement from the school district. Endrew F. argued that the Douglas County School District did not provide Endrew, a child with autism, the appropriate level of educational care because Endrew did not make any meaningful progress with his IEP. The Douglas County School District responded that Endrew’s receipt of some educational benefit was sufficient to satisfy the FAPE standard, and thus not a violation of the IDEA. The Supreme Court will likely resolve the Circuit conflict between the “meaningful educational benefit” standard adopted by some courts of appeals and the “merely more than de minimis” educational benefit standard that the Tenth Circuit maintained.

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Halliburton is accused of making misstatements about its financial position regarding asbestos litigation, a merger, and  costs-overruns  on fixed price contracts. As those misstatements came to light or were corrected, Halliburton’s stock price dropped. The Erica P. John Fund asserts that these misstatements defrauded Halliburton’s investors and seeks class certification to recover investors' losses from Halliburton. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that in order to be certified as a class, investors must not only demonstrate elements common to the  class,  but must also prove that the fraud actually caused the drop in stock value. Halliburton asserts that this is necessary  because,  unless the fraud actually caused the loss, no presumption of reliance on the misstatement can arise, and therefore the plaintiffs have failed to make the case for certification as a class. The Erica P. John Fund argues that the Fifth Circuit’s holding contradicts the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court  precedent,  and that requiring proof of loss causation undermines the values and goals of the reliance presumption. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will affect the ability of investors to pursue private securities actions against companies who misstate their financial positions.

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