Abuelhawa v. United States

Issues

Whether, if someone uses a cellular phone to buy drugs for personal use, which is a misdemeanor offense, that person can also be charged with a separate felony offense because using the cellular phone facilitated the sale of the drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).

Salman Khade Abuelhawa was convicted on felony drug charges under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) for facilitating a drug deal. Abuelhawa bought a small amount of cocaine for personal use, and set up the transaction with his dealer using his cellular phone. The Fourth Circuit found that 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) applied to anyone that facilitated a drug offense with any communication device, regardless of whether the person was the drug dealer or the drug purchaser. The Supreme Court will now interpret the meaning of this statute at the center of a Circuit split, to decide if the use of a cell phone or other communication device should be able to elevate a misdemeanor drug possession to a felony charge.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the use of a telephone to buy drugs for personal use "facilitates" the commission of a drug "felony," in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), on the theory that the crime facilitated by the buyer is not his purchase of drugs for personal use (a misdemeanor), but is the seller's distribution of the drugs to him (a felony).

When Salman Khade Abuelhawa called drug dealer Mohammed Said on his cellular phone, he had no way of knowing that there was a third party listening to and taping their conversations: the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See United States v. Abuelhawa, 523 F.3d 415, 417 (4th Cir. 2008). The FBI suspected that Said was distributing cocaine in the Washington, D.C.

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Abbott v. United States; Gould v. United States

Issues

Which, if any, federal criminal statute with a mandatory minimum sentence of five years or more can trigger the "except" clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)?

 

In two separate and unrelated cases, Kevin Abbott and Carlos Rashad Gould were convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) by possessing weapons in the furtherance of a violent or drug trafficking crime. Abbott and Gould were also sentenced for their underlying crimes, both of which required a minimum sentence of greater than five years. Abbott's and Gould's respective sentencing judges both included an additional five-year sentence for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), on the grounds that this was a mandatory minimum sentence. Abbott and Gould appealed, arguing that they qualified for an exception to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because the minimum sentences for their underlying offenses were greater than five years. The appeals courts affirmed the lower courts' decisions. Certiorari was granted to answer which federal criminal statutes that carry a minimum sentence greater than five years, if any, trigger the "except" clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Abbott

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) provides, in part, that a person convicted of a drug trafficking crime or crime of violence shall receive an additional sentence of not less than five years whenever he “uses or carries a firearm, or * * * in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm” unless “a greater minimum sentence is * * * provided * * * by any other provision of law.” The questions presented are:

1. Does the term “any other provision of law” include the underlying drug trafficking offense or crime of violence?

2. If not, does it include another offense for possessing the same firearm in the same transaction?

Gould

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) requires a 5-year minimum sentence for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime – “[e]xcept to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by . . . any other provision of law.”

3. Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit correctly hold, despite this “except” clause, that a defendant is subject to the 5-year minimum sentence for the firearm possession even though another provision of law requires a greater minimum sentence for another count of conviction?

Abbott

In 2004, Petitioner, Kevin Abbott, and Michael Grant were selling drugs out of a house in Philadelphia. See United States v. Abbott, 574 F. 3d 203, 204–05 (3d Cir.

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Additional Resources

· Findlaw.com: No Discretion for Judges with Mandatory Sentences (April 1, 2010)

· United States Sentencing Commission: 1991 Sentencing Commission Report

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Abbott v. Abbott

Issues

Whether a ne exeat order confers a right of custody to the non-custodial parent under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction.

 

Petitioner Timothy Abbott and Respondent Jacquelyn Abbott divorced in Chile. The Chilean court granted the mother custody of their son while allowing the father only visitation rights. At the mother’s request, the Chilean court issued a ne exeat order prohibiting either parent from removing the child from Chile without the agreement of both parents. Without the father’s consent, the mother brought her son to the United States. The father asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the ne exeat order constitutes a right of custody under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. A right of custody ruling would mandate return to Chile. This case will primarily impact international child custody battles where one parent abducts a child to or from the United States.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction requires a country to return a child who has been “wrongfully removed” from his country of habitual residence. Hague Convention art. 12. A “wrongful removal” is one that occurs “in breach of rights of custody.” Id. art. 3. The question presented is: Whether a ne exeat clause (that is, a clause that prohibits one parent from removing a child from the country without the other parent’s consent) confers a “right of custody” within the meaning of the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction.

In 1992, Timothy Abbott, a British citizen, married Jacquelyn Abbott, an American citizen, in England. See Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081, 1082 (5th Cir. 2008). Their son was born in the United States in 1995, and the family moved to Chile in 2002. See id. In 2003, Mr. and Mrs.

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Additional Resources

·      Wex: Law about Child Custody

·      Hague Conference: Child Abduction

·      ConflictofLaws.Net: A Divided Opinion on the Hague Abduction Convention

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14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett

Issues

Is an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement which precludes an employee from bringing a lawsuit in court for an alleged violation of statutory anti-discrimination law enforceable?

 

Steven Pyett, Thomas O’Connell, and Michael Phillips (the "employees") claim that their employer, Temco Service Industries, Inc., and the company, 14 Penn Plaza, LLC, that owns the building in which they worked, discriminated against them on the basis of their age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). The employees are members of Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ, which negotiated a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations, Inc. ("RAB"), of which Temco and 14 Penn Plaza are members. The CBA stated that the sole and exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination claims, including those brought under the ADEA, is the union’s grievance and arbitration procedure. The issue in this case is whether a union has the power to bargain away its members’ rights to litigate employment discrimination claims. The employees argue that the answer should be no, while the employers argue the opposite. The outcome of this case will clarify whether a union has the power to waive its members' statutory right to sue their employers in federal court for certain types of discrimination in favor of a mandatory arbitration procedure.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Is an arbitration clause contained in a collective bargaining agreement, freely negotiated by a union and an employer, which clearly and unmistakably waives the union members’ right to a judicial forum for their statutory discrimination claims, enforceable?

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Bank of America v. Miami, 15-1111, Wells Fargo & Co. v. Miami, 15-1112 (consolidated)

Issues

Does a lawsuit against a bank satisfy the Fair Housing Act’s “zone of interest” and proximate cause requirements, where a municipality alleges harm to its fiscal interests from urban blight stemming from foreclosures caused by the bank’s discriminatory lending practices?

In this consolidated action, the Supreme Court will decide whether a city can sue a bank under the Fair Housing Act for discriminatory lending practices, and whether it can recover lost property tax revenues and funds spent addressing widespread foreclosures that the bank’s discriminatory practices allegedly caused. The City of Miami alleges, based on statistical analyses, that loans by Bank of America and Wells Fargo & Co. to minority borrowers were more than five times as likely to result in foreclosures than loans to white borrowers. The banks argue that the City of Miami falls outside the zone of interests required to obtain standing under the Fair Housing Act, and that any alleged causal relationship between the City’s financial losses and the discriminatory housing practices of the banks is too far a stretch to support a valid lawsuit. The City responds that it meets the broad standing requirements of the Fair Housing Act and should recover for its injuries because they are foreseeably and directly linked to the discriminatory lending practices of the banks. A victory by Miami could potentially overburden the courts with similar lawsuits and overextend judicial power; however, Miami’s defeat could leave the FHA under-enforced and cities underfunded to battle urban blight.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. By limiting suit to "aggrieved person[s]," did Congress require that an FHA plaintiff plead more than just Article III injury-in-fact?
  2. The FHA requires plaintiffs to plead proximate cause. Does proximate cause require more than just the possibility that a defendant could have foreseen that the remote plaintiff might ultimately lose money through some theoretical chain of contingencies?

MIAMI’S LAWSUIT AGAINST BANK OF AMERICA

Miami brought a Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) lawsuit against Bank of America, Countrywide Financial Corporation, Countrywide Home Loans, and Countrywide Bank (collectively, “Bank of America” or “the Bank”) on December 13, 2013, for discriminatory mortgage lending practices and unjust enrichment at the expense of Miami. See Miami v. Bank of America Corp., No.

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Lynch v. Morales-Santana

Issues

  1. Did Congress violate the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection when it passed a law that made it more difficult for out-of-wedlock, foreign-born children with United States-citizen fathers to inherit United States citizenship than for those with United States-citizen mothers?
  2. Is a federal appellate court allowed to grant citizenship when it lacks express authority to do so?

When a child with one United States-citizen parent is born abroad and out of wedlock, that child may or may not inherit United States citizenship. One of the factors that determines the child’s citizenship is whether the United States-citizen parent is the child’s mother or father. In 1958, Congress passed a law that placed different physical-presence requirements on the father than on the mother, whereby the father must have lived in the United States for at least ten years before the child’s birth, while the mother must have lived in the United States for only one continuous year. Luis Ramon Morales-Santana argues that this distinction unjustifiably discriminates on the basis of gender and therefore violates the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch argues that this distinction is not actually based on gender, but on the legal realities inherent in out-of-wedlock births, and is constitutional. The outcome of this case will affect the legal criteria bearing upon a foreign-born child’s ability to inherit United States citizenship. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In order for a United States citizen who has a child abroad with a non-U.S. citizen to transmit his or her citizenship to the foreign-born child, the U.S.-citizen parent must have been physically present in the United States for a particular period of time prior to the child's birth.

The questions presented are:

  1. Whether Congress's decision to impose a different physical-presence requirement on unwed citizen mothers of foreign-born children than on other citizen parents of foreign-born children through 8 U.S.C. 1401 and 1409 (1958) violates the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.
  2. Whether the court of appeals erred in conferring U.S. citizenship on respondent, in the absence of any express statutory authority to do so.

In 1962, Luis Ramon Morales-Santana was born in the Dominican Republic to unmarried parents. See Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 521, 524 (2nd Cir. 2015). At the time of Morales-Santana’s birth, his mother was a citizen of the Dominican Republic, and his father was a citizen of the United States.

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Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp.

Issues

Do federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over lawsuits against the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) based soley on the sue-and-be-sued clause in its congressional charter? 

The Supreme Court will decide whether the sue-and-be-sued clause in Fannie Mae’s congressional charter under 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(a) confers original jurisdiction to federal district courts for cases to which Fannie Mae is a party. Petitioners Crystal Lightfoot and Beverly Hollis-Arrington argue that the clause is not sufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction. In doing so, they contend that the clause requires an independent determination of subject matter jurisdiction, and that the Court’s decision in Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247 (1992), did not establish an “if federal, then jurisdiction” rule, which diverges from the Court’s past methods of statutory interpretation and creates confusion. Respondent Fannie Mae argues that Lightfoot and Hollis-Arrington misconstrue Red Cross and asserts that the statutory language, legislative history, context, and purpose of Fannie Mae as a government sponsored enterprise (GSE) confirm that Fannie Mae’s charter confers federal question jurisdiction. This case will clarify the scope of jurisdiction for GSEs under Article III and will settle whether private individuals can file suit against GSEs in federal district court based on state-law causes of action.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The congressional charter of the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) grants it the power “to sue and to be sued, and to complain and to defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal.” 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(a).

The questions presented are:

  1. whether the phrase “to sue and be sued, and to complain and to defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal” in Fannie Mae’s charter confers original jurisdiction over every case brought by or against Fannie Mae to the federal courts; and
  2. whether the majority’s decision in Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247 (1992) (5-4 decision), should be reversed. 

In 2001, Petitioner Hollis-Arrington filed a suit, pro se, in U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against Cendant Mortgage Corporation, Fannie Mae, and Attorneys Equity National Corporation, all of which had participated in foreclosure proceedings against the home that Hollis-Arrington shared with Petitioner Crystal Lightfoot in California.

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National Labor Relations Board v. SW General, Inc.

Issues

May a senior agency official appointed by the president to serve as acting head of the same agency continue to serve in this capacity after being nominated by the president to permanently fill the office, even if the officer never served as first assistant to the office? 

This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to interpret § 3345 of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (“FVRA”) and to determine if a person performing the acting duties of an office that requires Senate confirmation may continue to do so after the president nominates them to fill the vacancy permanently. The parties disagree over the meaning of § 3345(b)(1) of the FVRA, which dictates that officials serving in an acting capacity may continue to do so after being nominated for permanent status only if they served as first assistant to the vacant office for 90 days in the year prior to the vacancy. Petitioner, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), argues that this limitation only applies to first assistants who automatically assume acting duties under § 3345(a)(1). The NLRB contends that this interpretation accords with both the language and objectives of the FVRA, and also with the historical practices of prior presidents and the Senate. Respondent, SW General, Inc., maintains that § 3345(b)(1) applies to all acting officials appointed pursuant to § 3345(a). SW General argues that § 3345(b)(1)’s language and purpose are clear and that core principles like separation of powers and the protection of the balance between the state and federal governments support its interpretation. The outcome of this case will affect presidential appointments that require Senate confirmation. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Many important government posts must be filled by persons who are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA), 5 U.S.C. 3345 et seq., provides that when such an office is vacant, its functions and duties may be performed temporarily in an acting capacity by either the first assistant to the vacant post, under Section 3345(a)(1); a Senate-confirmed official occupying another office in the Executive Branch who is designated by the President under Section 3345(a)(2); or a senior official in the same agency designated by the President under Section 3345(a)(3). 

Section 3345(b) of the FVRA provides as a general rule that "[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)(1)," a person who is nominated to fill a vacant office that is subject to the FVRA may not perform the office's functions and duties in an acting capacity unless the person served as first assistant to the vacant office for at least 90 days in the year preceding the vacancy. 5 U.S.C. 3345(b). 

The question presented is whether the precondition in 5 U.S.C. 3345(b)(1) on service in an acting capacity by a person nominated by the President to fill the office on a permanent basis applies only to first assistants who take office under Subsection (a)(1) of 5 U.S.C. 3345, or whether it also limits acting service by officials who assume acting responsibilities under Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3).

The General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) is a position that requires appointment by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate. See SW General v. NLRB, No. 14-1107, slip op. at 5 (D.C. Cir. Aug.

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