Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a state may prohibit licensed concealed carry holders from bringing firearms onto private property that is open to the public without the property owner’s express authorization. Jason Wolford, Alison Wolford, Atom Kasprzycki, and the Hawaii Firearms Coalition contend that Hawaii’s default rule effectively nullifies the public-carry right recognized in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen by turning ordinary, publicly accessible destinations such as stores, restaurants, and parking lots into presumptive no-carry zones. Hawaii Attorney General Anne E. Lopez, meanwhile, argues that the Second Amendment does not confer a right to carry a firearm onto another person’s property without consent, and that the statute simply codifies owners’ longstanding authority to exclude firearms on their private properties. J. Wolford, A. Wolford, Kasprzycki, and the Hawaii Firearms Coalition argue that Bruen requires Hawaii to justify such a broad default ban with a well-established historical analogue, and that the Ninth Circuit’s decision deepens a conflict over how lower courts apply Bruen to modern carry restrictions. Lopez responds that history and tradition support consent-based limits on armed entry, and that the default rule promotes public safety while respecting private property rights. This case touches upon the extent to which the Second Amendment’s public-carry protection applies to everyday life and will influence whether states may adopt similar default rules that either narrow or preserve practical access to lawful carry in public-facing spaces.

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This case considers whether the removal of Lisa Cook, a member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, by President Donald J. Trump, comported with constitutional and statutory requirements. The Court must address a temporary restraining order leaving Cook in her position after President Trump sought the first-ever (attempted) presidential removal of a Federal Reserve Board of Governors member, citing an alleged incident of prior fraud by Cook. The parties disagree about what, if any, cause is required for a president to remove a Board member. Trump argues that he has broad discretion to remove a Board member, with only minimal procedural protections required, whereas Cook construes the presidential removal power narrowly, and argues for robust procedural protections against removal. This dispute could reshape the relationship between the president and the Federal Reserve, potentially limiting or ending the Federal Reserve’s longstanding independence in setting monetary policy.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the deadline by which 29 U.S.C. § 1391 requires multiemployer pension plans to calculate the liability an employer would have should they choose to withdraw from that plan. The Employers argue that the plain text of § 1391 supports a bright-line rule that requires multiemployer pension plan actuaries to calculate the unfunded vested benefits, or the plan’s underfunding, as of the end of the year prior to the year a given employer withdraws from the plan. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund argue that because § 1391 is silent on the date as of which actuarial assumptions must be calculated, unlike other statutes addressing similar subject matters, that silence is controlling. The Employers further argue that Congress intended the statute to provide employers information about their potential withdrawal liability, which limits the information actuaries can use in determining this liability. The Trustees counter that Congress did not intend for employers to have advanced notice of the assumptions an actuary will use to calculate withdrawal liability, nor is it practical to do so. This case will directly impact how employers make business decisions related to multiemployer pension plans. Additionally, this case raises fairness concerns related to who will bear the risks when employers withdraw from multiemployer pension plans.

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This case asks the Court to decide whether states may prevent transgender girls from participating in girls’ sports. West Virginia argues that its statute does not violate Title IX because it makes no distinction on the basis of gender identity and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it passes intermediate scrutiny based on the state’s interest in competitive fairness. B.P.J. argues that the statute violates Title IX by discriminating against transgender girls and violates the Equal Protection Clause because the statute is not substantially related to the state’s goal of competitive fairness. This case raises significant concerns about fairness within women’s sports and the safety of transgender and cisgender athletes.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether laws that limit participation in women’s and girls’ sports to biological females violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Petitioner Bradley Little, the Governor of Idaho, argues that the prohibition on males participating in women’s sports does not violate equal protection because it is substantially related to the important state interest of promoting women’s equality in athletics. Respondent Lindsay Hecox counters that the prohibition violates equal protection by discriminating against a quasi-suspect classification of transgender people. Moreover, Hecox argues the prohibition is not substantially related to the government’s interest in fair athletic competitions. The outcome of this case will have significant ramifications for participation in women’s sports and the ongoing interpretation of gender discrimination law.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation (“NJ Transit”) is an arm of the State of New Jersey entitled to interstate sovereign immunity. Cedric Galette initiated a negligence lawsuit against NJ Transit under Pennsylvania law. NJ Transit filed a motion to dismiss the suit based on interstate sovereign immunity, a common law doctrine under which a sovereign cannot be sued without its consent. Galette argues that although the Legislature of the State of New Jersey (“the State”) established the entity as an “instrumentality” of the State, NJ Transit’s structure, as well as the lack of direct state liability for its adverse judgements, demonstrate it is not an arm of the State for sovereign immunity purposes. NJ Transit counters that NJ Transit was created as an arm of New Jersey entitled to sovereign immunity, emphasizing statutory language calling it an instrumentality of the State, its governmental powers, essential public function, gubernatorial control, and dependence on state funding. The outcome of this case will impact federalism and state sovereignty as well as economic consequences for state-affiliated commercial entities.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide how the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which allows federal officers and persons “acting under an officer” to remove lawsuits from state to federal courts, applies to federal contractors after a 2011 amendment. In this case, it specifically asks whether three gas and oil’s companies’ production of crude oil sufficiently relates to their contracts to furnish refined aviation gasoline for the federal government during World War II. Chevron, one of the companies involved in this suit, argues that the federal-officer removal statute applies broadly to defendants requesting removal and that wartime oil refining was inherently related to its production of crude oil at the time. Plaquemines Parish, one of multiple jurisdictions that sued the companies for environmental damage, counters that, because Chevron’s refining contracts with the federal government did not address crude production, that production does not sufficiently “relate to” the refining, as required by the 2011 amendment. This case raises significant issues regarding the scope of federal contractors’ ability to litigate in federal forums, the willingness of companies to contract with the federal government, and the effectiveness of congressional amendments over established federal caselaw.

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