Issues

This case presents to the Supreme Court the issue of whether district courts should defer to the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) preliminary investigations and legal judgments when deciding on preliminary injunctions under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) during unfair labor practice investigations. The Petitioner, Starbucks Corp., argues that the Sixth Circuit improperly weighted the scales in favor of the NLRB by deferring too much to the Board's initial assessment of the case and its labor-law expertise, thus undermining judicial independence and overstepping established boundaries of agency deference. The Respondent, the NLRB, maintains that such deference is warranted given its role, expertise in labor relations, and the comprehensive investigatory and adjudicative processes it undertakes before seeking injunctive relief under Section 10(j). The Court's determination will crucially affect the balance of power between administrative agencies and the judiciary and will have significant implications for labor practices and the enforcement of labor rights in the United States.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Section Three of the Federal Arbitration Act is violated when courts dismiss claims subject to arbitration agreements. Smith, and other delivery truck drivers, argue that the use of “shall” in Section Three compels courts to stay claims pending arbitration, promoting the underlying purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act. Spizzirri counters that the language in Section Three is ambiguous, and allowing courts to dismiss claims will actually promote the efficiency of arbitration agreements and protect these contracts from interference by courts. The outcome of this case has serious implications for the ability of plaintiffs to have courts oversee arbitration agreements and their ability to appeal.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret whether the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTALA”), which requires hospitals to provide stabilizing care to patients, can preempt state abortion regulations. Idaho’s Defense of Life Act prohibits hospitals from performing abortion unless it is necessary to protect the pregnant mother from death. EMTALA states that it preempts any state law which directly conflicts with its requirements, which includes providing stabilizing care to patients.  Idaho and its House speaker Mike Moyle argue that EMTALA cannot preempt Idaho state law because preemption would violate state sovereignty where there is no conflict between the two laws. The United States counters that EMTALA imposes a broader standard than Idaho law, and the executive and legislature can preempt state law under EMTALA via the Supremacy Clause. The outcome of this case has important implications for abortion rights, separation of powers, and sovereignty of states.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve a dispute between the City of Grants Pass, Oregon, and a class of homeless residents of Grants Pass represented by Gloria Johnson. Petitioner Grants Pass contends that its anti-camping ordinances do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Respondent Johnson argues that the city’s ordinances amount to criminalization of the status of homelessness, contravening the Eighth Amendment. This case could impact the balance of power between federal, state, and local government and may clarify the limits on criminalizing conduct like camping outside at night.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the government infringes upon a U.S. citizen’s constitutionally protected interest when it denies their non-citizen spouse’s visa, and if so, whether the government’s citation of a statute as its reasoning is sufficient to provide that citizen with due process. Sandra Muñoz, a U.S. citizen, married Luis Asencio-Cordero, a non-citizen, and petitioned the government to grant her husband an immigration visa. The government denied the application, giving only a citation to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) as the reason. The government argues that Muñoz has no statutory or constitutional right to appeal the visa denial nor any right to further explanation of the reasoning behind the decision. Muñoz argues that the denial of her husband’s visa infringes upon her constitutionally protected liberty interests, and that she is entitled to further explanation about the denial under due process. This case has important ramifications for U.S. citizens with noncitizen spouses who wish to live together in the United States, for national security, and the ability of Congress to exercise oversight over agencies.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit improperly overruled a district court when granting a defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim on habeas review. The IAC claim arose in an Arizona capital murder case in which Respondent Danny Lee Jones argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to secure psychology and neurology professionals in support of mitigating evidence relating to Jones’s mental health. Petitioner Ryan Thornell, the director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to accord proper deference to the district court’s fact-finding as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, Thornell argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to consider Arizona’s state sentencing laws as well as improperly weighed aggravating factors in Jones’s case. Jones rejects these claims, arguing that the Ninth Circuit properly adjudicated his claim with respect to both law and fact. This case has significant implications with respect to the proper standard of deference between appellate courts and district courts and raises concerns about finality and state sovereignty in enforcement of criminal statutes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether 18 U.S.C. Section 666—the statute for federal-funds bribery—also criminalizes gratuities. Snyder, a former mayor in Indiana, steered city contracts to a local company and then accepted from that company a fabricated consulting job worth $13,000. A jury convicted him of accepting an illegal gratuity under the statute. Snyder argues that the law only criminalizes bribes, however, because Congress has removed the language from the statute that used to refer to gratuities. The United States argues that the statute criminalizes gratuities through the word “rewarded,” while the word “influenced” refers to bribes. This case raises concerns about federal intrusion on state interests depending on how broadly courts will construe federal criminal statutes that seek to prohibit gratuities. It may also affect the outcome of how federal prosecutors will combat corruption at the state and local levels.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Court to determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act covers obstructive conduct interfering in official proceedings that are unrelated to investigations and evidence. Petitioner argues that the Court should interpret § 1512(c)(2) as only covering obstructive conduct interfering in official proceedings that involve investigations and evidence, and points to textual analysis, principles of statutory construction, and the Court’s interpretations of similar statutes in Yates v. United States and Begay v. United States for support. Respondent counters that the Court should interpret § 1512(c)(2) as a catch-all provision covering all obstructive conduct and rejects the textual analysis and principles of statutory construction argued by the petitioner while pointing to 18 U.S.C. § 1503 for support. This case touches on important questions regarding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the usage of § 1512(c)(2) to cover rioters’ conduct during the January 6 Capitol Building storming, such as sentencing fairness and providing notice to parties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

In this case, the Supreme Court must decide whether Jascha Chiaverini’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against the City of Napoleon, Ohio may proceed, although some of the charges filed against Chiaverini were based on probable cause. Jascha Chiaverini argues that state common law governs his lawsuit, and that as such the charge-specific rule, in which any baseless charge allows a § 1983 to proceed, applies. The City of Napoleon argues that Petitioner presents a false binary between the “any-crime” rule and the charge-specific rule that leads to a framework that is incompatible with the intent and meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This case has implications for the viability of malicious prosecution suits filed under § 1983 and the reach of Fourth Amendment protections against baseless charges.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the court to interpret whether the 60-day time limit for a federal employee to appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit imposed by U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) amounts to a jurisdictional requirement that strictly bars claims brought after 60 days. Stuart Harrow maintains that the language in 28 U.S.C. § 1295, which grants jurisdiction to claims “pursuant to” § 7703(b)(1)(A), is simply a cross-reference and not conditional. Harrow further argues that Congress likely did not intend to create such a harsh bar when enacting § 7703(b)(1)(A), considering that many federal employee claims are brought without a lawyer. The Department of Defense counters that “pursuant to” should mean “conforming to,” which sets a conditional requirement, not a reference. The Department of Defense further notes that the Court’s precedents have already decided that § 7703(b)(1)(A) is a jurisdictional requirement; and, Harrow is attempting to artificially parse the statute to reach a favorable result. The case’s outcome will significantly impact methods of Congressional intent interpretations and federal appeal procedures.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources