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Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), a party to a private arbitration agreement may petition a court to compel arbitration. However, the FAA only applies if federal law is implicated. A credit card agreement between Discover Bank and Betty Vaden contained an arbitration provision obligating cardmembers to arbitrate any disputes arising under the agreement. Discover Bank’s affiliate eventually sued Vaden in state court when she failed to make payments, and Vaden counterclaimed under state law. Discover Bank then petitioned the U.S. District Court of Maryland to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the FAA. The district court granted the petition, but the Fourth Circuit remanded, holding that the district court could only compel arbitration if the underlying dispute presented a federal question. The district court found that a federal question existed in the underlying dispute. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that it had jurisdiction because federal banking law preempted Vaden’s state law claims. Vaden argues that the Fourth Circuit’s holding conflicts with other circuits that hold that the petition itself must present a federal question.

The Supreme Court’s decision will resolve a circuit split on whether a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over Section 4 FAA petitions where jurisdiction is based solely on the complaint for the underlying dispute. If the Court affirms the Fourth Circuit, parties may be able to invoke the FAA to compel arbitration when a federal question arises only in a counter-claim, even though the federal court would not have jurisdiction over the underlying dispute.

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Following the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA began regulating greenhouse gas emissions from mobile sources, such as cars and trucks. The categorization of greenhouse gases an an “air pollutant” under the Clean Air Act automatically triggered the regulation of stationary sources, such as factories, through the EPA’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V permit programs. However, because the new regulatory framework easily triggered EPA oversight for low levels of emissions, the EPA decided to increase the threshold emissions level for greenhouse gases. Petitioners, including various states and industry groups, assert that the EPA’s regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources expands the scope of the Act beyond Congress’s original intent. Accordingly, Petitioners argue that the EPA lacks authority for this regulation. The EPA responds that because greenhouse gases are plainly air pollutants, the agency has the statutory authority to regulate them. Moreover, the EPA contends that this reading of the Act conforms with Congress’s intent to give the EPA broad discretion in regulating air pollution to protect public health and welfare. The Supreme Court’s determination of whether the EPA may continue to regulate greenhouse gases under these programs will significantly impact the United States’ approach to climate change.

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In 2006, an anonymous tip led Utah police officer Douglas Fackrell to investigate suspected drug activity at a house. After observing respondent Edward Strieff leave the house, Fackrell illegally detained him. During the stop, Fackrell learned Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant. Fackrell arrested and searched Strieff, and found drugs and paraphernalia. In Strieff, the Supreme Court will decide whether evidence obtained incident to an illegal search should be admitted under the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule. Generally, the exclusionary rule permits defendants to suppress evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Constitution. The attenuation exception, however, provides that evidence may be admissible if intervening circumstances have sufficiently weakened the taint of the original violation. Utah argues that the exclusionary rule only applies when it will deter future police misconduct. The state maintains that Fackrell did not flagrantly violate Strieff’s constitutional rights, and had a duty to arrest Strieff after discovering the arrest warrant. Accordingly, the rule would not deter misconduct. But Strieff contends the attenuation exception does not apply, because Fackrell could have foreseen that stopping Strieff illegally could have led to the discovery of a warrant. Strieff concludes that attenuation only applies when the “intervening event” that weakens the taint of Fackrell’s violation is unforeseeable. The Court’s decision could affect how police handle outstanding arrest warrants, and how judges balance Fourth Amendment protections with the need to admit relevant evidence.

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The U.S. Supreme Court will consider whether the False Claims Act (“FCA”) applies to fraudulent misrepresentation in payment claims due to violations of staffing regulations for medical centers. Petitioner Universal Health Services argues that the basis for liability stemming from the FCA does not allow for the implied certification theory, under which liability may be based on merely filing for payment, and thus should merit reversal of the judgment below. On the other hand, respondent Escobar contends that UHS knowingly and materially committed fraud under the FCA provisions notwithstanding the absence of an express fraudulent statement. This case will determine whether businesses that provide services to the government will be subject to FCA liability and will establish the range of remedies available to qui tam litigants under the FCA.

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Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure empowers a judge to determine an issue himself, rather than submitting it to the jury, when the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude to the contrary. When the judge's determination of the particular issue makes it impossible for the losing party to prevail in its overall claim or defense, the judge will enter a "judgment as a matter of law" against the party. Because such a judgment deprives the losing party of its constitutional right to a jury trial, the rules governing the exercise of Rule 50(a) power are very important. This case addresses a significant question about these rules: may a court of appeal review the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial, when a party loses a pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a), but then fails to renew the motion under Rule 50(b) after the jury has reached a verdict? The Supreme Court's resolution will greatly impact the speed and quality of review of trial court decisions by courts of appeal, as well as the power these courts possess to overturn improper verdicts.

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Francisco J. Espinosa filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and proposed in his Chapter 13 reorganization plan that he would repay $13,250 in student loans to United Student Aid Funds (“Funds”). Although Funds claimed they were owed an additional $4,582.15, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona confirmed Espinosa's plan as proposed, and Funds did not object to the confirmed plan. Espinosa repaid all debts according to the Chapter 13 plan. Funds subsequently began to intercept Espinosa's income tax refunds, claiming that Espinosa had improperly discharged his student loans, because Espinosa had not initiated a statutorily required adversary proceeding to determine whether repayment of the student loans would constitute an "undue hardship." While the U.S. District Court of Arizona held that Espinosa had violated Funds' due process interests by failing to initiate an adversary proceeding and serve a complaint and summons upon Funds according to the statutory procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, and Funds now appeals. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine how student loans and other debts are collected in bankruptcy and will affect the overall relationship between debtors and creditors in America.

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After Respondent Williams sent a hyperlink containing pornographic images of children to an Internet chat room dedicated to child pornography, he was prosecuted under the PROTECT ACT (18 U.S.C. � 2252A(a)(5)(B)) for "pandering" material in a manner intending to cause another to believe that the material contains child pornography. Williams pled guilty but reserved the right to challenge whether the PROTECT Act was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and thus interfered with First Amendment free speech. In particular, Williams argued that the statute criminalized speech about child pornography when the actual materials were not pornographic or did not exist. Williams further claimed that the statute similarly criminalized those who appear to be but are not actually discussing child pornography. The Eleventh Circuit Court held the PROTECT Act unconstitutional, and the United States government appealed. The United States argues that the PROTECT Act is neither overbroad nor vague because it only criminalizes speech which the First Amendment does not protect. It further claims that the statute requires intent and that the PROTECT Act is necessary to combat child pornography.

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The United States indicted Respondent Jason Tinklenberg for illegal possession of a handgun and materials used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, or “crystal meth.” On the last business day before his trial, Tinklenberg filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. The Speedy Trial Act requires certain federal criminal trials to begin within 70 days of the defendant’s first appearance before the court, unless certain “delays,” including the filing of pretrial motions, occur. The government argues that two of its pretrial motions qualify as excludable delays. Tinklenberg argues that because these pretrial motions did not result in a postponement of the trial date, the Speedy Trial Act does not exclude them from the 70-day count. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Tinklenberg, finding that 73 non-excludable days occurred before Tinklenberg’s scheduled trial date, and remanded the case to the lower court for dismissal. The Supreme Court's decision will settle which pretrial motions are excludable from the Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day count, and could affect the trial strategy of prosecutors and criminal defendants.

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In 2014, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a guidance policy granting temporary deportation protection to 4.3 million undocumented immigrants, called the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) program. In the same year, twenty-six states (the “states”) challenged the DAPA guidance. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide: (1) whether states have standing to challenge DAPA if it will increase the costs of state-subsidized benefits, such as driver’s licenses; and (2) whether DAPA is lawful under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution. The United States argues that the states do not have standing because the increased costs of state subsidized benefits are merely incidental effects of the guidance policy and are self-inflicted. Additionally, the United States argues that the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) gives the executive branch power to choose which immigrants to deport—a power exercised through the DAPA guidance policy. But the states assert that the United States cannot defeat standing by claiming that the costs are self-inflicting. Moreover, the states claim that the INA does not explicitly give the executive power to provide temporary protection from deportation. The Court’s decision could affect the status of and benefits available to undocumented immigrants and the scope of the president’s discretion when executing immigration law. 

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The United States prosecuted Robert J. Stevens (“Stevens”) for violating 18 U.S.C. § 48, which states: “Whoever knowingly creates, sells, or possesses a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.” Stevens was prosecuted for selling videos depicting dog fights. Stevens claimed that § 48 violates his First Amendment right to free speech and is therefore unconstitutional. The Third Circuit held that § 48 reached a form of protected speech and that the government’s interest in preventing animal cruelty is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify a ban on depictions of animal cruelty. How the Supreme Court decides this case will reflect its view on the scope of the First Amendment right to speech and affect the power of Congress to identify new areas of unprotected speech.

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