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This case will decide what unified standard public schools must provide students under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). IDEA requires schools in receipt of federal funds to provide an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) for each student with a disability. The IEP must comply with each student’s right to Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”). Should the school district fail to comply, parents are permitted to enroll their child into private school and seek reimbursement from the school district. Endrew F. argued that the Douglas County School District did not provide Endrew, a child with autism, the appropriate level of educational care because Endrew did not make any meaningful progress with his IEP. The Douglas County School District responded that Endrew’s receipt of some educational benefit was sufficient to satisfy the FAPE standard, and thus not a violation of the IDEA. The Supreme Court will likely resolve the Circuit conflict between the “meaningful educational benefit” standard adopted by some courts of appeals and the “merely more than de minimis” educational benefit standard that the Tenth Circuit maintained.

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Halliburton is accused of making misstatements about its financial position regarding asbestos litigation, a merger, and  costs-overruns  on fixed price contracts. As those misstatements came to light or were corrected, Halliburton’s stock price dropped. The Erica P. John Fund asserts that these misstatements defrauded Halliburton’s investors and seeks class certification to recover investors' losses from Halliburton. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that in order to be certified as a class, investors must not only demonstrate elements common to the  class,  but must also prove that the fraud actually caused the drop in stock value. Halliburton asserts that this is necessary  because,  unless the fraud actually caused the loss, no presumption of reliance on the misstatement can arise, and therefore the plaintiffs have failed to make the case for certification as a class. The Erica P. John Fund argues that the Fifth Circuit’s holding contradicts the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court  precedent,  and that requiring proof of loss causation undermines the values and goals of the reliance presumption. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will affect the ability of investors to pursue private securities actions against companies who misstate their financial positions.

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In 2000, the Environmental Protection Agency sued Duke Energy Corporation for making a number of upgrades to its power plants without filing for permits under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) program. The PSD program, which was added to the Clean Air Act in 1977, regulates “major modifications” to existing power plants. Duke Energy first argues that the 1971 New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”) provide a definition of “modification” that governs the PSD program; Duke then argues that the changes to its plants do not fall within the NSPS definition of “modification.” In 1980 the EPA promulgated regulations providing a more stringent definition of “modification,” and Environmental Defense, which has stepped in as a plaintiff in the case, maintains that this more stringent definition applies to the PSD. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with Duke Energy, holding that the NSPS definition of “modification” must be applied to the PSD program. The Supreme Court’s decision will affect how energy companies assess the costs of rebuilding or renovating older plants, and it could potentially lead environmentalists to push for more stringent standards for changes made to existing plants.

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Cooling water intake structures divert billions of gallons of water into coolant systems for industrial equipment and power generation. These systems can injure or kill billions of aquatic organisms, resulting in severe environmental impacts. Congress sought to remedy this problem through 33 U.S.C. §1326(b). The statute requires that “cooling water intake structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact.” The “best technology available” requirement is the heart of the dispute. In enforcing the statute, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) turned to a cost-benefit analysis. If the cost of a particular technology was not justified by a corresponding environmental benefit, the technology was not required. Environmental groups sued to require the EPA to employ a cost only analysis. This analysis requires the best technology a facility could afford, even if the environmental benefit generated was minimal. This case will affect the EPA’s method of regulating cooling water intake structures, potentially leading to greater costs for power plants and industry. Increased costs may disrupt the energy industry and potentially lead to greater costs for consumers.

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Under what is known as the class-of-one theory, an individual plaintiff can bring an Equal Protection claim against a state actor for "irrational and wholly arbitrary treatment." The person is a "class-of-one" when she alleges that the government is subjecting only her to differing and unique treatment compared to others similarly situated. This differs from a traditional Equal Protection claim, in which a person alleges discriminatory acts by the government against an entire group of people treated differently because of a protected characteristic like race. Anup Engquist brought such a claim against her employer, the Oregon Department of Agriculture, alleging that it arbitrarily failed to promote her to a position for which she was qualified, allowed a supervisor with whom she had an acrimonious relationship to harass and degrade her, and eventually laid her off. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in overturning the District Court that found in her favor on the Equal Protection claim, held that the class-of-one theory is inapplicable to decisions made by state employers with regard to their employment decisions. Engquist has appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that there is no basis in the Equal Protection Clause for a limitation on class-of-one claims in the employment context. The Oregon Department of Agriculture and the Ninth Circuit assert that class-of-one cases are appropriate when the government is acting as regulator, but not as employer.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether automotive “service advisors” qualify for the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (“FLSA”) mandatory overtime pay requirements. Encino Motorcars, LLC, a Mercedes-Benz dealership in California, contends that these employees are primarily “servicem[e]n . . . engaged in . . . servicing automobiles” and thus they are clearly captured within the law’s exceptions. Similarly, Encino argues that even if the statute is sufficiently ambiguous on the matter, the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the statute is unreasonable and unentitled to judicial deference. Hector Navarro and other employees assert that construing the statute’s exception to include service advisors would violate the text, spirit, and purpose of the FLSA. Relatedly, they maintain that the Department’s interpretation is entirely reasonable and thereby warrants deference from the Court. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case could affect the terms of employment between America’s 45,000 service advisors and their employers. 

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This case derives from a reimbursement action brought by Empire HealthChoice Assurance, a private healthcare provider, against a federal employee who received health care benefits under the terms of a contract brought into being by the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act. The District and Circuit courts held that federal law did not govern the action, and that the action should have been raised under state contract law in state court. The Supreme Court must now decide whether the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act creates a federal common law basis for Empire’s claim, and thus whether the federal courts have jurisdiction over cases brought to enforce provisions of contracts created under the Act.

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Elmer and Dorothy Cullers created the EC Term of Years Trust (“the Trust”) to reduce the impact of federal taxes on their estate. When the IRS claimed the Cullers had transferred property to the Trust to avoid paying taxes, the Trust opened a bank account to pay the back-taxes. The IRS levied on the account.  Afterwards , the Trust sought to recover the funds under 26 U.S.C. § 7426 (wrongful levy statute) and 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (tax refund statute). At  issue in this case  is whether 26 U.S.C. § 7426, with its shorter statute of limitations, is the exclusive remedy for wrongful levy actions by third parties, or whether third parties may alternatively seek relief under the more general tax refund provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1346, which has a longer statute of limitations. The Court’s  decision in this case  will determine whether wrongful levy claimants will have this longer statutory period during which to bring suit against the U.S. The Court’s decision will also implicitly give weight to particular methods of statutory interpretation and ways of determining congressional intent.

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In 2003, a jury found that eBay, an online auction website, was violating various patents owned by MercExchange. The district court nevertheless refused to issue a permanent injunction that would have barred eBay from continuing to use the patented methods. The Federal Circuit of Appeals granted the injunction against eBay and held that permanent injunctions were the “general rule” in patent infringement cases. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a patentee has an automatic right to a permanent injunction after a finding of infringement. If the Court upholds the “near-automatic injunction rule,” then patent holders will have a powerful remedy that can give them tremendous leverage in litigation. However, upholding the rule may also make it easier for “patent trolls” to continue benefiting from genuine innovators. If the Court instead finds that patent holders do not automatically have the right to an injunction, infringers will be able to continue using the patented product, thereby subverting the purposes of patent law. Not granting automatic injunctions may also encourage more patent infringement. How the Supreme Court decides the case will depend on its interpretation of important precedents and how it weighs these important social implications.

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In 2003, the Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania fired its police chief, Charles J. Guarnieri, Jr. Guarnieri filed a grievance leading to arbitration and his reinstatement. When Guarnieri returned to his position, Duryea issued him a number of directives limiting the tasks he could and could not do  on  the job. Guarnieri filed a second grievance, leading to modification of the directives. Subsequently, Guarnieri sued Duryea in District Court alleging that Duryea issued the directives in retaliation for his filing of the 2003 grievance, violating his First Amendment right to petition. After a jury found for Guarnieri in District Court, Duryea appealed to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit held that the First Amendment protects public employees in filing grievances concerning any matter, even those of a personal nature. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether public employees may sue their employers for  retaliation,  when the alleged retaliation is for the filing of grievances based on private matters rather than issues of public concern.

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