LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Company

Issues

Is a train that has made a temporary stop in a rail yard considered “in use” on a railroad’s line and subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act and its corresponding safety regulations?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a train that has stopped temporarily in a rail yard as part of its journey is considered “in use” on a railroad’s line and subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA) and other safety regulations. LeDure asserts that precedent cases under related legislation apply to the LIA and argues the term “use” encompasses locomotives, like UP5683, stopped en route to a destination, furthering the goal of the statutes to protect employees. Union Pacific counters that the precedent under similar statutes does not interpret “use” to encompass sidelined locomotives, and that the LIA contains unique aspects that limit the “use” of locomotives to their main purpose of actively hauling railcars. The outcome of this case has important implications for the safety and compensation of employees and the expectations of railroad operations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a locomotive is in use on a railroad’s line and subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act and its safety regulations when its train makes a temporary stop in a rail yard as part of its unitary journey in interstate commerce, or whether such use does not resume until the locomotive has left the yard as part of a fully assembled train, as held by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Court and other circuits.

Locomotive UP5683 was a component of a train that originated in Chicago, IL and terminated in Dexter, MO. Brief for Petitioner, Bradley LeDure at 7. UP5683 arrived in Salem, IL at 2:00 AM; before its scheduled departure of 3:00 AM, its crew needed to be replaced. Id. Petitioner Bradley LeDure (“LeDure”) was part of the replacement crew.

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Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon

Issues

Are airline cargo loaders and their supervisors, who load and unload goods from planes that cross international or interstate borders but do not physically transport such goods themselves, “transportation workers” who are exempt from arbitration under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court whether an airline ramp supervisor is exempt from arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Federal Arbitration Act codifies the federal policy for disputes to go through arbitration, exempting workers that engage in interstate commerce. Southwest Airlines argues that Saxon must resolve her dispute through arbitration because Saxon is not an exempt employee under the Act. Saxon argues that her work as a ramp supervisor includes loading and unloading cargo that travels interstate, so she is exempt from mandatory arbitration. The outcome of this case has implications for defining the limits of the Federal Arbitration Act and how courts define a worker operating in interstate commerce.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether workers who load or unload goods from vehicles that travel in interstate commerce, but do not physically transport such goods themselves, are interstate “transportation workers” exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act.

Latrice Saxon is a Southwest Airlines (“Southwest”) ramp supervisor that manages the loading and unloading of passenger luggage. Saxon v. Sw. Airlines Co. at 494. As a ramp supervisor, Saxon trains, supervises, and occasionally assists ramp agents with loading and unloading cargo. Id.

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ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd

Issues

Does 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which authorizes federal district courts to order discovery “for use in a foreign or international tribunal,” apply to foreign or international private commercial arbitral tribunals?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a private commercial arbitral tribunal is a “foreign or international tribunal” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1782, a federal law that governs international judicial assistance. International judicial assistance refers to aid provided by one sovereign government to another in judicial proceedings. In ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd, Petitioner ZF Automotive US, Inc. contends that, based on the plain meaning and legislative history of § 1782, it does not apply to private commercial arbitral tribunals located in foreign nations. Respondent Luxshare, Ltd. counters that the dictionary definitions and legal use of the terms “foreign” and “tribunal” show that the statute does apply to private commercial arbitration. In AlixPartners, LLC v. Fund for Protection of Investor Rights in Foreign States, Petitioner AlixPartners, LLC argues that its arbitral panel does not qualify under § 1782 simply due to the international nature of the parties or the dispute because that does not turn the panel itself into an “international tribunal.” Respondent Fund for Protection of Investors’ Rights in Foreign States counters that the arbitral panel does constitute an international tribunal because it is resolving a dispute over whether one country violated its obligations under a treaty. These cases implicate the fair and efficient resolution of arbitral disputes, party autonomy, and international comity.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd.

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which permits litigants to invoke the authority of United States courts to render assistance in gathering evidence for use in “a foreign or international tribunal,” encompasses private commercial arbitral tribunals, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 4th and 6th Circuits have held, or excludes such tribunals, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 5th and 7th Circuits have held.

AlixPartners, LLC v. Fund for Protection of Investor Rights in Foreign States

Whether the phrase “international tribunal” in 28 U.S.C. § 1782 excludes an international arbitral tribunal constituted pursuant to a treaty signed by two sovereign States and charged with the authority to adjudicate with finality whether one of the two sovereigns breached its obligations under the treaty.

ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Maggie Gardner for her guidance and insights into this case.

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Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.

Issues

Does a party waive its contractual right to arbitrate a claim whenever it engages in litigation proceedings on that claim or only when the opposing party is prejudiced by those litigation proceedings?

This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to assess whether arbitration clauses in contracts may be waived by entering litigation. The FAA provides standards that courts must apply when enforcing contractual agreements to arbitrate disputes. Robyn Morgan argues that the FAA requires courts to interpret arbitration agreements to be no less and no more enforceable than other contractual provisions. Therefore, Morgan contends that she does not need to show that she was prejudiced in order to establish that her employer, Sundance, Inc. (“Sundance”), waived an agreement to arbitrate. Sundance counters that the FAA merely provides minimum standards for arbitration clauses, and even if it did not, proving waiver in this instance requires a showing of prejudice. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for arbitration proceedings and employment contracts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the arbitration-specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violates the Supreme Court’s instruction in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion that lower courts must “place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts.”

Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925. Brief for Petitioner, Robyn Morgan at 5. The FAA’s purpose was to make arbitration agreements, previously disfavored in legal proceedings, as enforceable as other contracts. Id. at 6. To that end, Section 2 of the FAA explicitly states that agreements to arbitrate are valid and enforceable.

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Golan v. Saada

Issues

When the court is deciding to return a child to their habitual residence after the child was taken to the US against parental custody rights, should the court consider measures that may make the situation safer after a definitive finding that the child is at risk of grave danger if returned?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether, under the Hague Convention, a court may consider ameliorative measures, such as protective orders or custody determinations, to prevent grave danger to a child when ordering a child back to their home country. The Hague Convention requires that children abducted in violation of parental custody rights must be returned to their country of habitual residence. Narkis Golan, a United States citizen living in Italy, brought her Italian-born child to the United States, and did not return to Italy because she was a victim of domestic abuse by her Italian husband, Isaac Saada. Saada then sued Golan under the Hague Convention. Golan claims that her case falls under an exception within the Hague Convention that stops the return of the child if there is risk that the child will be in grave danger. While the lower court found sufficient ameliorative measures to prevent potential danger and granted Saada’s petition, Golan argues that the ameliorative measures are counter to the goals of the Hague Convention and should not be required or considered, especially where there is domestic violence. Saada responds that ameliorative rights must be considered to fairly assess the child’s return to their habitual residence. The outcome of this case could affect the safety of children, Hague Convention proceedings, and cooperation between foreign nations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, upon finding that return to the country of habitual residence places a child at grave risk, a district court is required to consider ameliorative measures that would facilitate the return of the child notwithstanding the grave risk finding.

In August 2015, Narkis Golan (“Golan”), a United States citizen, married Isacco Saada (“Saada”), an Italian citizen, in Milan, Italy. Saada v. Golan II, at 3. In June 2016, Golan gave birth to her and Saada’s son, B.A.S., in Milan. Saada v. Golan I, at 6. Saada physically and mentally abused Golan for most of their relationship. Id.

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Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP

Issues

Do state legislators authorized under North Carolina law have a right to intervene to defend the constitutionality of the state’s voter-ID law, even though the Attorney General is representing the state in the litigation; and, must state legislators make a showing of inadequate representation to intervene?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether state legislators have a right to intervene in a lawsuit filed against the state of North Carolina concerning the constitutionality of the state’s voter-ID law when the Attorney General is already representing the state in the matter. Petitioners Philip E. Berger, President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate and Timothy K. Moore, Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives argue that Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) and North Carolina law grant state legislators the right to intervene on behalf of the state in judicial proceedings. Petitioners further maintain that Rule 24 only requires state agents to establish a minimum standard of inadequate representation to intervene in litigation involving their state’s interests. Respondents North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP and other North Carolina NAACP branches counter that Rule 24(a)(2) does not allow an additional party to join the case when its interests are identical to the existing party’s interests. Moreover, the Respondents argue that state legislators need to demonstrate a higher standard of inadequacy to show that the Attorney General is inadequately representing the state to join the case. The outcome of this case has important implications for the role of state governments in litigation, future parties that are or will be engaged in litigation with the states, and the judiciary.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether a state agent authorized by state law to defend the State’s interest in litigation must overcome a presumption of adequate representation to intervene as of right in a case in which a state official is a defendant?

2. Whether a district court’s determination of adequate representation in ruling on a motion to intervene as of right is reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion?

3. Whether petitioners Philip Berger, the president pro tempore of the state senate, and Timothy Moore, the speaker of the state house of representatives, are entitled to intervene as of right in this litigation?

In 2018, North Carolina passed Senate Bill 824 (“the Bill”), which required voters to “present one of ten forms of authorized photographic identification” in order to vote. N. Carolina State Conf. of NAACP v.

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West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency

Issues

Under a provision of the Clean Air Act, did Congress prohibit the EPA from issuing rules and standards of performance that could potentially reshape the country's electricity grids and unilaterally decarbonize any sector of the economy?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the statutory limitations imposed on the Environmental Protection Agency by the Clean Air Act when it attempts to regulate emissions emanating from stationary sources. Petitioner West Virginia argues that the Court should not allow the EPA to issue significant rules that can reshape the country’s electricity grids and thus expand the agency’s power to an unprecedented level. Respondent the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) responds that the Court should not read into the text an artificial restriction because any qualification will be directed at the states, not the federal agency. The Court’s decision in this case has heavy implications for the scope of federal administrative power, climate change policy, and statutory interpretation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, in 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d), an ancillary provision of the Clean Air Act, Congress constitutionally authorized the Environmental Protection Agency to issue significant rules — including those capable of reshaping the nation’s electricity grids and unilaterally decarbonizing virtually any sector of the economy — without any limits on what the agency can require so long as it considers cost, nonair impacts and energy requirements.

In 1963 Congress passed the Clean Air Act, which aimed to “protect and enhance” the quality of our air. Am. Lung Ass'n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency at 930. In 1970, Congress amended the Clean Air Act and granted the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) additional powers to regulate any “new and existing” sources of air pollution originating from stationary sources. Id.

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Ruan v. United States

Issues

Does a doctor who prescribed controlled substances outside of the usual standard of medical care violate federal drug distribution laws if the doctor believed in good faith that he was adhering to standard medical practice?

 

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the requirements for criminal conviction under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1). Two physicians, Petitioners Xiulu Ruan and Shakeel Kahn, were convicted of violating the CSA by prescribing medication without legitimate medical purposes. Both physicians brought good-faith defenses, arguing that they did not intentionally or knowingly violate the CSA. The physicians claim that a subjective lack of knowledge or intent is sufficient to maintain innocence under the CSA. At trial, juries were instructed to find the physicians innocent only if the physicians reasonably believed they were in compliance with the law. Respondent United States claims this objective standard is the correct reading of the statute, and Ruan and Kahn claim the objective standard creates an impermissibly low standard for conviction. This case has important implications for the future of medical practice, medical research, and mens rea requirements in criminal law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a physician alleged to have prescribed controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice may be convicted of unlawful distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) without regard to whether, in good faith, he “reasonably believed” or “subjectively intended” that his prescriptions fall within that course of professional practice

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Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan v. DaVita, Inc.

Issues

Does a health insurance plan’s uniform classification of all dialysis providers as “out-of-network” violate the Medicare Secondary Payer Act by “tak[ing] into account” Medicare-eligibility of end-stage renal disease patients or “differentiat[ing]” in benefits eligible to Medicare-eligible end-stage renal disease patients?


This case asks the Supreme Court to decide what type of dialysis-reimbursement schemes are acceptable for group health plans considering that end-stage renal disease (“ESRD”) patients are eligible for Medicare. The Medicare Secondary Payer Act (“MSPA”) prohibits health plans from “tak[ing] into account” Medicare eligibility of ESRD patients and “differentiat[ing]” in benefits provided to Medicare-eligible ESRD patients. Marietta contends that its plan did not violate the “take into account” or “differentiation” provisions of the MSPA because the dialysis reimbursement applies equally to dialysis patients with and without ESRD and because the purpose of the MSPA is coordination-of-benefits for ESRD patients rather than anti-discrimination. DaVita counters that the design of Marietta’s plan is intended to induce ESRD-patient members to drop the Plan in favor of Medicare, and that the plan design differentiates based on the disparate impact that ESRD patients face when seeking dialysis reimbursement. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for ESRD access to care, dialysis-treatment reimbursement, and health insurance plan structuring.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether a group health plan that provides uniform reimbursement of all dialysis treatments observe the prohibition provided by the Medicare Secondary Payer Act that group health plans may not “take into account” the fact that a plan participant with end stage renal disease is eligible for Medicare benefits; (2) whether a plan that provides the same dialysis benefits to all plan participants, and reimburses dialysis providers uniformly regardless of whether the patient has end stage renal disease, observe the prohibition under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act that a group health plan also may not “differentiate” between individuals with end stage renal disease and others “in the benefits it provides”; and (3) whether the Medicare Secondary Payer Act is a coordination-of-benefits measure designed to protect Medicare, not an antidiscrimination law designed to protect certain providers from alleged disparate impact of uniform treatment.

DaVita and its subsidiary DVA Renal Healthcare (collectively “DaVita”) are well-known healthcare providers specializing in kidney care. DaVita, Inc. v. Marietta Mem. Hosp. at 2.

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Egbert v. Boule

Issues

Does a plaintiff have a Bivens implied right of action against a federal officer under either the First Amendment or under the Fourth Amendment when the officer is engaged in immigration enforcement functions?


This case asks the Supreme Court to consider extending the implied right of action from Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents to a situation involving a federal officer carrying out immigration enforcement functions. In Bivens, the Court recognized a limited federal cause of action for damages when federal officers, acting under color of federal authority, violate an individual’s constitutional rights. Currently, the Court recognizes Bivens actions for Fourth Amendment violations committed by law enforcement officers, as well as violations of rights secured by the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. Erik Egbert argues that extending Bivens to encompass First Amendment retaliation claims and Fourth Amendment claims involving immigration enforcement officials is unwarranted. Robert Boule counters that extending Bivens to his two claims ensures that individuals are provided with a constitutional remedy when federal officers violate fundamental rights. This case has significant implications for civil rights, separation of powers, and questions related to judicial overreach in matters involving alleged constitutional violations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1) Whether a cause of action exists under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics for First Amendment retaliation claims; and (2) whether a cause of action exists under Bivens for claims against federal officers engaged in immigration-related functions for allegedly violating a plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Robert Boule is the owner of a bed and breakfast in Blaine, Washington. Boule v. Egbert at 1312. Boule’s property directly adjoins the United States-Canada border. Id. In March 2014, Boule encountered Erik Egbert, a Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) agent. Id. Egbert asked Boule about guests staying at Boule’s inn.

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