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Edwards v. Vannoy

Issues

Does the right to a unanimous jury verdict in state criminal court, decided in Ramos v. Louisiana, apply retroactively?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Ramos v. Louisiana, which held that a criminal defendant charged in state court can only be convicted by a unanimous jury, applies retroactively to cases that were finalized before Ramos was decided. Petitioner Thedrick Edwards was convicted under Louisiana’s nonunanimous jury rule and contends that Ramos recognized an ancient guarantee of criminal procedure that should be given retroactive effect under Teague v. Lane. Alternatively, Edwards asserts that Ramos enunciated a new watershed rule that must be applied retroactively because of the importance of juror unanimity to ensure accurate convictions. In response, Respondent Darrel Vannoy, the Warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary, argues that Ramos overruled Apodaca v. Oregon and announced a new rule that significantly changes criminal proceedings in states that allowed conviction by nonunanimous juries. Additionally, Vannoy claims that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1966 independently bars the retroactive application of Ramos. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for individuals seeking retrial for guilty verdicts decided by nonunanimous juries.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ___ (2020), applies retroactively to cases on federal collateral review.

Ryan Eaton drove to his girlfriend’s apartment near Louisiana State University on May 13, 2006, around 11:30 P.M. Edwards v. Cain, Report and Recommendation at 3. As Eaton exited the vehicle, two armed assailants abducted him and took him to the ATM to withdraw cash, then to Eaton’s apartment to steal some personal property, and then to Eaton’s girlfriend’s apartment where the assailants raped two women at gun point. Id. at 4.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John Blume for his guidance and insights into this case.

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DOJ v. House Committee on the Judiciary

Issues

In conducting an impeachment investigation and trial, does the House Committee on the Judiciary act in the same role as an ordinary court that oversees litigation between parties? 

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether an impeachment trial before a legislative body qualifies as a “judicial proceeding” under Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Department of Justice (DOJ) argues that an impeachment inquiry is not a judicial proceeding, and therefore, President Trump’s impeachment trial is not subject to the exception to grand-jury secrecy for judicial proceedings and can remain redacted. The House Committee on the Judiciary counters that the Committee plays the same role during its impeachment inquiry as an ordinary court that oversees litigation between parties, and therefore, the impeachment inquiry is a judicial proceeding. As such, the House Committee demands access to unredacted transcripts and all other documents that special counsel Robert Mueller’s grand jury considered. The outcome of this case determines whether House Democrats can gain access to Mueller’s report on President Trump’s alleged interference with Mueller’s investigation as part of their ongoing impeachment inquiry and the extent of the House Committees’ access to information in future impeachment inquiries. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an impeachment trial before a legislative body is a “judicial proceeding” under Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In May 2017, an investigation was conducted to determine whether members of President Trump’s election campaign had cooperated with the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 presidential election. In re Comm. on Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice (“In re Comm.

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CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Service

Issues

Does the Anti-Injunction Act bar pre-enforcement challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act to newly promulgated agency guidelines that include discretionary tax-penalty enforcement provisions, or is the act narrowly confined to direct tax assessments and collections?

This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret the Anti-Injunction Act and to determine whether it bars pre-enforcement legal challenges to agency guidelines and regulations that incorporate a tax-penalty enforcement mechanism into the framework. CIC Services argues that the Supreme Court should construe the Administrative Procedure Act’s review provisions broadly enough and the Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibitory provisions narrowly enough to provide material tax advisors relief from the Internal Revenue Service’s new interpretative guidelines concerning reportable transactions. The Internal Revenue Service counters that the Anti-Injunction Act applies to CIC’s challenge so the lawsuit is barred and that none of the available exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act’s provisions apply to CIC’s sought injunction. This case has important implications for corporations whose business involves reporting earnings to the Internal Revenue Service, as well as for federal agencies’ abilities to avoid lawsuits by tying in certain tax-penalty provisions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Anti-Injunction Act’s bar on lawsuits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of taxes also bars challenges to unlawful regulatory mandates issued by administrative agencies that are not taxes.

The Internal Revenue Service has the authority to require taxpayers and some third parties to submit certain records about “reportable transactions.” CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Serv. at 249. The Internal Revenue Service also defines what constitutes a reportable transaction.

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Brownback v. King

Issues

Does a judgment in favor of the United States on state law tort claims brought under Section 1346(b)(1) of the Federal Tort Claims Act necessarily preclude a plaintiff from seeking recourse under Bivens for a civil rights violation stemming from the same underlying factual allegations?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a judgment against the plaintiff on a Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) claim, alleging violations under state tort law, bars the plaintiff from pursuing a constitutional remedy under Bivens. Petitioner Douglas Brownback contends that the district court’s dismissal of Respondent James King’s FTCA claims on the basis of his failure to establish the elements of Section 1346(b) constitutes a final judgment on the merits of all claims pertaining to the same subject matter. Brownback argues that consistent with the purpose of the statute, Section 2676 of the FTCA bars King from pursuing his Bivens action. King counters that the judgment bar should be interpreted to incorporate the doctrine of res judicata, which precludes subsequent claims only if a court with jurisdiction has entered a judgment on the merits. King argues that since no such jurisdiction exists over the claims in this case, his Bivens action should not be barred. The outcome of this case has significant implications for plaintiffs’ access to courts and the avenues for relief plaintiffs may pursue to hold government officials accountable for state tort and constitutional violations.    

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a final judgment in favor of the United States in an action brought under Section 1346(b)(1) of the Federal Tort Claims Act, on the ground that a private person would not be liable to the claimant under state tort law for the injuries alleged, bars a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics that is brought by the same claimant, based on the same injuries, and against the same governmental employees whose acts gave rise to the claimant’s FTCA claim.

On July 18, 2014, Officer Ted Allen, a detective with the Grand Rapids Police, and Agent Douglas Brownback, a special agent with the FBI, participated in a joint fugitive task force in search of a criminal suspect pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the State of Michigan. King v.

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California v. Texas

Issues

Do the individual and state plaintiffs have standing to challenge the amended individual mandate provision of the ACA; and, if they do, is the provision unconstitutional because Congress reduced the penalty for non-compliance with the provision to zero; and, finally, if the provision is unconstitutional, can it be severed from the rest of the ACA?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the status of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) after Congress amended the ACA’s individual mandate in 2017. When Congress enacted the ACA in 2010, the individual mandate required individuals to maintain health insurance or pay a penalty. In 2012, the Court upheld the individual mandate as a valid exercise of Congress’s Taxing Power. In 2017, as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Congress lowered the individual mandate’s penalty for failing to maintain health insurance to zero dollars. Texas contends that by setting the penalty for non-compliance to zero dollars, Congress rendered the individual mandate unconstitutional because it no longer is a valid exercise of Congress’s Taxing Power. Texas further argues that the individual mandate is not severable from the rest of the ACA, requiring the Supreme Court to strike down the entirety of the ACA. California disputes this. As a threshold matter, California contends that the opposing parties do not have standing to bring this claim because they have not been injured by the penalty of zero dollars. But even if they have standing, California argues that the individual mandate is constitutional. Finally, if it is not constitutional, California contends that the individual mandate can be severed from the rest of the ACA. This case, and the viability of the ACA, has drastic policy implications for the millions of Americans who rely on the ACA for their health insurance.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the individual and state plaintiffs in this case have established Article III standing to challenge the minimum-coverage provision in Section 5000A(a) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA); (2) whether reducing the amount specified in Section 5000A(c) to zero rendered the minimum-coverage provision unconstitutional; and (3) if so, whether the minimum-coverage provision is severable from the rest of the ACA.

In March 2010, President Obama signed the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) into law. Texas v. United States at 2. The ACA’s proponents hoped to expand healthcare coverage while offsetting the costs of rising health insurance premiums.

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Niz-Chavez v. Barr

Issues

Must the government serve a “notice to appear” as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), providing a noncitizen in removal proceedings with the required information about the proceedings, in a single document?

A notice to appear in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) triggers a stop-time rule that prevents noncitizens from accruing uninterrupted time spent in the United States—ten years of which makes a noncitizen eligible to cancel removal. The issue presented to the Supreme Court is whether the information required for a notice to appear must be included in a single document or whether it may be included in multiple documents. Agusto Niz-Chavez argues that the text and purpose of Section 1229(a) indicates that the required information must be included in a single notice and that the Court should not defer to the Board of Immigration Appeal’s (“Board”) interpretation of the statute. In contrast, Attorney General William Barr argues that the text and purpose of Section 1229(a) permits the government to issue notices to noncitizens across multiple documents and the Court should grant the Board deference. The outcome of this case has important implications for the procedural due process rights of immigrants subject to removal proceedings and the administrative burden of those proceedings on immigration courts and other government agencies.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, to serve notice in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) and trigger the stop-time rule, the government must serve a specific document that includes all the information identified in Section 1229(a), or whether the government can serve that information over the course of as many documents and as much time as it chooses.

8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) requires that noncitizens in removal proceedings be served with a notice to appear. Pereira v. Sessions at 2109.

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Borden v. United States

Issues

Does classifying a crime committed with a mental state of recklessness as a violent felony expand the reach of the Armed Criminal Career Act beyond its intended purpose?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 includes crimes in which an individual used force recklessly. Petitioner Charles Borden asserts that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit incorrectly held that committing a crime with a mens rea of recklessness constitutes a violent felony because the mental state of recklessness does not include the intention or knowledge that would satisfy the requirement of using force “against the person of another.” Respondent United States counters that a mens rea of recklessness satisfies the element because the focus is on the “use” of the physical force, which does not discern between mental states. The outcome of this case has important implications for criminal procedure, due process rights, and the necessary interpretation of the text of the ACCA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act encompasses crimes with a mens rea of mere recklessness.

In the course of a traffic stop in April 2017, police found Petitioner Charles Borden in possession of a pistol. United States v. Borden at 266.

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Emma Cueto, 5 Supreme Court Access To Justice Cases To Watch, Law360 (Oct. 4, 2020).

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Fulton v. City of Philadelphia

Issues

Under the First Amendment, can a city prevent a private foster care agency from participating in the city’s foster care system because that agency refuses to agree to a non-discrimination policy that requires it to consider potential same-sex or unmarried foster parents?

This case asks the Court to balance First Amendment rights with the government’s interest in promoting equality. Petitioner Catholic Social Services (“CSS”) contracted with Respondent City of Philadelphia (“the City”) to provide foster care and choose foster parents for the City’s youth; however, CSS objected to the inclusion of a non-discrimination clause in its contract that required it to consider LGBT+ individuals as foster parents. CSS argues that the City’s non-discrimination clause specifically targets it as a Catholic organization, thereby infringing upon its religious beliefs under the Free Exercise Clause and compelling it to endorse LGBT+ relationships in contravention of the Free Speech Clause. The City counters that the non-discrimination clause is a policy that applies to all contractors who undertake governmental work, and that CSS cannot claim to use religious freedom to undermine the City’s strong interest in preventing discrimination. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will implicate laws impacting religious freedom, LGBT+ issues, and equal protection.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether free exercise plaintiffs can only succeed by proving a particular type of discrimination claim—namely that the government would allow the same conduct by someone who held different religious views—as two circuits have held, or whether courts must consider other evidence that a law is not neutral and generally applicable, as six circuits have held;

(2) whether Employment Division v. Smith should be revisited; and

(3) whether the government violates the First Amendment by conditioning a religious agency’s ability to participate in the foster care system on taking actions and making statements that directly contradict the agency’s religious beliefs.

Catholic Social Services (“CSS”) was established in 1797 in Philadelphia (“the City”), Pennsylvania as a religious non-profit foster care service. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia at 12. Although affiliated with the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, CSS is regulated both by the state of Pennsylvania and the City. Id. at 12–13.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Nelson Tebbe for his insights into this case.

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U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club

Issues

Does the deliberative process privilege exemption under the Freedom of Information Act protect a federal agency’s draft documents from disclosure when those documents were created for an interagency consultation and ultimately altered an agency’s decision-making process and subsequent agency action?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the deliberative process privilege under Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act protects interagency draft documents. The documents in question are draft biological jeopardy opinions produced by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service pursuant to Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act during an environmental consultation with the Environmental Protection Agency regarding a proposed agency regulation. The Sierra Club contends that the requested documents do not fall within the scope of the deliberative process privilege exemption because the jeopardy decision within the draft opinion was final, not tentative, and the documents shaped later agency decisions by requiring the Environmental Protection Agency to discontinue, modify, or seek an exemption for its proposed action. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service argue that the requested documents fall within the scope of the deliberative process privilege exemption because the exemption aims to encourage effective governmental decision-making and must protect inter-agency documents and memoranda that have not been adopted as final to further this goal. By granting certiorari in this case, the Supreme Court will determine the extent to which government agencies can invoke the deliberative process privilege and the correlative scope of the public’s right of access to information under the Freedom of Information Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act, by incorporating the deliberative process privilege, protects against compelled disclosure of a federal agency’s draft documents that were prepared as part of a formal interagency consultation process under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and that concerned a proposed agency action that was later modified in the consultation process.

In 2012 and 2013, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) consulted with the U.S.

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Jones v. Mississippi

Issues

Does the Eighth Amendment require a factual finding that a juvenile defendant is incorrigible before the juvenile defendant can be sentenced to life without parole?

This case asks the Court to decide whether a state may impose a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile who is found guilty of murder without first finding that the juvenile is permanently incorrigible. Petitioner Brett Jones contends that the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on cruel and unusual punishment categorically prohibits a life sentence without parole for a juvenile offender who is not permanently incorrigible and requires courts to make a factual finding on incorrigibility. Respondent Mississippi counters that the Eighth Amendment imposes no such requirement, claiming that the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence only forbids states from imposing mandatory life without parole sentences on juvenile offenders. The outcome of this case has significant policy implications because it raises concerns of federalism, transparency in sentencing procedures, and impact on victims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Eighth Amendment requires the sentencing authority to make a finding that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without parole.

In August, 2004, Petitioner Brett Jones ("Jones") lived with his grandparents, Bertis and Madge Jones in Lee County, Mississippi. Jones v. State at 3–4. At the time, Jones was fifteen years old and legally a minor in the state of Mississippi. Id. at 13. On August 9, 2004, Jones had an argument with his grandfather. Id. at 4. Jones claims that during the argument, his grandfather pushed him and he pushed his grandfather back.

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